WILLIAM ALSUP, District Judge.
In this wrongful-death and negligence action arising from an airplane crash in Cuba, plaintiffs move for default judgment. Defendants have responded with their own motion to set aside default. To the extent stated herein, both motions are
The background of this action is already set forth in prior orders (see, e.g., Dkt. No. 74). In short, plaintiffs are family members of decedent, Lorenzo Corazon Mendoza Cervantes, who died in the November 2010 crash of Aerocaribbean Flight 883 in Cuba. Plaintiffs identify defendants as Cuban airlines that "owned, maintained, serviced and operated" the aircraft (Compl. ¶ 16).
This action then began on June 28, 2011. Plaintiffs have attempted to serve process on defendants. In November 2013, plaintiffs filed certificates of service on the named defendant airlines, but the Clerk declined to enter default due to a lack of showing that defendants had received and signed for process. Then, in February 2014, an order approved plaintiffs' proposed method of service, such that the summons and complaint would be mailed via DHL Express with proof-of-delivery signatures. On April 15, 2014, the Clerk entered default against defendants after plaintiffs provided a certificate of service to defendants' alleged addresses in Cuba.
On May 28, 2014, defense counsel submitted a letter to the undersigned judge indicating their intent to represent defendants and requesting additional time to respond to the default and any motion for default judgment. They explained that they needed to obtain a license from the United States Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control to lawfully represent defendants, who are based in Cuba. OFAC reportedly informed them the licensing process typically lasts sixty to ninety days, and counsel had applied the week prior. On June 9, 2014, the undersigned judge denied defense counsel's request for additional time, as "[t]he Cuban entities have had plenty of time to come forward and contest jurisdiction and service," and "have waited until the eve of default judgment to seek to go back to square one," particularly "since no motion has actually been filed and may not even be filed in the foreseeable future" (Dkt. No. 87).
At issue now are (1) plaintiffs' motion for default judgment, and (2) defendants' motion to set aside default. At hearing, defense counsel conceded that they would only defend this action on the basis of subject-matter jurisdiction and/or the merits, and not on personal jurisdiction or venue, other than venue under the Montreal Convention.
Following full briefing from the parties, both motions are
In addition, the parties will submit supplemental briefing — addressing only the foregoing issues and limited to