ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE, United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Res-Care, Inc. brought this action for indemnity against Defendants Roto-Rooter, Leonard Valve and Bradford White arising from Plaintiff's $8.5 million settlement of a lawsuit brought by the Conservator of a severely developmentally disabled adult, Theresa Rodriguez, who was badly scalded by hot water during a shower at her residential care facility. Defendants Roto-Rooter and Leonard Valve have moved for summary judgment.
The Court held a hearing on Defendants' Motions on September 16, 2010. The Court issued a brief order on October 1, 2010 denying both motions. This opinion sets forth the Court's reasoning in detail.
Summary judgment shall be granted if "the pleadings, discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and give it the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The court must not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter, but only determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Balint v. Carson City, 180 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir.1999). The evidence presented by the parties must be admissible. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e).
If the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party "may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading;" rather, it must set forth "specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "Conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment." Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir.2007); see also Nelson v. Pima Community College, 83 F.3d 1075, 1081-82 (9th Cir.1996) ("[M]ere allegation and speculation do not create a factual dispute for purposes of summary judgment"). If the nonmoving party fails to show that there is a genuine issue for trial, "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Roto-Rooter moves for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff cannot provide evidence that Roto-Rooter's conduct was intentional so as to indemnify Plaintiff or its employee for their relative intentional conduct; (2) Plaintiff will be unable to demonstrate that any portion of the settlement of the underlying action represents comparative negligence of Roto-Rooter because Plaintiff failed to allocate the settlement according to the claims in the underlying case; and (3) the intentional misconduct of Plaintiff and the criminal misconduct of its employee constitute superceding causes that cut off any potential liability on the part of Roto-Rooter.
Theresa Rodriguez is a severely developmentally disabled woman who resided at McGarvey House, a residential care facility for severely developmentally disabled individuals located in San Mateo County owned by Plaintiff, from 2002 until the scalding incident on May 5, 2004. Declaration of Angela Ompoc (Ompoc Decl.) Ex. A. She was dependent on staff for activities of daily living, including showering. Ompoc Decl. Ex. B.
Plaintiff has a commercial account with Roto-Rooter. Ferguson Decl. Ex. K at 77-78. On April 28, 2004, Roto-Rooter was called to the McGarvey House to replace a leaking water heater. Ompoc Decl. Ex. C at 78-79; Declaration of Lori Ferguson (Ferguson Decl.) Ex. E. Keith Campbell was the plumbing service technician sent to McGarvey House that day. Ompoc Decl. Ex. D; Ferguson Decl. Ex. E. He had been an employee of Roto-Rooter for nine and one half years. Id.
Roto-Rooter states on its website that it has factory trained and expert plumbers,
Campbell removed a 50-gallon water heater and replaced it with a 50-gallon Bradford White water heater. Ompoc Decl. Ex. D. He was not advised on that date that there were any problems with temperature fluctuation. Ompoc Decl. Ex. E. He did not speak with anyone at the McGarvey House to ascertain any information about the particular needs of the McGarvey House residents with respect to hot water. Ferguson Decl. Ex. G at 69. He did not know when he went to the McGarvey House that it was a residential care facility. Ferguson Decl. Ex. G at 105.
After installing the water heater, Campbell set the temperature to between "high" and "warm" where he usually sets it, but which is higher than the manufacturer's recommended setting. Ompoc Decl. Ex. F; Ferguson Decl. Ex. H at RR000033. He estimated that the temperature at that setting would probably be 118 or 120 degrees. Ferguson Decl. Ex. G at 135. He testified that in general, his determination of where to set the temperature of the water heater is not influenced by who would be using the hot water. Ferguson Decl. Ex. G at 77. Campbell did not test the water temperature before leaving the McGarvey House; it is not his practice to do so because it takes about forty-five minutes for the water to heat up and because there is no training to test the temperature before leaving. Ferguson Decl. Ex. G at 73-74. According to Plaintiff's expert, the failure to test the water temperature was contradicted the manufacturer's instructions and was a breach of his duty as a plumber. Declaration of Ronald George (George Decl.) Ex. B at 12-13. Further, according to the expert, Campbell's reliance on the water heater's thermostat to control the outlet temperature was a violation of the Uniform Plumbing Code because the thermostat cannot accurately control the hot water in the water heater. Id. at 14. The Bradford White manual states that water above 125 degrees can cause severe burns instantly. Ferguson Decl. Ex. H at RR000029.
Campbell did not make any adjustments to the mixing valve manufactured by Leonard Valve that had been attached to the water heater at the McGarvey House, nor did he know what it was when he saw it attached to the water heater. Ompoc Decl. Ex. H; Ferguson Decl. Ex. I; Ex. G at 74-75, 113. Plaintiff's expert testified that an adequately trained plumber would have known what a mixing valve was and would have checked it when changing the water heater. Ferguson Decl. Ex. K at 70; George Decl. Ex. B. The mixing valve was connected to the water heater by a short branch pipe and was visible. Ferguson Decl. Ex. G, I, K. The purpose of a mixing valve is to reduce the temperature from a boiler or heater down to a lower level. Ompoc Decl. Ex. J; Ferguson Decl. Ex. K. The valve operates as a safety device, so that if the water comes out of the water heater at an unsafe temperature, the mixing valve will bring the temperature down to a safe level before delivering the water to the household fixtures. Ferguson Decl. Ex. K. The mixing valve label stated that it was not to be used for "direct showering or bathing applications." Ompoc Decl. Ex. I.
