JOSEPH C. SPERO, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiffs Patrick A. Missud and Julie E. Missud ("the Missuds" or "Plaintiffs")
In the original Complaint, Patrick made the following allegations. On June 7, 2011, the Oakland Coliseum ("Coliseum") hosted a concert featuring the band U2 ("Concert"). Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice; Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion to Strike ("Order"), 2. Patrick alleged that OCJV cut services to maximize profits at the Concert. Id. Defendants were aware for approximately one year that the Concert would be sold out such that 69,000 people would be in attendance. Id. Defendants were required to provide access to the venue, security, safe premises, sanitary facilities, light, ventilation, water, safety evacuation plans, ramps, walks, elevators, on-site emergency services, and parking. Id.
The Missuds purchased two tickets to the Concert. Id. Upon arrival, Patrick discovered that the necessary facilities were either severely deficient or non-existent, and that only one of his tickets would be honored by Defendants. Id. The Court dismissed each of Patrick's asserted causes of action, with leave to amend, as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
The First Amended Complaint ("FAC") identifies the Plaintiffs in this action as follows:
FAC, 2:25-29.
The First Amended Complaint ("FAC") recites the same underlying factual allegations as were set forth in the initial Complaint. As described in this Court's previous Order:
Order, 2.
Plaintiffs allege nine causes of action. Additional factual allegations are added following each cause of action. Otherwise, the factual allegations are unchanged. The causes of action are pled as follows:
(1)
Plaintiffs make the following new factual allegations in their FAC. Plaintiffs gave Elliot Myles, attorney for OCJV, which includes all Defendants in this action, notice of this suit more than 364 days before bringing this suit. Id. at 10:11-11:15. Moreover, Plaintiffs provided notice to various state and federal Department of Justice Agents and to agents from the FBI. Id. at 11:16-19. "Any and all officials in a position to act were notified of the OCJV's ongoing violations." Id. at 11:19-20. As to standing, Plaintiffs allege that Patrick would have continued to eat lunch at the nature walk near the Oakland Estuary in the vicinity of the Coliseum but for Defendants' pollution.
(2)
(3)
Plaintiffs make the following new factual allegations in their FAC. Patrick suffers from sclerosis and sciatica, limiting his walking mobility to two city blocks. Id. at 13:5-20. The walk from the Coliseum to the overflow lot aggravated his sciatica. Id. at 14:11-12. The walk requires traversing curbs exceeding twelve inches and there are no ramps available. Id. at 14:10-11. In addition, he nearly tripped over a collapsed chain link fence and nearly fell in a rut full of muddy water. Id. at 14:12-13, 14:14-15. Patrick also had to walk through "a maze of barbed wire, and assorted booby-traps" to return to the parking lot. Id. at 14:24-25. Even so, Patrick "will absolutely return" to the Coliseum for an A's game this summer, so there is a real, immediate threat of repeated injury in the future. Id. at 14:18-21. Plaintiffs also allege that, since suit was brought, the "lot's been graded and is rut-free; area routinely patrolled for debris and trash; grasses are growing where tire treads once scarred the land; collapsed fences have been removed and/or repaired; rusty barbed wire replaced with new; and various other improvements." Id. at 12 n.4.
(4)
(5)
(6)
For the first time in the FAC, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' mismanagement of the overflow lot caused Patrick pain in his back and leg. Id. at 18:8-9. Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached their covenant of good faith and fair dealing and fraudulently induced Plaintiffs to attend the event. Id. at 18:17-18. Plaintiffs allege that they reasonably relied on Defendants' representations that they could handle the volume of ticketholders invited to the event, and that Defendants had a duty to provide adequate safe parking and traffic control. Id. at 18:20-22. Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants had a duty to provide access to the Coliseum because Plaintiffs paid for seat licenses inside the Coliseum. Id. at 18:27-28. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants intentionally and maliciously caused them to waste time sitting in traffic outside the Coliseum in an effort to boost profits by requiring Plaintiffs to wait to pay for parking. Id. at 18:28-19:8.
(7)
For the first time in the FAC, Plaintiffs clarify that they purchased two tickets with community funds, and only one was timely honored. Id. at 19:20-22. Plaintiffs further clarify that their ticket directs them to www.ticketmaster.com for the terms and conditions of their contract, but state that they are unable to find the terms and conditions at that website. Id. at 20:1-3. Instead, Plaintiffs allege that "[j]ust because the services which are required to support a Concert aren't specifically enumerated on the Ticket or under `terms and conditions' yet to be found, that doesn't mean they aren't necessary when a multi-million-dollar consortium of private/public special interests want to make lots of money hosting 69,000 people. A traffic control plan and adequate parking were a must for this event." Id. at 20:25-29. Further, Plaintiffs invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Id. at 21:2-4.
