THELTON E. HENDERSON, District Judge.
Presently under consideration are two motions, filed by the County of Sonoma and the City of Santa Rosa, their law enforcement agencies and officials ("County Defendants" and "City Defendants," respectively), which, taken together, request dismissal of all claims presented in this suit. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part and denies in part each motion.
This is a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California Civil Code § 52.1 raising challenges to various aspects of Defendants' enforcement of California Vehicle Code § 14602.6, which authorizes the impoundment of a vehicle for thirty days under limited circumstances.
Section 14602.6(a)(1) provides:
Within two working days of an impoundment pursuant to § 14602.6(a)(1), the impounding agency must notify the vehicle's owner of the impoundment. Cal. Veh. Code § 14602.6(a)(2). The vehicle's owner "shall be provided the opportunity for a storage hearing to determine the validity of, or consider any mitigating circumstances attendant to, the storage, in accordance with Section 22852." Cal. Veh. Code § 14602.6(b). Section 22852 sets out the procedure for hearings to "determine the validity of the storage" and provides, among other things, that a "public agency may authorize its own officer or employee to conduct the hearing if the hearing officer is not the same person who directed the storage of the vehicle." Cal. Veh. Code § 22852(c).
Plaintiffs allege that, on January 27, 2011, Mateos-Sandoval was driving his GMC Sierra pickup truck on Santa Rosa avenue when a Sonoma County Sheriffs Department (SCSD) deputy pulled him over. He stopped his truck at a safe and legal location by the street curb in front of a credit union parking lot. The truck was not blocking traffic.
While the deputy and Mateos-Sandoval were still at the scene of the traffic stop, his friend Sonja Oralia Ortiz arrived. Ortiz told the deputy that she had a California driver's license, and Mateos-Sandoval and Ortiz asked the deputy to permit Ortiz to drive the truck away. The deputy denied their request. The tow truck arrived and removed Mateos-Sandoval's truck.
Mateos-Sandoval alleges that he was not arrested, but he was charged with violating § 12500 of the California Vehicle Code, driving without a valid California driver's license, and § 5201, relating to the proper mounting of license plates. On March 28, 2011, Mateos-Sandoval appeared in the Superior Court of the County of Sonoma, where he pled guilty to, and was convicted of, the § 12500 charge. The § 5201 charge was dismissed.
On January 28, 2011 — the day after his truck was impounded — and again on January 31, 2011, Mateos Sandoval went to the SCSD office, where he requested a hearing in order to get his truck back. On both occasions, SCSD personnel informed him that he was not eligible for a tow hearing and refused to schedule one.
Later, Mateos-Sandoval received by mail a California Highway Patrol ("CHP") form 180, "Notice of Stored Vehicle." The form stated, "[u]nder the provisions of Section 22852 VC, you have the right to a hearing to determine the validity of this storage." (Docket No. 21, Exhibit A.) The form did not specify why Mateos-Sandoval's truck was being impounded for thirty days; it informed him only that it "was stored pursuant to the provisions of the California Vehicle Code." (Docket No. 21, Exhibit A.)
On February 1, 2011 and February 3, 2011, SCSD personnel informed Mateos-Sandoval that the thirty-day impoundment of his truck was required under § 14602.6, even though he had a Mexican driver's license. Mateos-Sandoval was denied the use of his truck for over thirty days. He seeks recovery for the resulting expenses, and for expenses incurred in his attempts to recover his truck.
Plaintiff Simeon Avendando Ruiz alleges that on or about September 1, 2011, he was driving his Chevy Silverado pickup truck when he was stopped at a checkpoint
Avendando Ruiz received a CHP form 180 in the mail. On or about September 6, 2011, he informed SRPD through his attorney that he had a valid Mexican driver's license and requested that SRPD release his truck. SRPD refused on the ground that § 14602.6, as interpreted by SRPD, mandated that his truck be impounded for thirty days.
Avendando Ruiz alleges that at all times while his truck was impounded, he was ready and able to pay the storage fee and have a person with a California driver's license drive his truck away from the storage yard. However, Defendants prevented him from doing so based on their policy of treating individuals with Mexican drivers licenses as individuals who have never been issued a driver's license for purposes of § 14602.6.
Avendando Ruiz took possession of his truck after the expiration of the impoundment period by paying the accrued storage fees and an administrative fee charged by SRPD. As a result of the loss of the use of his truck for more than thirty days and his efforts to retrieve it, Avendando Ruiz incurred expenses, which he now seeks to recover.
