MARIA-ELENA JAMES, United States Magistrate Judge.
This case considers the Fourth Amendment privacy rights of co-inhabitants of probationers. Pending before the Court are the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. Defs.' Mot., Dkt. No. 26; Pls.' Mot., Dkt. No. 33. Having considered the parties' positions, relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, the Court
Plaintiffs Elva Barajas and Raul Barajas ("Plaintiffs") are the mother and step-father of Edgar Horacio Perez. Defs.' Summ. of Undisputed Facts ("Defs.' SUF") ¶ 1, Dkt. No. 40.
On November 4, 2014, at 4:52 p.m, three officers of the Rohnert Park Police Department, Defendants Jacy Tatum, David Rodriguez, and Matthew Snodgrass, went to Plaintiffs' home to conduct a suspicionless search of Perez's residence pursuant to his probation search conditions. Defs.' SUF ¶¶ 4, 6; Pls.' SUF ¶¶ 7, 9. There was no urgency or exigent circumstances to do the search on that day. Pls.' SUF ¶ 12.
Two officers, Rodriquez and Snodgrass, went to the front door and knocked, and Plaintiffs answered the door. Pls.' SUF ¶ 20; Defs.' SUF ¶ 7. Mr. Barajas testified he asked the officers to see "a letter that said that they could enter," and an officer responded "they could come in whenever they wanted" because Perez was on probation. Lewis Decl., Ex. B (R. Barajas Dep.) 33:25-34:6, Dkt. No. 32-1. Officer Rodriquez testified he told Plaintiffs his name and that he was there to do a probation search, and "[Perez]'s father said, `I want to see your search warrant.'" Id., Ex. D (Rodriquez Dep.) 44:3-8, 44:25-45-2, Dkt. No. 32-3. Officer Rodriquez testified that he explained to Mr. Barajas that did not have a search warrant, but Perez was on probation and he therefore did not need one. Id. 44:8-10. According to Officer Rodriquez, Mr. Barajas kept saying, "I want to read your search warrant, I want to see your paper." Id. 44:12-17. Officer Snodgrass did not speak with Mr. Barajas when he answered the door but confirmed that Officer Rodriquez informed Mr. Barajas they were there to do a probation search and that there was a dialogue about a search warrant. Lewis Decl., Ex. E (Snodgrass Dep.) 34:21-35:8, Dkt. No. 32-3. Mr. Barajas also testified he told the officers Perez was not home. R. Barajas Dep. 34:7-11.
During this conversation, Officer Tatum went through the side gate and entered the Barajas home through a rear sliding door. Pls.' SUF ¶ 21; Defs.' SUF ¶ 9. He entered the Barajas' home with his gun drawn while the two other officers were still outside the front door, speaking with the family. Pls.' SUF ¶ 23. Officer Tatum testified he could hear officers Snodgrass and Rodriquez talking as he entered, and according to Officer Tatum, he announced "Police Department, probation search[.]" Lewis Decl., Ex. A (Tatum Dep.) 55:25-56:1, Dkt. No. 32-1. He testified he cleared the room for any people and then went into a dining area and the kitchen, making his way towards the front where he could hear talking. Id. 58:2-9. He also testified he could not see the other officers from the sliding door and described the voices as "[m]uffled. I could just hear voices talking." Id. 58:10-16. Plaintiffs' daughter, Lorena Barajas, was present during the search and explained that while her father was speaking with the officers in the front, "very shortly (within 30 seconds) of my father opening the door, a third officer... came inside and was standing inside our home, behind us and essentially surrounding my father, my mother, and me." L. Barajas Decl. ¶ 3, Dkt. No. 36. She
Lorena further explained that "[b]ecause the officer was already inside, I told my father to let the other two officers in." Id. Mr. Barajas testified the officers in the front "waited for the other one to come in" and once they "saw that he was inside... they put on their gloves and they went inside." R. Barajas Dep. 34:19-21, 36:9-16. Officer Snodgrass testified he saw officer Tatum inside "[a]t some point just prior to making entry" into Plaintiffs' home. Snodgrass Dep. 35:21-25; 37:1-7. Officer Rodriquez testified that Perez's sister told her father "something to the effect of ... They don't need a paper, just let them in," but also testified this was after Officer Tatum had already entered the home. Rodriquez Dep. 52:10-22. According to Defendants, Officers Rodriquez and Snodgrass "entered the home and searched the premises for Perez over the objection of Plaintiffs." Defs.' SUF ¶ 10.
