JEFFREY T. MILLER, District Judge.
This is a shareholders' derivative suit brought on behalf of nominal Defendant Bridgepoint Education, Inc. ("Bridgepoint") against the members of Bridgepoint's Board of Directors (the "Board") Defendants Andrew S. Clark, Ryan Craig, Dale Crandall, Marye Anne Fox, Patrick T. Hackett, Robert Hartman, and Adarsh Sarma ("Individual Defendants"), and Bridgepoint's controlling stockholder, Warburg Pincus Private Equity VIII, L.P. ("WP VIII") and its affiliates Warburg Pincus & Co., Warburg Pincus LLC, and Warburg Pincus Partners LLC (collectively, "Warburg"). Defendants Bridgepoint, Clark, Craig, Crandall, Fox, and Hartman filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint for failure to first demand action from the corporation's directors prior to bringing a derivative action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 23.1(b)(3) and for failure to state a claim under Rule12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 13). Defendants Warburg, Hackett, and Sarma filed a notice of joinder in the other Defendants' motion to dismiss, (Dkt. No. 14), as well as their own motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 23.1(b)(3) and Rule 12(b)(6), (Dkt. No. 15). The motions have been fully briefed by both sides, and the court finds this matter suitable for resolution on the papers without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. For the reasons set forth below, the motions to dismiss are GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
Plaintiffs currently own shares of Bridgepoint common stock, have owned such shares at the time of the events relevant to this action, and will continue to own Bridgepoint common stock throughout this litigation.
Defendant Bridgepoint is a provider of postsecondary education services. It operates two institutions, Ashford University ("Ashford") and University of the Rockies (collectively, the "Institutions"). The Institutions deliver programs primarily online, as well as at their traditional campuses. In total, 81,810 total students were enrolled at the Institutions as of December 31, 2012. The majority of the students at these Institutions attend via accessible online platforms.
Defendant Warburg Pincus Private Equity VIII, L.P. ("WP VIII") is a majority stockholder of Bridgepoint and is managed by Defendant Warburg Pincus LLC. Defendant Warburg Pincus & Co. is the managing member of Defendant Warburg Pincus Partners LLC, which is the sole general partner of WP VIII. As previously noted, these Defendants will be referred to collectively as "Warburg." Warburg is a global private equity firm with offices in the United States, Europe, Brazil, China and India. Warburg has been a private equity investor since 1966 and currently has approximately $35 billion in assets under management and investments in a wide range of sectors.
Individual Defendants Clark, Craig, Crandall, Fox, Hackett, Hartman, and Sarma served as directors of Bridgepoint during the events relevant to this action. In addition to serving on Bridgepoint's Board, Individual Defendants Hackett and Sarma are also Warburg employees.
Bridgepoint was founded in early 2004 by defendant Clark with an initial $20 million investment from Warburg. Warburg's investment was the only outside money that was ever put into Bridgepoint. In 2009, Bridgepoint became publicly traded. In total, 13,500,000 shares of Bridgepoint common stock were sold in the initial public offering ("IPO"), with Warburg selling 9,095,297 shares. After the sale, Warburg retained 34,589,220 shares of Bridgepoint common stock following the IPO and remained Bridgepoint's majority shareholder. Warburg continued to own these shares as of November 13, 2013, comprising 63.4% of Bridgepoint's outstanding common stock.
In the past 6 years, Bridgepoint has realized significant growth, increasing its enrollment from 12,623 students as of December 31, 2007 to 81,810 students as of December 31, 2012, an increase of 548%. As it grew, Bridgepoint expressed concern at various times during this period that its growth might "place a strain on [its] resources" and that "failure to obtain additional capital in the future could adversely affect [its] ability to grow." In light of these concerns, Bridgepoint indicated that it "[did] not expect to pay dividends on shares of [its] common stock in the foreseeable future and [it] intend[ed] to use [its] cash position to grow [its] business. Consequently, [stockholders'] only opportunity to achieve a positive return on [their] investment in [Bridgepoint] [would] be if the market price of [Bridgepoint's] common stock appreciates."