Campbell did not have any factory training with respect to the Bradford White water heater or anything else. Ferguson Decl. Ex. G at 93. Roto-Rooter has no factory training program. Ferguson Decl. Ex. D at 37-38. Roto-Rooter also has no
The McGarvey House maintains a temperature log in which staff daily tracks the temperature of the water coming out of the shower. Ompoc Decl. Ex. G (April), N(May). Staff checks the temperature by letting the water run hot, putting the water in a container and using a thermometer to determine the temperature. Ompoc Decl. Ex. P at 39; Ex. W at 17. Temperatures for showers should be between 100 and 110 degrees. Id. The temperature log from McGarvey House shows that the water temperatures were in the normal range of about 110 degrees for the two days following the water heater installation on April 28, 2004. Ompoc Decl. Ex. G. In the five days before the scalding incident on May 5, 2004, the water temperature readings were much higher than 110 degrees, including up to 135 degrees. Ompoc Decl. Ex. N. The McGarvey House manager, Frederick Porche, admitted that he adjusted the knob on the water heater in an attempt to change the temperature. Ompoc Decl. Ex. U at 62. Staff workers at the McGarvey House notified the administrator of the temperature fluctuations for at least five days before the incident. Ompoc Decl. Ex. B at RC-INDEMNITY000012. According to the investigation report regarding the scalding incident by the Department of Health Services, at 10:45 a.m. on May 5, 2004 (the date of the incident), Kelli Stanton-Clarke, Plaintiff's administrator, was instructed to cease using hot water for showering or bathing clients until further notice. Ompoc Decl. Ex. B at RC-INDEMNITY 000008. However, Plaintiffs' Executive Director, Faye Richins, testified that she did not know if the Department of Health Services had ordered showers to be ceased before the incident. Ferguson Decl. Ex. R at 97. Stanton-Clarke testified that she could not recall if anyone ordered showers to cease before the incident. Id. Ex. Q at 154-55.
Richins stated in a declaration submitted in the underlying state court matter that Porche told her that he contacted Roto-Rooter several times between April 28, 2004, the date of the water heater installation, and May 4, 2004, the day before the incident, to complain about the fluctuations in water temperatures at McGarvey House. Ferguson Decl. Ex. M at ¶ 4. Bill Foley of Roto-Rooter, however, stated that there were no calls from the McGarvey House to Roto-Rooter between April 28 and May 5, and that the next contact was on May 6. Ompoc Decl. Ex. T at 92-93. The investigation report does not mention any attempts by McGarvey House employees to contact Roto-Rooter. Ompoc Decl. Ex. B. Roto-Rooter did not send a technician to the McGarvey house between April 28 and May 5, 2004. Ferguson Decl. Ex. E.
Oretha Ocansey, an employee at McGarvey House, gave Ms. Rodriguez a shower at approximately 7:00 p.m. on May 5, 2004. Ompoc Decl. Ex. V at 188. After removing Ms. Rodriguez from the shower, Ocansey dressed Ms. Rodriguez and placed her in bed. Ompoc Decl. Ex. B. As a result of the shower, Ms. Rodriguez sustained second degree burns to her abdomen and lap
Another hour passed before staff called 911 for Ms. Rodriguez. Ompoc Decl. Ex. B. Another staff member who was present on May 5, 2004, Norma Molina, testified that the house manager, Porche, advised against calling 911 because it "would be a problem for the company." Ompoc Decl. Ex. X. Porche testified that on the night of the incident, he was at home sleeping when Mercado called him to say that Ms. Rodriguez had a blister, but Mercado did not say it was a burn. Ferguson Decl. Ex. S at 101. Porche told Mercado to put ointment on it. Id. Then Ocansey called him and said only: "I didn't do anything, I didn't do anything." Id. at 103. Then Mercado called back to say that the skin was peeling back and that 911 had already been called because another staff member called immediately when she saw Ms. Rodriguez's condition. Id. at 105.
Plaintiff's expert states that while delay in treatment can cause additional progression in burn severity in some instances, the evidence does not support a finding in this case that the delay in treatment significantly contributed to their severity or caused complications that worsened Ms. Rodriguez's injuries. Natarajan Decl. ¶ 6. Roto-Rooter's expert, however, testified that the delay in treatment caused the burns to progress from second to third degree. Ompoc Decl. Ex. Y. As a result of her injuries, Ms. Rodriguez underwent painful treatment, and became dependent on a ventilator and restricted to an acute care hospital facility. Ompoc Decl. Ex. Z.
Ocansey eventually pled nolo contendere to violation of California Penal Code section 368, elder abuse, for her role in causing Ms. Rodriguez's injuries. Ompoc Decl. Ex. AA at 4.
Following the incident, the mixing valve was found to be corroded. Ompoc Decl. Ex. K at 70. Roto-Rooter's expert testified that the condition of the mixing valve indicated that it was likely inoperable for over two months prior to the incident. Ompoc Decl. Ex. L. Roto-Rooter technicians made two visits to the McGarvey House after May 5, 2004 before discovering on a third visit (by another plumbing technician) that the mixing valve was corroded. Ferguson Decl. Ex. E.
