LAUREL BEELER, United States Magistrate Judge.
In this ERISA action, Plaintiff John Doe,
The Court
LINA never determined, however, whether Plaintiff was disabled under the definition of "disabled" in the life insurance policy. LINA did find that Plaintiff was disabled under the long-term disability plan, but the definition of "disabled" in that plan is different than the definition in the life insurance policy. At LINA's request, the Court will remand to allow LINA to determine whether Plaintiff is "disabled" under the policy. See Mongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long Term Disability Benefit Plan, 46 F.3d 938, 944 (9th Cir.1995). If he is, he is entitled to continued coverage under the policy without paying premiums. The parties shall file a joint case management statement in 60 days advising the Court of the plan administrator's decision (or progress toward making that decision).
Excite offered employees—including Plaintiff—long-term disability and life insurance policies, both issued and administered by LINA under the name CIGNA Group Insurance. See First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 33 at 2 and 8, ¶¶ 4, 8, and 60. This case involves the terms and requirements of those policies. The parties did not file the master policies but instead cite the certificates given to Plaintiff that describe the coverage. See ECF Nos. 52-1 and 55-1 at 3. The life insurance certificate states that it "is not the insurance contract" and that the "master policy is the only contract under which benefits are paid." ECF No. 52-1 at 3 (LM-8L82);
In June 1996, Plaintiff was diagnosed with AIDS. First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 33 at 2, ¶ 14. In February 1997, he went on disability leave and submitted a claim to LINA for long-term disability benefits. Id. at 3, ¶¶ 16, 18. On June 20, 1997, LINA approved his claim and has paid him disability benefits since (except during the temporary hiatus). Id. at 3, ¶ 19; ECF No. 52-3. Plaintiff also applied for Social Security disability benefits, and the Social Security Administration found him disabled as of January 31, 1997. ECF No. 33 at 3, ¶ 17.
In March 1999, Excite notified Plaintiff that it would terminate his employment in April 1999. Id. at 9, ¶ 64. On March 19, 1999, Plaintiff emailed Kristi Dinelli (an HR manager at Excite) about the life insurance policy. ECF Nos. 52-4, 57 at 2, ¶ 4. The policy is excerpted in the next section, but generally, it provides for life and accidental death and dismemberment benefits. ECF No. 52-1 at 6.
At argument, the parties agreed that Excite paid the insurance premiums probably as a percentage of payroll. If an employee's coverage ended (for example, when employment ended), the employee could convert the policy to an individual policy and thereafter pay the premiums. Id. at 4. The policy also provides that premiums are not required for disabled participants who give proof of disability, are disabled for 9 months, and become disabled before age 60. Id. at 11. At argument, the parties agreed that once an employee gives proper proof of disability under the policy, the policy remains in effect as to the disabled employee even if the employer terminates the policy or the disabled employee's employment unless certain events happen (such as the disability ends or the insured turns 65 or retires). Id. To reiterate, this means the following: (1) a non-disabled terminated employee may convert the policy to an individual policy and pay premiums; and (2) the disabled employee retains coverage (and premiums are waived) even if the employer later discontinues the policy, goes out of business, or terminates the disabled employee.
In an email titled "waiver of life insurance premium," Plaintiff asked about the provision of the policy that provides that no insurance premiums are required for disabled employees:
ECF Nos. 52-4, 57 at 2, ¶ 4. On March 23, 1999, Ms. Dinelli replied:
Id. At oral argument, the Court asked whether records might establish whether Excite paid Doe's premiums, or whether they were waived, after Doe became disabled and before Excite terminated his employment. The parties essentially indicated that they could not ascertain anything more.