In 2009, both of Bridgepoint's Institutions were accredited by the Higher Learning Commission of the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools ("HLC"). In order to derive revenue from federal student aid programs ("Title IV Programs") administered by the United States Department of Education ("DoE"), the Institutions must maintain their accreditation. Shortly after Bridgepoint acquired Ashford, it began an aggressive marketing campaign to increase enrollment, which eventually grew to 84,713 students. These students were increasingly located in San Diego, California, which was outside the HLC's jurisdiction and endangered Ashford's accreditation when the HLC adopted a policy in 2010 that required institutions to demonstrate a "substantial presence" in the HLC's region.
This prompted Bridgepoint to seek to obtain accreditation from the Western Association of Schools and Colleges ("WASC") in August 2010. During the accreditation process, WASC indicated to Bridgepoint that there were issues that needed to be addressed in order to obtain WASC accreditation, including (a) inadequate student retention and completion, (b) insufficient student progress tracking, (c) an insufficient core of full-time faculty members, and (d) lack of an empowered and independent governing board.
With Ashford facing the possibility of losing accreditation and the associated revenue from Title IV Programs, Plaintiffs allege that Warburg sought to exit its position in Bridgepoint in its entirety. On July 22, 2011, Bridgepoint filed with the SEC a preliminary Registration Statement on Form S-3 (the "2011 Registration Statement") to register for sale all 34,589,220 shares of Bridgepoint common stock owned by Warburg.
Plaintiffs allege Warburg's exit strategy was strategically timed. By 2011, Warburg had been an investor in Bridgepoint for seven years, a substantial period of time for a private equity investment, particularly given that Warburg had not received a cash distribution since the IPO in 2009. Not only did the public not yet know of Bridgepoint's pending accreditation difficulties when Warburg registered its shares for sale, Bridgepoint's stock price was also trading at its all-time high. After closing at $16.41 per share on April 19, 2011, the stock price surged by more than 85% to close at $30.50 per share on July 22, 2011, the same day the 2011 Registration Statement was filed with the SEC.
However, Plaintiff contends the market reacted unfavorably to Warburg's intended exit from Bridgepoint. On July 25, 2011, the first trading day after the 2011 Registration Statement, Bridgepoint's stock price closed at $27.01 per share, down more than 11% from the previous day's close. On August 3, 2011, Bridgepoint filed with the SEC a prospectus on Form 424B3 (the "2011 Prospectus") pursuant to which Warburg was to sell its 34,589,220 shares of Bridgepoint common stock and exit Bridgepoint. The 2011 Prospectus stated that Warburg may offer to sell its Bridgepoint shares through public or private transactions at prevailing market prices, at prices related to prevailing market prices, or at privately negotiated prices. However, by August 8, 2011, Bridgepoint's stock price had deteriorated, closing at $19.87 per share that day, and as low as $16.52 per share on October 3, 2011. As of November 13, 2013, Warburg had not sold any shares of Bridgepoint common stock pursuant to the 2011 Prospectus.
On July 3, 2012, WASC informed Ashford's president and CEO that WASC would be denying Ashford's accreditation. On July 9, 2012, Bridgepoint disclosed Ashford's lack of accreditation to investors in a Form 8-K (the "July 9 8-K") filed with the SEC before the markets opened. Bridgepoint's stock price declined precipitously following the July 9 8-K. It closed at $21.50 per share on July 6, 2012, the last trading day before the July 9 8-K, and at $14.25 per share on July 9, a one-day drop of 33.7%. On July 10, 2012, the stock price closed at $13.07 per share, and by July 26, 2012, Bridgepoint's stock price fell to $8.40 per share, down more than 60% from its July 6 trading price.
Following the July 9 8-K, Bridgepoint's stock price has never again closed as high as $21.50 per share, its July 6, 2012 closing price. From July 9, 2012 to July 10, 2013, Bridgepoint's stock price closed at an average price of $10.57 per share, 50.8% below the July 6, 2011 close and 65.3% below Bridgepoint's all-time high stock price on July 22, 2011, when Warburg announced its intention to exit its position in Bridgepoint. Thus, even though Warburg's 34,589,220 Bridgepoint shares were registered and eligible for sale, Plaintiffs allege Warburg was unable to sell its Bridgepoint shares at a price that provided Warburg with adequate return on its investment.