(8)
Plaintiffs make the new factual allegation that they "believed that since their Licenses were offered for sale, they would be guaranteed admission to the Concert if they performed per contract and arrived timely. . ." Id. at 21:20-22. Plaintiffs made arrangements to attend the concert and arrived timely. Id. at 21:22-29. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants promised "to put on an epic Concert," and Plaintiffs bought tickets. Id. at 22:6-7. The concert took place June 7, 2011. Id. at 22:8-10. Defendants mismanaged the concert for unknown reasons, but probably because they sought to maximize profits by minimizing expenses. Id. at 22:10-12.
(9)
For the first time in the FAC, Plaintiffs allege that they learned of the Concert through some means of advertisement. Id. at 23:5-6. As to the unlawful prong, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants sold out the concert knowing they could not handle a sold out crowd. Id. at 23:8-11. As to the fraudulent prong, Plaintiffs imply that they have produced circumstantial evidence that Defendants were driven by greed to sell the maximum number of tickets possible knowing they could not handle such a crowd. Id. at 23:12-16. As to the unfair prong, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated public policy by stranding ticketholders in traffic for hours, preventing any disaster relief first responders from accessing the Coliseum and preventing any evacuation of the Coliseum that could have become necessary. Id. at 23:16-22. Plaintiffs also allege that public-policy prevents conditioning ticketholders' access to a venue on buying parking in the muddy overflow lot. Id. at 23:22-25.
Defendants separately filed both a Motion to Dismiss the FAC and a Motion to Strike (1) the prayer for punitive damages; (2) the class allegations; (3) the allegations that Julie could properly serve as a class representative; (4) the prayer for attorneys' fees; and (5) web addresses improperly listed in the FAC. See Dkt. Nos. 58-59. Plaintiffs filed a consolidated Opposition to both Motions.
Plaintiffs organize their Opposition with serial responses to specific points made in Defendants' papers. As to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs first argue that they notified the proper authorities prior to filing suit pursuant to a master email list that Patrick maintains. Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike ("Opposition"), 11. Plaintiffs assert that the list includes Defendants' counsel, the FBI, state and federal departments of justice, and county and state attorneys representing state agencies. Id. Second, Plaintiffs assert that they have standing under the CWA and RCRA because judicial oversight is necessary to prevent Defendants from again ravaging the Oakland Estuary to boost their profits. Id. at 12.
Third, Plaintiffs make a series of responses pertaining to their ADA claim. Plaintiffs argue that ADA discrimination can include failure to remove architectural barriers and state that Defendants could have installed ramps in their twelve-inch concrete curbs, picked up collapsed fencing, filled potholes and ruts, and collected other debris. Id. Plaintiffs also reiterate that the overflow lot is under Defendants' control. Id. at 13. Next, Plaintiffs clarify that Patrick arrived at the Coliseum using BART, which was crowded. Id. The walk from BART to the Coliseum's entry gates was time-consuming, as "throngs of concertgoers were shuffling feet in unison to make forward progress." Id. Patrick was in severe back pain by the time he reached the gates. Id. On the other hand, Julie took a car to the event, parked in the overflow lot, and missed the vast majority of the concert as a result of the traffic snafu Plaintiffs argue was caused by Defendants. Id. Plaintiffs argue that any ADA accessible parking is irrelevant because they could not get to it through traffic. Id.
Fourth, Plaintiffs do not dispute Defendants' assertion that there is no private right of action supporting their NHSTA claim, but state that Defendants' failure to comply with the safety advisories demonstrates Defendants' "cavalier attitude when it comes to commingling children and the elderly among 18-wheelers." Id. at 14.
Fifth, Plaintiffs contend that their inability to find the terms of their contracts is proof that the terms do not exist. Id. However, Plaintiffs request Defendants provide the terms of the contract in Defendants' Reply brief. Id. In any event, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants prevented them from accessing the venue at all by causing the traffic congestion because, once stuck in traffic, Plaintiffs could not be expected to leave their cars and walk into the venue. Id. at 14-15.
Sixth, Plaintiffs argue that the economic loss rule does not apply because the terms of their contract of adhesion were not bargained and because Defendants withheld the material information that they were cutting corners to maximize profits in such a way that jeopardized Plaintiffs' ability to access the Coliseum. Id. at 15.
Seventh, Plaintiffs assert that they pled fraud with particularity. Id. They state that OCJV knowingly oversold the concert, knowing it could not handle the crowds based on its past experiences. Id. Plaintiffs contend that they were impliedly misinformed, by sale of the ticket, that they could get into the venue within three hours of arrival. Id. Plaintiffs appear to argue that the misrepresentation occurred at the Coliseum on the day of the Concert as a result of Defendants reckless greed. Id.
Eighth, Plaintiffs assert that they have established a UCL claim based on Defendants' misrepresentation that they could handle 69,000 guests. Id. at 15-16. Plaintiffs state that their tickets were not honored at entry gates because those gates were inaccessible because of the traffic congestion that resulted from the concert being oversold. Id. at 16. Plaintiffs assert that the traffic congestion and the overflow lot created dangerous conditions. Id.