The officers then searched the bedrooms, closets, and the bathroom for Perez and did not find him. Tatum Dep. 75:20-21; Rodriquez Dep. 53:9-12; Defs.' SUF ¶ 11; Pls.' SUF ¶ 49. Officer Rodriquez testified he asked Perez's father and sister many times where he was and where his room was, but they never answered directly. Rodriquez Dep. 53:13-25. The entire incident, from arrival of the officers to their departure after the search, lasted 18 minutes. Defs.' SUF ¶ 6. No one was injured or assaulted or arrested. Id. ¶ 11.
Afterwards, the Barajas family went to the Rohnert Park Police Station to complain about the November 4, 2014, search of their home. Pls.' SUF ¶ 39. A sergeant told Officer Snodgrass the family had come to the police department to complain about the search of their home; Officer Snodgrass told the sergeant they did a probation search, and the sergeant did not ask him anything further about what had happened. Pls.' SUF ¶ 40. Officers Tatum and Snodgrass have not been given any guidance on what they might have done differently with respect to the search of the Barajas' home, and Officer Rodriguez has not been told he did anything incorrectly with respect to the search. Id. ¶¶ 41-42. Additionally, Officers Tatum and Snodgrass have not been told they violated policy or protocol in connection with their search. Id. ¶ 43.
After speaking with two Commanders at the Rohnert Park Police Department about the way he entered the Barajas home, Officer Tatum concluded they had no issue with the way he entered the home. Id. ¶ 46. Officer Snodgrass testified he did not report anything to his supervisors about officer Tatum's entry because having an officer enter through the back before officers enter through the front is the Rohnert Police Department's "practice. That's happened before." Id. ¶ 28. Officer Tatum has entered through a rear door during probation searches 50-60 times before other officers have entered through the front door and testified this was consistent with his training. Id. ¶¶ 25-27. Sergeant Jeff Justice was designated as the 30(b)(6) witness for the City of Rohnert Park to testify regarding training and practices pertaining to probation searches and testified that he has trained officers in the city of Rohnert Park to conduct probation searches in this manner. Id. ¶¶ 30, 34. No additional training has been offered and nothing has changed (since the search of the Barajas' home) with respect to how the Rohnert Park Police Department conducts probation searches. Id. ¶ 45.
Plaintiffs filed this action on November 21, 2014. Compl., Dkt. No. 1. In their
Plaintiffs and Defendants have filed cross motions for summary judgment. The Court held a hearing on the matters on October 15, 2015. Dkt. No. 57. Having carefully considered the evidence and briefing in this matter, the Court addresses the parties' arguments below.
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits demonstrate that there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). On an issue where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can prevail merely by pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
If the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set forth specific facts showing that there is some genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. All reasonable inferences must be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir.2004). However, it is not the task of the Court to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact. Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir.1996). The Court "rel[ies] on the nonmoving party to identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment." Id.; see also Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir.2010). Thus, "[t]he district court need not examine the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found." Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (internal quotations omitted).
Both parties contend they are entitled to summary judgment. Plaintiffs argue "[t]here is no genuine dispute that the search of the Barajas home was unreasonable and failed to comply with the Fourth Amendment" because (1) the officers did not have reasonable suspicion that Perez
In considering whether the search in this case was constitutional, the Court is mindful that Fourth Amendment rights "are personal in nature." Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 219, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981). A search that is reasonable as to one individual may be unreasonable as to another. Id. Thus, while the parties tend to focus on the privacy expectations of Plaintiffs' son, Edgar Perez, concentrating on how diminished a probationer's privacy rights are and what terms Perez agreed to in his probation search conditions, the Court is cautious in not conflating Perez's rights with Plaintiffs' rights. Put another way, it is not Perez's privacy interests that matter here — rather, it is the privacy interests of his co-inhabitants that are of consequence to this case. See Perez v. Simmons, 884 F.2d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir.1988) ("The privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment is personal to the individual asserting it."), amended on other grounds, 900 F.2d 213 (9th Cir.1990), order corrected on other grounds, 998 F.2d 775 (9th Cir.1993).