As a result of the injuries to Ms. Rodriguez, the Conservatorship of Ms. Rodriguez filed a civil suit against Plaintiff and its employees alleging violations of the state elder abuse act and California Business and Professions Code section 17200, as well as negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. Ompoc Decl. Ex. BB. Roto-Rooter was not named as a defendant. Id. Plaintiff filed a cross-complaint against Roto-Rooter, Leonard Valve and Bradford White in the state court action, alleging negligence and products liability. Ompoc Decl. Ex. CC. Three days into the trial, Res-Care dismissed without prejudice its cross-complaint against Roto-Rooter. Ompoc Decl. ¶ 41.
On July 24, 2008, Plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement with the Conservatorship
Roto-Rooter argues that Plaintiff's intentional conduct, including that of Ocansey, precludes Plaintiff from receiving indemnity and contribution. "There shall be no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally injured the injured person." Cal. Code of Civil P. 875(d); Bartneck v. Dunkin, 1 Cal.App.3d 58, 61, 81 Cal.Rptr. 428 (1969) ("Subdivision (d) of section 875 clearly denies the right of contribution to `any tortfeasor who has intentionally injured the injured person.'"). An intentional tortfeasor is entitled to seek indemnity from a concurrent intentional tortfeasor (Baird v. Jones, 21 Cal.App.4th 684, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 232 (1993)), but an intentional tortfeasor is barred from seeking partial indemnity from a negligent tortfeasor (Allen v. Sundean, 137 Cal.App.3d 216, 186 Cal.Rptr. 863 (1982); Thomas v. Duggins Constr. Co., 139 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1112-13, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 66 (2006) ("The same policy considerations of deterrence and punishment that bar a reduction of an intentional tortfeasor's liability to reflect the plaintiff's contributory negligence also support the conclusion that an intentional tortfeasor's liability to the plaintiff is not subject to apportionment (i.e., reduction) where the negligence of one or more third party tortfeasors contributed to the injuries.")); Weidenfeller v. Star and Garter, 1 Cal.App.4th 1, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 14 (1991) (stating that a party that commits an intentional tort cannot escape responsibility for damages based on the negligence of the joint tortfeasor, but "Unlike Godfrey [v. Steinpress, 128 Cal.App.3d 154, 180 Cal.Rptr. 95 (1982)] and Allen, this is not a case where the intentional actor is attempting to shift its financial burden to a negligent party. We have the converse situation, where the injured party is attempting to transfer the intentional actor's responsibility to the negligent tortfeasor.").
Here, unlike in Weidenfeller, Allen, and Baird, there was no trial in the underlying state court action resulting in a finding of fact of intentional acts. Further, Plaintiff made no admission of liability when it settled the underlying case. See Ompoc Decl. Ex. DD at 4. In addition, Plaintiff notes that Res-Care, Inc. was granted summary judgment on the punitive damages claim in the underlying case, which is somewhat inconsistent with a finding of intentional conduct by Plaintiff or its employee. See Request for Judicial Notice Ex. 3. Plaintiff also notes that an elder abuse act violation may be based on recklessness and is not limited to intentional misconduct. See Conservatorship of Gregory, 80 Cal.App.4th 514, 521, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 336 (2000). Further, Ocansey's plea of nolo contendere was to a violation of California Penal Code section 368(b)(1), which does not require a showing of intent. See People v. Holvey, 205 Cal.App.3d 51, 60, 252 Cal.Rptr. 335 (1988); see also Request for Judicial Notice Ex. 1 (Petition and Order of Expungement for Ocansey). Plaintiff also notes that Plaintiff was not cited by the Department of Health Services for violation of the state Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, but instead for violation of Welfare and Institutions Code section 4502(b), (d), (h)
Roto-Rooter argues that the allegations in the complaint in the underlying case are instructive in framing Plaintiff's right to indemnity, even absent a judicial finding of intent. Specifically, Roto-Rooter points to the allegations in the state court complaint against Res-Care that Res-Care "knowingly set the water temperature at an unsafe level," and "knowingly" placed Ms. Rodriguez in a hot shower "knowing" that temperatures were being recorded as excessive. Ompoc Decl. Ex. BB at 7, 10. Roto-Rooter, however, cites no authority that the bare allegations in a complaint are sufficient for the Court to determine as a matter of law that a party engaged in intentional conduct.
Roto-Rooter argues that because Plaintiff settled the state court action only on behalf of itself and its employees, and there is no evidence that the parties settled claims based on the fault of any other party, including Roto-Rooter, Plaintiff's indemnity claim fails. Specifically, Roto-Rooter points to the testimony of Plaintiff's Rule 30(b)(6) witness:
See Ferguson Decl. Ex. U at 34. Roto-Rooter cites Angelus Assoc. Corp. v. Neonex Leisure Prods., 167 Cal.App.3d 532, 535, 213 Cal.Rptr. 403 (1985) in support of its argument. Angelus, however, is inapposite. In Angelus, the question before the court was whether a nonsettling defendant retailer in a products liability action may pursue a cross-complaint for total equitable
Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Roto-Rooter's motion for summary judgment based on Plaintiff's lack of standing is denied.
Roto-Rooter argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to indemnity or contribution because Plaintiff failed to seek a good faith determination of the settlement and failed to allocate the settlement according to the claims in the underlying action.
California Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6, which governs the determination of good faith settlements, does not require that a party seek a good faith determination. However, if a good faith settlement determination is sought, the parties must allocate the settlement between issues and/or parties. See Erreca's v. Superior Court, 19 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1488, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 156 (1994); Regan Roofing Co. v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.App.4th 1685, 1701, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 62 (1994). Roto-Rooter has provided no caselaw to support its argument that because Plaintiff did not seek a good faith settlement determination, Plaintiff cannot seek indemnity from Roto-Rooter. There was no requirement that Plaintiff seek a determination of the good faith of the settlement under California Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6. Thus, the failure to do so does not support summary judgment in favor of Roto-Rooter.
