Filed: Dec. 11, 2019
Latest Update: Dec. 11, 2019
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR. , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on December 11, 2019. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until January 30, 2020, and to exclude time between December 11, 2019, and January 30, 2020, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The go
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR. , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on December 11, 2019. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until January 30, 2020, and to exclude time between December 11, 2019, and January 30, 2020, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The gov..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR., District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on December 11, 2019.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until January 30, 2020, and to exclude time between December 11, 2019, and January 30, 2020, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes over a hundred thousand of pages of documents, electronically imaged devices, and video and audio files. That discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to continue reviewing the large volume of discovery, consult with his clients, review the current charges and research related defenses, to discuss pretrial motions and immigration consequences, research potential sentencing exposure, including conducting an analysis of the Guidelines, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, and prevent continuity of counsel.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of December 11, 2019 to January 30, 2020, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
