WILLIAM McCURINE, Jr., Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff Teresa Guardado Nunez brings her motion under § 205(g) of the Social Security Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
The Court finds the motions appropriate for submission on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). After careful review of the moving and opposition papers, the administrative record, the facts, and the law, the Court
On August 21, 2007, Plaintiff applied for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits alleging disability. See Administrative Record ("AR") at 107-14.
On September 29, 2010, plaintiff filed the instant complaint pursuant to §405(g) of the Act in order to obtain judicial review of a "final decision" from the Commissioner denying her claim for DIB. Defendant filed an answer to the complaint on December 17, 2010. [ECF Nos. 1, 6].
On February 11, 2011, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. [ECF No. 10]. Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and opposition to plaintiff's motion on March 10, 2011. [ECF No. 11]. Both motions were found suitable for decision without oral argument and taken under submission.
A claimant is entitled to disability benefits if, considering her age, education and work experience, she is unable to perform the work she previously performed and unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months ..." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Act further provides that an individual:
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
The Secretary of the Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 c), 416.920 c).
The ability to do basic work activities is defined as "the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521 (b), 416.921 (b). Such abilities and aptitudes include "[p]hysical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling"; "[c]apacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking"; "[u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions"; [u]se of judgment"; "[r]esponding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual work situations"; and "[d]ealing with changes in a routine work setting." Id.
If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the disability claim is denied. If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the
Section 405(g) of the Act allows unsuccessful applicants to seek judicial review of a final agency decision of the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of judicial review is limited. The Commissioner's denial of benefits "will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error." Brawner v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529 (9th Cir. 1986)).
Substantial evidence means "more than a mere scintilla" but less than a preponderance. Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). "[I]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). The court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner's conclusions. Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir.1985)). If the evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, the court must uphold the ALJ's decision. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). When the evidence is inconclusive, "questions of credibility and resolution of conflicts in the testimony are functions solely of the Secretary." Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982).
Even if the reviewing court finds substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusions, the court must set aside the decision if the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal standards in weighing the evidence and reaching his or her decision. See Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978). Section 405(g) permits a court to enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The reviewing court may also remand the matter to the Social Security Administrator for further proceedings. Id.
After weighing the evidence from the administrative record and listening to the testimony of plaintiff and the experts, the ALJ made the following findings. Plaintiff had not performed substantial gainful employment since her application date. (AR 16). She had severe mental and physical impairments, but her impairments did not meet or equal any of the presumptively disabling listed impairments. (AR 16-17). Her subjective symptom testimony was not fully credible. (AR 19-22). Additionally, the ALJ determined:
(AR 17-18).
Plaintiff does not contest the ALJ's findings regarding her physical impairments. See [ECF Nos. 1, 10]. Plaintiff had no past relevant work, but could perform other jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy. (AR 23-24). Accordingly, the ALJ found plaintiff not disabled and thus ineligible for disability benefits. (AR 24-25).
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in a giving "great weight" to the opinions of Drs. Paxton and Hurwitz and "less than moderate weight" to the opinions of Drs. Heindenfelder and Rodriguez-Reimann because Drs. Paxton and Hurwitz were merely reviewing physicians whereas Drs. Heindenfelder and Rodriguez-Reimann were treating physicians. [ECF No. 10 at 13]. Plaintiff asserts the opinion of a treating physician is entitled to greater weight than the opinion of a non-treating physician. Id. at 14. Accordingly, plaintiff claims the ALJ's reliance on non-treating physician opinions over the opinions of treating physicians was "not only illogical, but illegal." Id. at 13.
Defendant contends the ALJ properly relied on the opinions of Drs. Paxton and Hurwitz and properly discounted the opinions of Drs. Heidenfelder and Rodriguez-Reimann. [ECF No. 11-1 at 5-7]. Although defendant acknowledges that treating physician opinions are generally given more weight than non-treating physician opinions, defendant claims an ALJ may properly discount a treating physician's opinion where the ALJ finds specific and legitimate evidence in the record in support of his conclusion. Id.
The opinions of treating physicians are generally given greater weight than those of other physicians because of the treating physicians' intimate knowledge of the claimant's condition. Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 2001). In order to reject the opinion of a treating physician, the ALJ is required to show specific and legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence from the record. Id.; see also Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence may be based in part on the testimony of a non-treating, non-examining medical advisor. Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 602-3 (9th Cir. 1999). However, substantial evidence may not be based on a reviewing physician's opinion alone, or on the reviewing physician's opinion and the ALJ's personal observations. Id. Rather, substantial evidence requires additional evidence, such as inconsistencies between the treating physicians' reports and the testimony of the claimant. Id. Additionally, an ALJ may properly discount a treating physician's opinion where the treating physician relies heavily on the subjective complaints of the claimant. See Id. However, where the ALJ fails to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the treating physician's opinion, the court will credit the treating physician's opinion as a matter of law. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995).
As explained above, in order to reject the opinion of a treating physician the ALJ is required to show specific and legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence from the record.