The standard for judicial notice is set forth in Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which allows a court to take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact not subject to "reasonable dispute," either because it is "generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court" or it is "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201. As a general rule, the court "may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." U.S. v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001)). However, the court may consider unattached evidence on which the complaint "necessarily relies" if: "(1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is central to plaintiff's claim; and (3) no party questions the authenticity of the document." Id. at 999 (citing Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006)). In addition, the court may take judicial notice of "matters of public record," but not facts that may be "subject to reasonable dispute." Id. (citing Lee, 250 F.3d at 689).
Patrick referenced eleven web pages in his initial Complaint. Each of those webpages remains in his FAC, unchanged. The Court adopts its judicial notice ruling as to the contents of those eleven web pages. See Order, 16-18.
The FAC adds five new internet references. Two are links to support the assertions that third-party organizations have referenced various government reports. FAC, 15:22-24. Incorporation by reference of these websites is improper because the FAC does not necessarily rely on their contents, and the articles are not central to Plaintiffs' claims. Moreover, they are not subject to judicial notice as public records. Nevertheless, the Court will consider Plaintiffs' allegation that the government reports are referenced in third party publications at two internet addresses.
The other three addresses are to government websites, provided as citation to support allegations in the FAC. Id. at 16:21, 17:2, 17:14. Incorporation by reference of these websites is improper for the same reasons. However, the Court takes judicial notice of the information contained at each of the government websites included in the FAC as public records. See Paralyzed Veterans of America v. McPherson, 2008 WL 418391, at *5-*6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008) (taking judicial notice of information appearing on official government websites). The information on these websites, much of which is repeated in the FAC in any event, is not subject to reasonable dispute.
As in its previous Order, even where the Court does not take judicial notice of the content of certain websites it still considers the allegations pled in the FAC relating to the contents of those websites in resolving the present motions.
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint." N. Star Int'l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). Generally, a plaintiff's burden at the pleading stage is relatively light. Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[a] pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12, the court analyzes the complaint and takes "all allegations of material fact as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). Dismissal may be based on a lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of facts that would support a valid theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A complaint must "contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007) (citing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)). "A pleading that offers `labels and conclusions' or `a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders `naked assertion[s]' devoid of `further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
The factual allegations must be definite enough to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. However, a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive dismissal. Id. Rather, a complaint need only include enough facts to state a claim that is "plausible on its face." Id. at 570. That is, the pleadings must contain factual allegations "plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)" a right to relief. Id. at 545 (noting that this requirement is consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), which requires that the pleadings demonstrate that "the pleader is entitled to relief"). Generally, a plaintiff's statement in an opposition brief cannot amend the complaint under Rule 15. See Fabbrini, 544 F.Supp.2d at 1050 (citing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984)).
The Ninth Circuit has "repeatedly held that a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that "[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake." Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). A court may dismiss a claim grounded in fraud when its allegations fail to satisfy Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading requirements. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003). The plaintiff must include "the who, what, when, where, and how" of the fraud. Id. at 1106 (citations omitted). "The plaintiff must set forth what is false or misleading about a statement, and why it is false." Decker v. GlenFed, Inc., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994). A claim for fraud must be "specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular conduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong." Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985).
No civil suit may be brought against a public entity "until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board. . ." Cal. Gov't Code § 945.4; see also State of California v. Superior Court of Kings County, 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1243, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 534, 90 P.3d 116 (2004) ("Bodde"). The "board" is the governing body of a local public entity, including a county. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 900.2, 900.4. The board must grant or deny a claim within forty-five days after it is presented or the claim is deemed rejected. Cal. Gov't Code § 912.4. Lawsuits that seek monetary relief based on claims sounding in tort, as well as claims sounding in contract, are lawsuits for "money or damages." See City of Stockton v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.4th 730, 738, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 295, 171 P.3d 20 (2007). Failure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement is grounds for dismissal of a plaintiff's claims. Bodde, 32 Cal.4th at 1245, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 534, 90 P.3d 116. This requirement applies in federal court. Butler v. Los Angeles Cnty., 617 F.Supp.2d 994, 1001 (C.D. Cal. 2008). The written claim "shall show all of" the enumerated requirements listed in California Government Code section 910. Cal. Gov't Code § 910. Claims statutes must be satisfied even in the face of the public entity's actual knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the claim. City of Stockton, 42 Cal.4th at 738, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 295, 171 P.3d 20.
Plaintiffs allege that they provided notice of their claims to the attorney for the OCJV, including the County of Alameda and the City of Oakland. FAC, 9:19-28. Plaintiffs have not alleged compliance with the California Tort Claims Act. See Cal. Gov't Code § 910 et seq. Plaintiffs' claims against the City of Oakland and Alameda County for money or damages are again dismissed on this basis, this time with prejudice.
A private citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf under the CWA against any violator of the Act. Northern California River Watch v. Honeywell Aerospace, 830 F.Supp.2d 760, 765 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)). The CWA requires a prospective plaintiff to give a 60-day notice to the proper parties — the Environmental Protection Agency Administrator, the state in which the violation is occurring, and the violator — before commencing suit against an alleged violator. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)). Compliance with the notice requirement is a jurisdictional necessity. Center for Biological Diversity v. Marina Point Dev. Co., 566 F.3d 794, 800 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Waterkeepers N. Cal. v. AG Indus. Mfg., Inc., 375 F.3d 913, 916 (9th Cir. 2004)).
