STANLEY A. BOONE, District Judge.
Maria Aguilar de Orozco ("Plaintiff") seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner" or "Defendant") denying her application for disability benefits pursuant to the Social Security Act. The matter is currently before the Court on the parties' briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone.
Plaintiff suffers from migraine disorder, lumbar spondylosis, and adjustment disorder with mixed depression and anxiety. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's Social Security appeal shall be denied.
Plaintiff protectively filed a Title XVI application for supplemental security income on June 13, 2014. (AR 551.) Plaintiff's application was initially denied on November 6, 2014, and denied upon reconsideration on June 12, 2015. (AR 583-586, 592-596.) Plaintiff requested and received a hearing before Administrative Law Judge Judith A. Kopec ("the ALJ"). Plaintiff appeared for a video hearing on January 19, 2017. (AR 513-540.) On May 2, 2017, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 20-40.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on April 18, 2018. (AR 1-4.)
Plaintiff appeared for a video hearing on January 19, 2017, and testified with the assistance of an interpreter. (AR 519-533.) At the hearing, Plaintiff amended the alleged onset date to June 13, 2014. (AR 518.) Plaintiff was born on January 3, 1968. (AR 519.) She is 5'6" tall and weighs about 150 pounds. (AR 519-520.) Plaintiff is right-handed. (AR 520.)
Plaintiff lives with her husband; her three children, ages 19, 17, and 15; and her mother. (AR 520.) Plaintiff no longer drives because she has anxiety attacks and depression and her medication makes her sleepy so it is difficult for her to drive. (AR 520.) Her husband dropped her off for the hearing. (AR 520.)
Plaintiff completed school through the sixth grade in Mexico. (AR 521.) She understands very little English. (AR 521.)
Plaintiff worked for In-Home Supportive Services through 2011 taking care of her father. (AR 521.) She was paid for three or four hours and she would not be paid when her father was in the hospital. (AR 521.) Plaintiff worked the full day but was only paid for three to four hours because that was the maximum they would pay since her father lived with her. (AR 522.) Plaintiff would bathe her father, cook for him, feed him, vacuum his room, do his laundry, and take him to get his haircut. (AR 522.) She would lift him out of bed, help him walk and sit in a chair, and that is how she got hurt. (AR 522.) She would lift eight pounds in each hand. (AR 523.)
Plaintiff is unable to work because of back pain, headaches, anxiety attacks, and depression. (AR 523.) Plaintiff stated that she was in pain during the hearing and her pain level was 6 to 7. (AR 523.) On a good day, Plaintiff's pain level will be 5 and on a bad day it goes beyond 10 and she feels like she is dying. (AR 524.) Almost every day is a bad day. (AR 524.) Plaintiff does not go to the emergency room every day, she only goes about every month or month and a half. (AR 524.)
Plaintiff has headaches every day. (AR 525.) She will take her medication, lay down, and apply ice or alcohol to her head. (AR 525.) If the pills are working she will lie down for one and a half to two hours. (AR 525.) Plaintiff's pills do not work about every month or month and a half so she will go to the emergency room. (AR 525.) When she has headaches, Plaintiff is sensitive to light and cannot even stand to hear a piece of paper rustling. (AR 526.) Sometimes her headaches last two hours and sometimes they last all day. (AR 526.) Even after the headache goes away, she still feels discomfort. (AR 526.) Two or three days a week, Plaintiff's headaches will last all day. (AR 526.)
Plaintiff's back pain bothers her when she is walking or standing. (AR 526.) Plaintiff can walk about half a block and can stand for less than five minutes before she starts experiencing increased pain. (AR 526-527.) During an eight-hour work day, Plaintiff would be able to stand about half an hour but with pain. (AR 527.) As for walking, she is only able to walk to the bathroom or kitchen in her small house. (AR 527.) Plaintiff cannot clean or do any activity that lasts longer than that. (AR 527.)