To assess the parties' motions, the Court finds it helpful to begin with a survey of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relating to the issues in this case and the legal standards associated with qualified immunity and municipal liability. The Court then turns to whether Plaintiffs' rights were violated and then whether the Defendant officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, the Court considers whether Plaintiffs may maintain their municipal liability claims against the City.
The United States Constitution protects "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment protects reasonable and legitimate expectations of privacy. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). It protects "people not places." Id. at 351, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507. A private home is "`where privacy expectations are most heightened.'" Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
"A probationer's home, like anyone else's, is protected by the Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches be `reasonable[,]'" Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987), but parolees and probationers often consent to searches of their residences as a condition of their parole or probation. In light of such consent, in certain instances the Supreme Court has found suspicionless searches or searches conducted on only reasonable suspicion to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 872-73, 107 S.Ct. 3164 (based on "special need" of Wisconsin's probation system, upholding state regulation permitting a probation search on only reasonable suspicion rather than requiring a warrant or probable cause); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114-22, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001) (moving away from Griffin's "special needs" analysis in favor of "totality of circumstances" test, and finding search conducted with only reasonable suspicion reasonable because government's interest outweighed probationer's privacy interest as his probation search condition "significantly diminished" his expectation of privacy); see also Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848-50, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006) (finding Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a warrantless, suspicionless search of a parolee under a state parole-search statute, but also noting "parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment.").
However, as one commentator noted, in Samson v. California, "the majority merely observed that `we need not reach the issue whether acceptance of the search condition constitutes consent in the Schneckloth sense of a complete waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights[.]'" 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.10(b) n.62 (5th ed. 2015) (quoting Samson, 547 U.S. at 852 n. 3, 126 S.Ct. 2193 and citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). Rather, "Samson does say, [] just as does Knights, that it was relevant that the search condition... had been `clearly expressed' to petitioner." Id.; see Knights, 534 U.S. at 119-20, 122 S.Ct. 587 ("The probation order clearly expressed the search condition and Knights was unambiguously informed of it. The probation condition thus significantly diminished Knights' reasonable expectation of privacy."). But the Supreme Court has not decided whether a probation condition can "so diminish[], or completely
The Ninth Circuit subsequently addressed a similar issue in United States v. King, which considered whether to suppress evidence obtained during a suspicionless search of a probationer's home. 736 F.3d 805, 807 (9th Cir.2013), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1492, 188 L.Ed.2d 378 (2014). The defendant's probation agreement stated: "Defendant is subject to a warrantless search condition, as to defendant's person, property, premises and vehicle, any time of the day or night, with or without probable cause, by any peace, parole or probation officer." Id. at 806 (footnote omitted). The Court of Appeals held that "such a search is permissible when, as here, a violent felon has accepted a suspicionless-search condition as part of a probation agreement." Id. Stated another way, the Ninth Circuit held "only that a suspicionless search, conducted pursuant to a suspicionless-search condition of a violent felon's probation agreement, does not violate the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 810.
In arriving at this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit considered "the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the suspicionless search of Defendant's residence was reasonable[,] .... assess[ing] on the one hand, the degree to which the search intrudes upon Defendant's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Id. at 808 (quotations and internal marks omitted). First, the Ninth Circuit noted that, as a probationer, the defendant "begins with a lower expectation of privacy than is enjoyed by a citizen who is not subject to a criminal sanction." Id. (citing Knights, 534 U.S. at 119, 122 S.Ct. 587). Additionally, because the defendant-probationer had agreed to the probation search condition noted above, his lower expectation of privacy was further "significantly diminished[.]" Id. at 809. In comparing this "small" expectation of privacy, the Ninth Circuit noted the government had at least three "important interests": (1) "an interest in apprehending violators of the criminal law, thereby protecting potential victims from probationers' recidivism[;]" (2) "an interest in discovering criminal activity and preventing the destruction of evidence[;]" and (3) "an interest in a probationer's successful completion of probation and in his or her reintegration into society." Id. (quotation and internal marks omitted). "Balancing the slight intrusion on Defendant's expectation of privacy against the government's significant need to promote its legitimate governmental interests," the Ninth Circuit held the search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 810.
A probationer's consent to searches as part of his or her probation condition is thus "a salient circumstance" in weighing the reasonableness of a search and the probationer's legitimate expectation of privacy. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 587. The question then is how that search condition might affect the expectations of privacy for a probationer's co-resident.
