Filed: Sep. 06, 2013
Latest Update: Sep. 06, 2013
Summary: STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER EXCLUDING TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT, 18 U.S.C. 3161 ET SEQ . EDWARD M. CHEN, District Judge. The United States of America, by and through its attorney of record, and defendant Nicholas Alexander Snow ("defendant"), by and through his attorney of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. For the reasons stated in open court on September 5, 2013, and with the defendant's consent, the Court continued the above-captioned matter to October 16, 2013 at 2:30
Summary: STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER EXCLUDING TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT, 18 U.S.C. 3161 ET SEQ . EDWARD M. CHEN, District Judge. The United States of America, by and through its attorney of record, and defendant Nicholas Alexander Snow ("defendant"), by and through his attorney of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. For the reasons stated in open court on September 5, 2013, and with the defendant's consent, the Court continued the above-captioned matter to October 16, 2013 at 2:30 ..
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STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER EXCLUDING TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 ET SEQ.
EDWARD M. CHEN, District Judge.
The United States of America, by and through its attorney of record, and defendant Nicholas Alexander Snow ("defendant"), by and through his attorney of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. For the reasons stated in open court on September 5, 2013, and with the defendant's consent, the Court continued the above-captioned matter to October 16, 2013 at 2:30 p.m., and excluded time under the Speedy Trial Act from September 5, 2013 through October 16, 2013 to provide the defense lawyer with additional time to investigate this case for effective preparation.
2. The parties stipulate and agree that this matter should be continued to October 16, 2013 and that the failure to grant such a continuance would unreasonably deny the defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The parties further stipulate and agree that the time from September 5, 2013 through October 16, 2013 should be excluded in accordance with the provisions of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), on the basis that the ends of justice are served by taking such action which outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial and also under section (B)(iv) for effective preparation of counsel, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in court on September 5, 2013, and upon the parties' stipulation, and GOOD CAUSE appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-captioned matter shall be continued to October 16, 2013 at 2:30 p.m. and that the time from September 5, 2013 through October 16, 2013 shall be excluded in accordance with the provisions of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv). The Court finds that (A) failure to grant the continuance would unreasonably deny the defendants continuity of counsel and the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence; and (B) the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) & (B)(iv).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
