ORDER GRANTING REQUEST TO LIFT PROTECTIVE ORDER FOR CERTAIN DOCUMENTS

(Doc. No. 86)

ANTHONY W. ISHII, Senior District Judge.

I. Introduction

This lawsuit is about a prisoner, Plaintiff Douglas Stevenson, who allegedly was physically abused by prison officers on November 11, 2012, and December 7, 2012. Plaintiff sued the prison officers for cruel and unusual punishment, assault, battery, and negligence. During discovery the parties entered into a stipulated protective order, which the Court issued. See Doc. No. 48. The protective order permits the parties to designate certain materials as "Confidential," and the protective order largely precludes the parties from publicly disclosing materials designated as "Confidential."

Defendants recently moved the Court for summary judgment. In opposing Defendants' summary judgment motion, Plaintiff wants to publicly file certain "Confidential" documents. Accordingly, Plaintiff has asked the Court to lift the protective order's applicability to the documents at issue. For the reasons discussed herein, the Court will grant Plaintiff's request.

II. Plaintiff's Request to Lift the Protective Order

Plaintiff has six "batches" of documents that he wants to publicly file in conjunction with his opposition to Defendants' summary judgment motion:

Plaintiff argues that the protective order should be lifted as to the foregoing documents because, first, the documents are material to Plaintiff's claims and, second, there is no compelling reason or good cause for keeping the documents sealed from the public. Plaintiff also correctly notes that since Defendants want the documents sealed, then the burden is on Defendants to show either compelling reasons or good cause for keeping the documents sealed from the public.

Defendants oppose Plaintiff's request, arguing that the documents should remain subject to the protective order and sealed from the public because the documents are irrelevant to Defendants' summary judgment motion. According to Defendants, Plaintiff's "only reason" for publicly filing the documents is to "promote public scandal and satisfy the private spite that Plaintiff may hold against Defendants." Doc. No. 88 at 10.

III. Legal Standard

All documents filed with the Court are presumptively public. San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999). "[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents." Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).

Two standards generally govern the sealing of documents filed with the Court: the "compelling reasons" standard for materials directly related to the underlying causes of action, such as documents attached to summary judgment briefs, and the lesser "good cause" standard for materials only tangentially related to the underlying causes of action, such as some discovery documents:

Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).

The compelling reasons standard "derives from the common law right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents." Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass'n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). "To limit this common law right of access, a party seeking to seal judicial records must show that compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure." Id. (citations omitted). In general, "compelling reasons" sufficient to outweigh the public's interest in disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such "court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes, such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets." Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (citations omitted). However, "[t]he mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant's embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records" under the compelling reasons standard. Id.

The good cause standard "comes from Rule 26(c)(1), which governs the issuance of protective orders in the discovery process." Ctr. for Auto Safety, LLC, 809 F.3d at 1097. Rule 26(c) states that the court "may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). The good cause standard under Rule 26(c) asks "whether `good cause' exists to protect the information from being disclosed to the public by balancing the needs for discovery against the need for confidentiality." Pintos, 605 F.3d at 678. "Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test." Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992). The good cause standard "presents a lower burden for the party wishing to seal documents than the `compelling reasons' standard," and this is because the "cognizable public interest in judicial records that underlies the `compelling reasons' standard does not exist for documents produced between private litigants." Pintos, 605 F.3d at 678.

As the Ninth Circuit has stated, a blanket protective order does not by itself demonstrate good cause, let alone compelling reasons, for sealing specific information and documents. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1183 ("Although the magistrate judge expressly approved and entered the protective order, the order contained no good cause findings as to specific documents that would justify reliance by the United States . . . ."); Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[A] party seeking the protection of the court via a blanket protective order typically does not make the `good cause' showing required by Rule 26(c) with respect to any particular document."); San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., N. Dist., 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999); Beckman Indus., Inc., 966 F.2d at 476 ("Further, because the protective order was a stipulated blanket order, International never had to make a `good cause' showing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) of the need for protection of the deposition transcripts in the first place. Nor does it allege specific prejudice or harm now. Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.") (citations omitted); see also Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 854, 858 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Even if the parties agree that a protective order should be entered, they still have the burden of showing that good cause exists for issuance of that order. It is equally apparent that the obverse also is true, i.e., if good cause is not shown, the discovery materials in question should not receive judicial protection.") (citations omitted).

The protective order in this lawsuit clearly states that "this protective order does not assure that any of the materials protected [by the protective order] will be sealed by the Court in the event a party wishes to file them." Doc. No. 48 at 7 (emphasis added). The protective order further states that any party may "apply to the Court for an order removing the Confidential Material designation from any document." Id. It is pursuant to this latter provision of the protective order that Plaintiff seeks to remove the "Confidential" designation of the documents at issue.1

IV. Discussion

Defendants failed to demonstrate that the documents at issue warrant sealing under either the good cause standard or compelling reasons standard. Even if the Court were to assume that the lesser good cause standard applies here, Defendants have nonetheless failed to demonstrate that the public disclosure of the documents will cause a sufficient level of annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, undue burden, or expense. In fact, Defendants did not even earnestly attempt to make this argument: Defendants focused solely on the issue of relevance.2 The closest Defendants came to actually wrestling with the good cause standard was to baldly assert that Defendant M. Crotty "is entitled to privacy with regard to his employment and personnel records." Doc. No. 88 at 10. But that assertion both misses the mark of Rule 26(c) and fails to offer specific examples or articulated reasoning of specific harm or prejudice that will befall Defendant M. Crotty if the documents become public. See Beckman Indus., Inc., 966 F.2d at 476.

Consequently, because Defendants failed to provide the Court with a proper basis for sealing the documents from the public, the Court will grant Plaintiff's request to lift the protective order as to the documents. ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

IT IS SO ORDERED.