JON S. TIGAR, District Judge.
In this action alleging violation of Plaintiff Gabriel Pineida's Eighth Amendment rights, Pineida moves for leave to amend his complaint to add four new defendants and to add a claim alleging the violation of his First Amendment rights. The motion is opposed by the six original defendants as well as the four newly proposed defendants. The matter came for hearing on June 26, 2014.
Defendants R.T.C. Grounds, Charles Lee, Kathleen Wall, R. Rodriguez, Eloy Medina, Michael Sepulveda, Carl Millner, Brian Wilson, Anise Adams, and Darren Bright (collectively, "Defendants") are or were allegedly employed at Salinas Valley State Prison ("SVSP"). Proposed Second Amended Complaint ("PSAC") ¶¶ 8-17, Exh. A to Declaration of Todd R. Gregorian, ECF No. 86-1. This action arises out of their alleged continuous mistreatment of Pineida during his incarceration at SVSP beginning in 2005.
Plaintiff filed his original complaint pro se on March 8, 2012, alleging that various SVSP employees were deliberately indifferent to his ulcerative colitis condition, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Complaint by a Prisoner under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Complaint"), ECF Nos. 1 & 1-1. The initial complaint named identified Lee, Wall, Rodriguez, Medina, Sepulveda, and Millner as defendants as well as then-SVSP Warden E. Evans (collectively, "Original Defendants"). ECF No. 1 at ECF Page No. 1.
In June 2013, the court granted in part and denied in part a motion to dismiss brought by the then-named and served defendants. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss; Dismissing Unserved Defendant; Staying Action and Referring to Settlement; Directions to Clerk ("June 2013 Order"), ECF No. 42. In that order, the court (1) held that "claims against defendants in their official capacities are dismissed with prejudice," (2) dismissed the claims against then-Warden Evans with prejudice because the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim against him, and (3) dismissed the claims against Defendant Dr. Millner without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4(m) since Plaintiff had failed to serve him.
In September 2013, Plaintiff filed a "Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint," ECF No. 59, and concurrently submitted a document labeled "First Amended Complaint," ECF No. 60. The sole basis for Plaintiff's request for leave to file an amended complaint was to re-assert his claims against Defendant Millner. ECF No. 59. Therefore, the court "construe[d] the motion as a request for the Court to locate and serve Dr. Millner." Order Granting Plaintiff's Request to Locate Unserved Defendant; Denying Plaintiff's Second Motion for Appointment to Counsel; Directions to Clerk ("October 2013 Order"), ECF No. 62. By order dated October 23, 2013, the court ordered requested that the SVSP Litigation Coordinator forward any address information for Defendant Millner to the court under seal.
In December 3, 2013, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 64. The court appointed Pineida pro bono counsel on December 16, 2013. ECF No. 74. Since Plaintiff's new counsel indicated they would file a motion to amend the complaint, the parties agreed that the motion for leave to amend should be resolved before a further summary judgment schedule is set. Joint Case Management Statement at 3, ECF No. 80.
A subsequent scheduling order issued on March 10, 2014 set a deadline for motions to add parties and amend. ECF No. 82. Pineida then timely filed the present motion. ECF No. 86. On March 19, Plaintiff filed a certificate of service indicating that Defendant Millner was served on March 4. ECF No. 83.
In the operative complaint, Pineida stated that he suffers from ulcerative colitis, a painful condition that often requires surgery and can be fatal if left untreated. Complaint ¶¶ 12-13. Defendants were allegedly made aware of Pineida's condition when it was confirmed via oral scope procedure in April 2005, yet allowed Pineida to suffer without a surgical procedure until May 2008.
Pineida now moves to amend the complaint to add Grounds, Wilson, Adams, and Bright ("Proposed Defendants"). Motion for Leave to Amend ("Mot.") at 3, ECF No. 86. All four of these new defendants took their positions at SVSP after Plaintiff filed the original complaint in 2012, and the new defendants are alleged to have joined the previously named defendants in their deliberate indifference towards Mr. Pineida's medical needs.
All of the Original Defendants, except for Evans and Millner — Lee, Medina, Rodriguez, Sepulveda and Wall (collectively, the "Appearing Defendants") — have filed an opposition brief.
Plaintiff brings a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which gives this court jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) permits a party to amend a pleading once "as a matter of course" within 21 days of serving it or within 21 days after a response to it has been filed. Otherwise, "a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). A district court "should freely give leave" to amend a pleading "when justice so requires."
The Appearing Defendants oppose the motion for leave to amend, arguing that the proposed amendment would be futile, cause undue delay, and be prejudicial to the Original Defendants. Opp. at 1, 15. The Appearing Defendants do not allege bad faith. They also argue that the joinder of parties and claims contemplated in the PSAC is improper under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and argue that certain allegations in the PSAC should be stricken under Rule 12(f). The court addresses each of the Defendants' arguments in turn.