Plaintiff does not do anything. (AR 527.) She cooks only rarely. (AR 527.) She sometimes goes shopping but will wait in the car while her husband and children do the purchasing. (AR 527.) Lifting aggravates Plaintiff's pain and she can only lift about three pounds. (AR 527.) She cannot lift a gallon of milk because it will cause her back and head to start hurting and her hand will ache up into her neck and along the side of her head on both sides. (AR 527-528.) Sometimes sitting aggravates her back pain, so that is why she took a pill prior to coming to the hearing. (AR 529.) Plaintiff can sit for two hours in an eight-hour workday. (AR 529.) Plaintiff has problems reaching in front of her or over her head because it hurts. (AR 529.) It hurts to grab an object and hold onto it tightly. (AR 529.)
Plaintiff is depressed every day. (AR 529.) She always feels sadness and feels like crying. (AR 529.) Plaintiff just wants to be by herself. (AR 529.) She never wants to go anywhere. (AR 529.) Plaintiff's depression affects her concentration and she does not even watch television or read. (AR 529-530.) Plaintiff does not socialize with anyone and just stays in her room alone almost all of the time. (AR 530.)
Plaintiff also has panic attacks. (AR 530.) Whenever she walks a little bit on the street she feels like one of the cars is going to hit her. (AR 530.) The cars are loud and the sound makes her nervous so she cannot be outside very long. (AR 530.) She has to go back inside the house. (AR 531.) Plaintiff goes outside about once or twice a week and this will happen. (AR 531.) She only goes out once a week, and sometimes she will not go out for two weeks at a time. (AR 531.) Plaintiff also gets panic attacks when she is at home. (AR 531.) If she is not having a panic attack then she will have a deep depression. (AR 531.) She feels sad and like all she wants to do is cry. (AR 531.) She does not want to watch television or listen to music. (AR 531.) She just wants to isolate. (AR 531.)
Plaintiff takes medication that makes her sleepy. (AR 531.) During the day, Plaintiff will sleep for two to three hours. (AR 531.) She also lies down two times during the day. (AR 532.) Plaintiff's medication will sometimes relieve her pain. (AR 532.) She will lay down and wake up in extreme pain so her daughter will give her a massage to relieve the pain or she will give herself a massage. (AR 532.) Plaintiff stopped going for mental health treatment because the doctor told her she needed to stop taking the pain medication but she cannot. (AR 532.) She changed her doctor because she had problems with his receptionist. (AR 532-533.)
Susan D. Green, a vocational expert ("VE") also testified at the hearing. (AR 533-539.)
The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
(AR 28-40.)
To qualify for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, the claimant must show that she is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security Regulations set out a five step sequential evaluation process to be used in determining if a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520;
Congress has provided that an individual may obtain judicial review of any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security regarding entitlement to benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In reviewing findings of fact in respect to the denial of benefits, this court "reviews the Commissioner's final decision for substantial evidence, and the Commissioner's decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error."
"[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence."
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by improperly considering the report of Dr. Lundeen, failing to include work-related limitations consistent with the nature and intensity of her limitations, failing to provide clear and convincing reasons for discounting her testimony regarding her migraine headaches, and the agency erred by failing to consider the new evidence presented. Defendant counters that the ALJ properly weighed the medical opinion evidence and the evaluation of Plaintiff's subjective complaints was proper and supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff replies that the ALJ cannot cherry pick those findings in Dr. Lundeen's report that support the residual functional capacity assessment. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to separately evaluate and weigh the opinion of Dr. Mangat. Plaintiff contends that this opinion was submitted to the appeals counsel that failed to consider it. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant cannot rely on evidence in the record that the ALJ did not cite in his opinion to support the adverse credibility finding.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ cherry picked portions of Dr. Lundeen's opinion and erred by failing to provide specific and legitimate reasons to discount Dr. Lundeen's concurrence with Dr. Mangat's report or alternately that the ALJ erred by failing to consider Dr. Mangat's report.
The weight to be given to medical opinions depends upon whether the opinion is proffered by a treating, examining, or non-examining professional.
The ALJ considered the history of Plaintiff's back pain, including Plaintiff's treatment by Dr. Manjat and more recent treatment.
(AR 33.) The ALJ also considered the opinion of Dr. Lundgeen and the Worker's Compensation findings.
(AR 36.)
