Filed: Jan. 30, 2020
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: Case: 19-1100 Document: 44 Page: 1 Filed: 01/30/2020 NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit _ INTELLIGENT AUTOMATION DESIGN, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant v. ZIMMER BIOMET CMF AND THORACIC, LLC, DBA BIOMET MICROFIXATION, Defendant-Appellee _ 2019-1100 _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida in No. 3:16-cv-01044-BJD-MCR, Judge Brian J. Davis. _ Decided: January 30, 2020 _ JOHN DAVIS HOLMAN, Matthews, L
Summary: Case: 19-1100 Document: 44 Page: 1 Filed: 01/30/2020 NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit _ INTELLIGENT AUTOMATION DESIGN, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant v. ZIMMER BIOMET CMF AND THORACIC, LLC, DBA BIOMET MICROFIXATION, Defendant-Appellee _ 2019-1100 _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida in No. 3:16-cv-01044-BJD-MCR, Judge Brian J. Davis. _ Decided: January 30, 2020 _ JOHN DAVIS HOLMAN, Matthews, La..
More
Case: 19-1100 Document: 44 Page: 1 Filed: 01/30/2020
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
INTELLIGENT AUTOMATION DESIGN, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
ZIMMER BIOMET CMF AND THORACIC, LLC, DBA
BIOMET MICROFIXATION,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2019-1100
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida in No. 3:16-cv-01044-BJD-MCR,
Judge Brian J. Davis.
______________________
Decided: January 30, 2020
______________________
JOHN DAVIS HOLMAN, Matthews, Lawson, McCutcheon
& Joseph, PLLC, Houston, TX, argued for plaintiff-appel-
lant.
KEVIN P. WAGNER, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, Minne-
apolis, MN, argued for defendant-appellee. Also repre-
sented by LAUREN MARIE WILLIAMS STEINHAEUSER; DANIEL
M. LECHLEITER, Indianapolis, IN.
______________________
Case: 19-1100 Document: 44 Page: 2 Filed: 01/30/2020
2 INTELLIGENT AUTOMATION DESIGN v. ZIMMER BIOMET CMF
AND THORACIC
Before PROST, Chief Judge, WALLACH and HUGHES, Circuit
Judges.
HUGHES, Circuit Judge.
This is a patent case about controlling a motor used to
drive a screwdriver bit. Intelligent Automation Design,
LLC sued Zimmer Biomet CMF and Thoracic, LLC for in-
fringement of all claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,091,683. The
district court found that independent claims 1 and 6 were
invalid as indefinite for failing to meet the requirements of
35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. 1 We agree with the district court that
§ 112 ¶ 6 applies because both claims include means-plus-
function terms. But because we conclude that the ’683 pa-
tent’s specification discloses sufficient structure to define
the bounds of the means-plus-function terms, we reverse
the district court’s finding of indefiniteness and remand for
further proceedings.
I
The ’683 patent teaches both a method and a system
for controlling a motor used to turn a screwdriver bit.
Claim 1, the independent method claim, recites:
A method of controlling a motor (106) used to
drive a screwdriver bit (105) such that screws
(107) are seated to the optimum point of grip
1 The America Invents Act (AIA) re-designated
§ 112 ¶ 6 as § 112(f). Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 4, 125 Stat. 284, 296 (2011). But
the amended version of § 112 applies only to patent appli-
cations “filed on or after” September 16, 2012. See AIA
§ 4(e), 125 Stat. at 297. Because the ’683 patent was filed
before this date, we refer to the pre-AIA statute. See J.A.
24.
Case: 19-1100 Document: 44 Page: 3 Filed: 01/30/2020
INTELLIGENT AUTOMATION DESIGN v. ZIMMER BIOMET CMF 3
AND THORACIC
between the screw (107) and the work piece mate-
rial, the method comprising:
(a) detecting a torque of the motor;
(b) determining a time when the torque
reaches a maximum by an average means
for determining an average value as a func-
tion of a current value and a new value,
thereby determining the optimum point of
grip; and
(c) stopping the motor at the optimum
point of grip.