Even assuming Plaintiffs have adequately pled notice to Defendants, the purported violators, and California, the state in which the violation occurred, Plaintiffs have not pled that they provided a 60-day notice to the Administrator. Rather, Plaintiffs allege:
FAC, 11:16-21. In addition, pursuant to their RCRA cause of action, Plaintiffs allege: "As discussed supra, Missud notified all required entities and all Defendants who've already lied about not receiving proper notice." Id. at 12:11-12. In Opposition, Plaintiffs clarify that Patrick sent notice, of some sort, to Defendants' counsel, county and state attorneys representing governmental agencies, the FBI, and state and federal Departments of Justice, through his own master email list. Opposition, 11-12.
In spite of the Court's Order, which stated that the Environmental Protection Agency Administrator was a party that must be provided notice as a jurisdictional requirement and provided a citation to the relevant statute, and two extensions of time to amend their complaint, Plaintiffs have not made the specific factual allegation that they provided notice to the Administrator. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not acknowledge or address their failure to do so in their Opposition despite Defendants' clear argument that their claim should be dismissed without leave to amend for failure to provide notice to the Administrator. See Motion to Dismiss, 10. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' CWA claim is dismissed without leave to amend as further amendment would be futile.
A private citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf under the RCRA against any violator of the Act. Northern California River Watch, 830 F.Supp.2d at 765 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)). The RCRA requires a 60-day notice to the proper parties before commencing a suit for a violation of any "permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition or order" and a 90-day notice to a violator who has contributed to the "past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6972). The required notice must be provided to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the state in which the alleged violation occurs, and the alleged violator. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b). Notice to the alleged violator may be less than 60 or 90 days prior to initiating suit in certain enumerated circumstances. Id. Giving pre-suit notice is a "mandatory condition[] precedent to commencing suit under the RCRA citizen suit provision." Gregory Village Partners, L.P. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 805 F.Supp.2d 888, 899 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Hallstrom, 493 U.S. 20, 31, 110 S.Ct. 304, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (60-day notice)); see also Covington v. Jefferson County, 358 F.3d 626, 636 (9th Cir. 2004) (both 60-day and 90-day notice provisions are jurisdictional).
Even assuming Plaintiffs have adequately pled notice to Defendants, the purported violators, and California, the state in which the violation occurred, Plaintiffs have not pled that they provided any notice to the Administrator. Rather, as noted above, Plaintiffs allege:
FAC, 11:16-21. In addition, pursuant to their RCRA cause of action, Plaintiffs allege: "As discussed supra, Missud notified all required entities and all Defendants who've already lied about not receiving proper notice." Id. at 12:11-12. In Opposition, Plaintiffs clarify that Patrick sent notice, of some sort, to Defendants' counsel, county and state attorneys representing governmental agencies, the FBI, and state and federal Departments of Justice, through his own master email list. Opposition, 11-12.
Once again, the Court provided statutory authority demonstrating that, as a jurisdictional necessity, notice had to be afforded to the Administrator prior to bringing suit. Despite two extensions of time to amend their complaint, Plaintiffs have not pled that they provided any notice to the Administrator. Rather, as with their CWA claim, Plaintiffs do not acknowledge or address their failure to do so in their Opposition despite Defendants' clear argument that their claim should be dismissed without leave to amend for failure to provide notice to the Administrator. See Motion to Dismiss, 10. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' RCRA claim is dismissed without leave to amend as further amendment would be futile.
The ADA was enacted to address Congress' finding that although "physical or mental disabilities in no way diminish a person's right to fully participate in all aspects of society . . . many people with physical or mental disabilities have been precluded from doing so because of discrimination." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1). The purpose of the ADA is to "provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1); see also PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001) (the ADA provides a "broad mandate" "to eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals, and to integrate them `into the economic and social mainstream of American life.'")(quoting S.Rep. No. 101-116, p. 20 (1989); H.R.Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, p. 50 (1990), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1990, pt. 2, pp. 303, 332)). Further, because the ADA is a civil rights statute that relies primarily on private enforcement actions to obtain compliance, the Supreme Court has instructed that courts should take a "broad view of constitutional standing." Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 946 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Doran v. 7-11, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008)(quoting Trafficante v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972)). Nonetheless, a plaintiff asserting claims under the ADA must establish the existence of a case or controversy under Article III of the Constitution. Id. (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; Lujan, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351).
In Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., the Ninth Circuit addressed the requirements for Article III standing to seek injunctive relief under the ADA. Id. The starting point of the court's analysis was the general principal that to establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she has suffered an injury-in-fact traceable to the defendant's actions and that the injury can be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. (citing Fortyune v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004)). In addition, to obtain injunctive relief a plaintiff must "demonstrate a `real or immediate threat of repeated injury' in the future." Id. (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496 (1974)).
