RONALD M. WHYTE, District Judge.
Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a second amended civil rights complaint ("SAC") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that defendants discriminated against him based on his sexual orientation, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has filed an opposition,
Plaintiff is a condemned inmate incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison. (SAC at form 1.) Plaintiff has been openly bi-sexual since he was twelve years old. (SAC, Ex. 1.)
According to plaintiff, on February 3, 2003, Confidential Informant ("CI") #1 told Officer Berry that plaintiff and another inmate were gay lovers. (SAC form at 3.) CI #2 told Officer Brown that plaintiff and another inmate were participating in homosexual activities on Exercise Yard #1. (SAC form at 3.)
On February 6, 2003, Officer Crandle, Officer McCullum, and Sergeant Van Blarcom assigned plaintiff to a different cell, and denied his request that Inmate Chism be housed next to him because, according to plaintiff, the officers perceived plaintiff and Chism to be homosexual lovers. (
On March 9, 2003, Officer Dassell told Sergeant Van Blarcom and Officer Russell that plaintiff had "sugar in his tank," in reference to plaintiff's sexual orientation. (SAC at 8.) From March 10 through March 12, 2003, the East Block staff locked down Exercise Yard 1 due to unrest on the yard. (
On March 18, 2003, Nunez gave plaintiff another confidential disclosure form which accused plaintiff of physically battering another inmate on March 7, 2003. (SAC at 8, Ex. 3.) On March 20, 2003, plaintiff went to the Institutional Classification Committee ("ICC") and was assigned to Grade B walk alone exercise yard for 7 days, pending investigation into the battery. Grade B walk alone exercise yard had no running water or toilet facilities. (SAC at 9.)
On March 26, 2003, Captain Nunez gave plaintiff four additional confidential disclosure forms, all stating that plaintiff had been observed on March 7, 2003, battering Inmate Hovarter on Exercise Yard #1. (
On July 8, 2004, ICC determined plaintiff could be on Grade A status based on his appropriate behavior. (SAC at 18.) However, because of safety concerns, ICC placed him in the Grade A walk alone exercise yard which had no running water or toilet facilities. (
On July 20, 2004, Fuller moved plaintiff away from the cell next to Chism, who had helped circulate a petition to return plaintiff to Exercise Yard #1. (SAC at 19.) On July 24, 2004, Fuller gave notice to plaintiff that he would not be allowed to be housed on the same tier or in proximity to Chism. (SAC at 20, Ex. 24; Decl. Garske, Ex. T.) Plaintiff used the walk alone exercise yard, which had no running water or toilet facilities, from July 9, 2004 through August 9, 2007. (Opp. at 45; SAC at 9.)
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits demonstrate that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case.
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The court is only concerned with disputes over material facts and "factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted."
Plaintiff claims that defendants discriminated against him because of his sexual orientation by: (1) assigning him to an exercise yard with poor facilities; (2); assigning an "R" suffix to him for his custody classification; (3) disciplining him based on "false" evidence; and (4) assigning him to a "bad" cell.
"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall `deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike."
Where a prisoner claims his right to equal protection has been violated, the proper question for this court's determination is that set forth in
Thus, to defeat summary judgment on his equal protection claim, a prisoner must set forth specific facts showing there is a triable issue as to whether: (1) he was treated differently from similarly situated inmates; (2) such unequal treatment was not reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective; and (3) such unequal treatment was the result of invidious discrimination against plaintiff.
Plaintiff was assigned to a walk alone exercise yard with no running water or toilet facilities from March 20 through March 27, 2003. (SAC at 9.) From March 27, 2003 through December 18, 2003, plaintiff was assigned to a walk alone yard which had proper facilities. (Opp. at 44.) On December 18, 2003, plaintiff was assigned to Grade B mixed yard. (
The ICC determines each inmate's assignment in the Grade A or Grade B program. (Decl. Garske, Ex. D.) These assignments determine an inmate's privileges, such as permissible personal property, access to the canteen, visitation, and yard privileges. (
Here, plaintiff fails to provide any factual support demonstrating that defendants intentionally treated him differently from other similarly situated inmates, or that the assignments to these walk alone yards were
That some defendants made sexually derogatory remarks over the course of plaintiff's incarceration also does not provide sufficient evidence to conclude that these defendants later fabricated confidential informants, or placed him in walk alone yards with poor facilities because of his sexual orientation.
Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED on this claim.
Alternatively, defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The defense of qualified immunity protects government officials "from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."
Whether a reasonable official could have believed the action taken was lawful is a mixed question of law and fact: "It involves an objective test of whether a reasonable official could have believed that his conduct was lawful in light of what he knew and the action he took."