The ALJ did consider Dr. Manjat's opinion that Plaintiff was limited to sedentary work and provided two reasons to reject her opinion. The ALJ found that the sedentary work recommendation was provided several year's prior to the amended alleged onset date and that it did not take into account the later conducted entirely negative musculoskeletal and physical examinations that were reflected in the record and for that reason it was given little weight.
Here, Plaintiff did not provide the treatment records of Dr. Manjat. The ALJ cites to Dr. Lundeen's report which sets forth the treatment and opinions of Dr. Manjat. (AR 36, 959-968.) While Dr. Manjat opined that Plaintiff was limited to sedentary work, the ALJ found that subsequent medical records, including those two months prior to the alleged onset date, demonstrated that Plaintiff had normal musculoskeletal examinations.
Review of the medical record from January through May 2013 shows that Plaintiff had tenderness in the lumbar paraspinal muscles with no guarding and no spasms.
Plaintiff's amended onset date is June 2014, and after this date there are multiple notations that Plaintiff denied having back pain. On June 27, 2014, it is noted that Plaintiff reports no back pain and no musculoskeletal tenderness (AR 859); October 30, 2014, Plaintiff reported no back pain (AR 863); January 9, 2015, Plaintiff reported no tenderness (AR 867); February 7, 2015, Plaintiff reports negative for back pain (AR 870); April 12, 2015, Plaintiff reported negative for back pain or gait problems (AR 886); April 17, 2015, Plaintiff reports negative for back pain (AR 889); and July 6, 2016, Plaintiff reported no back pain (AR 1006).
The only notations regarding complaints of back pain in the relevant record are on July 19, 2015, when Plaintiff was complaining of a headache and low back pain. (AR 951.) However, musculoskeletal examination revealed no evidence of joint pain, tenderness or deformity with full range of motion intact to all major joints. (AR 952.) Plaintiff had normal bulk and tone for age and normal gait. (AR 952.) Similarly, on August 29, 2015, Plaintiff reported to the emergency room complaining of back pain and a headache, but musculoskeletal examination revealed normal range of motion, no tenderness, no bony tenderness, and no swelling with full strength to the upper and lower extremities. (AR 1042.) On September 16, 2016, Plaintiff reported midline lower back pain. (AR 990.) An x-ray of the lumbar spine showed mild degenerative changes with spondylosis. (AR 995.)
The ALJ properly considered the inconsistency with the medical record in rejecting Dr. Mangat's opinion that Plaintiff was limited to sedentary work.
In the determination of whether Plaintiff was permanent and stationary from her work related injury, Plaintiff had an agreed medical examination by Dr. Lundeen on July 18, 2012. (AR 954-973.) Dr. Lundeen considered Plaintiff's prior treatment, including that Dr. Mangat had performed a permanent and stationary report on January 19, 2012. (AR 955-956, 959-968.) Dr. Lundeen performed a physical examination of Plaintiff. He noted that Plaintiff was a well-appearing 44-year-old female in no acute distress. (AR 968.) On examination she was able to perform heel and toe walk with no evidence of weakness in dorsiflexion or plantar flexion. (AR 968.) Lower back evaluation demonstrated range of motion with forward flexion to 45 with 70 being normal and extension to 5 with 30 being normal. (AR 968.) Lateral bending was to 15 to the right and 15 to the left with 25 being normal. (AR 968.) Dr. Lundeen noted that Plaintiff had positive tenderness to palpation in the paravertebral musculature on the right and left sides. (AR 968.) There was positive muscle guarding with active range of motion of the lumbar spine and positive paravertebral muscle tightness and spasm appreciated on the right and left sides. (AR 968.) Waddell's simulation tests were performed. (AR 968.) Axial loading was negative and truncal rotation was negative. (AR 968.)
Motor examination of the lower extremities revealed 5/5 to the right lower extremity and 4/5 to the left lower extremity. Dr. Lundeen found that Plaintiff demonstrated "cogwheel weakness in all myotomes of the left lower extremity" and this is considered to be non-physiologic. (AR 968.).
Sensory examination of the lower extremities to include light touch and pinprick was normal on the right and decreased on the left. Reflex examination showed 2+ to the bilateral knees and right ankle and 1+ to the left ankle. Babinski and Conus were negative bilaterally. (AR 969.) Straight leg raising examination of the lower extremities on sitting was 90/90 to the right and 70/90 to the left with pain. (AR 969.)