On July 10, 2013, Bridgepoint issued a press release announcing that WASC had granted Ashford initial accreditation for five years. On September 5, 2013, Bridgepoint issued a press release announcing that the HLC had removed sanctions against Ashford because Ashford had successfully established accredited status with WASC. On November 11, 2013, Bridgepoint issued a press release announcing that the DoE had notified Ashford that it had been approved for accreditation with WASC.
Following the initial announcement of Ashford's WASC accreditation, Bridgepoint's stock price began to rise, and Plaintiff asserts Warburg was presented with a renewed opportunity to sell its Bridgepoint stock. Between July 10, 2013 and November 11, 2013, Bridgepoint's stock price rose from $12.61 per share to $16.87 per share, an increase of more than 33%.
Before the markets opened on November 13, 2013, Bridgepoint filed a Form SC TO-I (the "Schedule TO") with the SEC to commence a self-tender offer. Pursuant to the Schedule TO, Bridgepoint offered to purchase up to 10,250,000 shares of Bridgepoint common stock at a purchase price of $19.50 per share, less applicable withholding taxes and without interest, subject to proration.
As set forth in the Offer to Purchase filed with the Schedule TO (the "Offer to Purchase"), both Warburg and Bridgepoint's officers and directors were eligible to participate in the tender offer, and the officers and directors were eligible to tender both their shares and vested stock options. Warburg indicated its intent to tender the maximum number of shares it can tender without potentially triggering a change in control of Bridgepoint under applicable regulations and accreditation standards, which Bridgepoint asserts is 8.6 million shares. In addition, Bridgepoint's directors and officers (excluding directors affiliated with Warburg) expected to tender approximately 4.2 million shares of Bridgepoint common stock.
In 2013, Bridgepoint's directors and officers (excluding directors affiliated with Warburg), collectively owned approximately 4.2 million shares of Bridgepoint common stock, including approximately 1.9 million exercisable stock options. Through the tender offer, Plaintiffs allege Bridgepoint's officers and directors (including the Individual Defendants not affiliated with Warburg) intended to tender their entire positions by tendering all of their shares in Bridgepoint, including all their exercisable stock options. Plaintiff alleges, among the directors' and officers' exercisable stock options are options with an exercise price of $17.10, which were "out of the money" immediately prior to the announcement of the tender offer when Bridgepoint stock closed at $16.86 per share, but well "in the money" at the tender offer price of $19.50 per share. Thus, according to the Offer to Purchase, Plaintiffs allege Warburg (Bridgepoint's controlling stockholder) and Bridgepoint's officers and directors collectively intend to tender up to 12.8 million shares, well in excess of the 10.25 million shares announced in the Schedule TO. Assuming Warburg and Bridgepoint's directors and officers sell the number of shares stated in the Offer to Purchase, Plaintiffs allege they would reap proceeds of $249,600,000.
According to the Offer to Purchase, the Board created a special committee to review a variety of alternatives for utilizing Bridgepoint's available financial resources with Bridgepoint's management. According to the Offer to Purchase, this review resulted in the Board's approval of the tender offer to the exclusion of other alternatives.
On the whole, Plaintiffs allege the timing and pricing of the tender offer demonstrate that: (1) the special committee process was a sham; and (2) the tender offer is intended to benefit Bridgepoint's controlling stockholder, Warburg, and Bridgepoint's officers and directors, including the Individual Defendants, at the expense of Bridgepoint itself. First, Plaintiffs allege that the Offer to Purchase fails to disclose, among other things: (1) when the special committee was formed; (2) the authority of the special committee; (3) the membership of the special committee; (4) the members of management who participated in the review; (5) whether the special committee actually approved the tender offer, or whether special committee approval was required to commence the tender offer; (6) how many times the special committee met to review the tender offer and/or other alternatives; (7) whether the special committee retained independent financial and/or legal advisors to review the tender offer or alternatives thereto; (8) whether the special committee received a fairness opinion in connection with its review of the tender offer; or (9) the alternatives reviewed by the special committee.