To meet the "real and immediate threat of repeated injury" requirement for injunctive relief, a plaintiff who has suffered injury-in-fact can demonstrate either that: 1) "he intends to return to a noncompliant accommodation and is therefore likely to reencounter a discriminatory architectural barrier;" or 2) "discriminatory architectural barriers deter him from returning to a noncompliant accommodation." Id. at 950. As to the scope of an ADA plaintiff's standing, the Chapman court held that "[t]he ADA's remedial scheme is not limited to orders for the removal of encountered barriers, but instead dictates that `injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.'" Id. at 951 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1288(a)(2)). Thus, "the ADA specifically does not require that the disabled individual personally encounter each architectural barrier as a predicate to seeking its removal." Id. Further, even where the barriers that were encountered are later remedied, an ADA plaintiff does not lose his standing to challenge unencountered barriers. Id. at 952 (citing Doran, 524 F.3d at 1047).
In Chapman, the court held that the plaintiff failed to establish injury-in-fact where he alleged only that he was "physically disabled" and that he visited the defendant's store and "encountered architectural barriers that denied him full and equal access." Id. at 954. He did not allege what the barriers were or how his disability was affected by them. Id. Instead, he attached to his complaint an accessibility study, which merely identified alleged ADA and California Building Code violations "without connecting the alleged violations to Chapman's disability, or indicating whether or not he encountered any one of them in such a way as to impair his full and equal enjoyment" of the facility. Id. at 955. Citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the court held that these were "precisely the `formulaic recitation' of the elements of a claim that the Supreme Court has deemed insufficient under Rule 8." Id. (citing 556 U.S. 662, 677). Because the plaintiff's allegations "[left] the . . . court to guess which, if any, of the alleged violations deprived him of the same full and equal access that a person who is not wheelchair bound would enjoy when shopping at [the defendant's store]," and also failed to "identify how any of the alleged violations threatens to deprive him of full and equal access due to his disability" in the future, Plaintiff did not sufficiently allege standing. Id.
Title III of the ADA provides that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182. To prevail on a discrimination claim under Title III, a plaintiff must show that: "(1) he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied a public accommodation by the defendant because of his disability." Cullen v. Netflix, Inc., 880 F.Supp.2d 1017, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Ariz. ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enters., 603 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 2010)).
In addition, Title II of the ADA covers discrimination in the provision of public services. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165. Title II is divided into two parts: Part A covers public services generally, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134; Part B applies specifically and only to public transportation provided by public entities, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12141-12165. To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) she is an individual with a disability under the Act; (2) she is "otherwise qualified" to participate in or receive the benefit of the entity's services programs, or activities, i.e., she meets the essential eligibility requirements of the entity, with or without reasonable accommodation; (3) she was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the entity's services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity solely by reason of her disability; and (4) the entity is a public entity. Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999). "The ADA shall be construed broadly in order to effectively implement the ADA's fundamental purpose of providing a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." D.K. ex rel. G.M. v. Solano County Office of Educ., 667 F.Supp.2d 1184, 1190 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2002)).
Patrick is removed as a party from the FAC, he is now "only the attorney of record herein." Nevertheless, the amended allegations of disability pertain only to Patrick. There are no allegations in the FAC that Julie, the only Plaintiff, is disabled. Therefore, there are no allegations of any deprivations under the statute as to the sole plaintiff. The ADA claim is therefore dismissed without leave to amend.
In addition, even if Patrick were still a party, he has not adequately pled his standing to pursue an ADA claim for injunctive relief pursuant to Chapman. Plaintiffs allege that Patrick suffers from sciatica and severe sclerosis, and is accordingly limited to a walking range of two city blocks. Plaintiffs allege the following barriers to access: (1) the distance between the overflow parking lot and the Coliseum; (2) some unspecified number of curbs between the overflow lot and the Coliseum that lack ramps; and (3) various hazards in and around the overflow lot. Plaintiffs further plead that Patrick will return to the Coliseum to attend an A's game. Plaintiffs do not plead that Patrick will be required to use the overflow lot to do so. Thus, Plaintiffs have not pled that Patrick is likely to reencounter any of the alleged discriminatory architectural barriers at the Coliseum. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not pled that the discriminatory architectural barriers deter Patrick from returning to the Coliseum. See Chapman, 631 F.3d at 950.
"[T]o satisfy Article III's standing requirements, a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an `injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-181, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000).
In his FAC, Plaintiffs assert a violation of the National Highway Safety and Traffic Act and Caltrans requirements based on Defendants' failure "to provide adequate pedestrian walkways, railings, landings, ramps, and other components which require separation from vehicular traffic, roadways, and thoroughfares prescribed by the Act." FAC, 15:3-5, 16:15-18. Plaintiffs provide citations to several National Highway Traffic Safety Administration publications, the Caltrans Mission Statement, and a Caltrans press release relating to improvements made on Interstate 5 to support their assertion that these violations are actionable. FAC, 15:7-16:10, 16:20-17:19.
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that there is a private right of action for violation of any of these provisions. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not alleged any injury resulting from the alleged violations.
