BARBARA A. McAULIFFE, Magistrate Judge.
COMES NOW, Defendant, Pedro Ferrell, by and through his attorney of record, Monica L. Bermudez and The United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, Melanie Alsworth, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 28, 2019 at 1:00 p.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. Counsel for Mr. Ferrell was appointed this matter on January 15, 2019.
b. Counsel for defendant is currently engaged in trial in Kern County in the case of People v. Alejandro Gonzalez BF171143A and BF170046A. This trial is anticipated to end around January 30, 2019.
c. Counsel is still awaiting discovery in this case and requires time to review the discovery along with meet with Mr. Ferrell to discuss the case and conduct any necessary investigation.
d. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
e. The government does not object to, and agrees with, the requested continuance.
f. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of the date of this stipulation to March 25, 2019, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i), (ii) and (iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED that 1
IT IS SO ORDERED.