Roto-Rooter argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to indemnification because it failed to allocate the settlement not only as to the negligence claims, but also as to economic and noneconomic damages. Where the "settling parties have failed to allocate, the trial court must allocate in the manner which is most advantageous to the nonsettling party." Dillingham Construction v. Nadel Partnership, 64 Cal.App.4th 264, 287, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 207 (1998); see also Knox v. County of Los Angeles, 109 Cal.App.3d 825, 835, 167 Cal.Rptr. 463 (1980) (holding that the plaintiff has the burden of proving an agreed allocation in a settlement as between the claims in which joint tortfeasor status was alleged, so the court could determine the appropriate setoff amount to be applied against a money judgment entered in the plaintiff's favor after trial against a non-settling defendant, and remanding for further proceedings to determine the setoff amount). The testimony of an attorney for the party seeking indemnification is not reliable evidence of the allocation. See id. at 285, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 207; id. at 277, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 207 (testimony from attorney and expert not sufficient to show allocation because the numbers "sprang from the
Dillingham, 64 Cal.App.4th at 284, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 207; id. at 285, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 207 ("As we see it, a reasonable settlement amount can be used to establish damages in equitable indemnity actions, where (1) the parties to the settlement agreement have entered into a negotiated agreement specifically allocating settlement proceeds between claims; and (2) in a proceeding in which the nonsettling parties are allowed to be heard, the trial court finds that the allocation was made in good faith. If no such pretrial allocation and determination has been made, there may be other methods to establish damages. However, an attorney for the party seeking indemnification cannot be permitted to testify, after the fact, as to how he believes settlement proceeds would have been allocated had the parties negotiated and resolved the issue.").
"Where multiple tortfeasors are responsible for an indivisible injury suffered by the plaintiff, each tortfeasor is jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for those damages and thus may be held individually liable to the injured plaintiff for the entirety of such damages." Expressions at Rancho Niguel v. Ahmanson Developments, Inc., 86 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1139, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 895 (2001). An individual tortfeasor's joint and several liability for noneconomic damages is limited to its proportion of fault. Marina Emergency Medical v. Superior Court, 84 Cal.App.4th 435, 439, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 866 (2000); Cal. Civil Code § 1431.2 (requiring that liability for noneconomic damages must be several, not joint).
The failure to allocate is not fatal to a determination of indemnity, but instead when there is no allocation, the trier of fact must determine the allocation before determining indemnity. See Dillingham, 64 Cal.App.4th at 276, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 207; Union Pacific Corp. v. Wengert, 79 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1448, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 68 (2000) (stating that the jury in that case should have been instructed to determine the amount of settlement attributable to economic losses and the defendant should have only been charged with his proportionate share of that amount). In Union Pacific, the court stated that:
Union Pacific, 79 Cal.App.4th at 1449, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 68.
Accordingly, drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiff, and because the question of the allocation of the settlement is disputed, summary judgment is denied on this basis.
Roto-Rooter argues that the intentional conduct of Plaintiff as well as the criminal conduct of Ocansey were so extraordinary as to cut off any negligence by Roto-Rooter. "A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force which by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about." Restatement of Torts, § 440. "Where, subsequent to the defendant's negligent act, an independent intervening force actively operates to produce the injury, the chain of causation may be broken. It is usually said that if the risk of injury might have been reasonably foreseen, the defendant is liable, but that if the independent intervening act is highly unusual or extraordinary, not reasonably likely to happen and hence not foreseeable, it is a superseding cause, and the defendant is not liable." 6 Wiktin, Summary of California Law, § 1197 (10th ed. 2005).
"Whether the act of the third person is a superseding cause depends in part on whether it (and plaintiff's injury) was reasonably foreseeable." Powell v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 166 Cal.App.3d 357, 364, 212 Cal.Rptr. 395 (1985); see also Torres v. Xomox Corp., 49 Cal.App.4th 1, 19, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 455 (1996) ("It must appear that the intervening act has produced `harm of a kind and degree so far beyond the risk the original tortfeasor should have foreseen that the law deems it unfair to hold him responsible.' . . . As Xomox notes, there are cases in which the modification of a product has been determined to be so substantial and unforeseeable as to constitute a superseding cause of an injury as a matter of law . . . However, foreseeability is a question for the jury unless undisputed facts leave no room for a reasonable difference of opinion. . . . Thus, the issue of superseding cause is generally one of fact.") (internal citations omitted); Pappert v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co., 137 Cal.App.3d 205, 210, 186 Cal.Rptr. 847 (1982) ("Several cases express this proposition in the strict affirmative, stating `[t]he general test of whether an independent intervening act, which operates to produce an injury, breaks the
Bigbee, 34 Cal.3d at 57-58, 192 Cal.Rptr. 857, 665 P.2d 947 ("Here, defendants placed a telephone booth, which was difficult to exit, in a parking lot 15 feet from the side of a major thoroughfare and near a driveway. Under these circumstances, this court cannot conclude as a matter of law that it was unforeseeable that the booth might be struck by a car and cause serious injury to a person trapped within.").