"[C]onsent by one resident of jointly occupied premises is generally sufficient to justify a warrantless search[.]" Fernandez v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1126, 1132-33, 188 L.Ed.2d 25 (2014)
In Georgia v. Randolph, the Supreme Court reiterated a narrow exception to this rule, holding that "a physically present inhabitant's express refusal of consent to a police search is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant." 547 U.S. at 122-23, 126 S.Ct. 1515; see also Fernandez, 134 S.Ct. at 1134 (emphasizing Randolph does not extend to cases where the objector is not present and objecting). Put another way, the Supreme Court has held that "a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident." Id. at 120, 126 S.Ct. 1515 (footnote omitted) (holding search invalid under the Fourth Amendment when a physically-present occupant expressly objected to a search, notwithstanding the consent of a fellow occupant).
Subsequent courts have applied Randolph in the context of parole and probation searches, even where the parolee or probationer gave consent to search. In Thornton v. Lund, a court considered a similar case where two sisters sued officers for conducting a warrantless search of their home while looking for their parolee brother. 538 F.Supp.2d 1053, 1055-56 (E.D.Wis.2008). As the court explained, the question was not about the parolee brother's expectation of privacy but "whether plaintiffs' own Fourth Amendment rights were diminished because defendants reasonably believed that William, a parolee, lived in their home." Id. at 1058. The court rejected that individuals living with parolees and probationers necessarily had diminished Fourth Amendment rights. It noted that parolees and probationers have lower expectation of privacy as compared with other citizens because "their liberty is conditional and because the government `clearly expressed' to them that they were subject to warrantless searches, and they acknowledged this `unambiguously.'" Id. (quoting Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2199; Knights, 534 U.S. at 119-20, 122 S.Ct. 587). But "[w]here, as here, the government gave the parolee's co-resident no notice of its intent to search and the co-resident did not consent to a search," the court found "the rationale for concluding that the co-resident has a diminished privacy interest evaporates." Id. Furthermore, the Thornton court noted a parolee's consent to warrantless search is not sufficient
Judge Anthony Ishii of the Eastern District of California adopted the Thornton court's logic in Sanders v. City of Bakersfield, where a parolee, Ken McDaniel, resided with Arlene Sanders, a non-parolee, at the time the police searched their home. 2009 WL 734059, at *1-3 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 17, 2009). Sanders had demanded that the officers leave, but they entered the home despite her non-consent, justifying the search as a parole search. Id. at *1. Judge Ishii found the search could "not be justified as a parole search in relation to Arlene Sanders," relying on Thornton for the proposition that Randolph set forth a new rule when a physically present resident refused consent, even with parolee co-inhabitants who had agreed to such searches. Id. at *2-3
Other courts have similarly acknowledged that Randolph has changed the typical analysis for consent based searches, even in the context of probationers, although those courts have declined to extend Randolph to cases where a probationer has already consented to such searches and the probationer's co-resident did not object to the search or where the co-resident was aware of the search condition. For instance, in Donald v. State, the Delaware Supreme Court wrote that "[w]hile a co-occupant does not forfeit her own Fourth Amendment rights by allowing a probationer to live with her, she must object to the search to which the probationer has consented in order to prevent a search without a warrant. Because Donald did not do that, we conclude that the Superior Court did not err when it denied the motion to suppress." 903 A.2d 315, 321 (Del. 2006). Additionally, in Taylor v. Brontoli, the court briefly considered whether a co-resident's refusal to consent to a search prevails over the other co-inhabitant's consent to search under that person's probation agreement in light of Randolph. 2007 WL 1359713, at *1 n. 4 (N.D.N.Y. May 8, 2007). The defendants "maintain[ed] that the ruling in [Randolph] should not be extended to the facts [t]here because it [wa]s undisputed that [the non-consenting co-resident] was aware that [the other co-inhabitant] was on probation and that her trailer was subject to searches." Id. The court agreed, finding that under the circumstances, Randolph was "distinguishable because [the] residence was already subject to searches under a probation agreement." Id. Similar to Thornton, the implication of Taylor is that where the co-resident has no knowledge of the search condition applicable to their home, if that person is physically present and refused to the search, that refusal is dispositive as to him or her. The foregoing cases demonstrate that courts interpret Randolph as potentially applicable even in the face of probation search conditions.
