Filed: Apr. 17, 2019
Latest Update: Apr. 17, 2019
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER DALE A. DROZD , District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. This matter was originally set for change of plea on April 15, 2019. 2. At the April 15, 2019 hearing, the defendant and the government agreed to continue the matter to May 20, 2019. The gove
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER DALE A. DROZD , District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. This matter was originally set for change of plea on April 15, 2019. 2. At the April 15, 2019 hearing, the defendant and the government agreed to continue the matter to May 20, 2019. The gover..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
DALE A. DROZD, District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. This matter was originally set for change of plea on April 15, 2019.
2. At the April 15, 2019 hearing, the defendant and the government agreed to continue the matter to May 20, 2019. The government and the defense agree to exclude time between April 15, 2019, and May 20, 2019, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that all of the discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client and to discuss potential resolutions with his client.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 15, 2019 to May 20, 2019, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4], the time period of April 15, 2019 to May 20, 2019 is excluded.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