Second, Plaintiffs allege the $19.50 per share tender offer price is grossly excessive as it represents a substantial and unjustifiable premium to Bridgepoint's publicly traded stock price. Bridgepoint's stock price closed at $16.86 per share on November 12, 2013, the last trading day before the announcement of the tender offer. Thus, the tender offer represents a 15.7% premium to the closing stock price on November 12, 2013. Moreover, Plaintiffs allege the $19.50 per share tender offer price represents a substantial premium to Bridgepoint's average 10-day, 30-day, 60-day, 90-day, 6-month, 12-month and year-to-date closing stock prices up to and including November 12, 2013, the day before the tender offer was announced:
Plaintiffs assert that no economically rational, independent director acting in good faith would agree to purchase a company's publicly traded common stock at a premium to market. If a board of directors believed in good faith that its stock was worth more than its market price, Plaintiffs argue it would either purchase the stock at the market price or seek a third-party buyer willing to pay a premium to market. Significantly, notwithstanding the pendency of the $19.50 per share tender offer, Plaintiffs allege Bridgepoint's stock price has not closed above $18.50 per share after the tender offer was announced and prior to the complaint being filed.
Third, Plaintiffs allege the timing of the tender offer demonstrates that it was intended to benefit Warburg and the Individual Defendants at the expense of Bridgepoint itself. Despite having been an investor in Bridgepoint for nearly a decade, Warburg has not extracted money from Bridgepoint since the IPO in 2009. And, as Bridgepoint has repeatedly stated in its SEC filings, it did not intend to issue dividends to its stockholders. Thus, market sales of Bridgepoint common stock would be the only way for stockholders to realize return on their investments in Bridgepoint. Despite having registered its entire holdings for sale in 2011, Warburg has not sold any of its shares of Bridgepoint common stock. Thus, Plaintiffs assert Warburg caused the Board to agree to the market-premium tender offer in order to generate a cash return for itself and its investors.
Fourth, Plaintiffs contend the timing of the approval and announcement of the tender offer indicates that the Board waited until after news of WASC's accreditation reached the market in an attempt to maximize the tender price paid to Warburg and the Individual Defendants. Plaintiffs allege the tender offer was announced on the morning of November 13, 2013, because the Board likely approved the tender offer on November 12, 2013, just one day after Bridgepoint issued its November 11, 2013 press release in which it announced that the DoE had approved Ashford for accreditation with WASC. Plaintiffs argue the Board's approval of the tender offer within one day of the public announcement of Ashford's accreditation, and four days after Ashford first received news of its accreditation, indicates that the Board was waiting to approve the tender offer until the accreditation had been received and that the Special Committee and Board were not actually considering alternatives to the tender offer, as asserted in the Offer to Purchase.
Fifth, Plaintiffs allege the Board's decision to spend such a significant portion of Bridgepoint's cash on hand to repurchase its own shares could not possibly have been made in good faith in light of Bridgepoint's repeated warnings that it faced the risk of not having sufficient cash on hand to conduct its operations, and that Bridgepoint "intend[ed] to use [its] cash position to grow [its] business." The aggregate purchase price of the tender offer, assuming the purchase of the minimum 10,250,000 shares, would be approximately $199 million. As of September 30, 2013, Plaintiffs allege Bridgepoint had approximately $432 million in cash and cash equivalents. Thus, Plaintiffs assert the minimum aggregate purchase price of the tender offer represents 46% of Bridgepoint's cash on hand.
Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs argue the Individual Defendants approved the tender offer to benefit Warburg and the Individual Defendants at the expense of Bridgepoint. As a result, Plaintiffs contend the decision to approve the tender offer was self-dealing, disloyal, not made in good faith, not protected by the business judgment rule and not entirely fair to Bridgepoint.