The elements of a cause of action for breach of contract in California are: (1) the existence of the contract; (2) performance by the plaintiff or excuse for nonperformance; (3) breach by defendant; and (4) damages. First Commercial Mortg. Co. v. Reece, 89 Cal.App.4th 731, 745, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 23 (2001). "There is implied in every contract a covenant by each party not to do anything which will deprive the other parties thereto of the benefits of the contract." Harm v. Frasher, 181 Cal.App.2d 405, 417, 5 Cal.Rptr. 367 (1960). A breach of contract may be established on the basis of either an express provision of the contract or on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Storek & Storek, Inc. v. Citicorp Real Estate, Inc., 100 Cal.App.4th 44, 55, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 267 (2002) ("every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in the performance of the contract such that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of either party to receive the fruits of the contract"). An implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot contradict the express terms of a contract. Id. (Citing Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev. Cal., Inc., 2 Cal.4th 342, 374, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 826 P.2d 710 (1992)). Further, because "the implied covenant operates to protect the express covenants or promises of [a] contract . . . [it] cannot impose substantive duties or limits on the contracting parties beyond those incorporated in the specific terms of [the parties'] agreement." McClain v. Octagon Plaza, LLC, 159 Cal.App.4th 784, 806, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 885 (2008).
"Facts alleging a breach, like all essential elements of a breach of contract cause of action, must be pleaded with specifity." Levy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 150 Cal.App.4th 1, 5, 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 (2007). Thus, to state a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a plaintiff must identify the specific contractual provision that was frustrated. See Lingad v. Indymac Fed. Bank, 682 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1154 (2010).
The Court dismissed Plaintiffs' initial Complaint for failure to identify any factual basis underlying any express or implied contractual duty owed by Defendants. In the FAC, Plaintiffs state that they are unaware of any of the terms and conditions of their contract, because they cannot find those terms on www.ticketmaster.com, except for the words: "Rain or Shine." FAC, 19:28-20:3. Without providing contractual terms, Plaintiffs allege that a traffic control plan and adequate parking were necessary for the Concert. FAC, 20:28-29. Plaintiffs plead that "[a]ll the many, many Plaintiffs (1) had a Ticket. . ., (2) timely arrived to the Venue for admission, (3) were directed by the Defendants in all sorts of weird directions through a maze of gridlocked cars to get an additional $25 per car thereby denying them admission to the Venue which they paid handsomely to enter, (4) and suffered damages but-for these Defendants' greed and insistence that they go to the overflow parking lot and other mismanaged facilities. Plaintiffs wasted money on Tickets that weren't honored by these Defendants." Id. at 20:6-12. However, Plaintiffs also allege that they, the Missuds, purchased two tickets, only one of which was timely honored. Id. at 19, 21:22. In their Opposition, Plaintiffs clarify that Patrick took BART to the Coliseum and had his ticket timely honored, whereas Julie drove her car, became stuck in traffic, and missed the vast majority of the Concert. Opposition, 13.
In the absence of the contractual provisions, the Court cannot conclude that, by virtue of Plaintiffs' tickets, Plaintiffs were entitled to anything other than admission to the venue when their tickets were presented at the entry gate.
The Court also cannot conclude that Plaintiffs have stated a claim for a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiffs essentially allege that Defendants constructively prevented Plaintiffs from attending the Concert, the purpose of their contract, by mismanaging the traffic in their parking lots and by selling tickets to more patrons than they could expect to provide parking for. To find a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing on this theory, the Court would have to conclude that Defendants were obligated by the contract to provide parking and traffic control. See McClain, 159 Cal.App.4th at 806, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 885 (because "the implied covenant operates to protect the express covenants or promises of [a] contract . . . [it] cannot impose substantive duties or limits on the contracting parties beyond those incorporated in the specific terms of [the parties'] agreement"). On this record, the Court cannot.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim is dismissed with prejudice. As Plaintiffs have pled that they are unable to locate the terms of their contract, leave to amend would be futile.
To state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the defendant's legal duty of care to the plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) resulting injury to the plaintiff. Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 26 Cal.4th 465, 500, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 28 P.3d 116 (2001). The existence of a duty is a question of law to be determined by the court. Id. at 501.
"[T]he economic loss rule prevents the law of contract and the law of tort from dissolving one into the other." Robinson Helicopter, 34 Cal.4th at 988, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 352, 102 P.3d 268. It "requires a purchaser to recover in contract for purely economic loss due to disappointed expectations, unless he can demonstrate harm above and beyond the broken contractual promise." Id. Tort damages have been permitted in contract cases where a breach of duty directly causes physical injury, for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in insurance contracts, for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, and where the contract was fraudulently induced. Erlich, 21 Cal.4th at 551-52, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 886, 981 P.2d 978. In each of those cases, the duty that gives rise to tort liability is either completely independent of the contract or arises from conduct that is both intentional and intended to harm. Id. at 552. In addition, in the products liability context the rule may be overcome by allegations of personal injury or damages to property aside from the defective product. See Robinson Helicopter, 34 Cal.4th at 988, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 352, 102 P.3d 268.