Roto-Rooter argues that the intentional and reckless actions of Plaintiff and Ocansey could not have been foreseen or anticipated by Roto-Rooter, and therefore, Roto-Rooter cannot be liable. In Stultz v. Benson Lumber, 6 Cal.2d 688, 59 P.2d 100 (1936), the defendant manufactured defective boards that were used in scaffolding, and the defective condition of the board as well as its unsuitability for the purpose of scaffolding was known to the end user who still used it for that purpose. The user's negligence in constructing a scaffolding with supplies known to be defective terminated the manufacturer's liability. Further, in Premo v. Grigg, 237 Cal.App.2d 192, 46 Cal.Rptr. 683 (1965), the decedent, a child, suffered burns and died from falling into a bucket of hot water used by her father in his janitorial job. The court there found that the defendant restaurant was not aware that the decedent's father was using the water at full heat, rather than diluting it with cold water, so there was no liability on the part of the restaurant. The Stultz and Premo cases, however, are inapposite here. There is no evidence that Plaintiff knew that the water heater was defective, yet used it anyway, thereby superceding Roto-Rooter's liability.
Roto-Rooter argues, however, that like in Stultz and Premo, Roto-Rooter could not have foreseen that employees at McGarvey House would disregard their policies of stopping showers when the temperature was too hot or that an employee
Roto-Rooter points out that for two days after the installation of the water heater, there were normal temperature readings. Also, Roto-Rooter notes that Porche adjusted the water heater temperature at least two times, and that Plaintiff has a policy of stopping showers when the temperatures are too high. This evidence, however, is consistent with the existence of a triable issue of fact as to the foreseeability of Ms. Rodriguez's injuries.
The question of foreseeability is generally one for the jury. This is not a case like Stultz and Premo in which the injuries and harm were so extraordinary as to cut off liability. Because there is a triable issue of fact as to what was foreseeable, summary judgment is denied on this ground.
Accordingly, Roto-Rooter's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
Leonard Valve moves for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff will be unable to demonstrate that any portion of the settlement of the underlying action represents comparative negligence of Leonard Valve because Plaintiff failed to allocate the settlement according to the claims in the underlying case; (2) Plaintiff did not obtain a release of Plaintiff's claims against Leonard Valve; (3) Plaintiff's negligence claim fails because there is no evidence of design or manufacturing defect or evidence of failure to warn; and (4) Leonard Valve acted with reasonable care in designing and manufacturing the mixing valve and provided adequate warnings.
The water heater at the McGarvey House was attached to a Leonard Valve Model 110 tempering valve. Leonard Valve began manufacturing the Model 110 tempering valve in the 1950's and ceased manufacturing it in 1995. Pender Decl. Ex. G at 4, 14. The qualities of the metal used in the Model 110 prevent or limit rust and corrosion. Pender Decl. Ex. H at 10. Leonard Valve connected each Model 110 produced to a known hot water source with a temperature of 135 degrees, and employees
Res-Care California (dba RCCA Services) did not know when the mixing valve was installed at the McGarvey House, and believes that it may have been installed during a retrofit of the McGarvey House in or around October 1995. Pender Decl. Ex. J at 5. RCCA has no information about any persons or companies (aside from Roto-Rooter in May 2004) that inspected or tested the valve. Pender Decl. Ex. J at 7-8. RCCA does not know precisely how the valve was connected to the hot water heater as of the day of the incident. Pender Decl. Ex. J at 6.
The valve served the bath and shower spigots at the McGarvey House. Pender Decl. Ex. J at 7. With respect to the Model 110, Leonard Valve's product catalog stated that: "Leonard's Model 110 is a low cost, easily installed tempering valve which can keep hot water consumption low reducing fuel waste. The Model 110 automatically mixes the hot water supply with cold water to deliver tempered water to fixtures." Pender Decl. Ex. L. The product catalog also stated:
Pender Decl. Ex. M. There is also a warning label attached to the Model 110 valves, including the valve at issue in this case, which read:
Pender Decl. Ex. N.
The Model 110 was not certified to meet any industry standards, including the American Society of Sanitary Engineering. Ferguson Decl. Ex. I at 136-37. Leonard Valve designed its Model 110 valve in the 1950's and although it changed the warnings and labels over the years, it did not alter the physical design of the product. Ferguson Decl. Ex. I at 87-88, 101, 115, 131. Leonard Valve had developed alternative designs prior to 1995 for the valve, as it began phasing out the Model 110 in 1993, in favor of other products that were certified to industry standards. Ferguson Decl. Ex. I at 120, 190. Leonard Valve continued to sell the Model 110 without recalling it or warning users about the inferior product. Id. The Model 110 came off the market in 1995 in favor of a product that met industry standards. Ferguson Decl. Ex. I at 136-37, 154-55.
For the reasons stated above with respect to Roto-Rooter, and as addressed below, Leonard Valve's motion for summary
Leonard Valve argues that a tortfeasor who settles a claim such as Plaintiff is not entitled to contribution from another tortfeasor such as Leonard Valve whose liability is not explicitly extinguished in the settlement agreement through a release. See, e.g., Pearson Bros. Co., Inc. v. Allen, 131 Ill.App.3d 699, 86 Ill.Dec. 897, 476 N.E.2d 73 (1985) (citing state statute: "`A tortfeasor who settles with a claimant pursuant to paragraph (c) is not entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability is not extinguished by the settlement.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 70, par. 302(e))."); U.S. v. Sunoco, Inc., 644 F.Supp.2d 566, 576 (E.D.Pa.2009) (citing state statute: "While payment is a prerequisite to a money judgment for contribution, the case law cited above makes it clear that the party seeking contribution must also extinguish the liability of the other joint tortfeasors to the injured party in order to bring a separate contribution claim."); Martin v. CSX Transp., Inc., 617 F.Supp.2d 662, 666 (N.D.Ohio 2009) (citing state statute: "`a tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or loss to person or property . . . is not extinguished by the settlement' . . ."). The out-of-state cases cited by Leonard Valve rely on state laws other than California's and Leonard Valve cites no comparable California law on the release issue. Thus, the failure to obtain a release does not support summary judgment in favor of Leonard Valve.