On December 2, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in this Court presenting claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California Civil Code § 52.1. They seek declaratory and injunctive relief, restitution, and damages on behalf of themselves and a statewide class of individuals who "have had cars seized/impounded for thirty days pursuant to § 14602.6, or may in the future have them so seized/impounded." (Docket No. 1, at p. 12.). The complaint encompasses five claims, each alleged against all defendants, and a facial challenge to § 14602.6.
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), for lack of standing and 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim. A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement" showing "the grounds for the court's jurisdiction" and "that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). A
Defendants make several arguments for dismissal that apply to more than one of Plaintiffs' claims. The Court will address these arguments first, and then turn to Defendants' arguments for dismissal of each of the five counts set out in the complaint.
County Defendants move for the dismissal of Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against the county and its officers acting in an official capacity, arguing that Plaintiffs have failed to allege plausible facts sufficient to support a claim that their injuries arose out of County Defendants' customs, practices, or policies. Section 1983 provides for a cause of action against any "person" who, acting under the color of law, subjects another to "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 claims against government officials in their official capacities "are really suits against the governmental employer because the employer must pay any damages awarded." Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1023 n. 8 (9th Cir.2002); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991). Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, § 1983 plaintiffs cannot state a claim for municipal liability based on a respondeat superior theory. 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). However, a municipal government entity may be held liable under § 1983 "when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury." Id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018.
The longstanding rule in the Ninth Circuit, set out in Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, was that "a claim of municipal liability under section 1983 is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss `even if the claim is based on nothing more than a bare allegation that the individual officers' conduct conformed to official policy, custom or practice.'" 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir.1988), quoting Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir.1986). The Supreme Court, in Leatherman v. Tarrant Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, cited with approval to Karim-Panahi in rejecting a "heightened pleading standard" for Monell claims. 507 U.S. 163, 165-68, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993). Karim-Panahi has not been overruled, but the Ninth Circuit
In Starr v. Baca, the Ninth Circuit attempted to reconcile the apparent inconsistency between the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Iqbal and other recent cases in which the Court construed Rule 8(a) in a way that would permit more claims to survive a motion to dismiss. 652 F.3d 1202, 1213-16 (9th Cir.2011). In Starr, the court synthesized the following two-part rule:
Id. at 1216.
Recently, in A.E. ex rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, the Ninth Circuit applied the Starr standard to a Monell claim. 666 F.3d at 637-38. The plaintiff in A.E. was a minor who was sexually abused while in foster care. He alleged that the county was liable under Monell because the defendants "performed their acts and omissions `under the ordinances, regulations, customs, and practices of Defendant COUNTY OF TULARE ...'" and "`maintained or permitted an official policy, custom, or practice of knowingly permitting the occurrence of the type of wrongs'" that were alleged elsewhere in the complaint. Id. at 635 (quoting complaint). Applying Starr, the court held that these allegations were insufficient to state a claim, but it directed the district court to grant the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to state additional facts showing that the "alleged constitutional violations were carried out pursuant to County policy or custom." Id. at 637.
In the present case, as in A.E., Plaintiffs base their Monell claims on the theory that County Defendants had deliberate customs, policies, or practices that were "the `moving force' behind the constitutional violation [Plaintiffs] suffered." Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir.2007) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95, 98 S.Ct. 2018). But Plaintiffs' allegations, in contrast those offered by the plaintiffs in A.E., specify the content of the policies, customs, or practices the execution of which gave rise to Plaintiffs' Constitutional injuries. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Plaintiffs allege that County Defendants "routinely enforce" § 14602.6 by:
(Docket No. 1, at p. 4.) These allegations, in contrast those set out by the plaintiffs in A.E., specify the content of the policies, customs, or practices the execution of which gave rise to Plaintiffs' constitutional injuries. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. The allegations are sufficient to "give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively," particularly since information relating to the policies, customs, and practices of County Defendants in enforcing § 14602.6 and related statutory sections is likely to be easily available to them. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. As to Starr's second prong — whether the allegations "plausibly suggest entitlement to relief" — it is inherently plausible that Plaintiffs' constitutional claims, which largely are based in the alleged misconstruction of or failure to comply with California statutory law, arose as a result of the County Defendants' customs, policies, or practices. Id. To the extent that Plaintiffs' allegations relating to each individual Constitutional claim satisfy Rule 8(a), plaintiffs therefore have pled facts sufficient to state a claim that County Defendants are liable under Monell.
