Filed: Aug. 06, 2019
Latest Update: Aug. 06, 2019
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR. , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on August 8, 2019. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until October 17, 2019, and to exclude time between August 8, 2019, and October 17, 2019, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The governme
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR. , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on August 8, 2019. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until October 17, 2019, and to exclude time between August 8, 2019, and October 17, 2019, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The governmen..
More
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR., District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on August 8, 2019.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until October 17, 2019, and to exclude time between August 8, 2019, and October 17, 2019, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that has produced the discovery associated with this case including, among other things, investigative reports, photographs, as well as audio and video recordings.
b) Counsel for defense has recently substituted into this matter and desires additional time to consult with his client, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with his client, to prepare pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
c) Defense counsel believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of August 8, 2019 to October 17, 2019, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
Dated: August 6, 2019 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT
United States Attorney
/s/ JAMES R. CONOLLY
JAMES R. CONOLLY
Assistant United States Attorney
Dated: August 6, 2019 /s/ JESSE I. SANTANA
JESSE I. SANTANA
Counsel for Defendant
NOE GANDARA-SOTO
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
