Filed: Aug. 05, 2019
Latest Update: Aug. 05, 2019
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TROY L. NUNLEY , District Judge . Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on August 8, 2019. 2. By this stipulation, the defendants now move to continue the status conference until September 26, 2019, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time bet
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TROY L. NUNLEY , District Judge . Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on August 8, 2019. 2. By this stipulation, the defendants now move to continue the status conference until September 26, 2019, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time betw..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on August 8, 2019.
2. By this stipulation, the defendants now move to continue the status conference until September 26, 2019, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between August 8, 2019, and September 26, 2019, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes over 14,000 pages and several hours of recorded telephone conversations. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel.
b) Defense counsel desired additional time to review the discovery, conduct research into the case, to discuss the case with their clients, and otherwise prepare for trial in this matter.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of August 8, 2019, to September 26, 2019, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
Dated: August 5, 2019 McGREGOR W. SCOTT
United States Attorney
/s/ JUSTIN L. LEE
JUSTIN L. LEE
Assistant United States Attorney
Dated: August 5, 2019 /s/ SHARI RUSK
SHARI RUSK
(as authorized on August 5, 2019)
Counsel for Defendant
ALDO ARELLANO
Dated: August 5, 2019 /s/ KELLY BABINEAU
KELLY BABINEAU
(as authorized on August 5, 2019)
Counsel for Defendant
RACHEL FELIX
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
