ANTHONY W. ISHII, Senior District Judge.
Jason Morris (hereinafter "Jason") was a convicted sex offender. While Jason was imprisoned in California's Wasco State Prison, prison officials placed Jason in a "double" prison cell with a cellmate who had a violent, non-sexual criminal history. By double-celling Jason with a violent prisoner, the prison allegedly placed Jason in harm's way and contravened reasonable prison policies, which aim to prevent sex offenders from being double-celled with prisoners who have violent, non-sexual criminal histories. On February 7, 2017, Jason was strangled to death by his cellmate.
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff Jennifer Morris (hereinafter "Morris"), who was Jason's wife, sued the following defendants: (1) California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR"); (2) the secretary of CDCR, Scott Kernan; (3) the warden of California's Wasco State Prison, John Sutton; and (4) multiple unnamed "Doe" defendants.
In Morris's original complaint, which was filed on November 3, 2017, Morris pleaded the following causes of action: (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against all defendants for depriving Jason and Morris of their constitutional rights; (2) a California Bane Act claim under California Civil Code § 52.1 against Sutton and the Doe defendants for depriving Jason and Morris of their rights under federal and California law; (3) a negligence claim against Sutton and the Doe defendants for allowing Jason to be killed in prison; and (4) a wrongful death claim against all defendants based on Morris's damages caused by Jason's death.
The parties engaged in Rule 12(b)(6) motion practice, which led the Court on March 8, 2018, to dismiss with prejudice all of Morris's claims against CDCR and Kernan. Thereafter, Morris filed her first amended complaint on April 9, 2018, pleading the following amended causes of action: (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against only the Doe defendants; (2) a California Bane Act claim against only the Doe defendants; (3) a negligence claim against Sutton and the Doe defendants; and (4) a wrongful death claim against only Sutton and the Doe defendants.
The Court then issued a scheduling order on August 15, 2018, and the scheduling order imposed the following deadlines and dates on the parties:
Doc. 23 (Court's scheduling order).
The deadline to amend the pleadings and the discovery deadline eventually expired, and by that time, Morris failed to amend her complaint to identify and name any of the unnamed Doe defendants. For that reason, the Court concluded that Morris's § 1983 claim was facially implausible. Stated the Court,
Doc. No. 49 (citations omitted). On that basis, the Court dismissed with prejudice Morris's § 1983 claim on September 6, 2019.
Up until that time, the Court's subject matter jurisdiction in this lawsuit was premised on, first, federal question jurisdiction over the § 1983 claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and, second, supplemental jurisdiction over the California state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Consequently, when the Court dismissed the § 1983 claim on September 6, 2019 — which was approximately two months before the scheduled trial date, November 5, 2019 — the Court no longer had federal question jurisdiction over this lawsuit: the only remaining claims were California state law claims. With the Court no longer exercising federal question jurisdiction over this lawsuit at a time when the scheduled trial date was months into the future and the Court had not adjudicated any summary judgment motions,
The Court's dismissal decision was guided by the authorization and instruction from Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Ninth Circuit in, respectively, 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(2)-(3),
Sutton was displeased with the Court's dismissal decision. He wanted Morris's state law claims against him to be adjudicated in this federal forum, either by way of summary judgment or trial. Consequently, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), Sutton moved the Court to reconsider and reverse its dismissal decision.
After Sutton filed his Rule 60(b)(6) motion, Morris filed a lawsuit in California state court against Sutton and other defendants based on virtually the same allegations that Morris alleged in this federal lawsuit.
Sutton argues that there are "extraordinary circumstances" under Rule 60(b)(6) that require the Court to reverse its dismissal decision and resume exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Morris's state law claims. The following circumstances, according to Sutton, collectively amount to "extraordinary circumstances" under Rule 60(b)(6).
First, by the time the Court issued its dismissal decision on September 6, 2019, the state law claims had been "extensively" litigated in this forum. Doc. No. 50-1 at 7. The parties had conducted discovery, and Sutton had prepared and filed a summary judgment motion which was pending when the Court issued its dismissal decision, and trial was just two months away.
Second, by the time the Court issued is dismissal decision, Sutton "by way of the State and its taxpayers" had spent over $75,000 in legal fees and costs in this lawsuit.