Leonard Valve cites Morgan Creek Residential v. Kemp, 153 Cal.App.4th 675, 684-85, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 232 (2007) for the argument that principles of contribution allow for recovery only when a settling defendant pays in excess of its pro rata share of liability:
Morgan Creek, 153 Cal.App.4th at 684-85, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 232. Leonard Valve argues that here, the evidence of Plaintiff's Rule 30(b)(6) witness demonstrates that the settlement reflected only the conduct of Res-Care and its employees, and that therefore, there are no rights of contribution because the settlement was not on behalf of Leonard Valve. See Ferguson Decl. Ex. U at 34 ("Q: Did the 8.5 million dollars in settlement contain any funds that reflected conduct of parties other than Res-Care and its employees? . . . A: No.").
Plaintiff, however, argues that Leonard Valve's reliance on the Rule 30(b)(6) testimony is misplaced because
Plaintiff contends in the complaint that it is entitled to indemnity from Leonard Valve on the basis that the tempering valve was negligently designed, manufactured and sold, and that Leonard Valve failed to warn consumers of that negligent design, rendering the product dangerous, hazardous and unsafe for its intended use. Compl. ¶ 51.
"In general, a manufacturing or production defect is readily identifiable because a defective product is one that differs from the manufacturer's intended result or from other ostensibly identical units of the same product line." Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal.3d 413, 429, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443 (1978) ("For example, when a product comes off the assembly line in a substandard condition it has incurred a manufacturing defect.").
Leonard Valve argues that there is no triable issue of fact as to manufacturing defects of the Model 110. Specifically, Leonard Valve points to evidence that the valve at issue, along with all other Model 110 valves, had the same specifications. See Pender Decl. Ex. M. Further, the valve at issue, along with other Model 110 valves, automatically mixed hot water with cold water to deliver water to the fixture that is usually at 110 degrees. Id. The product literature for the valve at issue and all Model 110 valves states that it is not an anti-scald device and that it may deliver water hotter than 110 degrees if water greater than 135 degrees is supplied to the valve. Id. Ex. N. According to the warning labels, the valves were specifically not to be used for direct showering and bathing applications. Id. Ex. M, N. Leonard Valve argues that there is no evidence that the subject valve was defective when it was manufactured. Further, Leonard Valve's response to special interrogatory 10 states:
Ferguson Decl. Ex. O at Spec. Int. 10. There is evidence, however, that the bimetallic coils from the valve from the McGarvey House were corroded and rusted. See George Decl. Ex. B at 8-9.
Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that the valve was properly maintained or that it was not installed as an anti-scald device. See Pender Decl. Ex. J at Spec. Int. 3, 5, 8. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is no triable issue of fact as to whether the valve was defectively manufactured. Specifically, there is evidence that the valve at issue rusted and corroded, but there is also no evidence that Plaintiff maintained the valve. Leonard
The California Supreme Court has stated:
Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 432, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443. Under the consumer expectations test, "a plaintiff is required to produce evidence of the `objective conditions of the product' as to which the jury is to employ its `own sense of whether the product meets ordinary expectations as to its safety under the circumstances presented by the evidence.'" Arnold v. Dow Chemical Co., 91 Cal.App.4th 698, 717, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 722 (2001). Further, "the consumer expectations test is reserved for cases in which the everyday experience of the product's users permits a conclusion that the product's design violated minimum safety assumptions, and is thus defective regardless of expert opinion about the merits of the design." Soule v. General Motors Corp., 8 Cal.4th 548, 567, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 882 P.2d 298 (1994); see also Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 429, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443 ("First, our cases establish that a product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner."). The Soule court further held that where the consumer expectation test applies, evidence of the relative risks and benefits of the design is irrelevant and inadmissible: "If the facts permit such a conclusion, and if the failure resulted from the product's design, a finding of defect is warranted without any further proof. The manufacturer may not defend a claim that a product's design failed to perform as safely as its ordinary consumers would expect by presenting expert evidence of the design's relative risks and benefits." Id. at 566, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 882 P.2d 298.
Even if a product satisfies the first test, if the product's design embodies "excessive preventable danger," or, in other words, that the "risk of danger inherent in the challenged design outweighs the benefits," the product may still be defective under the second risk-benefit test. Hansen v. Sunnyside Prods., Inc., 55 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1512, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 266 (1997). "`Excessive' preventable danger logically includes consideration of package warnings to determine the likelihood that harm will occur." Id.
Leonard Valve points to the product catalog, the packaging instructions and the warning labels as evidence that the valve did not fail to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when
Leonard Valve notes that Plaintiff only has knowledge of a possible installation date in 1995, and that there are no records of any maintenance or cleaning from that time until after the incident. The instructions and warning labels mandate maintenance every 6-12 months, but Plaintiff has not produced evidence or argued that it did any kind of regular maintenance.