The "method of an officer's entry into a dwelling" is a factor to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995). The "principle that officers must announce their presence and provide residents an opportunity to open the door" is "ancient" and commanded by the Fourth Amendment. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 589, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006). The goals of the knock and announce principle include "protecting the sanctity of the home, preventing the unnecessary destruction of private property through forced entry, and avoiding violent confrontations that may occur if occupants of the home mistake law enforcement for intruders." United States v. Combs, 394 F.3d 739,
Thus, in order to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, police are generally required "to announce their intent to search before entering closed premises;" however, the obligation "gives way when officers have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or [] would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence." United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36, 124 S.Ct. 521, 157 L.Ed.2d 343 (2003) (quotation omitted). To determine whether an entry is reasonable, courts must consider all the circumstances surrounding the entry, including, but not limited to, officer safety, time of day, destructibility of evidence, the size of the residence, the nature of the offense, and any other observations by law enforcement that would support a forced entry. Combs, 394 F.3d at 744. Additionally, they must examine what, if any, notice the police gave before entry and the likelihood that the notice alerted those inside the home to the officer's presence and purpose. Id. at 744-45. Finally, a "probation search does not permit an exception to the knock and announce requirement unless there are exigent circumstances or futility." Portnoy v. City of Davis, 663 F.Supp.2d 949, 957 (E.D.Cal.2009) (citing Green, 420 F.3d at 699).
"Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages" unless a plaintiff demonstrates "(1) that the official violated a ... constitutional right, and (2) that the right was `clearly established' at the time of the challenged conduct." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). An official's conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, "[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear" that every "reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987);
"The plaintiff bears the burden of proof that the right allegedly violated was clearly established." Tarabochia v. Adkins, 766 F.3d 1115, 1125 (9th Cir.2014) (quotation omitted). "To meet this standard the very action in question need not have previously been held unlawful." Id. (quotation and internal marks omitted). This is particularly true in the Fourth Amendment context, where the constitutional standard of "reasonableness" demands a fact-specific inquiry. Mattos, 661 F.3d at 442. The question is "whether a reasonable officer would have had fair notice that [the action] was unlawful[.]" Tarabochia, 766 F.3d at 1125 (quotation omitted).
The Supreme Court has provided little guidance as to where courts should look to determine whether a particular right was clearly established at the time of the injury. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 n. 32, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (declining to define "the circumstances under which `the state of the law' should be `evaluated by reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Appeals, or of the local District Court.'") (quoting Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565, 98 S.Ct. 855, 55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978)). In the Ninth Circuit, courts begin the inquiry by looking to binding precedent. Tarabochia, 766 F.3d at 1125 (citing Boyd v. Benton Cty., 374 F.3d 773, 781 (9th Cir.2004)). If the right is clearly established by decisional authority of the Supreme Court or this Circuit, the inquiry should come to an end. Id. On the other hand, "[i]n the absence of binding precedent clearly establishing the constitutional right, `we look to whatever decisional law is available ... including decisions of state courts, other circuits, and district courts.'" Id. (quoting Boyd, 374 F.3d at 781). Fundamentally, "[t]he qualified immunity doctrine rests on a balance between, on the one hand, society's interest in promoting public officials' observance of citizens' constitutional rights and, on the other, society's interest in assuring that public officials carry out their duties and thereby advance the public good." Beier v. City of Lewiston, 354 F.3d 1058, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004).
To hold a municipal entity liable for a constitutional violation, a plaintiff must show that an official's action that caused the plaintiff's injury was pursuant "to official municipal policy of some nature." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). In other words, a local government may only be liable under § 1983 for its own action or inaction, not that of its employees. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018; see also Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011). To prevail, a plaintiff must go beyond the respondeat superior theory of liability and demonstrate that the alleged constitutional deprivation
Liability based on a municipal policy may be satisfied one of three ways: (1) when official policies or established customs inflict a constitutional injury; (2) when omissions or failures to act amount to a local government policy of "deliberate indifference" to constitutional rights; or (3) when a local government official with final policymaking authority ratifies a subordinate's unconstitutional conduct. Clouthier v. Cty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1249-50 (9th Cir.2010) (synthesizing Supreme Court authorities). "[A]n act performed pursuant to a `custom' that has not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force of law." Brown, 520 U.S. at 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382. Moreover, "a local governmental body may be liable if it has a policy of inaction and such inaction amounts to a failure to protect constitutional rights." Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir.1992) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989)). In any case, a successful Monell claim must prove that a government entity's policy, practice, or custom is the "moving force behind a violation of constitutional rights." Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir.2011) (citation omitted).
