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U.S. v. Chi Meng Yang, 2:17-CR-0169 GEB. (2019)

Court: District Court, E.D. California Number: infdco20190408a44 Visitors: 15
Filed: Apr. 05, 2019
Latest Update: Apr. 05, 2019
Summary: STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED ORDER] SETTING DATES FOR TRIAL AND A TRIAL CONFIRMATION HEARING GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR. , Senior District Judge . Defendant Gaosheng Laitinen, through her counsel of record, Katryna Lyn Spearman, the United States of America, through its counsels of record, McGregor W. Scott, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of California, and Michael M. Beckworth, Assistant United States Attorney, defendant Chi Meng Yang, through his counsel of record, Douglas J. Be
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STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED ORDER] SETTING DATES FOR TRIAL AND A TRIAL CONFIRMATION HEARING

Defendant Gaosheng Laitinen, through her counsel of record, Katryna Lyn Spearman, the United States of America, through its counsels of record, McGregor W. Scott, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of California, and Michael M. Beckworth, Assistant United States Attorney, defendant Chi Meng Yang, through his counsel of record, Douglas J. Beevers, hereby stipulate and agree that the trial confirmation hearing in this case will be set for June 14, 2019, and the trial date be set for August 27, 2019 at 9:00 am. The parties further stipulate that the time from March 22, 2019, through August 27, 2019, be excluded from the calculation of time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161.

The parties submit that the ends of justice are served by the Court excluding such time so that counsel for each defendant may have reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercises of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), (B)(iv) [Local Code T4].

The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court to find the following:

a. The government has provided approximately 40 discs of discovery, and additional discovery related phones searched pursuant to federal search warrants is expected in the near future. b. Counsel for defendants, particularly counsel for defendant Laitinen, who joined the case on or about November 16, 2018, desire additional time to complete the review of discovery, to conduct defense investigation, and to discuss the case with their clients. Counsel for Ms. Laitinen would also like additional time to discuss potential resolution with the government. c. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested scheduling would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, considering he exercise of due diligence. d. The government does not object to the continuance. e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweighs the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. f. For computing time under the Speedy Trial act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time from March 22, 2019, through August 27, 2019, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a scheduling order granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. g. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence. h. The parties stipulate and agree that the interests of justice served by granting this continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, the Court, having received, read, and considered the parties' stipulation, and good cause appearing therefrom, adopts the parties' stipulation in its entirety as its order. The Court specifically finds the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

Source:  Leagle

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