WILLIAM B. SHUBB, Senior District Judge.
The parties appeared for a status hearing on October 28, 2019. (Dkt. No. 31.) At the hearing, the parties set this matter for a jury trial, beginning January 7, 2020. (Id.) In addition, counsel for both parties explained the bases for an exclusion of time under the Speedy Trial Act and the relevant Local Code, after which the Court directed the parties to submit a proposed order. (Id.)
On August 29, 2019, Mr. Nunez-Roman was arraigned on the two-count Indictment in this case. (ECF Nos. 12, 14.) At the arraignment, the government produced to defense counsel discovery that included 227 pages of reports, memoranda, and photos, as well as several audio and video recordings. On September 9, 2019, the government produced two supplemental laboratory reports that confirm the chemical composition of the controlled substances seized from the defendant's car on the day of his arrest. Defense counsel has reviewed these discovery materials and discussed them with his client.
In the coming weeks, defense counsel will be conducting further investigation, researching potential defenses and motions, and otherwise preparing for trial.
Based on the foregoing, the parties agree that time under the Speedy Trial Act should be excluded from October 28, 2019 (the date of the most recent status hearing), up to and including January 7, 2020 (the first day of trial), under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) [reasonable time to prepare], and Local Code T4.
The parties agree that the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The parties also agree that the ends of justice served by the Court granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
The Court, having received and considered the parties' stipulation, and good cause appearing therefore, adopts the parties' stipulation in its entirety as its order. The Court specifically finds that the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The Court also finds that the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
The Court orders that the time from October 28, 2019, up to and including January 7, 2020, shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial in this case must begin under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) [reasonable time to prepare], and Local Code T4.