As discussed below, based on the current record, the Court cannot grant summary judgment in favor of either Defendants or Plaintiffs related to the constitutionality of the search in this case because genuine issues of material fact remain as to the reasonableness of the search. However, the Court finds that the officer Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on certain limited grounds and likewise that the City is entitled to summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiffs have not provided evidence that a City policy or custom was the moving force behind the potential constitutional violations in this case. The Court discusses each of the potential constitutional violations below and the potential liability of the Defendants.
Plaintiffs argue they are entitled to summary judgment because the officers conducted the search in this case without reasonable suspicion, whereas Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because no suspicion was required in part because Plaintiffs' son and co-resident consented to such searches as part of his probation search terms. The issue neither party truly addresses is whether Officer Tatum began the search of Plaintiffs' home before they objected. This fact matters because under Georgia v. Randolph, if the officers entered and searched the home over the objections of the physically present
While both parties generally agree the officers conducted the search over Plaintiffs' objections while they were physically present, Plaintiffs do not move for summary judgment on this ground and instead present evidence indicating factual disputes about when Plaintiffs objected to the search compared with when Officer Tatum entered the home. Specifically, Plaintiffs proffer that "[t]he time that passed between the knock at the front door and when the family realized Officer Tatum was standing behind them was within 30 seconds." Pls.' Opp'n at 11 (citing L. Barajas Decl. ¶ 3). They also note "Defendants attempt to argue that Officer Tatum could hear the conversation at the front door at the time he entered (Defs.' [Br.] at 3)," but assert "this fact is disputed." Pls.' Opp'n at 11. Having carefully reviewed the record, it is unclear precisely when the search began in relation to Plaintiffs' objections. As such, the Court cannot grant Defendants summary judgment on the ground that the search was constitutional as a matter of law, nor can the Court grant Plaintiffs summary judgment on the ground that reasonable suspicion was required to perform the search as discussed below.
Defendants urge the Court against such a conclusion, requesting it find (1) Randolph does not apply in the context of probation searches because "the `special needs' of the state were never considered" in that case, and (2) that under the circumstances here, the "state[']s interests prevail over the objecting occupant[.]" Defs.' Br. at 14-15. But the Court is unconvinced these arguments preclude the application of Randolph. While Randolph did not consider the state's interests as related to probationers, it is not the case that it did not consider the interests of the state. Rather, Randolph found that "in the balancing of competing individual and governmental interests entailed by the bar to unreasonable searches, ... the cooperative occupant's invitation adds nothing to the government's side to counter the force of an objecting individual's claim to security against the government's intrusion into his dwelling place." 547 U.S. at 114-15, 126 S.Ct. 1515 (citation omitted). In comparing the individual's interest in protecting the sanctity of his home, the Court found "[d]isputed permission is [] no match for this central value of the Fourth Amendment, and the State's other countervailing claims do not add up to outweigh it." Id. at 115, 126 S.Ct. 1515. The Court recognized the general interest in expedient law enforcement and bringing criminal activity to light but rejected that they outweighed the non-consenting individual's privacy interest. Id. at 115, 126 S.Ct. 1515 and n. 5. The Court concluded, "nothing in social custom or its reflection in private law argues for placing a higher value on delving into private premises to search for evidence in the face of disputed consent, than on requiring clear justification before the government searches private living quarters over a resident's objection." Id. at 120, 126 S.Ct. 1515.
