STIPULATION AND ORDER TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE AND TO EXCLUDE TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

DALE A. DROZD, District Judge.

STIPULATION

The United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous Order of the Court, the trial of this case was set for May 21, 2019 at 1:00 p.m., with time excluded under 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., of the Speedy Trial Act.

2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the trial until November 5, 2019 at 8:30 a.m., and to exclude time between the date of this stipulation and November 5, 2019 under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv). The government does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. Counsel for defendant Expose was in trial in Department 70 of the Fresno County Superior Court involving allegations of Attempted Murder from February 28, 2019 to March 20, 2019 in the Bernardo Madueno (F16902078) matter. Defense Counsel is currently in a second high profile jury trial, Joaquin Arambula (M19913880), in Department 74 of the Fresno County Superior Court. Defense counsel's second trial was scheduled on an expedited basis. Due to defense counsel's trial schedule, defense requests additional time to prepare for trial in the instant case. For example, the government recently produced supplemental discovery, in part generated by witness interviews for trial preparation. The defense has not been able to review these materials due to his impacted trial schedule.

b. Due to other scheduling conflicts of defense counsel, government counsel and the Court, the next earliest convenient trial date for all parties is November 5, 2019.

c. Counsel for the parties agree that the ends of justice served by continuing the trial as set forth above outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial, including by providing for continuity of counsel, and reasonable time necessary for effective trial preparation.

d. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

e. The government does not object to, and stipulates to, the requested continuance.

f. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of the date of this stipulation to November 5, 2019, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

The trial confirmation hearing is continued to October 21, 2019 and jury trial is continued to November 5, 2019. The time period of the date of this order to November 5, 2019, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.