By letter dated July 17, 2008, CIGNA temporarily suspended Plaintiffs long-term disability benefits effective August 2008. See First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 33 at 3 and 5, ¶¶ 19 and 36; ECF No 25 (Cigna reinstated benefits in July 2009). On October 28, 2008, Plaintiff's counsel wrote to CIGNA, acknowledging termination of the long-term disability benefits and asking the following:
ECF No. 52-5. On January 28, 2009, CIGNA's waiver specialist replied:
ECF No. 52-6. On March 6, 2009, Plaintiffs counsel responded, expressing surprise at CIGNA's failure to maintain records of the waiver, addressing Kristi Dinelli's March 1999 email confirmation of the waiver, and enclosing the certificate of insurance as proof of coverage. ECF No. 52-7 (documents not attached). On March 18, 2009, CIGNA said it was investigating the waiver issue. ECF No. 52-8. On October 14, 2009, LINA's counsel acknowledged that Excite told Plaintiff in the late 1990s that the premium was waived, but stated that in fact, no claim for a waiver was made to LINA and that Plaintiff's insurance coverage thus lapsed in the 1990s. ECF No. 52-9. Plaintiff then filed his first amended complaint and summary judgment motion seeking a determination that he is covered by the policy and is not required to pay premiums because he is disabled. ECF Nos. 33, 51.
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosures on file, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. See id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A dispute about a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. See id. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
The parties agree that the policy here is a qualifying ERISA plan and that Plaintiff is a participant who may bring an action "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan." See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Generally, the Court reviews a plan administrator's denial of benefits de novo. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989). If, however, a plan gives the administrator discretion to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the plan's terms, the Court reviews the administrator's decision for abuse of discretion. See id.; Jebian v. Hewlett-Packard Co. Employee Benefits Org. Income Prot. Plan, 349 F.3d 1098, 1102-03 (9th Cir.2003). LINA does not assert that the policy gives the administrator discretion, and the policy's plain language shows that it does not. Accordingly, the Court reviews de novo LINA's denial of benefits.
There are two issues here: (A) whether there was sufficient notice to LINA of Plaintiffs disability so that if he is in fact disabled, he remains insured and does not have to pay premiums; and (B) if notice was sufficient, whether Plaintiff is "disabled" under the policy. The Court finds notice sufficient but remands for LINA to address whether Plaintiff is disabled under the policy.
Plaintiff argues that he complied with the notice requirement in the policy's Waiver of Premium Benefit provision because he gave proof of disability, was disabled for 9 months, provided annual proof of his disability, and became disabled before age 60. Summary Judgment Motion, ECF No. 52-1 at 11. Defendants respond that the Payment of Claims provision also required Plaintiff to file a "notice of claim" within 30 days of disability. Opposition, ECF No. 54 at 3-4.
In its de novo review here, the Court interprets the life insurance policy by looking to the plain language of its terms. See Nelson v. EG & G Energy Measurements Group, Inc., 37 F.3d 1384, 1389 (9th Cir. 1994). The Court looks to the explicit language of the provisions and construes each provision consistently with the entire agreement. See Richardson v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 112 F.3d 982,
See Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 539 (9th Cir.1990) (citation omitted).
The certificate of insurance has the following provisions. The first 7 provisions are listed in the table of contents by page number as follows. The table of contents then identifies an eighth category called "Description of Coverage; Exclusions" with the additional provisions listed in order below.
1. Individual Insurance: Effective Date;
Termination ........................................ 2
2. Conversion Privilege .................................. 2
3. Eligible Classes ...................................... 3
4. Schedule of Benefits [includes Life
Insurance and Accidental Death &
Dismemberment] ..................................... 4
5. Life Insurance Benefit [includes
Beneficiary] ....................................... 4
6. Payment of Claims ..................................... 6 [actually 5]
7. General Provisions [includes clerical
error].............................................. 7 [actually 6]
8. Description of Coverage; Exclusions ................... Insert
ECF No. 52-1. The document has page numbers on the bottom (1 through 6 only) and separate numbers in the lower left corner that are non-sequential. Essentially, the document is assembled from different sources, depending on what coverage the employer elects.