County Defendants argue that the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiffs' claims for damages against the County of Sonoma, the Sonoma County Sheriff's Department ("SCSD"), and Sheriff Steve Freitas in his official capacity. Because an official-capacity suit against a state official is really a suit against the official's office, it "is no different from a suit against the State itself." Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). For this reason, state officers acting in their official capacities are entitled to sovereign immunity from suits for damages under the Eleventh Amendment. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat'l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir.1997). Sovereign immunity generally does not extend to suits against local government entities because, as in the case of suits for injunctive relief and personal-capacity suits against state officials, "relief is not sought from the state treasury." Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756-57, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999). Unless they are considered part of the state for sovereign immunity purposes, local government entities, and officials with "final policymaking authority for the local governmental actor," may therefore be held liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations carried out pursuant to the locality's policies and customs. McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 784-85, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997); Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n. 54, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978). It follows that neither the County nor the SCSD enjoys blanket immunity from suit under the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. See Streit v. County of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552, 565 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that California sheriffs departments may be separately sued under § 1983).
The more difficult question is whether Sheriff Freitas should be considered part of the state for sovereign immunity purposes — Defendants contend that he should,
Since Venegas, a division has arisen between district courts within the Circuit about which rule to apply. Many district courts have continued to apply the Ninth Circuit rule, holding that sheriffs performing law enforcement functions are county officers. See, e.g., Galati v. County of San Mateo, No. C07-4035, 2008 WL 1886033, at *6 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 25, 2008); Garcia v. County of Merced, 637 F.Supp.2d 731, 759-60 (E.D.Cal.2008); Brown v. County of Kern, No. C06-121, 2008 WL 544565, at *11-12 (E.D.Cal. Feb. 26, 2008); Fontana v. Alpine County, 750 F.Supp.2d 1148, 1153 (E.D.Cal.2010); Shoval v. Sobzak, No. C09-1348, 2009 WL 2780155, at *2 (S.D.Cal. Aug. 31, 2009); Warner v. County of San Diego, No. C10-1057, 2011 WL 662993, at *4 n. 2 (S.D.Cal. Feb. 14, 2011). Others, however, have applied Venegas and held that sheriffs performing law enforcement functions are officers of the state and therefore immune from suit. See, e.g., Walker v. County of Santa Clara, No. C04-2211, 2005 WL 2437037, at *4 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 30, 2005); Comm. for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma County v. Sonoma County, No. C08-4220, 2010 WL 2465030, at *3 (N.D.Cal. June 11, 2010); Johnston v. County of Sonoma, No. C10-3592, 2011 WL 855934, at *3 (N.D.Cal. March 9, 2011). The courts that have continued to apply the Ninth Circuit rule have reasoned that municipal liability under § 1983 is a question of federal law, and that, despite what the California Supreme Court may have said, they remain bound by Brewster. See, e.g., Fontana, 750 F.Supp.2d at 1153 (following Brewster because "the Ninth Circuit does not have to follow the determinations of the California courts in § 1983 lawsuits"); Galati, 2008 WL 1886033, at *6 (holding that "on this issue of federal law, the Court is bound by the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Brewster"). Those courts that have adopted the California Supreme Court's rule have concluded that the Venegas decision is correct, and by implication, that the Ninth Circuit got it wrong in Brewster. See, e.g., Comm. for Immigrant Rights, 2010 WL 2465030, at *3 (holding that Venegas "represents the correct statement of the function of California sheriffs"); Walker, 2005 WL 2437037, at *4 ("The California Supreme Court's decision comports with this court's understanding of the function of California sheriffs.")
The determination whether an official acts on behalf of a state or a county is "dependant on the definition of the official's functions under relevant state law." McMillian, 520 U.S. at 786, 117 S.Ct. 1734. This does not mean, however, that federal courts are bound by state court interpretations of state law in this context. In determining whether a local officer or entity is performing a state function, a federal court must conduct its own independent analysis of state law. Id.; see also Streit, 236 F.3d at 563.