Plaintiffs bring this action derivatively on behalf of Bridgepoint based upon Defendants' alleged breach of their fiduciary duties. Plaintiffs acknowledge that they have not made a demand on the Board to institute this action against the Individual Defendants as required by Rule 23.1(b)(3), but instead argue that such a demand would have been a futile and useless act because the Board is incapable of making an independent and disinterested decision to institute and vigorously prosecute this action.
Bridgepoint's Board consists of seven directors: Individual Defendants Clark, Craig, Crandall, Fox, Hackett, Hartman, and Sarma. Plaintiffs allege these directors are incapable of independently and disinterestedly considering a demand to vigorously prosecute this action for the following reasons. First, Plaintiffs allege the Individual Defendants knowingly, deliberately, and in bad faith approved the tender offer, which was not the product of a valid exercise of business judgment and for which they face a substantial likelihood of liability and are therefore directly interested in the challenged tender offer. Second, Plaintiffs allege the Individual Defendants intend to tender all their shares of Bridgepoint common stock and all their exercisable Bridgepoint stock options in the tender offer, and thus stand on both sides of the transaction and will receive a personal financial benefit not available to public stockholders who do not have exercisable stock options to tender. Plaintiffs argue this is particularly true because some of the directors' exercisable stock options have gone from "out of the money" to "in the money" as a result of the allegedly inflated tender offer price. Third, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Hackett and Sarma are incapable of independently and disinterestedly considering a demand to prosecute this action because they are also employees of Warburg.
Plaintiffs allege demand is also excused because the Board's decision to approve the tender offer was not the product of a good faith exercise of business judgment and is therefore not protected by the business judgment rule. Rather, Plaintiffs allege the approval of the tender offer is subject to the "entire fairness" standard. Plaintiffs argue the tender offer does not meet this standard because Warburg, the controlling stockholder of Bridgepoint, had a conflicting self-interest in the transaction and thus stood on both sides of the tender offer. Accordingly, Plaintiffs assert the business judgment rule does not protect the Board's decision to approve the tender offer, and Defendants bear the burden of proving that the tender offer was entirely fair to Bridgepoint. In approving the tender offer, Plaintiffs contend the Board failed to act loyally, in good faith, and with due care and instead knowingly acquiesced to Bridgepoint's controlling stockholder Warburg's proposing, negotiating, timing and initiating a transaction that was intended to and did benefit Warburg to the detriment of Bridgepoint. For these reasons, Plaintiffs allege demand on the Board would have been futile and was therefore not required before filing this derivative action.
Based upon these factual allegations, Plaintiffs brought this derivative action on behalf of Bridgepoint. In the complaint, Plaintiffs allege four claims: Count I against the Individual Defendants for Breach of Fiduciary Duty; Count II against the Warburg Defendants for Breach of Fiduciary Duty; Count III against all the Defendants for Unjust Enrichment; and Count IV against the Individual Defendants for Waste. Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint based upon Plaintiffs' failure to first make a demand for action on the Board as required by Rule 23.1 and the complaint's failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of the pleadings.
Ordinarily, the decision whether to institute a lawsuit on a corporation's behalf belongs to the corporation's board of directors.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, a shareholder plaintiff who brings a derivative suit against the board of directors on behalf of the corporation must "state with particularity: (A) any effort by the plaintiff to obtain the desired action from the directors . . . and (B) the reasons for not obtaining the action or not making the effort." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1(b)(3). "The purpose of this demand requirement in a derivative suit is to implement `the basic principle of corporate governance that the decisions of a corporation—including the decision to initiate litigation—should be made by the board of directors or the majority of shareholders."
Under Delaware law, "the entire question of demand futility is inextricably bound to issues of business judgment and the standards of that doctrine's applicability."
The first prong of the futility rubric is whether, under the particularized facts alleged, a reasonable doubt is created that . . . the directors are disinterested and independent. The second prong is whether the pleading creates a reasonable doubt that the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment. These prongs are in the disjunctive. Therefore, if either prong is satisfied, demand is excused.