Plaintiff argues that the Waiver of Premium Benefit provision contains the only requirements for waiver of premiums upon an insured's disability. That provision is as follows:
ECF No. 52-1 at 11 (paragraph numbers not in original). Plaintiff argues that he complied with these requirements because he gave proof of disability, was disabled for 9 months, provided annual proof of his disability, and became disabled before age 60.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff also had to comply with the Notice of Claim and Proof of Loss requirements in the Payment of Claims provision:
Id., ECF No. 52-1 at 7. The argument is that the "Waiver of the Premium Benefit" is a "covered loss" under the Accident/Disability Benefits: Notice of Claim section of the Payment of Claims provision. Opposition, ECF No. 54 at 3. Under that section, Defendants argue, an insured sends a written notice of claim for any covered loss (including a claim for waiver of the insurance premium) within 30 days. LINA then sends the claim forms. The insured then completes the forms and sends them back within 90 days under the Accident/Disability Benefits: Proof of Loss section. Id. at 3-4. Then, according to LINA, an insured seeking a waiver of the premium benefit must comply with the additional four requirements in the Waiver of Premium Benefit provision: give proof of disability, be disabled for 9 months, provide annual proof of disability, and become disabled before age 60. Id. at 5.
Looking at the policy's plain language, nothing in the Waiver of Premium Benefit provision requires an insured to file a notice of claim under the Payment of Claims provision. It requires only:
Communication with LINA is required only to give "proof of disability, and there is no mention of or cross-reference to the Payment of Claims notice provision to obtain the waiver of the premium. The only mention of a "notice of claim" is in paragraph 5, which requires written notice within 12 months of death of a claim for "this benefit," meaning, the life insurance benefit discussed in the preceding paragraph 4 and on page 4 of the policy. (Defendants do not contest this construction of paragraph 5. See ECF No 54 at 6.) The point of the Waiver of Premium Benefit provision is that if a person is disabled (¶¶ 1-3), then no premium is paid (¶¶ 1, 3), and the person is paid the life insurance benefit (¶ 4) if a written claim is made not more than 12 months after death (¶ 5).
Defendants' argument—that a waiver of premium is a "covered loss" requiring notice within 30 days after disability under the Payment of Claims provision—is not persuasive. Read in the context of the entire policy, see Richardson, 112 F.3d at 985, that construction makes no sense. Indeed, the ordinary construction of "covered loss" is that it is a "loss" (like loss of life or a hand) that triggers payment of benefits (like life insurance or accidental death or dismemberment benefits).
Walking through the plan illustrates this. See supra Table of Contents. The policy first lays out who is covered and the dollar amount of benefits: (a) life insurance equal to two times salary with a minimum $10,000 and a maximum $185,000; (b) accelerated benefits for terminal illness of the lesser of 50% of life insurance or $50,000; and (c) accidental death or dismemberment benefits equal to the amount of life insurance. ECF No. 52-1 at 1-6. Then, the Payment of Claims provision sets forth the 30-day notice procedure for "covered losses." Id. at 7. A general provision follows (covering clerical errors, assignments of rights, physical exams or autopsies, and time frames for legal actions). Then the policy defines the "losses" that will result in payment of benefits. Id. at 8-10.
For example, under Accidental Death and Dismemberment Benefit, the policy "pay[s] benefits" for injuries caused by an accident that results in any of the following "losses:"
Loss Benefit
Life.............................. 100% of the Principal Sum
Two or more members .............. 100% of the Principal Sum
One member ......................... 50% of the Principal Sum
Id. at 9. Similarly, under Seatbelt Benefit, the policy "pay[s] benefits" for "loss of life" from car accidents when seatbelts were in use. Id. at 10.
By contrast, the Waiver of Premium Benefit provision does not characterize disability as a "loss." Id. at 11. Indeed, disability alone is not a "loss" under the policy: only death and qualifying dismemberment (such as loss of a hand, foot, or eye) are. Id. at 6, 9, and 10. And only "covered losses" trigger the 30-day notice required in Payment of Claims.
The policy as a whole supports this construction in other ways.
