ORDER RE: DISCOVERY LETTER [DOCKET NO. 49]

DONNA M. RYU, Magistrate Judge.

Before the court is a joint discovery letter filed by Plaintiff Cory Narog and non-parties San Mateo County District Attorney's Office (the "DA's Office") and Deputy District Attorney Kevin Collins. [Docket No. 49.] The court finds that the matter is appropriate for resolution without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), and vacates the May 22, 2014 hearing.

This court has summarized the factual allegations in the First Amended Complaint [Docket No. 7] elsewhere. See Docket Nos. 38, 56. Non-party Collins is one of two deputy district attorneys who was involved in Plaintiff's criminal prosecution. Plaintiff seeks to depose Collins. Plaintiff claims that Collins possesses information that is relevant to establish Plaintiff's claims against Defendants City of Redwood City and certain named Redwood City Police Department ("RCPD") officers for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and violation of due process. Specifically, Plaintiff focuses on the defense that the DA's Office acted independently in prosecuting Plaintiff, which could render Defendants not liable for Plaintiff's criminal prosecution. Plaintiff avers that Collins may have information that rebuts that defense.

Ordinarily, the officials who catalyze or procure criminal proceedings are not liable for the resulting prosecution because "the decision to file a criminal complaint is presumed to result from an independent determination on the part of the prosecutor." Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1062 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266-68 (9th Cir. 1981))1; Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 862 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he prosecutor's independent decision [to prosecute] can be a superceding or intervening cause of a constitutional tort plaintiff's injury, precluding suit against the officials who made an arrest or procured a prosecution.").2 "However, the presumption of prosecutorial independence does not bar a subsequent § 1983 claim against state or local officials who improperly exerted pressure on the prosecutor, knowingly provided misinformation to him, concealed exculpatory evidence, or otherwise engaged in wrongful or bad faith conduct that was actively instrumental in causing the initiation of legal proceedings." Id. See also Beck, 527 F.3d at 862-866 (Fourth Amendment claim could be brought against non-prosecutors who file a police report triggering a prosecution if the plaintiff could rebut the presumption of prosecutoral independence, e.g., by showing the prosecutor was pressured by the police or was given false information). "If for reasons of privilege or otherwise the relevant evidence [to challenge the presumption of prosecutorial independence] is not available, no presumption will arise,' and the defendant has the burden to show that the prosecutor's judgment was independent." Id. at 863, 865-66 (citing Smiddy, 665 F.2d at 267).

Here, as in Awabdy and Beck, Plaintiff has brought claims against the city and its police, but not against the prosecutor. Plaintiff's theory is that information provided by the DA's Office will help Plaintiff establish that Defendants are liable for malicious prosecution by showing that the DA's decision to prosecute Plaintiff was the result of improper pressure or intervention by Defendants. To that end, although Plaintiff has identified seven areas of inquiry that he wishes to pursue with Collins, the only relevant topics are Topic 1 (Collins' communications with the RCPD officers about Plaintiff); Topic 3 (documents and other evidence produced by the RCPD to the DA's Office in support of Plaintiff's criminal prosecution); and Topic 5 (Deputy District Attorney Jennifer Ow's discussions with RCPD Sergeant Osborne about Plaintiff that were communicated to Collins). The remaining topics proposed by Plaintiff are not relevant.

Plaintiff may take a one-hour deposition of Collins at Collins' office on Topics 1, 3 and 5.3

IT IS SO ORDERED.