’683 patent col. 4 ll.11–20 (emphasis removed).
Claim 6, the independent system claim, recites:
A speed/torque controller (100) for con-
trolling the rotation speed and output
torque of the motor (106) with either sensor
feedback or back EMF used to monitor mo-
tor (106) speed and current used to monitor
motor (106) torque, the controller compris-
ing:
a detector for detecting the output
torque of the motor; and
a control circuit for determining a time
when the torque reaches a maximum by an
average means for determining an average
value as a function of a current value and a
new value, thereby determining the opti-
mum point of grip, and stopping the motor
at the optimum point of grip.
Id. col. 4 ll. 33–44 (emphasis removed).
The parties’ dispute centers on two issues: first,
whether “determining a time when the torque reaches a
maximum” in claim 6 should be construed as a “means-
Case: 19-1100 Document: 44 Page: 4 Filed: 01/30/2020
4 INTELLIGENT AUTOMATION DESIGN v. ZIMMER BIOMET CMF
AND THORACIC
plus-function” element subject to § 112 ¶ 6 and second, if
the specification describes structure that adequately de-
fines this function and thus, the invention. IAD appeals
from the district court’s entry of judgment holding inde-
pendent claims 1 and 6 of the ’683 patent invalid as indefi-
nite. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
II
We review de novo the district court’s ultimate inter-
pretation of a patent’s claims, including “means-plus-func-
tion” constructions in which the claim language invokes
§ 112 ¶ 6. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
792 F.3d 1339,
1346, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We also review de novo a dis-
trict court’s conclusion finding a claim indefinite under
§ 112 ¶ 2. Cox Commc’ns, Inc. v. Sprint Commc’n Co. LP,
838 F.3d 1224, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Biomet must prove
any factual determination “critical to a holding on indefi-
niteness” by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. For both
claim construction and indefiniteness, we review de novo
any underlying factual determinations based on evidence
intrinsic to the patent, but review for clear error any un-
derlying factual determinations based on extrinsic evi-
dence.
Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1346; Cox Commc’ns,
Inc.,
838 F.3d at 1228. “To trigger clear error review, ‘it is not
enough that the district court may have heard extrinsic ev-
idence during a claim construction proceeding—rather, the
district court must have actually made a factual find-
ing . . . .’” Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd.,
844 F.3d
1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Cardsoft, LLC v. Ver-
iFone, Inc.,
807 F.3d 1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). “If indef-
initeness can be determined based solely on intrinsic
evidence, our review is de novo.” Cox Commc’ns,
Inc., 838
F.3d at 1228. (citing Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz,
Inc.,
574 U.S. 831, 841 (2015) (holding the same for claim
construction)).
“An element in a claim for a combination may be ex-
pressed as a means . . . for performing a specified function”
Case: 19-1100 Document: 44 Page: 5 Filed: 01/30/2020
INTELLIGENT AUTOMATION DESIGN v. ZIMMER BIOMET CMF 5
AND THORACIC
but “such claim shall be construed to cover the correspond-
ing structure” described in the specification. 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 ¶ 6 (2000). “[T]he use of the word ‘means’ in a claim
element creates a rebuttable presumption that § 112 [¶] 6
applies[,]” but “the presence or absence of the word
‘means’” may yield to the “essential inquiry” of whether an
ordinarily skilled artisan would understand the recited
claim element “to have a sufficiently definite meaning as
the name for structure.”
Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348. In
construing a means-plus-function element, the court iden-
tifies the claimed function, then determines “what struc-
ture, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the
claimed function.”
Id. at 1351. “Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2
and ¶ 6 . . . a means-plus-function clause is indefinite if a
person of ordinary skill in the art would be unable to rec-
ognize the structure in the specification and associate it
with the corresponding function in the claim.” Noah Sys.,
Inc. v. Intuit Inc.,
675 F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
III
A
We agree with the district court that § 112 ¶ 6 applies
to claims 1 and 6. IAD does not contest the district court’s
means-plus-function interpretation of claim 1. Since
claim 1 recites the identical means-plus-function phrase as
claim 6, including the “determining a time when torque
reaches a maximum” function, that function should have
the same meaning in claim 6. 2 A “strong” principle of claim
construction dictates that the same phrase in different
2 Nor did IAD ask the district court to construe this
phrase differently between claims 1 and 6. See J.A. 391–
94; J.A. 16–17. The district court considered whether the
“control circuit” in claim 6 described sufficient structure for
the disputed function, just as IAD requested. J.A. 18; J.A.