Original Defendants claim that allowing Pineida to amend his complaint would create undue prejudice. Mot. at 16.
"Prejudice is the touchstone of the inquiry under rule 15(a)."
Even then, however, a finding of prejudice is not automatic but dependent upon a party's ability to articulate why a late amendment is prejudicial.
Here, the Appearing Defendants base their claim of prejudice upon (1) the addition of another cause of action, (2) the fact that the Appearing Defendants have already filed a motion for summary judgment; and (3) the need for an extension of time in the schedule to conduct discovery. Mot. at 16-17.
Pineida's motion for leave to amend was expressly contemplated by the court's scheduling order. The Appearing Defendants' generalized claim — that it is prejudicial to defend a new second cause of action while at the same time enduring an attendant increase in discovery — is unsupported by case law and inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's admonition that leave to amend should be granted liberally.
Denying leave to amend on the basis of undue delay is disfavored "[w]here there is a lack of prejudice to the opposing party and the amended complaint is obviously not frivolous, or made as a dilatory maneuver in bad faith."
As discussed supra, the Appearing Defendants have shown no evidence that they would suffer prejudice as a result of the proposed amendments, that the new claim is frivolous, or that Pineida has acted in bad faith. Although the case has been pending for more than two years, no trial or pretrial conferences dates have been set.
"[A] proposed amendment is futile only if no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense."
The Appearing Defendants argue that the PSAC fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against the newly Proposed Defendants. Mot. at 3. They also argue that Pineida has not alleged a viable First Amendment retaliation claim against all defendants.
In order to establish a deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment, Pineida will have to show (1) he suffered a sufficiently serious deprivation; and (2) the Defendants carried out this deprivation while deliberately indifferent to his plight.
Plaintiff acknowledges that the Proposed Defendants all allegedly took positions at SVSP after Pineida filed his original complaint in 2012. Mot. at 4. Therefore, the only allegations that can reach the Proposed Defendants are those that occurred between the Proposed Defendants' various starting dates in 2012 and the filing of the PSAC in April 2014. Pineida also acknowledges that the Proposed Defendants did not directly provide or deny Plaintiff medical care. Plaintiff proposes to name the Proposed Defendants since they are responsible for medical care at SVSP, and he alleges that they were either aware of the Eighth Amendment violations and allowed them to continue, created or participated in creating the policies under which the Eighth Amendment violations occurred, and/or exhibited gross negligence in supervising subordinates providing Plaintiff's care. PSAC ¶¶ 83(a) & (g), 84.
"A supervisor is liable under § 1983 for a subordinate's constitutional violations `if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.'"
Defendants correctly point out that every "dated" example of alleged unconstitutional mistreatment in the PSAC occurred before the Proposed Defendants began working at SVSP. Opp. at 6. There are, however, several "undated" allegations that plausibly reach the Proposed Defendants. For instance, Pineida alleges that he experienced gaps in medical treatment wherein his prescriptions were not renewed or properly adjusted. PSAC ¶55. This allegedly occurred "throughout his time at SVSP," which would include the time Proposed Defendants have been in 8their current employment.
All of the above cited references in the PSAC suggest that SVSP could have had a policy, during the time the Proposed Defendants supervised it, of declining to provide the care and diet necessary to relieve Plaintiff of very serious pain, and that the Proposed Defendants knew of the alleged mistreatment Plaintiff suffered from the implementation of those policies. If proven, this allegation could state a claim against the Proposed Defendants. The court cannot conclude that "no set of facts" could be proved under the PSAC that would amount to a valid Eighth Amendment claim against the Proposed Defendants, and so amendment cannot be denied on the grounds of futility.
"Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal."
"In this context, and at the pleading stage," a litigant is not required, "per impossibile, to demonstrate a total chilling of his First Amendment rights to file grievances and to pursue civil rights litigation in order to perfect a retaliation claim."
Pineida has sufficiently alleged acts that could plausibly create a chilling effect on his speech. PSAC ¶ 90. Pineida alleges myriad adverse actions taken against him over his nine-year stay in SVSP.
The asserted futility of Pineida's First Amendment claims, against both Original Defendants and Proposed Defendants, thus depends on whether any alleged facts plausibly demonstrate a nexus between Pineida's exercise of his First Amendment rights and the alleged conduct of Defendants.
A prisoner's First Amendment rights include the right to file prison grievances and to pursue civil litigation.
For the Original Defendants, the PSAC sufficiently pleads a chronological link between the time Plaintiff filed complaints and appeals and his alleged mistreatment. Pineida alleges that Rodriguez, Millner, and Wall told Pineida he had a surgical consultation pending when in fact it was lost, and alleges that these actions were motivated by Pineida's earlier appeal for surgery. PSAC ¶¶ 43-45. Pineida alleges that Lee summarily dismissed Pineida's appeals for a diet that wouldn't aggravate his condition.
