STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER EXCLUDING TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 ET. SEQ

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE, Magistrate Judge.

The United States of America, by and through its attorneys of record, and defendant Chonthicha Jaemratanasophin ("defendant"), by and through her attorney of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. At her initial appearance on Thursday, October 23, 2014, the defendant was assisted by a Thai interpreter. This matter was continued for arraignment to Wednesday, October 29, 2014, and the Honorable Bernard Zimmerman, United States Magistrate Judge, granted the parties' stipulation excluding time from October 23, 2014 through October 29, 2014 based upon continuity of counsel and effective preparation under 18 U.S.C. §§3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv). This week, the Clerk's Office advised the parties that a Thai interpreter would not be available for defendant's arraignment until Friday, October 31, 2014, at 1:30 a.m. before the Honorable Elizabeth D. Laporte, United States Magistrate Judge.

2. The parties stipulate and agree that this matter should be continued from October 29, 2014 at 9:30 a.m. to October 31, 2014 at 1:30 p.m., and that the failure to grant such a continuance would unreasonably deny the defendant the reasonable time necessary for continuity of counsel and effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The parties further stipulate and agree that the time from October 29, 2014 through October 31, 2014 should be excluded on the basis that the ends of justice are served by taking such action which outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial and for continuity of counsel and effective preparation of counsel, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv).

ORDER

Upon the parties' stipulation, and GOOD CAUSE appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-captioned matter shall be continued from October 29, 2014 at 9:30 a.m. to October 31, 2014 at 1:30 p.m. and that the time from October 29, 2014 through October 31, 2014 shall be excluded in accordance with the provisions of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv). The Court finds that (A) failure to grant the continuance would unreasonably deny the defendant the reasonable time necessary for continuity of counsel and effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence; and (B) the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.