PAUL S. GREWAL, Magistrate Judge.
Defendant Louis Agront, Sr. ("Agront") challenges the constitutionality of the regulation under which he was convicted on May 30, 2012. Because the court does not find that the regulation, as applied in this case, is unconstitutionally vague, Agront's motion to dismiss the information charging him is DENIED.
The facts of this case are straightforward. Agront was brought by his family to the Palo Alto Veterans Administation ("VA") medical facility. Although Agront understood he was there to receive treatment for his injured knee, his family sought an evaluation of Agront's recent and unusual behavioral changes and sudden weight loss. After Agront initially spoke with VA employees, he became upset and left the facility. Later that same day, Agront's family persuaded him to return. Once again, Agront got upset, such that his manner of speaking became pressured. Agront then again left the facility, this time with his son following after. Outside the facility, Agront and his son ultimately began shouting at each other, such that the confrontation could be heard inside the facility some 25 yards away. A VA nurse and social worker were drawn away from their ordinary tasks to monitor the situation outside.
VA Police Officer David Calkins ("Calkins") responded to a call for assistance. Before exiting his vehicle 15 yards from the two Agronts, Calkins heard the shouting. The shouting continued as Calkins approached Agront and his son, and Calkins repeatedly requested Agront to sit on the ground. After Agront refused these commands, he was taken into custody. Agront was ultimately charged with violating 38 C.F.R. § 1.218(b)(11), which prohibits "loud, boisterous and unusual noise" on VA property.
Agront moved to dismiss the information that the regulation as applied was unconstitutionally vague and therefore void. Because of the "as applied" theory of Agront's motion, the motion was deferred pending trial. Agront was then tried before the undersigned. After a one-day trial in which six witnesses, including Calkins, testified, the court found Agront guilty as charged.
Agront contends that Section 1218(b)(11) violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment because it is so vague as applied in his case that it failed to reasonably apprise him of the conduct for which he was charged. The section prohibits "[d]isorderly conduct which creates loud, boisterous, and unusual noise, or which obstructs the normal use of entrances, exits, foyers, offices, corridors, elevators, and stairways or which tend to impede or prevent the normal operation of a service or operation of the facility."
A statute is void for vagueness if a person of average acumen could not comprehend what conduct is prohibited by the statute.
The court cannot find anything in the application of Section 1218(b)(11) in this case that meets either of these requirements. As an initial matter, "`loud,' `unusual' and `boisterous' are easily and understandably defined: `Loud'— marked by intensity or volume of sound; `unusual'— no usual, not common, rare [and] `boisterous'— noisily turbulent. ... There is not nothing vague or counterintuitive in this language."