Third, Morris will receive a "windfall" if she is permitted to adjudicate her state law claims in the California state court lawsuit. By "windfall," Sutton means the following three events will occur: (1) Morris will be able to name additional defendants in the state court lawsuit that Morris failed to timely name in this federal lawsuit; (2) Morris will be able to conduct additional depositions in the state court lawsuit that Morris failed to timely conduct during the discovery phase in this federal lawsuit; and (3) Morris will be able to re-depose Sutton in the state court lawsuit even though she deposed Sutton in this federal lawsuit.
Fourth, Morris's remaining state law claims are neither novel nor complex, so comity does not weigh heavily in favor of this Court relinquishing its supplemental jurisdiction in favor of the California state courts.
Rule 60(b)(6) states that "on motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . any . . . reason that justifies relief." Rule 60(b)(6) "has been used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice."
Sutton has not demonstrated "extraordinary circumstances" that warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(6). This is because the Court's decision to relinquish its supplemental jurisdiction of Morris's state law claims — which was not an abuse of discretion — does not amount to "manifest injustice" or an "extreme and unexpected hardship" to Sutton.
The Court's decision to relinquish its supplemental jurisdiction was sound. As noted
Section 1367(c)(3) authorizes federal district courts to "decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." Additionally, § 1367(c)(2) authorizes federal district courts to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when a state law claim "substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction." Here the Court was faced with both of those situations when Morris's § 1983 claim was dismissed: all federal claims had been dismissed before trial, and as a result the remaining state law claims inescapably and substantially predominated over any federal law claims, of which there were none. Therefore, the Court was authorized by Congress to relinquish its supplemental jurisdiction over Morris's state law claims.
While § 1367(c) authorizes a federal district court to relinquish its supplemental jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit in
The Ninth Circuit's reference to the "
Here, in conjunction with dismissing Morris's § 1983 claim, the Court correctly concluded that authorization existed under § 1367(c)(2)-(3) to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over Morris's state law claims. With that statutory authorization having been "triggered,"
On the one hand, considerations of Sutton's convenience weighed in favor of the Court maintaining its supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. This was because Sutton had engaged in discovery and prepared and filed a summary judgment motion in this federal lawsuit, and Sutton had expended time, attention, and legal fees and costs to defend himself in this federal lawsuit — although that can be said of most earnest defendants.
But on the other hand, judicial economy, fairness, and comity weighed in favor of this Court relinquishing its supplemental jurisdiction. As for judicial economy, the District Court Judge was not intimately familiar with the merits of Morris's state law claims and Sutton's defenses, having been exposed to the elemental substance of the claims only at the Rule 12(b)(6) phase.
As for fairness, there was no indication that Sutton would be treated unfairly if he were to defend himself in a California state court lawsuit. The fact that Morris could add additional defendants in a state court lawsuit does not demonstrate unfairness towards Sutton. Additionally, the fact that Sutton's summary judgment motion was pending when the Court dismissed this federal lawsuit does not demonstrate unfairness towards Sutton. For one, while the Court did not decide the merits of Sutton's summary judgment motion, the Court was aware that Sutton's summary judgment motion failed to comply with the Court's procedures for summary judgment motions,
As for comity, this consideration weighed strongly in favor of relinquishing supplemental jurisdiction. This is because the California state courts have the primary responsibility for developing and applying their state law claims, including Morris's Bane Act, negligence, and wrongful death claims. Sutton's "neither novel nor complex" contention fails to rattle that conclusion. While it may be true that Morris's state law claims are neither novel nor complex, Sutton's contention hearkens to § 1367(c)(1), which states that a federal district court "may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law." The problem for Sutton, of course, is that the Court never premised its dismissal decision on § 1367(c)(1).
Assuming arguendo that the Court abused its discretion by relinquishing its supplemental jurisdiction over Morris's state law claims, relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is still not warranted. This is because there are no extraordinary circumstances that will result in manifest injustice to Sutton.
As noted supra, extraordinary circumstances under Rule 60(b)(6) are rare. The following six examples are situations where extraordinary circumstances existed and warranted judicial relief under Rule 60(b)(6). First, Rule 60(b)(6) relief was appropriate to set aside a default judgment in a denaturalization proceeding because the petitioner had been ill, incarcerated, and without counsel for the four years following the judgment.
Unlike the foregoing examples where litigants were faced with extreme and unexpected hardships that were largely no fault of their own, here Sutton is simply a former defendant "
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
IT IS SO ORDERED.