Venegas does not provide a basis upon which this Court may reach a conclusion that is contrary to the Ninth Circuit's holding in Brewster. There is no indication that the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Brewster turned on California decisional law; in fact, the Brewster court considered and rejected the reasoning of the California cases upon which the majority in Venegas based its analysis. 275 F.3d at 809, 811; see also Venegas, 32 Cal.4th at 830-35, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 692, 87 P.3d 1. The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, recently reaffirmed the rule that a published decision of a Ninth Circuit panel must be followed by panels and district courts within the Circuit "unless and until overruled by a body competent to do so." Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 390 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); see also Streit, 236 F.3d at 563. This Court lacks that particular competence, and therefore denies the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' official-capacity claims against Sheriff Freitas.
County Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' personal-capacity claims against Sheriff Freitas on the ground that their allegations against him are conclusory. A supervisor can be held liable in his personal capacity under § 1983 "for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation ...; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others." Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, because there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, "a plaintiff must plead that each government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
In the present case, Plaintiffs allege only that Freitas is "the Sheriff of Sonoma County, and the SCSD policymaker" and that he "is responsible for enforcing SCSD policies on the interpretation and/or application of Cal. Veh. Code 14602.6" and "has ratified or approved of the unconstitutional acts complained of herein." (Docket No. 1, at ¶ 9.) Plaintiffs fail to allege the specific policies interpreting § 14602.6 for which Freitas is responsible. See Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir.2012) (holding that allegation of a specific policy for which a personal-capacity defendant is responsible is necessary to survive a 12(b)(6) motion). Plaintiffs' allegation that Freitas ratified
City Defendants argue that some or all of Avendando Ruiz's claims against them are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).
Plaintiffs allege that § 14602.6 is unconstitutional on its face, and they request declaratory relief and an injunction preventing its enforcement. County Defendants, citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), argue that Plaintiffs do not have standing to seek prospective
County Defendants point out that Plaintiffs' standing to pursue their requests for prospective relief must be based on an allegation that § 14602.6 will be applied to them in the future. By its terms, § 14602.6 applies only to individuals who are operating their vehicles in violation of California law. Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts suggesting that they will continue to operate their trucks illegally, and the Court must assume that they will conform their future conduct to the law. Id. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not adequately pled the actual controversy that is required for standing to pursue their claims for prospective relief. See id. at 104, 103 S.Ct. 1660; see also Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 15, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (holding that plaintiff did not satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement for standing when threat of future harm was contingent on "violating the law, getting caught, and being convicted"). The Court will dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief without prejudice.
County Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' state-law claims for damages on the ground that they have failed to adequately allege compliance with the Government Tort Claims Act, Cal. Gov't Code § 810, et seq. The Act provides, in pertinent part, that "no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented... until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board ..." Cal. Gov't Code § 945.4. Plaintiffs' state-law claims, which are brought under California Civil Code § 52.1, are subject to this requirement. Gatto v. County of Sonoma, 98 Cal.App.4th 744, 763, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 550 (2002). Hence, to state a claim against a public entity or a public employee acting within the scope of employment, plaintiffs must either allege compliance with the Act or that such compliance should be excused. California v. Superior Ct. (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 534, 90 P.3d 116 (2004). Plaintiffs do not oppose dismissal of their state-law claims for failure to properly allege compliance with the Act, so long as dismissal is with leave to amend. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs' state-law claims without prejudice.
County Defendants argue that Avendando Ruiz has failed to state a claim against them because he does not allege that he suffered any harm resulting from actions taken by them, as opposed to City Defendants. Similarly, the complaint contains no allegation from which a reasonable inference might be drawn that City Defendants' conduct resulted in harm to Mateos-Sandoval. Avendando Ruiz's claims against County Defendants and Mateos-Sandoval's claims against City Defendants are therefore dismissed without prejudice. See Hunt v. County of Orange, 672 F.3d 606, 617 (9th Cir.2012) (a court may sua sponte dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)
Having addressed all of Defendants' arguments for dismissal that apply to multiple claims, the Court now turns to the specific claims set out in the complaint. Plaintiffs' complaint encompasses five separate counts, each count alleged against all defendants. These are: (1) unlawful seizure and impoundment of Plaintiffs' vehicles in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) uncompensated taking of Plaintiffs' vehicles in violation of the Fifth Amendment; (3) deprivation of due process with regard to the storage hearing; (4) deprivation of due process by seizing the vehicles as punishment for a criminal violation; and (5) deprivation of due process by imposing a fee in excess of the administrative costs associated with the seizure and impoundment. County Defendants urge the Court to dismiss each count for failure to state a claim. City Defendants join County Defendants' arguments and request dismissal of all the claims, but do not argue any specific basis for dismissal of counts one, four, and five beyond their Heck argument, which is addressed above.