First, the Waiver of Premium Benefit provision requires proof of disability within 12 months to obtain the waiver of premium. By contrast, the Accidental Death
Second, reading the 30-day notice of Payment of Claims into the timing requirements of Waiver of Premium Benefit presents practical problems. The time lines are too different. Assuming disability triggers the notice and proof requirements, here are the competing time lines.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Days or Event months --------------------------------------------------------------after Payment of Claims Waiver of Premium disability Provision Benefit Provision -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 30 days Written notice of claim -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 90 days Return completed claims forms -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9 months Eligibility for premium waiver -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12 months Deadline for proof of disability --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
It does not make sense that an insured claiming a premium waiver gives notice in 30 days, submits proof (the completed claims forms) in 90 days, becomes eligible only in 9 months, and submits proof again in 12 months. Not only is double proof counterintuitive, but also (as defense counsel partly acknowledged at oral argument) it makes no sense to have two proofs of loss because an insured is not eligible for a premium waiver for 9 months, well after the 30 days' notice and 90 days' proof. What does make sense is that the Waiver of Premium Benefit provision has its own proof provision: proof of disability in 12 months (3 months after an insured becomes eligible after being disabled for 9 months). In sum, Doe did not need to provide 30 days' notice to obtain the waiver of premium.
In the last section, the Court concluded that "disability" is not a "covered loss" requiring 30 days' notice under the Payment of Claims provision. Alternatively, the Court holds that it is at least ambiguous whether it is a covered loss and construes the ambiguity against the drafter and in favor of the insured. See Kunin, 910 F.2d at 539. Plaintiff must comply only with the proof requirements in Waiver of Premium Benefit and not the notice and proof requirements in Payment of Claims.
Defendants argue that Doe provided notice of his disability only in October 2008, when Plaintiff's counsel acknowledged CIGNA's (ultimately temporary) termination of disability benefits and asked whether CIGNA also was terminating the waiver of premium benefit. ECF Nod. 54 at 1-2, No. 52-5 (excerpted supra p. 1037). Excite cancelled the policy in June 1999, and providing coverage now—Defendants assert—is actual and substantial prejudice under California's notice-prejudice rule, which allows an insurer to avoid liability based on an untimely notice of a claim only if the insurer shows actual, substantial prejudice due to the late notice. ECF No. 54 at 1-2.
Preliminarily, there is some evidence that Excite provided notice to LINA in 1997 and 1999. LINA administered the
Regardless, even if notice was late, LINA has not shown prejudice under the notice-prejudice rule. Lack of timely notice is a defense to coverage only if the insurer can prove substantial prejudice from the delay. See UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 366, 119 S.Ct. 1380, 143 L.Ed.2d 462 (1999). As the party seeking to disavow coverage, the insurer has the burden of showing that it has been prejudiced by the delay. Root v. Am. Equity Specialty Ins., 130 Cal.App.4th 926, 947, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 631 (2005). "Prejudice is hard to show under the rule." Id. There is no presumption or inference of prejudice based on evidence of delayed notice alone. Instead, "[t]he insurer must show actual prejudice, not the mere possibility of prejudice." Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 12 Cal.App.4th 715, 761, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 815 (1993).
LINA argues only that providing coverage under a cancelled plan is prejudice. ECF No. 54 at 8. But as Plaintiff points out, notice in 1997 would not change the status quo now. Excite still would have cancelled the policy in 1999; and disabled employees who gave proof of disability would have retained coverage and be entitled to waiver of the premiums. See ECF No. 56 at 4. Also, nothing suggests that Defendants' ability to investigate Plaintiff's disability was compromised by late notice. The record shows extensive investigation of Plaintiff's disability, including in 2008 and 2009 when LINA investigated whether Plaintiff still was disabled. See First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 33, ¶¶ 20-59. The disability definitions in the life insurance and disability policies may differ, see infra, but nothing suggests that LINA would have conducted its thorough investigation differently. In sum, LINA has not established actual prejudice.
The bottom line is that Plaintiff complied with the procedural notice requirements of the Waiver of Premium Benefit provision, and the notice-prejudice rule does not excuse liability.