Dr. Lundeen determined that Plaintiff's low back pain condition was a result of her injury on March 3, 2011 and that her narcotic dependency was a compensable consequence of the lower back injury and low back treatment. (AR 969-970.) Dr. Lundeen found that Plaintiff had reached permanent and stationary status on January 19, 2012. (AR 970.) Plaintiff was determined to have a 16 percent whole person impairment based on her low back pain condition and her narcotic dependency. (AR 971.) Dr. Lundeen opined that Plaintiff should avoid the use of opioid narcotics and should be treated with nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory medications or Tylenol. (AR 971-972.) Plaintiff was recommended to participate in physical therapy and consistent and regular participation in non-impact aerobic fitness exercise such as stationary bicycling, swimming, a vigorous walking program or an elliptical trainer for a minimum of thirty to forty minutes three times per week. (AR 972.) He also recommended that Plaintiff participate in truncal stability and neutral spine exercise program, such as Pilates. (AR 972.)
Plaintiff was found to be not capable of performing the customary duties of her job and was therefore a qualified injured worker. (AR 972.) Dr. Lundeen found that Plaintiff's permanent work restrictions were to avoid heavy lifting activities and avoid repetitive bending and stooping activities. (AR 973.)
The ALJ found that the heavy lifting restriction and repetitive bending and stooping restrictions were somewhat vague and were also rendered years prior to the amended alleged onset date. (AR 36.) However, she also considered that they were rendered as part of a permanent and stationary report and are consistent with some of Plaintiff's continued pain allegations and gave them some weight. (AR 36.)
Plaintiff argues that Dr. Lundeen's opinion is tied to that of Dr. Mangat and therefore, the ALJ erred by failing to adopt the limitation that Plaintiff could not lift, carry, push, or pull above 10 pounds and was limited to sedentary work. However, Dr. Lundeen made no such findings in his opinion. While he did set forth the opinion of Dr. Mangat in the medical records reviewed, Dr. Lundeen performed a physical examination and, following his examination, opined that Plaintiff should avoid heavy lifting activities and should avoid repetitive bending and stooping activities. (AR 973.) Dr. Lundeen did not opine that Plaintiff was limited to ten pounds and sedentary work. Therefore, the ALJ did not fail to adopt such limitations based on Dr. Lundeen's opinion.
While Plaintiff argues that it would be disingenuous to reject Dr. Mangat's opinion based on the 2012 date and then credit Dr. Lundeen's opinion that was issued the same year, the ALJ rejected Dr. Mangat's opinion because it was inconsistent with the subsequent medical record showing that Plaintiff had normal musculoskeletal examinations and few complaints of back pain subsequent to the amended onset date. However, in considering Dr. Lundeen's opinion, the ALJ found that, while the limitations opined were somewhat vague, they were consistent with Plaintiff's allegations of continued back pain. The ALJ provided a specific and legitimate reason for the difference in weight provided to Dr. Lundeen's opinion.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to provide a clear and convincing reason to reject her migraine symptom testimony.
"An ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain or other non-exertional impairment."
Then "the ALJ may reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of those symptoms only by providing specific, clear, and convincing reasons for doing so."
The ALJ found that Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms alleged, but that Plaintiff's testimony regarding the intensity and limiting effects of her symptoms were not consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence found in the record. (AR 33.)
The ALJ considered that Plaintiff alleged that she had back pain and headaches every day. (AR 32, 523.) Plaintiff testified that practically every day was a bad requiring her to lie down for one and half to two hours, place ice or alcohol on her head, and that she was sensitive to light and noise. (AR 32, 524-525, 532.) When she lies down she has to shift position and if does not she wakes up in extreme pain and has to be massaged to relieve the pain. (AR 532.) She also stated that she had a headache every day that lasted two hours to all day and that she sometimes had residual discomfort for two to three days. (AR 32, 526.)