In Count One of the complaint, Plaintiffs claim that the seizure of their trucks violated the Fourth Amendment because, at the time of impoundment, neither truck was impeding traffic, threatening public safety, or in a location where it would be susceptible to vandalism. Mateos-Sandoval additionally alleges that a licensed California driver was present who could have driven his truck away.
The impoundment of a vehicle is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and therefore must be reasonable. See Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir.2005); Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992). Warrantless seizures are "per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions." United States v. Hawkins, 249 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In their motion to dismiss, County Defendants argue that two exceptions to the warrant requirement apply. They first contend that the impoundment of Mateos-Sandoval's truck constituted a valid administrative penalty, and second, that it comported with the community caretaking doctrine.
County Defendants argue that their thirty-day impoundment of Mateos-Sandoval's truck under § 14602.6 constituted a facially valid administrative penalty, and as such, was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiffs argue that, regardless of whether the provision is facially valid, § 14602.6 did not authorize the thirty-day impoundment of Mateos-Sandoval's truck.
Section 14602.6 permits peace officers to impound for thirty days vehicles driven by three categories of drivers: (1) those whose driving privilege has been suspended or revoked, (2) those who have been convicted of driving under the influence and who are driving a vehicle that is not equipped with a required ignition interlock device, and (3) those who are "driving a vehicle without ever having been issued a driver's license." Cal. Veh. Code § 14602.6(a)(1). County Defendants argue that the Court should read the third category of drivers to encompass individuals who have "been issued a driver's license"
In interpreting California statutes, federal courts apply California rules of statutory construction. Turnacliff v. Westly, 546 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir.2008). To ascertain the meaning of a statute, California courts first "look to the intent of the Legislature as expressed by the actual words of the statute" because "it is the language of the statute itself that has successfully braved the legislative gauntlet." Wasatch Prop. Mgmt. v. Degrate, 35 Cal.4th 1111, 1117, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 262, 112 P.3d 647 (2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If a statute's language is "clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction, and courts should not indulge in it." People v. Belleci, 24 Cal.3d 879, 884, 157 Cal.Rptr. 503, 598 P.2d 473 (1979) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also California Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 128 Cal.App.4th 307, 312, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 845 (2005). California courts give statutory language "its usual, ordinary import," construing statutory provisions in context and keeping in mind the statute's purpose. Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Emp't & Housing Comm'n, 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387, 241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323 (1987). To the extent possible, "statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other." Id. A court may not resort to extrinsic sources, such as legislative history, to determine the Legislature's intent unless an interpretation based on a provision's unambiguous language and statutory context would inevitably frustrate the legislation's manifest purpose or lead to absurd results. See Id.; Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High Sch. Dist., 29 Cal.4th 911, 924, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 811, 62 P.3d 54 (2003).
The language of the provision at issue here is unambiguous: it permits the impoundment for thirty days of vehicles driven by individuals who are "driving a vehicle without ever having been issued a driver's license." Cal. Veh. Code § 14602.6(a)(1). The section's plain meaning is confirmed by reference to the Vehicle Code's definition of "driver's license": "a valid license to drive ... under this code or by a foreign jurisdiction." Cal. Veh. Code § 310. This definition governs the construction of § 14602.6 and is binding on the Court. See Cal. Veh. Code § 100 (providing that "[u]nless the provision or context otherwise requires" the definitions contained in the Vehicle Code "shall govern [its] construction"); Curie v. Superior Court, 24 Cal.4th 1057, 1063, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 16 P.3d 166 (2001) ("If the Legislature has provided an express definition of a term, that definition ordinarily is binding on the courts."). The definition of "driver's license" in § 310 confirms that the Legislature intended § 14602.6 to apply to individuals who are "driving a vehicle without ever having been issued [a valid license to drive ... under the California Vehicle Code or by a foreign jurisdiction]" (emphasis added).