Furthermore, as Knights, Samson, and King demonstrate, the focus has shifted in assessing the reasonableness of searches such as the one in this case, from the special needs doctrine articulated in Griffin, to the "general Fourth Amendment approach of `examining the totality of the circumstances,'" and in probationer cases, "with the probation search condition being
In any event, under the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that if the officers entered and searched Plaintiffs' home over their objections, they violated Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights. First, as discussed above, the general rule that consent by one resident of jointly occupied premises justifies a warrantless search is inapplicable here if the Plaintiffs were physically present and objected to the search. Therefore, the threshold question is what reasonable expectation of privacy Plaintiffs had, regardless of the specific scope of Perez's consent. Defendants argue "for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, Plaintiffs have a diminished expectation of privacy while their probationer son uses their home for a residence." Defs.' Opp'n at 10, Dkt. No. 43 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974); Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540 (1995)). But while a probationer "begins with a lower expectation of privacy than is enjoyed by a citizen who is not subject to a criminal sanction," King, 736 F.3d at 808 (citing Knights, 534 U.S. at 119, 122 S.Ct. 587), it is not clear that co-inhabitants of a probationer similarly have reduced privacy expectations merely because they reside with a probationer.
Part of the reason the probationers in King and Knights had reduced expectations of privacy was the fact that they accepted clear and unambiguous search conditions. Id. at 808-09; Knights, 534 U.S. at 119-20, 122 S.Ct. 587. Here, even if Perez accepted such a search condition, there is no evidence his parents were "unambiguously informed" of that condition. Indeed, there is evidence Raul Barajas demanded the police show him a warrant before he would allow them to enter, indicating he believed a warrant was necessary for them to search his home. Furthermore, although Perez had been on probation since November 2010, there is no evidence in the record that the Rohnert Park Police ever conducted a probation search in the four years prior to this time. Thus, even though the record reflects the Plaintiffs knew Perez was a probationer, "[w]here, as here, the government gave the [probationer]'s co-resident no notice of its intent to search and the co-resident did not consent to a search, the rationale for concluding that the co-resident has a diminished privacy interest evaporates." Thornton, 538 F.Supp.2d at 1058; cf. Taylor, 2007 WL 1359713, at *1 n. 4 (refusing to extend Randolph where "it [wa]s undisputed that [the non-consenting co-inhabitant] was aware that [the other co-inhabitant] was on probation and that her trailer was subject to searches.").
Turning to the Government's interests, the Ninth Circuit has recognized the following state interests related to searches of probationers: (1) "an interest in apprehending violators of the criminal law, thereby protecting potential victims from probationers' recidivism[;]" (2) "an interest in discovering criminal activity and preventing the destruction of evidence[;]" and (3) "an interest in a probationer's successful completion of probation and in his or her reintegration into society." King, 736 F.3d at 807-08. Defendants' arguments in this case confirm those interests are significant here as well, asserting "[t]he ability to monitor offenders such as Perez is crucial" because "he has not been a successful probationer" and he has demonstrated "that he would commit more crimes and perhaps more serious crimes." Defs.' Br. at 15.
Additionally, Defendants argue the government has an interest in conducting probation searches even where there are non-consenting co-inhabitants, arguing "[i]f a co-occupant could bar police entry at the door, the co-occupant could effectively thwart any unexpected search." Id. They assert "[i]t wouldn't take long for probationers to post objecting sentinels at the doors to thwart the purposes of probation." Id. Plaintiffs respond that Randolph limited its holding in a manner that alleviates Defendants' concern when it held that "a search over a tenant's objection would be unreasonable only `as to him,' not as to consenting co-tenants." Pls.' Opp'n at 7 n.3 (citing Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120, 126 S.Ct. 1515). The Thornton court suggested the same rationale, noting "[a] co-habitant's objection to a search does not affect its reasonableness as to the probationer or parolee and would not provide a basis for suppressing evidence against the probationer or parolee." 538 F.Supp.2d at 1059 n. 4 (citing Randolph, 547 U.S. at 119, 126 S.Ct. 1515). Of course, these arguments fail to consider that the police would be less likely to enter a home in such circumstances if there is the possibility the probationer's co-inhabitant could bring a civil suit against those officers. At the same time, Defendants' argument that a co-inhabitant could thwart "any unexpected search" by refusing consent is limited. Specifically, Randolph does not speak to searches conducted with probable cause or exigent circumstances (or perhaps other
Randolph further notes "the question whether the police might lawfully enter over objection in order to provide any protection that might be reasonable is easily answered yes." 547 U.S. at 118, 126 S.Ct. 1515 ("[E]ven when ... two persons quite clearly have equal rights in the place, as where two individuals are sharing an apartment on an equal basis, there may nonetheless sometimes exist a basis for giving greater recognition to the interests of one over the other.... [W]here the defendant has victimized the third-party ... the emergency nature of the situation is such that the third-party consent should validate a warrantless search despite defendant's objections[.]" (quotation omitted)). The Court acknowledged "the undoubted right of the police to enter in order to protect a victim[.]" Id. at 118-19, 126 S.Ct. 1515; see also King, 736 F.3d at 809 (similarly acknowledging "Defendant's expectation of privacy was small, in light of the serious and intimate nature of his underlying conviction for the willful infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant."). There is no indication in this case that the government had an interest in protecting the Barajas family from Perez or that they would have a diminished expectation of privacy based on the nature of Perez's prior criminal activities as related to them or their home.
