STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; MOOTNESS OF DEFENSE MOTION TO EXTEND PRETRIAL DEADLINES; AND FINDINGS AND ORDER

JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 14, 2020. A status conference was held on January 14, 2020.

2. By this stipulation, the parties agree and jointly request the defense motion to extend the pretrial motion deadline (ECF 15) be denied as moot, following this Court's oral statements at the January 14, 2020 status conference. Accordingly, the January 28, 2020 hearing should be vacated.

3. By this stipulation, the parties further move to set a status conference for March 3, 2020 at 9:15 a.m., and to exclude time between January 14, 2020, and March 3, 2020, under Local Codes C, F, M, and T4.

4. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes reports, photographs, videos, and other documents either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to review the current charges, conduct investigation and research related to the charges, review and copy discovery for this matter, consult with his client, discuss potential resolutions, and otherwise prepare for trial.

c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) The defendant is currently in the Eastern District of Arkansas pending resolution of federal charges in that district (E.D. AR. Case 4:14-CR-231-DPM).

f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 14, 2020 to March 3, 2020, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(B) [Local Code C], 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(E) [Local Code F], 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(3)(A) and (B) [Local Code M], and 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), (B)(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the parties' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

5. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.