Finally, Leonard Valve argues that there is no merit to Plaintiff's argument that a safety device should have been affixed to the valve to prevent hot water flow in the event of corrosion. Leonard Valve notes that the warning labels indicate that if excessively hot water flows to the valve, the water coming out of the valve will exceed 110 degrees and possibly up to 180 degrees. Thus, Leonard Valve argues that delivery of water hotter than 110 degrees from the valve is not a design defect and is in fact expected if excessively hot water is delivered to the valve. Leonard Valve argues that it was not reasonably foreseeable that Plaintiff would use the valve in disregard of the warnings and labels, so under the consumer expectation test, Plaintiff cannot maintain its design defect claim.
Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is no triable issue of fact as to the consumer expectations test for the design defect claim. Moreover, there has been no showing that this is a case in which the consumer expectations test would apply, that is, where the every day experience of a user "permits a conclusion that the product's design violated minimum safety assumptions." Soule, 8 Cal.4th at 567, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 882 P.2d 298.
The Barker Court stated:
Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 431, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443. Although there is some overlap between design defect and negligent design, the claims are not the same, as seems to be suggested by Leonard Valve. See Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 434, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443 ("It is true, of course, that in many cases proof that a product is defective in design may also demonstrate that the manufacturer was negligent in choosing such a design. As we have indicated, however, in a strict liability case, as contrasted with a negligent design action, the jury's focus is properly directed to the condition of the product itself, and not to the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct.").
Plaintiff argues that the design of the valve was defective because it utilized
Leonard Valve has the burden of proving that the benefits of the design outweigh the risk of danger. Leonard Valve could satisfy this burden by introducing evidence of:
Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 431, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443. Here, Leonard Valve has provided little evidence to meet its burden, although Leonard Valve does appear to argue that its warnings reduced the likelihood of injury.
By contrast, Plaintiff has provided expert testimony regarding an alternative design that would be less susceptible to rust, corrosion and calcification and thus, less susceptible to failure. See George Decl. Ex. B at 4-9. There is evidence that later models of the valve met industry standards. See Ferguson Decl. Ex. I at 191-92. Further, Leonard Valve was phasing out the Model 110 for approximately two years before the valve at issue was installed. Id. at 190. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is a triable issue of fact that Leonard Valve has failed to show that the benefits of the valve outweigh the risks, even accepting Leonard Valve's argument that the warnings reduced the likelihood of injury at least to some extent.
In a failure to warn case based on negligence:
Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 53 Cal.3d 987, 1002, 281 Cal.Rptr. 528, 810 P.2d 549 (1991). "[W]hen a sufficient warning is given, `the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.'" Johnson v. American Standard, Inc., 43 Cal.4th 56, 65, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 108, 179 P.3d 905 (2008). Although the adequacy of a warning label can be determined on summary judgment
In support of its argument that its warnings were sufficient, Leonard Valve quotes each one of its warnings and labels, including the one attached to the subject valve at issue. Leonard Valve argues that Plaintiff had notice of the warning because it was attached to the subject valve at the McGarvey House.
Plaintiff first argues that the instructions are ambiguous. The product catalog states:
Pender Decl. Ex. M (emphasis in original). The installation instructions state:
Id. Plaintiff argues that the instructions are ambiguous because the valve was permitted to be used in "residential .. hot water systems" per the instructions, yet Leonard Valve argues that the valve should not have been used in showering or bathing applications. Plaintiff also argues that the phrase "direct showering or bathing applications" is vague in the context of the instructions. See Ferguson Decl. Ex. K at 118-19. Roto-Rooter's plumbing technician, Mr. Weider, who discovered the corroded mixing valve at the McGarvey House, testified that he has performed approximately 100 water heater installations and he is familiar with mixing valves, see Ferguson Decl. Ex. K at 24, 57-58, yet he was unable to explain the meaning of the phrase, "direct showering or bathing applications," instead stating: "I don't know the—the technical definition of it. I'm assuming it is referring to devices at the shower itself." See Ferguson Decl. Ex. K at 119. There is also evidence that Leonard Valve's president, Gregory Wilcox, coined the phrase, "direct showering or bathing application." See Ferguson Decl. Ex. I at 32. Wilcox also testified that the Model 110 valve should be used with an additional temperature control installed between Model 110 and the shower fixture. See Ferguson Decl. Ex. I at 121-22. But the installation instructions do not call for an additional valve. See Ferguson Decl. Ex. I at 123-124, 126.
Although this is a close question, based on the authority that the adequacy of a warning is usually a question of fact for the jury, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is a triable issue of fact that Leonard Valve's instructions were at least ambiguous.
Pender Decl. Ex. M. The warning label on the valve itself stated:
Id. at Ex. N. The maintenance guide and record states:
Id. at Ex. M. Plaintiff argues that the warnings are insufficient in two ways: (1) Leonard Valve failed to indicate that the valve would lower output temperatures a certain number of degrees below the water heater temperature; and (2) Leonard Valve should have warned of the scalding consequences for failing to maintain the valve. Plaintiff's arguments are without merit. It is common sense that if the warnings state that water coming into the valve in excess of 135 degrees will result in water delivery to fixtures in excess of 110 degrees, water hotter than 135 degrees flowing to the valve would result in even hotter water delivery. Further, even though Plaintiff's expert opined that Leonard Valve failed to specifically describe the consequences of failing to maintain the valve (see Wolf Decl. Ex. B at 5), it is common sense that the failure to maintain the valve as described in the maintenance guide could result in the improper function of the valve, including possible scalding. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is no triable issue of fact as to the sufficiency of the warning regarding maintenance.