392–94.
Case: 19-1100 Document: 44 Page: 6 Filed: 01/30/2020
6 INTELLIGENT AUTOMATION DESIGN v. ZIMMER BIOMET CMF
AND THORACIC
claims of the same patent should have the same meaning
unless “it is clear that the same phrase has different mean-
ings in different claims.” In re Varma,
816 F.3d 1352, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2016). The recitation of a “control circuit for”
performing the determining function in claim 6 provides
detail about how the system achieves the function. But the
recited “control circuit” does not change the meaning of “de-
termining a time when torque reaches a maximum,” nor
does it provide enough description of the structure to ren-
der the limitation structural, rather than functional. See
Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l,
Inc.,
711 F.3d 1348, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (explaining
how “not just any adjectival qualification or functional lan-
guage” modifying a recited circuit will render a “circuit”
limitation structural, and providing examples of some ad-
jectival qualifications that would do so). We thus affirm
the district court’s application of § 112 ¶ 6 to “determining
a time when torque reaches a maximum.”
We next construe the claimed function. We agree with
IAD’s interpretation. Despite arguing for a holistic claim
interpretation, Biomet parses the claimed “determining a
time” function too rigidly. Biomet’s interpretation of the
function to mean determining when the torque is “arriving”
at the maximum, see Appellee’s Br. 52, has a major flaw:
both parties agree that function would be impossible to
practice.
Id. at 49–50; Appellant’s Reply Br. 16–17. “[A]
construction that renders the claimed invention inoperable
should be viewed with extreme skepticism.” AIA Eng’g
Ltd. v. Magotteaux Int’l S/A,
657 F.3d 1264, 1278 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
An ordinarily skilled artisan could plausibly under-
stand the claimed function to mean retrospectively observ-
ing changes in torque to ascertain when the torque has
reached the maximum, the tense of “reaches” notwith-
standing. Both the commonsense mathematics perspective
that one cannot conclusively determine whether the torque
reaches a maximum until one is able to calculate the slope
Case: 19-1100 Document: 44 Page: 7 Filed: 01/30/2020
INTELLIGENT AUTOMATION DESIGN v. ZIMMER BIOMET CMF 7
AND THORACIC
that follows the putative maximum, e.g., Appellee’s Br. 8,
and the operability of the invention support this interpre-
tation. The intrinsic record, if not entirely consistent,
yields stronger inferences in favor of this interpretation
than against it. See, e.g., J.A. 455 (“[The claimed method]
stops the motor at the optimum point of grip between the
screw and the material. It does [s]o by detecting a negative
rate of change in torque that occurs right after the peak
torque level is achieved at the maximum point of grip.” (em-
phasis added)); see also infra n.3.
Because we understand Biomet to contest the suffi-
ciency of the disclosed structure rather than the adequacy
of the link between that structure and the claimed func-
tion, see Appellee’s Br. 54, we need not address the link be-
tween this claimed function and the structure in the
specification.
B
We next address whether claims 1 and 6 are indefinite.
“[F]or a claim element recited in means-plus-function for-
mat, ‘the specification must contain sufficient descriptive
text by which a person of skill in the field of the invention
would know and understand what structure corresponds to
the means limitation.’” Bosch Auto. Serv. Sols., LLC v.
Matal,
878 F.3d 1027, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Ty-
phoon Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc.,
659 F.3d 1376,
1383–84 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). When describing microproces-
sor-implemented functions, the specification must “disclose
an algorithm for performing the claimed function” on the
microprocessor “in any understandable terms including as
a mathematical formula, in prose, or as a flow chart, or in
any other manner that provides sufficient structure.”