Here, the undisputed facts in the record make clear that the first assignment to the challenged walk alone yards was a result of plaintiff's being accused, and found guilty of, committing battery on Hovarter. (Decl. Garske, Ex. J.) In July 2004, although plaintiff's good behavior persuaded the Unit Classification Committee ("UCC") that he could return to Grade A Exercise Yard #1, the ICC determined that Exercise Yard #1 was inappropriate "due to enemy and safety concerns," and the "Grade A walk alone single yard was the only appropriate yard at [that] time." (Decl. Garske, Ex. U Attachment.) On March 3, 2005, the UCC reviewed his housing assignment. (
On October 19, 2006, plaintiff discussed with UCC returning to one of the group yards. (
In light of the limited options of housing assignments available to plaintiff because of safety and security concerns, a reasonable officer could have believed that the decision retain plaintiff in the Grade A walk alone exercise yard was not unlawful. Thus, defendants' request for qualified immunity is GRANTED.
California Code of Regulations title 15, section 3377.1 provides that inmates are classified into nine custody designations to alert staff as to where an inmate may be housed and assigned, and the level of supervision required of the inmate. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3377.1. An inmate may also be affixed an "R" or "S" suffix to indicate a history of sex offenses or need for single cell housing, respectively. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3377.1(b), (c). Plaintiff argues that he was improperly given an "R" suffix custody designation even though he was never convicted of a sex offense, and asserts that two of his sex-offense arrests were committed as a result of revenge rather than sexual depravity.
Plaintiff submits no evidence that other inmates with similar criminal histories did not receive the "R" suffix as he did. In other words, there is an absence of evidence to support plaintiff's assertion that he was treated differently from similarly situated inmates. Nor does plaintiff provide any evidence that the decision to affix the "R" suffix to plaintiff's custody designation was the result of invidious discrimination against him because of his sexual orientation. Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED on this claim.
Alternatively, defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff's criminal history indicated that he had a 1982 sustained petition for forced oral copulating, and two subsequent encounters with law enforcement because he committed sexual offenses by force. (Decl. Garske, Ex. CC.) Even assuming that defendants violated a clearly established right, because those incidents met the criteria for an "R" suffix, a reasonable officer could have believed that reaffirming plaintiff's "R" suffix was not unlawful. Thus, defendants' request for qualified immunity is GRANTED.
Plaintiff intimates that defendants falsified CI reports stating that he committed battery upon Hovarter because defendants were intentionally discriminating against him based on his sexual orientation. (Opp. at 19-21.) Plaintiff also asserts that his resulting discipline was based on this false evidence.
Much of plaintiff's allegations appears to challenge the reliability of information obtained from the confidential documents. Plaintiff urges the court to discredit those documents. (Opp. at 19-20, 34.) However, the issue before the court is not one of due process, or whether there was "some evidence" sufficient to support the finding of guilt. Rather, plaintiff's arguments do not provide evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants intentionally treated plaintiff differently from other similarly situated inmates, or that his treatment was the result of invidious discrimination based on his sexual orientation. Plaintiff's accusations that defendants and unnamed CIs conspired with each other to exclude plaintiff are wholly unsupported by any evidence. Again, plaintiff's conclusory allegations of discriminatory intent are not sufficient to defeat summary judgment.
Alternatively, defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Not only does plaintiff fail to show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, but the undisputed facts demonstrate that plaintiff was found guilty of battery upon an inmate based on the investigation, as well as several independent reliable confidential sources. (Decl. Garske, Ex. J; Decl. Luna, Confidential Exs. A-F.) Based on what was known to defendants, a reasonable officer could have believed that finding plaintiff guilty of battery based on a staff investigation as well as confidential information supporting that conclusion was not uunlawful. Thus, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Plaintiff argues that he was denied requests to be housed next to specific inmates because of his sexual orientation. Plaintiff asserts that, on February 6, 2003, defendants Crandle, McCullum, and Van Blarcom discriminated against plaintiff by denying another inmate to be housed next to him because those defendants believed plaintiff and that inmate to be lovers. (SAC form at 3.) On July 24, 2004, Correctional Lieutenant Fuller issued an informational chrono directing that plaintiff and Chism not be housed on the same tier or in close proximity above or below each other, effective throughout the course of their confinement to the East Block housing unit. (Decl. Garske, Ex. T.) Fuller remarked that both plaintiff and Chism had attempted to manipulate staff to remain housed next to each other, even after being separated and moved to different tiers. (
Again, plaintiff fails to proffer any evidence that he was treated differently from similarly situated inmates.
Alternatively, even if defendants violated a clearly established constitutional right, they are entitled to qualified immunity. The repeated demands of being housed next to each other by Chism and plaintiff made Fuller believe that prevention by separation was warranted to thwart any possible ulterior motive. As such, he issued an informational chrono to inform all prison officials of his reasons. In light of what they knew, it was reasonable for defendants to believe that keeping plaintiff and Chism from having adjacent cells was not unlawful. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions and close the file.