Plaintiffs negligence claim rests on the following theories: (1) Defendants breached their duty to provide adequate safe parking and traffic control by requiring Plaintiffs to park in an expensive and muddy overflow lot; (2) Defendants breached their duty to provide access to the Coliseum by creating a traffic jam through their attempts to collect a $25 fee for parking; and (3) Defendants breached their duty to maintain the overflow lot in a safe condition by leaving a number of hazards exposed, such as rusty barbed wire, muddy ruts, and collapsed chain link fences. FAC, 17:22-19:8, 25:10-15.
However, in spite of an opportunity to amend their complaint and a second round of briefing, Plaintiffs have still failed to identify any authority to support the proposition that Defendants were under any duty to provide adequate parking that arose independently from the contract. Rather, Plaintiffs ignore Defendants' argument, made in their Motion to Dismiss, that Plaintiffs have not alleged a breach of any duty arising independently of the contract. See Motion to Dismiss, 19. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not alleged that the contract provided any duty to provide adequate parking. Finally, the only injury alleged under this negligence theory is that Plaintiffs' expectations under the contract were frustrated. Because Plaintiffs have failed to remedy the defects of their Complaint, their negligence cause of action is dismissed without leave to amend.
"Fraud in the inducement is a subset of the tort of fraud. It `occurs when ``the promisor knows what he is signing but his consent is induced by fraud, mutual assent is present and a contract is formed, which, by reason of the fraud is voidable.'''" Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Ctr., 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294-295, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 364 (2005) (quoting Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp., 14 Cal.4th 394, 415, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061 (1996)). "The elements of fraud are (a) a misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) scienter or knowledge of its falsity; (c) intent to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage." Id. at 294 (citing Lazar, 12 Cal.4th at 638, 49 Cal.Reptr.2d 377, 909 P.2d 981). To plead a claim for fraud in the inducement, Plaintiffs' allegations must be sufficiently detailed to meet the heightened Rule 9(b) pleading standard for fraud. Parino, 838 F.Supp.2d at 906.
The economic loss rule does not bar a properly pled fraudulent inducement claim: "`[I]t has long been the rule that where a contract is secured by fraudulent representations, the injured party may elect to affirm the contract and sue for fraud." United Guar. Mortg. Indem. Co., 660 F.Supp.2d at 1188 (quoting Lazar, 12 Cal.4th at 645, 49 Cal.Reptr.2d 377, 909 P.2d 981).
The FAC rests on the same theory as the original Complaint. That is, Defendants oversold the concert knowing that they did not have adequate parking to accommodate 69,000 ticketed invitees. Defendants misrepresented that they could accommodate each ticketed guest by selling 69,000 tickets. Moreover, by selling the tickets they guaranteed admission to the Concert upon timely arrival. Plaintiffs relied on those representations by buying tickets. Plaintiffs have not added any allegations to the FAC concerning any statements made by Defendants, either through advertisements or directly to individuals. Instead, Plaintiffs rely solely on the implications of a ticket sale. Moreover, Plaintiffs make clear in their briefing that they do not mean timely arrival at the gates of the Coliseum, but rather timely arrival in the vicinity of the Coliseum by car, as opposed to by BART or by some other means of transit. See FAC, 19:20-22 (stating that one of the Missuds' tickets was timely honored), Opposition, 13, 15 (stating that Patrick took BART to the Coliseum whereas Julie drove, parked in the overflow lot, and missed almost all of the concert after sitting in traffic for upwards of three hours). In the absence of any alleged representations relating to whether Plaintiffs would be able to park at the venue, the amount of time it would take to park, or that parking would be available regardless of Plaintiffs' arrival time, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs have stated a claim for fraudulent inducement. That is, a promise to provide parking, regardless of arrival time, cannot be implied from sale of a ticket for a seat at an event without more. Plaintiffs have already been afforded an opportunity to plead, to the specificity required by Rule 9(b), particular false statements. As it is now apparent that they cannot do so, Plaintiffs' fraudulent inducement cause of action is dismissed without leave to amend.
The UCL prohibits "unfair competition," which is defined as any "unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. A claim may be brought under the UCL "by a person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of unfair competition." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. Therefore, to establish standing under the UCL a plaintiff must "(1) establish a loss or deprivation of money sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury, and (2) show that the economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice . . . that is the gravamen of the claim." Lawther v. OneWest Bank, FSB, 2012 WL 298110, at *23 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2012) (quoting Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.4th 310, 337, 120 Cal.Rptr.741, 246 P.3d 877 (2011)).
To establish a violation of Section 17200, a plaintiff may establish a violation under any one of three prongs. To state a cause of action based on an "unlawful" business act or practice under the UCL, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show a violation of some underlying law. People v. McKale, 25 Cal.3d 626, 635, 159 Cal.Rptr. 811, 602 P.2d 731 (1979). A "fraudulent" business act or practice is one in which members of the public are likely to be deceived. Weinstat v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 180 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1223 n.8, 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 614 (2010) (citations omitted). "`Fraudulent,' as used in the statute, does not refer to the common law tort of fraud but only requires a showing that members of the public `are likely to be deceived.'" Olsen v. Breeze, 48 Cal.App.4th 608, 618, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 818 (1996). UCL claims premised on fraudulent conduct trigger the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir.2009).