The ALJ found that Plaintiff's allegations of disabling pain at the hearing and in her function reports were inconsistent with her reports to physicians that she was able to care for her personal hygiene, occasionally help shop, cook and do household chores, and care for her mother who had dementia. (AR 29, 34.) On June 29, 2014, Plaintiff completed an adult function report. (AR 736-744.) Plaintiff reported that she did not take care of anyone else. (AR 737.) She reported that it was difficult for her to take a bath and she was unable to care for her hair or shave and other people had to make her food. (AR 737.) Plaintiff reported that she was unable to prepare her own meals and could only cook with help. (AR 738.) She reported she did not perform any household chores. (AR 738.)
On September 19, 2014, Plaintiff had a psychiatric consultation and reported that she is able to take care of her personal hygiene and can occasionally help shop, cook and do household chores. (AR 839.) On November 5, 2013, Plaintiff had reported at an office visit that she was depressed because she was taking care of her mother who had dementia and Plaintiff was helping her with all her activities of daily living. (AR 822.)
The ALJ properly considered Plaintiff's statements to medical providers that contradict her adult function report and hearing testimony regarding the disabling effects of her pain symptoms.
The ALJ also found that Plaintiff's allegations of disabling back pain were inconsistent with the reports in the medical record that she had no back pain until several months after her alleged onset date and only intermittent reports of back pain in the medical record after the hearing. (AR 35.) As discussed above, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's allegations of disabling back pain were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence in the record which showed generally normal musculoskeletal examinations and limited reports of back pain. Although, the ALJ cannot discredit Plaintiff's pain testimony solely because it is found not to be supported by the objective medical evidence,
The ALJ found that while Plaintiff did have regular treatment for her migraines, she had entirely negative neurological examinations and no additional workup for the migraines. (AR 34.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff's symptom reports were not entirely consistent because sometimes she would deny symptoms such as photophobia which she had earlier reported. (AR 34.)
The Court finds these reasons are not clear and convincing reasons to reject Plaintiffs' symptom testimony regarding her migraine headaches. First, the record demonstrates that Plaintiff has been diagnosed with migraine headaches and Defendant has not demonstrated that diagnostic tests are required to support the diagnosis (although the Court notes that the record does reflect that Plaintiff has not been provided with any medication to prevent her headaches). (AR 872.) Additionally, the fact that Plaintiff's migraine symptoms may differ do not necessarily reflect negatively on her credibility but rather speak to the type or severity of the headaches themselves.
The ALJ did find that at times Plaintiff's symptoms were reported when she had run out of medication, including incidents where physicians refused her medication and she left without scheduling a follow-up with her primary care physician. (AR 34.) There is support in the record that on several occasions in which Plaintiff presented to the emergency room with migraine she had run out of her medication. (AR 833, 985, 1005.) Further, there are notations in the record that when Plaintiff was refused pain medication she became angry and left, even when the providers were offering to assist her in getting an appointment with her primary care provider to have medication prescribed. (AR 987.) Finally, the ALJ considered that Plaintiff was noted to have some degree of symptom amplification and her physicians indicated concern that she had narcotic dependency. (AR 33, 35, 861.) Plaintiff admitted at the hearing that she stopped seeking mental health treatment because the psychiatrist recommending that she stop taking narcotic medication. (AR 532, 861, 928, 970.)
The Court finds that the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons to reject Plaintiff's symptom testimony.
Plaintiff argues that the appeals counsel erred by failing to consider the medical evidence that was provided after the ALJ issued his decision. Defendant does not address the issue in her opposition.
Prior to January 17, 2017, the Social Security regulations provided that the Appeal's Council was required to "consider" additional evidence as long as it was new, material, and related to the period on or before the ALJ's decision. 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b) (effective through January 16, 2017). As of January 17, 2017, the Social Security regulations provide that the additional evidence will be considered if "the Appeals Council receives additional evidence that is new, material, and relates to the period on or before the date of the hearing decision, and there is a reasonable probability that the additional evidence would change the outcome of the decision." 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(a)(5). `The Appeals Council will only consider additional evidence under paragraph (a)(5) of this section if [the claimant] show[s] good cause for not informing us about or submitting the evidence. . . ." 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b).