The existence of a separate provision in the California Vehicle Code authorizing the impoundment of vehicles driven by unlicensed drivers further confirms that the Legislature intended § 14602.6 to apply only to a subset of unlicensed drivers whose driving raises particular public safety concerns. Section 22651(p) — which was enacted prior to § 14602.6 and was amended by the bill in which § 14602.6 was enacted — permits a peace officer to "remove" a vehicle "when the peace officer issues the driver of the vehicle a notice to appear for a violation of § 12500 [driving without a valid California Driver's license]" among other offenses.
The documents to which County Defendants have directed the Court's attention do, however, confirm that § 14602.6 was enacted for the purpose of keeping particularly dangerous drivers off the road. Section 14602.6 was added to the California Vehicle Code by chapter 1221, § 13 of the Statutes of 1994 ("SB 1758").
Taking as true Mateos-Sandoval's allegation that he had a Mexican driver's license, the impoundment of his truck was not authorized by § 14602.6. County Defendants therefore cannot justify the thirty-day
County Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against them because the impoundment of Mateos-Sandoval's truck was justified by community caretaking concerns. The community caretaking doctrine "allows the police to impound where necessary to ensure that the location or operation of vehicles does not jeopardize the public safety." Miranda, 429 F.3d at 860. Police may impound a vehicle under the community caretaking doctrine if the vehicle presents a traffic hazard or public safety concern and the driver cannot lawfully operate the vehicle in order to move it to a safe location. Id. at 865. In Miranda, the Ninth Circuit held that the impoundment of a vehicle from its owners' driveway after a police officer had observed a licensed driver teaching his unlicensed wife how to drive was not justified by the community caretaking doctrine. Id. The Court reasoned that, even when the driver of a vehicle is unlicensed, "[a]n officer cannot reasonably order an impoundment in situations where the location of the vehicle does not create any need for the police to protect the vehicle or to avoid a hazard to other drivers." Id. at 866. Rather, "the decision to impound a vehicle after the driver has violated a vehicle regulation must consider the location of the vehicle, and whether the vehicle was actually `impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience.'" Id. at 865 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)).
Similarly, in United States v. Caseres, the court held that there was no community caretaking rationale for the impoundment of a vehicle that was legally parked on a residential street two blocks from the driver's home and was not posing a hazard or impediment to other traffic, even though the vehicle's driver had a suspended license. 533 F.3d at 1075. The court reasoned that the rationale of impounding a vehicle for the purpose of deterring unlawful driving is inconsistent with the community caretaking function. Id.
Applying Miranda and Caseres, the Ninth Circuit recently held in Cervantes that the community caretaking exception did not justify the impoundment of a vehicle that had been "appropriately pulled to the curb" when stopped in a residential neighborhood that was not near the driver's home. 703 F.3d at 1141-43. The court rejected the Government's attempt
County Defendants argue that the impoundment of Mateos-Sandoval's vehicle was justified on community caretaking grounds because "he does not allege that he could have left his vehicle legally parked where he pulled over during the traffic stop."
Plaintiffs also argue that even if the initial seizure of their vehicles were reasonable, the decision to retain their vehicles for thirty days, when they were prepared to pay the required fine and had a licensed driver available to drive the car away from the lot, was not. The Supreme Court has held that "a seizure lawful at its inception can nevertheless violate the Fourth Amendment because its manner of execution unreasonably infringes possessory interests protected by the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on `unreasonable seizures.'" United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124-25, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984). The Ninth Circuit recently applied this rule in a case involving the City of Los Angeles's confiscation and subsequent destruction of the personal possessions of homeless people that were temporarily left on city sidewalks, Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022, 1030 (9th Cir.2012). In Lavan, the court held that "even if the seizure of the property would have been deemed reasonable had the City held it for the return to its owner instead of immediately destroying it, the City's destruction of the property rendered the seizure unreasonable." Id. In the context of the present case, the discretion to impound a vehicle for thirty days under § 14602.6 must be exercised within the limits imposed by the Fourth Amendment's
Because community caretaking concerns did not justify the impoundment of Mateos-Sandoval's truck in the circumstances alleged in the complaint, County Defendants' motion to dismiss Mateos-Sandoval's unlawful seizure claim is denied.