Noah
Sys., 675 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Net MoneyIN, Inc. v.
VeriSign, Inc.,
545 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008) and
Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc.,
523 F.3d 1323, 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2008)). Even so, “[t]his court does not impose a
lofty standard in its indefiniteness cases.” In re Aoyama,
Case: 19-1100 Document: 44 Page: 8 Filed: 01/30/2020
8 INTELLIGENT AUTOMATION DESIGN v. ZIMMER BIOMET CMF
AND THORACIC
656 F.3d 1293, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting
Finisar,
523 F.3d at 1341). Rather, the specification need only dis-
close enough to “permit one of ordinary skill in the art
to . . . perceive the bounds of the invention.”
Id. (quoting
Finisar, 523 F.3d at 1340–41).
Here, the specification teaches “a series of instructions
for the computer to follow,” Typhoon
Touch, 659 F.3d at
1384, that reasonably bounds how the claimed invention
might “determin[e] a time when torque reaches a maxi-
mum . . . thereby determining the optimum point of grip.”
The microprocessor receives the already-filtered analog
current signal representing torque and smooths it using an
averaging formula. See ’683 patent col. 3 ll. 9–26. The mi-
croprocessor measures and monitors the value of the signal
after it receives and smooths it. See
id. Then, if the micro-
processor detects a decrease in current, signifying that the
torque has begun dropping and therefore that the screw
has reached the optimum point of grip, it signals the con-
troller to stop the motor.
Id. at col. 3 ll. 26–28. Understood
as a whole, this written description provides a coherent se-
ries of steps defining how to perform the corresponding
claimed steps: detecting the motor torque, smoothing that
torque using an average means (the averaging formula),
and stopping the motor at the optimum point of grip, deter-
mined by the time the torque reaches a maximum. 3
Id. at
col. 4 ll. 15–20.
3 The parallels between the written description and our
interpretation of the claimed function reinforce the correct-
ness of our interpretation. See Budde v. Harley-Davidson,
Inc.,
250 F.3d 1369, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“In constru-
ing [means-plus-function] terms used in patent claims, it is
necessary to consider the specification as a whole, and to
read all portions of the written description, if possible, in a
manner that renders the patent internally consistent.”).
Case: 19-1100 Document: 44 Page: 9 Filed: 01/30/2020
INTELLIGENT AUTOMATION DESIGN v. ZIMMER BIOMET CMF 9
AND THORACIC
Because the disclosed algorithm and the claimed func-
tion both solve the problem of establishing the “optimum
point of grip” when the microprocessor should signal the
control circuit to cut power to the motor, an ordinarily
skilled artisan would associate the algorithm and the func-
tion. Given other simplifying assumptions disclosed by the
patent, an ordinarily skilled artisan could perceive the
bounds of the invention. For instance, the ’683 patent
teaches that the preferred embodiment’s torque controller
is designed to measure the value of a torque profile that is
continuously increasing to a single peak before it drops.
See ’683 patent fig.5;
id. col. 2 ll. 43–64, col. 3 ll. 3–5. The
smoothing mechanisms taught by the ’683 patent also help
ensure that the torque curve takes this shape. See
id. col. 3
ll. 29–46. Given these assumptions—whether realistic or
not—the ’683 patent need only describe a simple computa-
tional process to define how to determine the time that the
torque reaches a maximum. It does so: The microprocessor
should “monitor” the motor current; when it detects a de-
crease in current, torque has reached a maximum and the
microprocessor should signal the controller to stop the mo-
tor. We are persuaded that an ordinarily skilled artisan
would find this a reasonably certain description of how the
invention determines a time when the torque reaches a
maximum, especially in view of the ultimate goal of deter-
mining when to stop the screwdriver.
