STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER EXCLUDING TIME UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 3161

RICHARD SEEBORG, District Judge.

The parties in this case appeared before the Court on July 9, 2013, for the defendant's initial appearance before this Court and a status conference. At that time, the parties represented to the Court that granting exclusion of time under the Speedy Trial Act would be appropriate. Due to an error regarding the defendant's appearance with this Court, the defendant, who had appeared in magistrate court the same morning, was transported back to his place of custody by the U.S. Marshal Service. Consequently, the defendant was not present for his hearing. In addition, defense counsel requested additional time to review the discovery recently disclosed by the government.

As a result, the parties requested the Court to set the matter out for two weeks, and agreed that granting exclusion of time under the Speedy Trial Act would allow the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation of counsel. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv). The parties further agreed that the ends of justice served by granting such an exclusion of time outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). At the hearing, the Court made findings consistent with this agreement, and set the matter to July 23, 2013.

[PROPOSED] ORDER

For the reasons stated above and at the July 9, 2013, hearing, the Court finds that the exclusion from the time limits applicable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161 of the period from July 9, 2013, and July 23, 2013, is warranted and that the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Denying the requested exclusion of time would deprive the parties of the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).

IT IS SO ORDERED.