In his report to the ALJ, Dr. Heidenfelder opined that plaintiff was moderately or markedly limited in all but one of twenty areas of work functioning. (AR 276-77). Dr. Heidenfelder also indicated plaintiff had a long history of severe depression with minimal improvement despite two years of medication and therapy. (AR 278). The ALJ gave "less than moderate weight" to Dr. Heidenfelder's opinion based on the following factors: (1) Dr. Heidenfelder's treatment notes did not support his conclusion; (2) the reviewing physicians' opinions credited plaintiff with greater potential ability than Dr. Heidenfelder;
After reviewing the record, this Court concludes that the ALJ identified legitimate and substantial evidence from the record to discount Dr. Heidenfelder's opinion. See Morgan, 169 F.3d at 602-03. This evidence included the expert opinions of the board-certified reviewing physicians, the discrepancies between Dr. Heidenfelder's opinion and his treatment notes, the inconsistencies between Dr. Heidenfelder's opinion and his own psychiatric function testing,
The ALJ also cited specific evidence to support his finding of discrepancies in the record. For example, the ALJ noted "[Dr. Heidenfelder's] opinion that the claimant has "marked" limitations in adhering to a schedule is flatly contradicted by her record of treatment with him. In more than 100 appointments over nearly four years, she did not miss any appointments and was late only once." (AR 22). The ALJ also found Dr. Heidenfelder's assessment of marked functional limitations was inconsistent with claimant's admitted daily activities which included caring for her twin sixteen year-old daughters, driving, shopping, cooking, cleaning, reading, visiting friends, paying bills and managing a checking account. Id. Finally, the ALJ considered the reviewing physicians' opinions regarding the claimant's functional capacity as well Dr. Heindenfelder's treatment notes. (AR 21-22).
Despite this evidence, plaintiff's argument has some merit. After all, Drs. Heindenfelder and Rodriguez-Reimann saw plaintiff a combined 260 times whereas Drs. Paxton and Hurwitz merely reviewed Plaintiff's medical records. (AR 22). When competing experts disagree, it is reasonable (indeed required by law) for the ALJ to apply greater weight to the treating physician's opinion. Morgan, 169 F.3d at 602. However, this rule is not absolute, and for good reason. See Morgan, 169 F.3d at 602-3. If the rule were absolute, the ALJ in the instant case would have been forced to accept Dr. Heindenfelder's opinion despite conflicting evidence from his own treatment notes and the admissions of the claimant. Such a rule would subvert the role of the ALJ because "questions of credibility and resolution of conflicts in the testimony are functions solely of the Secretary." Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982).
Based on the evidence identified above, this Court concludes the ALJ cited specific and legitimate reasons to accord Dr. Heidenfelder's opinion with "less than moderate weight." Id. Further, the Court finds these specific and legitimate reasons were based on more than the reviewing physician's opinions and the personal observations of the ALJ. Thus, the ALJ relied on substantial evidence in making its determination. See Morgan, 169 F.3d at 602-3.
Dr. Rodriguez-Reimann submitted a letter to the ALJ in which she described her history with plaintiff and opined that plaintiff was "very responsible" in following up with treatment appointments and medication recommendations. (AR 293). Also, Dr. Rodriguez-Reimann submitted a form that indicated plaintiff was moderately or markedly limited in all but one of twenty areas of work functioning. (AR 294-95). The ALJ gave "less than moderate weight" to Dr. Rodriguez-Reimann because her opinion was not supported by progress notes, her statement that Plaintiff was "very responsible" with medication compliance was inconsistent with the record, and she relied to a large extent on Plaintiff's subjective statements in forming her opinion. (AR 22-23).
After reviewing the record, this Court concludes the ALJ cited specific reasons to discount Dr. Rodriguez-Reimann's opinion. After noting Dr. Rodriguez-Reimann's pecuniary bias, the ALJ noted Dr. Rodriguez-Reimann did not submit progress notes, clinic notes, or standardized testing to substantiate her opinion. (AR 22-23). The ALJ then examined her unsupported opinions and found her statement that the claimant "was very responsible" with her medication "flatly contradicted" by the treating notes of the claimant's other treating physician, Dr. Heidenfelder. (AR 23). Given the absence of supporting clinical notes or testing and the presence of contradictory evidence, the ALJ concluded Dr. Rodriguez-Reimann's opinions relied too heavily on the claimant's "self-reporting." (AR 23).
The Court finds these specific reasons legitimate because "an ALJ may discredit treating physicians' opinions that are conclusory, brief, and unsupported by the record as a whole ..." See Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, Dr. Rodriguez-Reimann's opinion was not supported by the record because (a) she failed to provide corroborating clinical evidence, (b) her opinion was undermined by conflicting evidence in Dr. Heidenfelder's treatment notes, (c) two board-certified psychiatrists concluded the claimant was not disabled, and (d) there is no indication Dr. Rodriguez-Reimann relied on any evidence other than claimant's subjective statements. Moreover, the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Rodriguez-Reimann's opinion because she relied heavily on the claimant's own statements and the ALJ found the claimant's testimony not credible.
Accordingly, the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Rodriguez-Reimann's opinion.
The ALJ gave "great weight" to the opinions of Drs. Hurwitz and Paxton for the following reasons: (1) both doctors are board-certified psychiatrists and have experience with the Social Security disability program, (2) their opinions are supported by the record, including the claimant's admitted activities of daily life, and (3) both doctors had the benefit of reviewing the entire medical record. (AR 21).
Plaintiff does not provide any substantive argument or point to any evidence in the record to discount Drs. Hurwitz' and Paxton's opinions other than their status as reviewing physicians. Because "the opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians may ... serve as substantial evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record" the Court finds Plaintiff's argument to the contrary unavailing. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). Indeed, the independent clinic findings of Dr. Heidenfelder (finding claimant was within normal limits as to judgment, mood, insight, behavior, speech, attitude, appearance, thought process, thought content, etc. on during numerous clinical evaluations) and the claimant's admitted activities (including caring for her twin sixteen year-old daughters, driving, shopping, cooking, cleaning, reading, visiting friends, paying bills and managing a checking account) are consistent with Drs. Hurwitz' and Paxton's opinions and thus demonstrate the ALJ made a reasoned decision based on substantial evidence. See Id.
Accordingly,
For the reasons explained above,