Biomet does not persuade us otherwise, particularly
given its burden to show clear and convincing evidence of
indefiniteness. In addition to relying on a faulty interpre-
tation of the claimed function, Biomet mistakenly fixates
on the ’683 patent’s inability to solve certain technical
problems that the patent does not profess to solve. Biomet
further misplaces its focus in making an immaterial com-
parison between the ’683 patent’s “algorithm” and the al-
gorithm applied in IAD’s commercial embodiment (because
the latter purportedly would solve the alleged technical
problems). These arguments rest on an implicit critique of
Case: 19-1100 Document: 44 Page: 10 Filed: 01/30/2020
10 INTELLIGENT AUTOMATION DESIGN v. ZIMMER BIOMET CMF
AND THORACIC
the ’683 patent perhaps relevant to other patentability cri-
teria, but not persuasive when evaluating indefiniteness.
Cf. Miles Labs., Inc. v. Shandon Inc.,
997 F.2d 870, 875
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (“The invention’s operability may say noth-
ing about a skilled artisan’s understanding of the bounds
of the claim.”); EON Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. AT & T Mo-
bility LLC,
785 F.3d 616, 624 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining
the indefiniteness “question” as “whether the specification
contains a sufficiently precise description of the ‘corre-
sponding structure’ to satisfy section 112, paragraph 6, not
whether a person of skill in the art could devise some
means to carry out the recited function”).
Nor does Biomet’s expert testimony alter this conclu-
sion. Even if we consider the district court’s references to
this testimony to be findings of fact, when the specification
“unambiguously set[s] forth” the meaning of a claim term,
expert testimony about the claim term becomes “irrelevant
to the issue of indefiniteness.” Personalized Media
Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
161 F.3d 696, 706
(Fed. Cir. 1998); see
id. at 705–706 (explaining how the
specification sufficiently informed an ordinarily skilled ar-
tisan of the meaning of a claim term and thus rejecting ex-
pert testimony that the specification’s disclosure was
inadequate). Applying IAD’s sounder interpretation of the
claimed function, the specification manifestly discloses an
“algorithm” to perform that claimed function. Although
the specification cannot itself unambiguously establish
that the algorithm adequately defines the structure of the
claimed function, Biomet’s expert testimony does not pro-
vide clear and convincing evidence of the algorithm’s insuf-
ficiency. 4 To the extent that this testimony even discusses
4The district court indisputably did not make findings
of fact from Biomet’s expert testimony regarding the suffi-
ciency of the algorithm. The district court characterized
the expert testimony as showing that the specification did
Case: 19-1100 Document: 44 Page: 11 Filed: 01/30/2020
INTELLIGENT AUTOMATION DESIGN v. ZIMMER BIOMET CMF 11
AND THORACIC
the sufficiency of the specification’s disclosed algorithm,
the testimony, like Biomet’s arguments, focuses on the
“sufficiency of the written description to enable the practice
of the invention of the claims” and not the “imprecision of
the claims.” Personalized Media Commc’ns,
LLC, 161 F.3d
at 706.
We would not hold out the ’683 patent as an exemplar
of impeccable patent drafting. But given the simple prob-
lem described by this patent, the brief passage taught in
the specification suffices to define the bounds of the
claimed solution. In claims 1 and 6, the invention deter-
mines a time that torque reaches a maximum by using a
microprocessor to detect a decrease in torque. A “decrease
in current, corresponding to a drop in torque” provides a
clear, reasonably certain boundary, particularly in light of
the specification’s explanation of the assumptions inherent
in the method. That is enough for definiteness.
IV
We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. We agree with the district
court that the disputed claim term is subject to a means-
plus-function analysis. But we reverse the district court’s
judgment holding the ’683 patent invalid for indefiniteness
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
not disclose an algorithm, see J.A. 22, therefore foreclosing
the possibility of fact-findings about the sufficiency of an
algorithm. Evidence not relied on by the district court does
not receive deferential review on appeal. Cf.
CardSoft,
807 F.3d at 1351 n.1 (“[T]he mere submission of extrinsic
evidence is not enough to mandate deference to a district
court’s claim construction.”).
Case: 19-1100 Document: 44 Page: 12 Filed: 01/30/2020
12 INTELLIGENT AUTOMATION DESIGN v. ZIMMER BIOMET CMF
AND THORACIC
AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART,
AND REMANDED
No costs.