Leonard Valve argues that RCCA was the user of the valve, and that RCCA is a subsidiary of Res-Care, which is one of the largest providers of complex services involving dependent adult care. Leonard Valve further argues that the McGarvey House housed staff that were solely responsible for maintenance and operation of the building, and in particular, the staff recorded hot water temperatures daily. Thus, Leonard Valve argues that RCCA was sophisticated enough to know the importance of maintenance and proper use of a tempering valve. However, the defense of a sophisticated user under the circumstances of this case is a factual issue for the jury.
The focus of a claim for negligence in a products liability case is whether the manufacturer acted with reasonable care. Cf. Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 434, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443 ("Thus, the fact that the manufacturer took reasonable precautions in an attempt to design a safe product or otherwise acted as a reasonably prudent manufacturer would have under the circumstances, while perhaps absolving the manufacturer of liability under a negligence theory, will not preclude the imposition of liability under strict liability principles if, upon hindsight, the trier of fact concludes that the product's design is unsafe to consumers, users, or bystanders."). To prevail on a negligence claim, Plaintiff must show that Leonard Valve owed a legal duty, that it breached the duty, and that the breach was a proximate or legal cause of the injuries. See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 26 Cal.4th 465, 477, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 28 P.3d 116 (2001). Plaintiff argues that Leonard Valve cannot prove that it behaved reasonably as a matter of law because due care is generally a question of fact for the jury. 6 Witkin, Summary of California Law, § 866, at p. 93.
Leonard Valve argues that it acted with reasonable care in manufacturing the Model 110 subject valve. See Valentine v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 68 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1484-85, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 252 (1999)
However, Plaintiff points out that the valve was designed to temper water as hot as 180 degrees (see Pender Decl. Ex. M ("The Model 110 automatically mixes the hot water supply (120F to 180F) with cold water to deliver tempered water (usually at 110F) to fixtures.")), yet there was apparently no testing done at the high end of the input temperature range. Further, Leonard Valve claims that the output temperature of the mixing valve should only change by one degree for every seven degree change in input temperature (see Ferguson Decl. Ex. I at 119), but there is no evidence that there was any testing done to confirm this. Finally, there is no evidence that Leonard Valve conducted a visual inspection of the valves or the internal mechanism of the valve, yet in this case, the subject valve had extensive rust, corrosion and calcification. See George Decl. Ex. B at 5-9. Plaintiff's expert opined that the testing was inadequate because there were no specific tests to determine if the valve would function properly in its installation, nor were there tests of the individual parts of the valve before they were manufactured into the valve nor any final product testing or field testing. See Wolf Decl. Ex. B at 5-6.
Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is at least a triable issue of fact that Leonard Valve negligently manufactured the Model 110 valve. Leonard Valve's motion for summary judgment on the negligent manufacturing claim is denied.
The California Supreme Court has stated:
Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal.3d 465, 470, 85 Cal.Rptr. 629, 467 P.2d 229 (1970).
Leonard Valve cites Hansen, 55 Cal.App.4th at 1513, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 266,
Leonard Valve argues that it manufactured the Model 110 valve with a quality of bronze, brass and stainless steel that limits rust and corrosion. Pender Decl. Ex. H at 9-10. Leonard Valve notes that the valve was not designed for use in direct showering or bathing applications, but as a "low-cost, easily installed tempering valve which can keep hot water consumption low reducing fuel waste." Pender Decl. Ex. M at LV00004. The Model 110 was not designed to be an anti-scald device. Id.
Plaintiff, however, notes that Leonard Valve admits that it never considered alternative designs for the Model 110 valve, nor did it test to industry standards. See Ferguson Decl. Ex. I at 144, 148, 154. Moreover, Leonard Valve replaced the Model 110 with a newer model that met industry standards at around the time that the subject valve was used at the McGarvey House. See Ferguson Decl. Ex. I at 190; Ex. O at 18. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Leonard Valve was reasonable in continuing to manufacture the Model 110 when alternative designs were available.
Plaintiff also argues that Leonard Valve was negligent because there is no evidence that it ever tested the valves for the effects of long term use or foreseeable misuse, raising a triable issue of fact that Leonard Valve failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that the design was safe. See Putensen, 12 Cal.App.3d at 1078, 91 Cal.Rptr. 319 ("With respect to tests or inspections, it is well settled that where an article is such that it is reasonably certain, if negligently manufactured or designed, to place life and limb in peril, the manufacturer is chargeable with negligence if the defective condition could be disclosed by reasonable inspection and tests, and such inspection and tests are omitted."). Thus, Leonard Valve's motion for summary judgment as to negligent design is denied.
"... [T]he manufacturer has a duty to use reasonable care to give warning of the dangerous condition of the product or of facts which make it likely to be dangerous to those whom he should expect to use the product or be endangered by its probable use, if the manufacturer has reason to believe that they will not realize its dangerous condition." Putensen, 12 Cal.App.3d at 1076-77, 91 Cal.Rptr. 319; Anderson, 53 Cal.3d at 1003, 281 Cal.Rptr. 528, 810 P.2d 549 ("Stated another way, a reasonably prudent manufacturer might reasonably decide that the risk of harm was such as not to require a warning as, for example, if the manufacturer's own testing showed a result contrary to that of others in the scientific community. Such a manufacturer might escape liability under negligence principles.").
Leonard Valve argues that it exercised reasonable care in providing numerous instructions and warnings pertaining to maintenance and operation of the valve.
Thus, Defendant Leonard Valve's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
