JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
Defendant Bobby Sanders, by and through his counsel of record, Randy Sue Pollock, hereby request that the status conference presently set for June 11, 2019, be rescheduled for September 10, 2019 at 9:15 a.m. This extension is at the request of defense counsel so that she can have additional time to review the discovery with her client. Defense counsel was retained approximately eight months ago and needs to meet further with her client regarding these charges. Mr. Sanders resides in the EDCA (Fairfield) and until last month was working full-time in Hayward which did not allow sufficient time for counsel to meet with him.
1. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of May 28, 2019 to June 11, 2019, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
2. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
The Court hereby grants the motion submitted by Defendant Bobby Sanders. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period from June 11, 2019 to September 10, 2019, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.