Finally, while there is disagreement among California courts regarding the definition of "unfair" business practices, three tests have been applied, as the court in Phipps v. Wells Fargo explains:
2011 WL 302803, at *16 (E.D.Cal., Jan. 27, 2011).
As discussed below, Plaintiffs' UCL claim, relying on the same facts and theories set forth in the original Complaint, is dismissed without leave to amend.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants engaged in fraudulent acts by selling more tickets to the concert than they were capable of accommodating and by advertising the concert in a way that misled the putative class of "Plaintiffs-Invitees" to believe that their tickets would be honored. Plaintiffs allege that they suffered damage as a result. Reading the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, they have standing to assert a claim under the UCL on the theory that the concert was oversold because they allegedly suffered economic injury, the lost value of one of the two tickets they purchased, because Defendants sold tickets to more people than they were capable of accommodating. However, Plaintiffs still do not have standing to assert a UCL claim on a theory of misleading advertising because Plaintiffs still have not alleged that they purchased their tickets, or otherwise suffered economic injury, in reliance on any of the unspecified misleading advertising. Indeed, they cannot identify any advertisement that they were aware of, instead stating that they "learned of the Concert through some means of advertisement" because the performer "Bono did not personally call" each person who bought a ticket to the event. FAC, 23:5-7. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim premised on the misleading advertising theory is dismissed without leave to amend.
In its previous Order, the Court stated:
Order, 35. In spite of the opportunity to amend their Complaint, Plaintiffs restated their allegations that Defendants knowingly oversold the Concert without any attempt to plead that Defendants' conduct violated any other law. FAC, 23:8-11. The remainder of the FAC makes clear that the basis for the theory is Defendants inability to provide sufficient parking for a crowd of that size. Once again, the UCL claim under the unlawful prong is dismissed. Plaintiffs will not be given leave to amend because further amendment would be futile.
Plaintiffs amend their Complaint to include a legal argument, but no additional factual allegations, in support of their UCL claim under the fraudulent prong. FAC, 23:12-16. Presumably, Plaintiffs rely on the same factual allegations set forth in their fraudulent inducement claim. However, Plaintiffs still have not pled, to the standard required by Rule 9(b), that Defendants made any statement that would have deceived the public into believing that they would be able to drive to the Coliseum and park their car regardless of their time of arrival. Rather than do so, explicitly responding to two footnotes in the Court's prior Order, Plaintiffs plead that reasonable access is as necessary as clean air, potable water, and safe premises. FAC, 23-24 n.9. However, Plaintiffs still make no attempt to address their failure to plead, noted by the Court in one of the footnotes Plaintiffs explicitly respond to, facts to support their conclusory allegation that the only means of "reasonable access to the Venue" was by driving. See FAC, 23-24 n.9; Order, 36 n.18. Indeed, Plaintiffs' Opposition makes clear that BART provided an alternative means of access that enabled Patrick to timely access the venue. Opposition, 13. Thus, Plaintiffs still have not pled facts to justify their conclusion that Defendants oversold the event because they could not provide parking for attendees. As discussed above, and in light of Plaintiffs' footnote, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs cannot do so. The UCL claim under the fraudulent prong is dismissed without leave to amend.
To reach a contrary result on this record, the Court would be required to conclude as a matter of law that by selling tickets to attend an event, without making any representations whatsoever, Defendants could have promised to provide parking to each ticketholder regardless of whether or not there were other reasonable means of accessing the event. It cannot do so.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants lack of adequate parking and traffic control measures created a traffic jam, preventing emergency personnel from being able to use the roads surrounding the Coliseum and putting thousands of people in peril. FAC, 23:16-25. This does not cure the deficiencies in their Complaint. First, Plaintiffs still have made no effort to tether their public policy argument to any specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions. Second, as discussed above, Plaintiffs have not alleged that the business practices related to ticket sales, selling tickets to more individuals than Defendants could provide parking for, was immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers in light of Plaintiffs' failure to plead that Defendants made any indication parking would be provided for all ticketed patrons. To the extent Defendants disregard for any collateral effects of the lack of parking could qualify as such conduct, Plaintiffs have not alleged that any person suffered actual injury, aside from inability to attend the concert, as a result of the traffic jam. Finally, as to the third formulation of the test, Plaintiffs still have not pled that they could not have avoided the alleged injury. As noted above, Plaintiffs have not pled that they could not access the Coliseum using other means of transportation. In light of Plaintiffs failure to address the deficiencies in their Complaint, their UCL claim is dismissed without leave to amend.
For the foregoing reasons, the FAC is dismissed without leave to amend. The Motion to Strike is denied as moot. The Clerk shall close the file.
