Filed: May 01, 2019
Latest Update: May 01, 2019
Summary: STIPULATION CONTINUING STATUS CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR. , Senior District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 3, 2019 and time excluded to May 3, 2019. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until July 26, 2019, and to exclude time between May 3, 2019, and July 26, 2019, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and
Summary: STIPULATION CONTINUING STATUS CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR. , Senior District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 3, 2019 and time excluded to May 3, 2019. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until July 26, 2019, and to exclude time between May 3, 2019, and July 26, 2019, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and s..
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STIPULATION CONTINUING STATUS CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR., Senior District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 3, 2019 and time excluded to May 3, 2019.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until July 26, 2019, and to exclude time between May 3, 2019, and July 26, 2019, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) Both parties are investigating facts that may materially affect sentencing.
b) Counsel for defendants after consultation with their clients, are requesting additional time to review discovery, investigate, consult with their clients, and discuss developments with their clients.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) Counsel for all defendants must use the services of Mandarin, Cantonese, or other dialects of Chinese interpreters to interpret and explain court filings, discovery, and correspondence from the government to their clients.
e) The government does not object to the continuance.
f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 3, 2019 to July 26, 2019, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
McGREGOR W. SCOTT
United States Attorney
ROGER YANG
Assistant United States Attorney
Dated: May 1, 2019
ROBERT M. HOLLEY
Counsel for Defendant
Richard Phung
Dated: May 1, 2019
JEFFREY ROSENBLUM
Counsel for Defendant
SU QING LI
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