In Count Two of their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the impoundments of their respective vehicles constituted uncompensated takings for public use, in violation of the Fifth Amendment's takings clause. The takings clause applies to two types of government action — the taking of physical possession of property, or of an interest in that property, for a public use and the regulatory prohibition of a private use. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 152 L.Ed.2d 517 (2002). The first type of taking occurs through the physical appropriation of property. The second type — regulatory taking — involves state imposition of a regulation that prohibits or prevents property owners from using their property in a way that diminishes its value. The impoundments at issue in the present case fall into the first category: it is not disputed that Plaintiffs had a property interest in their trucks, and Defendants deprived them of that interest by impounding their trucks. See Ark. Game and Fish Comm'n v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 511, 515, 184 L.Ed.2d 417 (2012) ("[I]f government action would qualify as a taking when permanently continued, temporary actions of the same character may also qualify as a taking.").
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are not entitled to just compensation for the takings of their trucks because they were not taken for "public use." The Supreme Court has construed the public use requirement broadly. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005) (noting that Court's "public use jurisprudence has ... eschewed rigid formulas and intensive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power"); Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984) (holding that the scope of the "public use" requirement of the takings clause is "coterminous with the scope of the sovereign's police powers"). However, the requirement has not been construed so broadly as to encompass the government's acquisition of property as a result of a lawful forfeiture. In Bennis v. Michigan, the Court considered whether the state's forfeiture of a woman's interest in a car constituted a "public use." The state trial court ordered the sale of the car pursuant to an indecency statute after her husband had sex with a prostitute in it while it was parked on a Detroit city street. 516 U.S. 442, 453, 116 S.Ct. 994, 134 L.Ed.2d 68 (1996). Having determined that the sale did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, the Court further held:
Bennis, 516 U.S. at 452, 116 S.Ct. 994. Similarly, in Tate v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Circuit held that the impoundment and sale of a plaintiff's vehicle as a result of unpaid traffic fines did not "constitute a taking for public use for which she was entitled to compensation under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause." 627 F.3d 904, 909 (D.C.Cir.2010). The Court reasoned that "if the [government's] impoundment of Tate's vehicle did not deprive her of due process ... then there was no unlawful taking and no compensation due for the lawful taking that did occur." Id.
In the present case, if Plaintiffs can prove their Fourth Amendment claim, then Defendants' interference with their property rights — the impoundment of their trucks — was unlawful. But that does not mean that the taking was "for public use." The takings clause only "requires compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking." Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 161 L.Ed.2d 876 (2005). The "public use" requirement "goes to the legitimacy of the government's taking to begin with; if a taking is not for public use, the government has no right to complete the act of eminent domain." Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 475 (7th Cir.2003) (Wood, J., concurring). The unlawful seizure of property does not constitute a "public use."
If, on the other hand, Plaintiffs ultimately fail to prove their Fourth Amendment claim, their takings clause claim would also fail because Defendants lawfully acquired their trucks "under the exercise of governmental authority other than the power of eminent domain." Bennis, 516 U.S. at 452, 116 S.Ct. 994.
To be clear, as a general matter, the applicability of one constitutional amendment does not preclude a claim under another. See Soldal, 506 U.S. at 70, 113 S.Ct. 538. But based on the facts alleged in the complaint, Plaintiffs' takings clause claim cannot proceed under any theory of liability. It will therefore be dismissed without prejudice.
In Count Three of their complaint, Plaintiffs raise several due process challenges relating to the procedures that were afforded to them for contesting the impoundments of their trucks: (1) Plaintiffs were not provided notice that mitigating circumstances could be considered during the storage hearing; (2) Defendants have a practice of not considering mitigating circumstances; (3) the term "mitigating circumstances" is vague and arbitrary; and (4) the hearing officers are biased because they work for the same agency as the officers who effect the impoundments. Defendants move to dismiss all four components of this count.
First, Defendants argue that statutory law and case law provide adequate notice that mitigating circumstances will be considered. The Supreme Court has held that individualized notice "of state-law remedies ... established by published, generally available state statutes and case law" is not required. City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 241, 119 S.Ct. 678, 142 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999). Section 14602.6(b) provides that the vehicle's owner "shall be provided the opportunity for a storage hearing to determine the validity of, or consider any mitigating circumstances attendant to, the storage, in accordance with Section 22852." As the California
Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts suggesting that mitigating circumstances were not considered at Plaintiffs' storage hearings. Plaintiffs do not allege that Avendando Ruiz had a storage hearing. With respect to Mateos-Sandoval, Plaintiffs allege only that "on February 1, 2011 and February 3, 2011, SCSD re-affirmed that the 30 day impound under Veh. Code § 14602.6 was justified and required notwithstanding that Mr. Sandoval[] had [a] Mexican driver's license." (Docket No. 1, at ¶ 20.) This allegation is insufficient to support a claim that County Defendants deprived Mateos-Sandoval of an opportunity to present mitigating circumstances. Because Plaintiffs do not specify whether Mateos-Sandoval or Avendando Ruiz had a storage hearing, and, if so, whether they presented, or attempted to present, any mitigating circumstances for Defendants' consideration, they have failed to state a claim.