The Ninth Circuit has issued a series of decisions that distinguish evidence that the Appeal's Council formally considered and made part of the administrative record which was therefore subject to judicial review. "[W]hen the Appeal's Council considers new evidence in deciding whether to review a decision of the ALJ, that evidence becomes part of the administrative record, which the district court must consider when reviewing the Commissioner's final decision for substantial evidence."
Here, Plaintiff was advised that she would be required to show good cause as to why she did not inform the ALJ of the additional evidence or submit it earlier in response to her request for review. (AR 10, 14.) Despite, being notified that she would be required to show good cause for the failure to present the evidence earlier, the request for review merely states that the Worker's Compensation case was noted but records were never requested. (AR 797-798.) The denial letter does not address whether Plaintiff showed good cause for not submitting the additional evidence during the period in which the ALJ held evidence open and therefore good cause was not found for the failure to submit the new evidence earlier. (AR 1-4.) Because Plaintiff did not demonstrate good cause for the failure to submit the evidence earlier, the Appeal's Counsel was not required to consider it in determining whether to review the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(a), (b). Here, the Appeal's Counsel only looked at the evidence and determined that there was no reasonable probability that the newly submitted evidence would change the outcome of the decision. (AR 2.) Therefore, the new evidence was not considered or exhibited. (AR 2.) As the new evidence did not become part of the record, this Court may not review it.
In determining whether to remand a case in light of new evidence, the court considers whether the new evidence is material to the disability determination and whether the claimant has shown good cause for the failure to present the evidence to the ALJ earlier.
However, even were the Court to consider the additional evidence, it would not change the outcome of this appeal. Plaintiff concedes that much of the 500 pages are not individually material to the ALJ's decision because they contain records during her recovery period after the 2011 injury. Plaintiff argues that the maximum medical improvement and permanent and stationary status by Dr. Manjat are highly relevant to Plaintiff's functioning on the application date.
Under California Worker's Compensation "permanent and stationary status can be defined as attained ". . . after the employee has reached maximum medical improvement or his or her condition has been stationary for a reasonable period of time."
Dr. Manjat saw Plaintiff on January 19, 2012. (AR 219-225.) Dr. Manjat noted that Plaintiff was in mild distress, had tenderness on examination, her gait was slow, and she was ambulating with a cane. (AR 221-222.) Dr. Manjat opined that Plaintiff's "lower back impairment is best characterized by DRE category 3 with impairment of 10 percent of whole person. In my opinion she qualifies for this rating because of her radicular complaints as a result of mild loss of strength at the left ankle dorsiflexion and extensor hallucis longus to left big toe." (AR 223.) Dr. Manjat further opined that Plaintiff had reached maximum medical improvement as of January 19, 2012, and should have a permanent restriction to semi-sedentary work with no lifting, carrying, pulling, or pushing above 10 pounds, no twisting of the back, and change positions frequently. (AR 225.) This record is reflected in the report of Dr. Lundeen which was referenced by the ALJ, but not clearly addressed, in the opinion. (AR 36, 967-968.)
As discussed, the ALJ found that prior to her amended onset date, Plaintiff had normal musculoskeletal examinations and the record after the amended onset date showed entirely negative musculoskeletal and physical examinations. (AR 36.) The ALJ noted that the sedentary work restriction opined by Dr. Manjat was rendered several years prior to the amended alleged onset date and did not consider these entirely negative musculoskeletal and physical examinations prior to and after the alleged onset date. (AR 36.)
While Plaintiff argues that the limitations are highly relevant to Plaintiff's functioning on the application date, the ALJ considered that Dr. Mangat had found Plaintiff to be limited to sedentary work and provided a specific and legitimate reason to reject the limitation. The reasons that the ALJ provided to reject the limitation to sedentary work apply equally to Dr. Manjat's finding that Plaintiff was limited to semi-sedentary work with no lifting, carrying, pulling, or pushing above 10 pounds. (AR 225.) Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no "reasonable probability that the additional evidence would change the outcome of the decision." 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(a)(5).
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in considering the medical opinions, in determining that Plaintiff's symptom testimony was not credible and in failing to consider later presented evidence.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's appeal from the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is DENIED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that judgment be entered in favor of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security and against Plaintiff Maria Aguilar de Orozco. The Clerk of the Court is directed to CLOSE this action.