Plaintiff argues that Ms. Dinelli's email—that "we've already waived the premium" and that no forms were needed— demonstrates a clerical error in keeping records that should result in his coverage. More specifically, the life insurance policy's General Provisions contains this provision:
The Court's second inquiry is whether the summary judgment record establishes that Plaintiff is "disabled" under the life insurance policy. The Court concludes that it cannot tell based on this record, and it remands so that LINA (the plan administrator) can address the issue first.
Following oral argument, on May 12, 2010, the Court ordered supplemental briefing on whether remand was appropriate. See ECF No. 60. The reasons are as follows. The summary judgment motion and the opposition mostly addressed whether Plaintiff had to give 30 days' notice for the premium waiver. Plaintiff mentioned that the definitions of "disabled" under the life insurance and long-term disability policies were similar, see ECF No. 51 at 7, and LINA argued that they were different, see ECF No. 54 at 7, but the arguments were short. Then, in the declaration in support of the reply brief, Plaintiff attached excerpts from CIGNA's 800-page long-term disability claim file to support the conclusion that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Doe is disabled under the definition in the life insurance policy. See ECF Nos. 56 at 5, 58 and Exh. A. Even if the excerpts were sufficient to determine whether Plaintiff meets the definition of "disabled" under the life insurance policy (and the Court finds that they are not), Defendants had no opportunity to respond to them, making summary judgment problematic. Then, at oral argument, Defendants asserted that the plan administrator—not the Court—should make the determination initially about whether Plaintiff was disabled. The Court then ordered supplemental briefing. ECF No. 60.
The Court concludes that from a fact perspective and a legal perspective, LINA should make the initial determination about whether Plaintiff is disabled under the life insurance policy.
The two policies define disability differently. Under the life insurance policy, a participant is disabled and entitled to a premium waiver "only if [he] can not do any work for wage or profit." ECF No. 52-1 at 11. The long-term disability policy's definition is as follows:
The modest excerpts from the 800-page claim file are insufficient to evaluate whether Doe is disabled under the life insurance policy's definition.
Plaintiff nonetheless argues that life insurance policy's definition mirrors the Social Security regulations, see 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) & (2)(A), and that therefore, the Social Security Administration's determination that Doe was disabled resolves the issue. ECF No. 52 at 11. But a Social Security Administration award is not necessarily binding on a plan administrator. See Seleine v. Fluor Corporation Long-Term Disability Plan, 598 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1104 (C.D.Cal.2009) (citing Madden v. ITT Long Term Disability
Defendants argue that LINA never determined that Plaintiff was disabled under the definition in the life insurance policy, and LINA must apply the insurance policy before the Court can. ECF No. 61 at 1. Plaintiff counters that remand is inappropriate because LINA has had ample opportunity to determine whether Plaintiff is disabled and eligible for the waiver of premium. ECF No. 62 at 2-3.
In support of its argument that remand is appropriate, Defendants cite cases where the courts remanded to the plan administrator for the initial determination about whether an insured was disabled under the insurance policy's definitions. See ECR No. 61 at 4 ("Ninth Circuit has mandated remand") (collecting cases). For example, in Saffle v. Sierra Pacific Power Company Bargaining Unit Long Term Disability Income Plan, the district court held that the benefits committee— which had discretion to interpret and apply the plan—abused its discretion by construing the disability definition contrary to the plan's plain language. See 85 F.3d 455, 456-58 (9th Cir.1996). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the benefits committee construed the disability definition arbitrarily, but determined that the district court should have remanded to the committee to apply the properly-construed plan to the insured's application for benefits. Id. at 460-61 (citing Patterson v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 11 F.3d 948 (9th Cir.1993) and Mongeluzo, 46 F.3d 938).
