STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER EXCLUDING TIME FROM NOVEMBER 1, 2012 TO DECEMBER 3, 2012 FROM THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT CALCULATION (18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A))

HOWARD R. LLOYD, Magistrate Judge.

On November 1, 2012, the parties appeared for a hearing before this Court. At that hearing, the government and defense requested an exclusion of time under the Speedy Trial Act based upon the defense counsel's need to effectively prepare by reviewing discovery materials to be provided by the government. At that time, the Court set the matter for a hearing before Judge Davila on December 3, 2012.

The parties stipulate that the time between November 1, 2012 and December 3, 2012 is excluded under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, and agree that the failure to grant the requested continuance would unreasonably deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. Finally, the parties agree that the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interest of the public, and the defendant in a speedy trial and in the prompt disposition of criminal cases. 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(7)(A).

ORDER

Based upon the stipulation of the parties, and for good cause shown, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that the time between November 1, 2012 and December 3, 2012 is excluded under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §3161. The court finds that the failure to grant the requested continuance would unreasonably deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. Furthermore, the Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial and in the prompt disposition of criminal cases. The court therefore concludes that this exclusion of time should be made under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).

IT IS SO ORDERED.