Defendants' primary argument in favor of their motion to dismiss is that Plaintiffs failed to make a demand on Bridgepoint's Board and failed to adequately plead why demand would be futile. (Bridgepoint MTD at 14 (Dkt. No. 13)). "As an initial matter, the court acknowledges that `[e]ach derivative claim for which no demand was made on the board must be evaluated independently to determine whether demand was futile as to that claim.'"
Under the first prong of
When analyzing whether a director is "interested" for demand purposes, courts examine the specific transaction being challenged.
Here, Plaintiffs contend that all of the Individual Defendants were interested in the self-tender because: (1) the Individual Defendants stood on both sides of the tender offer, (2) the Individual Defendants received benefits from the tender offer not shared by other stockholders, and (3) the Individual Defendants faced a substantial likelihood of future liability relating to their approval of the tender offer.
In approving the tender offer, the complaint alleges the Individual Defendants intended to tender their entire positions in Bridgepoint, including all their exercisable stock options, at a price above the existing market premium. (Compl. ¶¶ 52, 56). As a result, Plaintiffs argue the Individual Defendants "both approved the Tender Offer as buyers and were eligible to and intended to participate in the Tender Offer as sellers, and thus they each stood on both sides of the Tender Offer," regardless of whether they received any special benefit which was not also extended to all the other shareholders. (Compl. ¶ 67(b); Pls. Resp. 11).
In
Plaintiffs analogize the facts of this case to a number of other cases in which demand was excused because a majority of the corporation's board members stood on both sides of transactions with Bridgepoint. (
Alternatively, Defendants offer the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in
Plaintiffs counter
Having considered the factors listed in
Plaintiffs further allege the Individual Defendants were interested under Aronson because they received benefits from the tender offer not shared by other stockholders. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege the Individual Defendants were eligible to exercise and sell into the tender offer Bridgepoint stock options that were otherwise underwater. (Compl. ¶ 67(b); Pls. Resp. 14). "[A]mong the directors' and officers' exercisable stock options are options granted on March 31, 2011 at an exercise price of $17.10, which were "out of the money" immediately prior to the announcement of the Tender Offer, when Bridgepoint stock closed at $16.86 per share, but well "in the money" at the Tender Offer price of $19.50 per share." (Compl. ¶ 52). Plaintiffs argue the ability to sell the shares from their "out of the money" or "underwater" options at a profit constitutes a benefit to the Individual Defendants that was not shared with other Bridgepoint shareholders, rendering the Individual Defendants interested in the tender offer under
In
It is immediately evident the
Of more immediate concern, however, is Plaintiffs' failure to identify in the complaint which of the Individual Defendants held the allegedly "underwater" options and how many allegedly "underwater" options there were. The complaint generally alleges that, "among the directors' and officers' exercisable stock options are options granted on March 31, 2011, at an exercise price of $17.10, which were `out of the money' immediately prior to the announcement of the Tender Offer, when Bridgepoint stock closed at $16.86 per share, but well `in the money' at the Tender Offer price of $19.50 per share." (Compl. ¶ 52). No further detail regarding the allegedly "underwater" options is provided. In order to determine if demand is excused based upon directorial self-interest, the court must be able to assess whether a majority of the directors would receive a benefit from the tender offer of such subjective material significance that it is reasonable to question whether those directors objectively considered the advisability of the challenged transaction to the corporation and its shareholders.
Accordingly, the court concludes Plaintiffs have insufficiently alleged that the Individual Defendants were interested in the transaction by receiving unshared special benefits from the tender offer.
Plaintiffs' complaint also broadly alleges that the Individual Defendants "knowingly, deliberately, and in bad faith approved the Tender Offer, which was not the product of a valid exercise of business judgment and for which they face a substantial likelihood of liability."
Having reviewed Plaintiffs' allegations, the complaint does not contain particularized facts necessary to provide a threshold showing that Plaintiffs claims have some merit. In Count I, Plaintiffs allege the Individual Defendants breached their fiduciary duty by approving a tender offer that was "initiated, structured, negotiated and timed" to unduly benefit the Defendants at the expense and to the detriment of Bridgepoint itself.