Similarly, Defendants identify other cases where district courts have remanded claims to plan administrators for initial decisions about disability. See Mongeluzo, 46 F.3d at 944 (when plan administrator misconstrues disability terms that the court construes more narrowly, the court may remand to the administrator to determine disability under the new standard); Minton v. Deloitte & Touche USA LLP Plan, 631 F.Supp.2d 1213, 1221 (N.D.Cal. 2009) (remanding for disability determination when MetLife had not yet determined whether the insured was disabled under a higher standard for disability); Lavino v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. CV 08-2910 SVW, 2010 WL 234817 at *13 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 13, 2010) (same); Seleine, 598 F.Supp.2d at 1103-04.
Plaintiff argues that these decisions involve plan administrators with discretion to interpret and apply policies. By contrast, Plaintiff argues, LINA has no discretion, and thus the Court owes no deference to the plan administrator and can decide the issue itself. ECF No. 62 at 4-6.
Except Mongeluzo, Plaintiffs cases do involve policies that confer discretion on the plan administrator. In Mongeluzo, however, the plan administrator had no discretion, and the district court reviewed de novo the administrator's decision that the insured should not receive disability benefits after 24 months. See 46 F.3d at 942. The insured there challenged the denial of disability benefits after 24 months on two grounds: (a) the "mental illness" and "functional nervous disorder" limitations on disability benefits were ambiguous and should be construed against the drafter; and (b) new evidence supported his claim for disability benefits beyond 24 months. Id. at 941. Without addressing the arguments about ambiguity, the district court declined to consider the new evidence, upheld the plan administrator's
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the limitations were ambiguous and construed them narrowly. That meant that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the insured's symptoms met the narrower definition. Also, because the administrator and district court did not recognize that the terms were ambiguous, they did not make proper fact findings about the nature of the disability. Id. at 943. The Ninth Circuit also held that a district court—in a de novo review of a plan administrator's decision—can hear new evidence not part of the administrator's record "in certain circumstances to enable the exercise of informed and independent judgment." Those circumstances existed in Mongeluzo to enable an "adequate de novo review of the [administrator's] benefit decision" because a misconception of the law and the narrower definition of the "mental illness" limitation required reevaluation of the evidence. Id. at 943-44. The Ninth Circuit noted that the district court had discretion "to remand to the plan administrator for an initial factual determination." Id. at 944.
Like the plan administrator in Mongeluzo, LINA misconstrued the provisions of the policy. Also, in Mongeluzo, the plan administrator never considered all evidence that the Ninth Circuit deemed relevant to determining disability, and here, LINA never considered the disability evidence at all. Cases—including Mongeluzo—establish that the Court may remand to LINA for the initial decision about whether Plaintiff is disabled under the insurance policy. Furthermore, ERISA gives courts a wide range of remedial powers, including the authority to remand to a plan administrator for factual determinations. See Beaver v. Bank of the W. Welfare Benefits Plan, No. C 09-02177 WHA, 2010 WL 1030464, at * 11 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 18, 2010) (citing Williamson v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir.1998)). Given that the Court does not have the full record about disability, and LINA has the full claims file and can develop the evidentiary record, remand is appropriate.
Plaintiff essentially argues that remand is inappropriate because LINA has refused to make fact findings about disability. ECF No. 62 at 5-6. The Court understands that starting in August 2008, Plaintiff had to fight LINA's temporary suspension of his long-term disability benefits. But there is no evidence that LINA delayed wrongfully in addressing Plaintiff's claim for a waiver of the premium for the life insurance policy. Instead, only in October 2008 (in Plaintiff's counsel's letter to CIGNA) did the issue come up. ECF No. 52-5. CIGNA investigated the claim until October 2009, which is a time period that also encompassed the reinstatement of disability benefits in July 2009. LINA's denial of the waiver of premium benefit rested only on its interpretation of the policy's notice requirements and is not behavior that persuades the Court that it should consider a fact issue before the plan administrator considers it.
Still, the Court appreciates Plaintiff's concern that LINA process his claim expeditiously. The Court is confident that defense counsel will facilitate a speedy determination by the plan administrator. To that end, the parties shall file a joint case management statement in 60 days advising the Court of the plan administrator's decision (or progress toward making that decision).
The Court