Third, Defendants argue that the term "mitigating circumstances" is not unconstitutionally vague. The term "mitigating circumstances" is widely used, and examples of mitigating circumstances in the context of impoundments under § 14602.6 are set out in the statute and in case law. See Cal. Veh. Code § 14602.6(d), (e) & (f) (identifying specific circumstances under which owners may obtain release of a vehicle prior to the expiration of the thirty-day impoundment period); Smith v. Santa Rosa Police Dept., 97 Cal.App.4th 546, 549-50, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 (2002) (owner's lack of knowledge that the license of vehicle's driver was invalid constituted mitigating circumstance); Samples, 146 Cal.App.4th 787, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 216 (reversing trial court holding that "mitigating circumstances" in the context of § 14602.6(b) was unconstitutionally vague). The term "mitigating circumstances" is not unconstitutionally vague on its face, and Plaintiffs have not specified in what way any latent ambiguity in the term deprived them of due process.
Fourth, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have insufficiently pled that the hearing officers at Plaintiffs' impoundment hearings were biased. As discussed above, Plaintiffs have not even pled that they had hearings to contest the impoundments of their trucks. Their allegations are therefore insufficient to support a claim that the officers who heard their claims, presuming such officers existed, were biased.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motions to dismiss Count Three of the complaint will be granted, and Count Three will be dismissed without prejudice.
In Count Four of their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' thirty-day impoundment of their trucks violates the due process clause to the extent that the purpose of an impoundment under § 14602.6 is punishment for driving without a valid license. Plaintiffs also argue that if the purpose of an impoundment under § 14602.6 is punishment, they are entitled to notice that they were accused of a crime and a hearing at which they were not presumed to be guilty, which they allege that they did not receive.
County Defendants argue that, under Ninth Circuit precedent, there is no procedural
Miranda, 429 F.3d at 867. The court directed the district court, on remand, to "determine whether any legitimate caretaking purpose offered by Defendants outweighs the affected private interest of the Mirandas in uninterrupted possession of their car and the risk of erroneous deprivation." Id. at 867-68.
As discussed above, based on the facts alleged in the complaint, the civil impoundment of Mateos-Sandoval's truck was not justified under the community caretaking doctrine and not authorized under § 14602.6. See id. at 866. Under Miranda, it is not necessary to consider whether County Defendants' justification of the impoundment as a penalty triggers heightened procedural protections in order to determine that Plaintiffs have stated a claim under the due process clause. See id. at 867-68; United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48, 114 S.Ct. 492, 126 L.Ed.2d 490 (1993) ("Our precedents establish the general rule that individuals must receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Government deprives them of property.") County Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' fourth count therefore is denied.
Plaintiffs' fifth count alleges that Defendants have a "custom, policy, and practice" of imposing a fee on vehicles seized and impounded pursuant to § 14602.6 that is "in excess of the administrative costs associated with the seizure and impound." (Docket No. 1, at ¶ 87.) They contend that the imposition of this fee violates § 22850.5(a), which permits a state or local government agency to establish procedures for the imposition of "a charge equal to its administrative costs relating to the removal, impound, storage, or release of the vehicles," and constitutes a constitutional violation. County Defendants move to dismiss this count because the complaint does not allege that Mateos-Sandoval paid any administrative fee to County Defendants. They are correct. Because the complaint provides no factual basis for a claim that County Defendants imposed an excessive fee, Count Five will be dismissed against them, without prejudice.
For the reasons given above, City Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to:
County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to:
The above-referenced claims are dismissed without prejudice. Any amended complaint must be filed on or before March 4, 2013. Defendants' motions are otherwise DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
County Defendants' motion to strike the documents attached to Plaintiffs' Opposition (Docket No. 32) is GRANTED because Plaintiffs do not request judicial notice of them, they are not incorporated by reference in the complaint, and they do not form the basis of Plaintiffs' claims. See Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 907-08.