In Count III, Plaintiffs allege unjust enrichment against the Individual Defendants based upon the "excessive and unwarranted payments" they will receive pursuant to the tender offer. (Compl. ¶ 78). Under Delaware law, an unjust enrichment claim requires plaintiffs to plead "(1) an enrichment, (2) an impoverishment, (3) a relation between the enrichment and the impoverishment, (4) the absence of justification and (5) the absence of a remedy provided by law."
In Count IV, Plaintiffs assert a waste claim against the Individual Defendants, alleging the "terms of the Tender Offer are so unfair to [Bridgepoint] that they constitute an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person might be willing to trade or conduct a business transaction." (Compl. ¶ 81). "Delaware law provides stringent requirements for a plaintiff to state a claim for corporate waste," and the "test to show corporate waste is difficult for any plaintiff to meet."
Here, outside of alleging self-interest on the part of Defendants, Plaintiffs' complaint primarily challenges the timing and pricing of the tender offer, which essentially consists of a disagreement with the Board's choices in structuring and approving the tender offer. Plaintiffs object to the amount of cash on hand spent by Bridgepoint and the allegedly excessive price of the shares. In doing so, Plaintiffs challenge the business risks associated with the Board's decision, but the appropriate degree of business risk is not the basis of a waste claim. Rather, it is a question of business judgment generally reserved for the Board and afforded discretion by the court. Considering the stringent requirements for alleging a waste claim, Plaintiffs' allegations fall short of the mark.
As the waste claim now stands, the Board made a business decision to approve a self-tender offer. Plaintiffs obviously disagree with the Board's judgment as to how this matter should have been handled. "But where, as here, [allegations do not create a] reasonable doubt as to the disinterest of or absence of fraud by the Board, mere disagreement cannot serve as grounds for imposing liability based on alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and waste."
On the whole, Plaintiffs have not alleged particularized facts that create a reasonable doubt that the majority of the Board was disinterested in the tender offer at the time the complaint was filed. As a result, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled demand futility under the first prong of
Generally, to determine whether demand is excused under the second prong of
(Pls. Resp. 17 (quoting 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997) (citations omitted, emphasis added)). Plaintiffs contend the Delaware Supreme Court reiterated this standard in two other recent cases, and therefore the court should employ the entire fairness standard here as well.
Notably, the cases relied upon by Plaintiffs involve either interested mergers of subsidiaries with their parent companies or the acquisition of shares by one company associated with the controlling shareholder from another company associated with the controlling shareholder.
In contrast, the challenged transaction here is neither a merger nor an exchange of stock between two companies, but rather a self-tender offer by Bridgepoint to buy its own stock from its shareholders. "In today's financial world, dividends and self-tender offers are viewed as conventional methods of delivering to shareholders a return on their investment. The transactional choices the Board made here-to assume debt and conduct a cash self-tender offer-were classic business judgment decisions of the kind that are normally protected by the business judgment rule."
Furthermore, the complaint alleges generally that Warburg "caused" Bridgepoint's Board to agree to the market-premium tender offer in order to generate cash to return to itself and its investors and that the Board "knowingly acquiesced" to "Warburg's proposing, negotiating, timing and initiating" the tender offer for its own benefit to the detriment of Bridgepoint. (Compl. ¶ 58, 68). Notably absent from the complaint, however, are any factual allegations suggesting how Warburg played any role in the timing, crafting, or approval of the self-tender offer.
As a result, the business judgment rule remains the proper standard under the second prong of
In sum, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that Defendants either stood on both sides of the transaction or were interested in the transaction by virtue of receiving a special benefit unshared with the other shareholders. Nor have Plaintiffs alleged facts suggesting the presumptive protection of the business judgment rule should not apply. Thus, Plaintiffs have not established demand futility as required by Rule 23.1(b)(3) under either the first or second prong of
Based on the foregoing, Defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to allege demand futility under Rule 23.1(b)(3) are GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
Should Plaintiffs wish to file a second amended complaint, they must do so within twenty days of this order.