ORDER
DEBORAH BARNES, Magistrate Judge.
This social security action was submitted to the court without oral argument for ruling on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment.1 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's treatment of the medical opinion evidence constituted error. For the reasons explained below, plaintiff's motion is granted, the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 30, 2014, plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act ("the Act") alleging disability beginning on August 1, 2013. (Transcript ("Tr.") at 26, 156-65.) Plaintiff's alleged impairments included mood disorder and dysthymia. (Id. at 73.) Plaintiff's application was denied initially, (id. at 95-99), and upon reconsideration. (Id. at 103-07.)
Thereafter, plaintiff requested a hearing which was held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on March 31, 2016. (Id. at 39-71.) Plaintiff was represented by an attorney and testified at the administrative hearing. (Id. at 39-41.) In a decision issued on April 26, 2016, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at 35.) The ALJ entered the following findings:
1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 30, 2014, the application date (20 CFR 416.971 et seq.).
2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: personality disorder; depression; and bipolar disorder (20 CFR 416.920(c)).
3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
4. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations; capable of simple routine tasks not at a production rate pace, but still capable of meeting end of day goals; capable of occasional superficial interactions with public and superficial interactions with coworkers.
5. The claimant has no past relevant work (20 CFR 416.965).
6. The claimant was born on June 29, 1992 and was 21 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.963).
7. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English (20 CFR 416.964).
8. Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant does not have past relevant work (20 CFR 416.968).
9. Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 416.969 and 416.969(a)).
10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since April 30, 2014, the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.920(g)).
(Id. at 28-35.)
On October 16, 2017, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's April 26, 2016 decision. (Id. at 1-7.) Plaintiff sought judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) by filing the complaint in this action on November 22, 2017. (ECF No. 1.)
LEGAL STANDARD
"The district court reviews the Commissioner's final decision for substantial evidence, and the Commissioner's decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error." Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001); Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997).
"[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a `specific quantum of supporting evidence.'" Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989)). If, however, "the record considered as a whole can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the Commissioner's decision, we must affirm." McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002).
A five-step evaluation process is used to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). The five-step process has been summarized as follows:
Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.
Step two: Does the claimant have a "severe" impairment? If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is appropriate.
Step three: Does the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claimant is automatically determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four.
Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.
Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.
Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).
The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation process. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 (1987). The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.; Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999).
APPLICATION
Plaintiff's pending motion argues that the ALJ's treatment of the medical opinion evidence constituted error. (Pl.'s MSJ (ECF No. 13) at 6-10.2) The weight to be given to medical opinions in Social Security disability cases depends in part on whether the opinions are proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining health professionals. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830; Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989). "As a general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating source than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant . . . ." Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. This is so because a treating doctor is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996); Bates v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 1990).
The uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining physician may be rejected only for clear and convincing reasons, while the opinion of a treating or examining physician that is controverted by another doctor may be rejected only for specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. "The opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining physician or a treating physician." (Id. at 831.) Finally, although a treating physician's opinion is generally entitled to significant weight, "`[t]he ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.'" Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009)).
Here, plaintiff notes that on July 16, 2014, non-examining physician Dr. Larry Kravitz opined that plaintiff's "irritability and low frustration tolerance would limit her to only brief and superficial workplace contacts, with no overly close supervision or working in close proximity to others." (Tr. at 79) (emphasis added). The ALJ's decision does not discuss Dr. Kravitz's opinion, nor does the ALJ's residual functional capacity determination ("RFC") explicitly limit plaintiff to no overly close supervision or working in close proximity to others.
Moreover, the ALJ's decision purported to afford "great weight" to the opinion of Dr. Randall Garland, also a non-examining physician. (Id. at 33.) Dr. Garland, however, also opined that plaintiff was limited to "no overly close supervision or working in close proximity to others." (Id. at 90.) The ALJ's decision does not discuss this aspect of Dr. Garland's opinion.
A claimant's RFC is "the most [the claimant] can still do despite [his or her] limitations." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(1); see also Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, n.5 (9th Cir. 1989) ("A claimant's residual functional capacity is what he can still do despite his physical, mental, nonexertional, and other limitations."). In conducting an RFC assessment, the ALJ must consider the combined effects of an applicant's medically determinable impairments on the applicant's ability to perform sustainable work. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B); Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 1996).
The ALJ must consider all of the relevant medical opinions as well as the combined effects of all of the plaintiff's impairments, even those that are not "severe." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a); 416.945(a); Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003). "[A]n RFC that fails to take into account a claimant's limitations is defective." Valentine v. Commissioner Social Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). The ALJ must determine a claimant's limitations on the basis of "all relevant evidence in the record." Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006).
Here, it is not clear that the ALJ considered all relevant medical opinions in formulating plaintiff's RFC. Moreover, the ALJ's determination that there were jobs existing in significant numbers that the claimant could perform was based on testimony from a Vocational Expert ("VE"). (Tr. at 35.) The VE identified three specific jobs and the ALJ's decision found that plaintiff "would be able to perform the requirements" of those three occupations. (Id. at 35.) However, the VE testified that those three jobs required working in close proximity to coworkers.3 (Id. at 69.) Thus, the court cannot conclude that the ALJ's error was harmless.
For the reasons stated above, the court finds that the ALJ failed to consider all relevant medical opinions in formulating plaintiff's RFC. Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on the claim that the ALJ's treatment of the medical opinion evidence constituted error.
CONCLUSION
After having found error, "`[t]he decision whether to remand a case for additional evidence, or simply to award benefits[,] is within the discretion of the court.'" Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 682 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987)). A case may be remanded under the "credit-as-true" rule for an award of benefits where:
(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand.
Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014). Even where all the conditions for the "credit-as-true" rule are met, the court retains "flexibility to remand for further proceedings when the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act." Id. at 1021; see also Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) ("Unless the district court concludes that further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it may not remand with a direction to provide benefits."); Treichler v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014) ("Where . . . an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is uncertain and ambiguous, the proper approach is to remand the case to the agency.").
Here, plaintiff argues that this matter should be remanded for further proceedings and the court agrees. (Pl.'s MSJ (ECF No. 13) at 10.)
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 13) is granted;
2. Defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 14) is denied;
3. The Commissioner's decision is reversed;
4. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order; and
5. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment for plaintiff, and close this case.