For the Proposed Defendants, a similar chronological link exists between Pineida's actions and Proposed Defendants alleged malfeasance. Pineida alleges that his filing of the instant lawsuit, along with his pro bono counsel's communications with Defendants, immediately preceded his again being denied the nutritional shakes and medicine he had been given in the past. PSAC ¶¶ 78-80.
Construed in favor of Pineida, these allegations set forth a chronology from which it is plausible to infer that Defendants retaliated against him for appealing and pursing civil litigation. The court cannot conclude that it would be futile to allow amendment of the complaint to add a First Amendment retaliation cause of action.
Defendants also argue that the amendment would be futile insofar as it brings claims against Defendants in their official capacities. Mot. at 11. The PSAC sues Defendants in their individual and official capacities seeking injunctive and monetary relief. PSAC ¶18. Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them in their official capacities. Mot. at 11.
The court already "dismissed with prejudice" all "claims against defendants in their official capacities for money damages." June 2013 Order at 9. The court does not understand Plaintiff to be seeking to reinstate any such claims, or to bring them anew against the Proposed Defendants.
As the court stated in its previous order, to the extent Pineida's surviving claims for damages are brought against Defendants in their individual capacities, such claims are unaffected by this ruling. Further, to the extent Pineida's surviving claims for injunctive relief are brought against defendants in their individual and official capacities, such claims are also unaffected by this ruling.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Proposed Defendants assert that Pineida has failed to show that he exhausted his administrative options before turning to litigation. Mot. at 12.
The court previously addressed the exhaustion allegations in the initial complaint and found that they were sufficient to preclude dismissal at the pleading stage. June 2013 Order, at 8-12. The court applied then-current precedent that exhaustion could be asserted in "an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion rather than [in] a motion for summary judgment."
Since that order, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit overruled
Here, the complaint plainly alleges that Pineida has exhausted his administrative options. PSAC ¶78, n.1. Defendants provide no reason to conclude, consistent with
Defendants claim that adding Proposed Defendants to Pineida's claim would be a violation of rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mot. at 14.
Under Rule 20(a)(2), permissive joinder of defendants is proper if: "(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Under the joinder rules, "the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged."
Construed liberally, Pineida's claims satisfy these requirements. The basis of the complaint against all defendants, original and new, concerns the allegedly systematic mistreatment of Pineida by SVSP staff. The facts regarding that alleged mistreatment will be pertinent to every defendant. It would not be a fair or efficient use of judicial resources to require Plaintiff to file a separate lawsuit against the Proposed Defendants for very similar complaints about his ongoing problems with medical care at SVSP. Joining Proposed Defendants to the complaint is therefore proper under Rule 20.
By naming Defendant Millner in the PSAC, Plaintiff effectively seeks to make Millner again a party to this lawsuit notwithstanding his earlier dismissal under Rule 4(m). Since Rule 4(m) dismissals are without prejudice, since this motion was made before the deadline to add parties, and since Rule 15 is liberally construed, the court finds it appropriate to permit Plaintiff to re-assert his claims against Defendant Millner.
In their opposition brief, the Original Defendants argue that the court should strike certain portions of the PSAC pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Opp. 18-19. A party may not make a motion to strike in an opposition brief. Moreover, Rule 12(f) applies only to pleadings, not proposed pleadings.
However, to avoid unnecessary future motion practice, the court can advise the parties that none of the challenged averments are properly subject to a motion to strike. To fall within the scope of Rule 12(f), the material sought to be stricken must be either (1) an insufficient defense; (2) redundant; (3) immaterial; (4) impertinent; or (5) scandalous.
The Original Defendants argue that the first exhibit to the PSAC, an expert study of SVSP's ability to provide medical care to its inmates, should be stricken because it is "aimed at gaining sympathy for Pineida" and does not portray the Original Defendants in a kind light. Opp. at 18-19. This report mentions all four of the newly proposed defendants by name, and concerns SVSP's systematic issues providing adequate healthcare to its inmates during a period that overlaps with Pineida's alleged mistreatment. Exh. A to PSAC at 5, 8-9. The report is not redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous.
Original Defendants also argue that the fact that Pineida and his attorneys have been in dialogue with SVSP prison officials should be stricken. Opp. at 19. This also does not seem to be redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous.
As discussed supra, court agrees, and does not understand Plaintiff to dispute, that under the Eleventh Amendment, Plaintiff may not bring a claim for money damages against Defendants acting in their official capacities. Plaintiff should clarify that fact before filing the proposed amended complaint.
For the foregoing reasons, Pineida's motion for leave to amend, ECF No. 86, is GRANTED. Since the Appearing Defendants' motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 64, is at least partially mooted by the filing of an amended complaint, that motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
