TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court pursuant to Plaintiffs Bill Barker, Tab Bachman, and William Yingling's ("Plaintiffs") Motion to Stay. (ECF No. 57.) Defendant Swift Transportation Company of Arizona, LLC ("Defendant"), opposes the motion. (ECF No. 58.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay is DENIED.
Plaintiffs filed a purported Class Action Complaint in the Superior Court of California, Sacramento County, on April 1, 2016, asserting various wage and hour causes of action. (ECF No. 1 at 1-2.) Defendant filed its Notice of Removal July 5, 2016, removing the case to this Court. (ECF No. 1.) On November 16, 2017, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment that is still pending before the Court. (ECF No. 39.) Plaintiffs provided a Notice of Related Case on December 11, 2017 (ECF No. 53), and subsequently filed a Motion to Stay (ECF No. 57) pending an outcome in the related case of Fritsch v. Swift, case no. 5:17-cv-02226-JGB-SPx.
The Court has broad discretion in deciding whether to issue a stay. "[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket . . . . [This] calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance." Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936). More specifically, "[w]here it is proposed that a pending proceeding be stayed, the competing interests which will be affected by the granting or refusal to grant a stay must be weighed." CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962). "[I]f there is even a fair possibility that the stay ... will work damage to someone else," the moving party must show hardship or inequity will result absent a stay for a stay to be proper. Landis, 299 U.S. 248 at 255.
When considering a motion to stay, courts within the Ninth Circuit have considered three factors: (1) potential prejudice to the non-moving party; (2) hardship and inequity to the moving party if the action is not stayed; and (3) the judicial resources that would be saved by avoiding duplicative litigation. Rivers v. Walt Disney Co., 980 F.Supp. 1358, 1360 (C.D. Cal. 1997); see also Single Chip Sys. Corp. v. Intermec IP Corp., 495 F.Supp.2d 1052, 1057 (S.D. Cal. 2007).
Weighing the competing interests of the parties, the Court finds a stay is not appropriate here. First, there is a strong possibility that a stay will damage Defendant due to the indefinite nature of the requested stay (premised on resolution of the related case), coupled with the undue delay in resolving Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment pending before this Court (ECF No. 39). Indeed, a stay pending the outcome of another case should only be granted if it "appears likely the other proceedings will be concluded within a reasonable time." Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1111 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, the related case has ping-ponged between the state and district courts at least three times, went up to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals once, and now remains pending in the Central District, with no apparent end in immediate sight. Fritsch v. Swift Transportation Co. of Arizona, LLC, No. EDCV172226JGBSPX, 2018 WL 6427722 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2018). Further, Plaintiffs have provided no end in sight, rather they seek a stay of an "undefined duration," requiring status updates from the parties with the only proposed end date being when the Court "lift[s] the stay at its discretion." (ECF No. 57 at 3:25-27.)
Second, Plaintiffs have offered little to no showing of any hardship or inequity they would experience if required to move forward, citing only that a stay would "preserve the parties' and judicial resources litigating claims now certified in State Court." (ECF No. 57 at 4:1-2.) This argument is unavailing because granting the stay would significantly complicate the case by requiring the Court to rule on only part of the summary judgment motion pending before it (or to defer ruling indefinitely, as discussed above). Plaintiffs argue staying the motion will not prejudice the parties because a "significant amount of discovery has been completed . . . [t]herefore, preservation of facts and memories of witnesses is not an issue." But notably, this argument cuts against Plaintiffs' claim that a stay would preserve resources because, apparently, significant time has already been spent litigating this matter. (ECF No. 57 at 3:19-21.)
Third, and most significantly, Plaintiffs' argument that denying a stay may result in inconsistent rulings is without merit. The Superior Court in Fritsch has defined the class as:
(ECF No. 57 at 1:24-26.) That proposed class is explicitly limited to yard hostlers who do not and/or have not crossed state lines. Here, Plaintiffs have admitted that interstate travel was part of their execution of job duties. (ECF No. 45 at 1:15-16.) Therefore, the proposed classes are distinct, and the outcome of the Fritsch case is not likely to impact the proceedings in the case at bar.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay proceedings pending an outcome in Fritsch.
IT IS SO ORDERED.