In sum, the Court finds the Randolph rule is properly applied to the facts in this case as the government's limited interests in conducting this search do not outweigh Plaintiffs' continued interest in the privacy in their home. Based on this record, a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiffs can prove Defendants violated their Fourth Amendment rights by entering their home and conducting a warrantless and suspicionless search of their joint premises over their express objections. Consequently, in light of Randolph, the Court cannot grant Defendants' summary judgment motion on the ground that their search was constitutional.
But Defendants also move for summary judgment on the ground that the Defendant officers are entitled to qualified immunity for their decision to conduct a probation search of Plaintiffs' home over their objections. In this respect, the Court agrees: Plaintiffs' rights under these circumstances were not clearly established, i.e., a reasonable officer at the time would not have known that a probation search over such objections was unconstitutional.
Plaintiffs argue that Randolph was decided eight years before the search at issue here, and the weight of authority at that time held that Randolph applied to probation/parole searches. Pls.' Opp'n at 14 (citing Thornton, Sanders, and Donald). On the other hand, Defendants cite Smith v. City of Santa Clara, where the district court considered but did not decide whether Randolph applies to probation searches. 2013 WL 164191, at *8 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 15, 2013) ("the Court declines to resolve the underlying constitutional question of whether the Fourth Amendment permits a probation search where another resident of the house is present and objects.").
The issue is whether a "reasonable official" in the officer's position "would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.'" Mattos, 661 F.3d at 442 ("Qualified immunity shields an officer from liability even if his or her action resulted from a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact." (quotation and internal marks omitted)). Sanders, Thornton, and Donald are out-of-district decisions, and Thornton and Sanders both considered parolee cases rather than probationer cases. Smith, meanwhile, is a more recent, in-district decision specifically dealing with probation searches. Given the uncertainty in the case law and the general absence of authority on this issue, reasonable officers at the time of the search could have concluded the issue of whether objecting co-residents could stop a probation search was not yet resolved. Accordingly, the Court agrees the Defendant officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the issue of conducting the probation search over Plaintiffs' objections.
At the same time, the Court cannot grant Plaintiffs summary judgment on the ground that Defendants were required to have reasonable suspicion before entering Plaintiffs' home. First, regardless of what consent Perez gave, if Plaintiffs objected to the search, their refusal in these circumstances may make the search unreasonable as to them; thus, as the Court has found that Randolph may properly apply to this case, Plaintiffs' investigation into the level of suspicion required to search probationers' homes may be unnecessary if a jury finds the officers searched Plaintiffs' home over their objections. Indeed, Plaintiffs all but admit that is the case. In their Opposition, Plaintiffs rephrase the issue in this case as follows: "the question at issue here ... [is] whether the state's interest outweighs the privacy expectation of an objecting, non-probationer tenant to be free from suspicionless searches of her home." Pls.' Opp'n at 5 n.1 (emphasis added).
The alternative — if the officers entered the home before Plaintiffs objected and based solely on Perez's consent as part of his probation condition — is more complicated.
Consequently, if the officers entered and searched Plaintiffs' home based solely on Perez's probation condition and before Plaintiffs objected, the issue is whether they were permitted to do so based on Perez's consent as part of his probation condition. Both sides accordingly analyze what Perez agreed to as part of his probation conditions. Defendants assert "[t]he Ninth Circuit has ruled that California's consent/waiver system of probation allows the police to conduct a suspicionless search under a Fourth Amendment analysis." See Defs.' Br. at 1-2, 10 (citing King, 736 F.3d at 808). Meanwhile, Plaintiffs argue that, where the specific terms of a probation search condition — like Perez's — state only that searches may be "warrantless," such searches must a least be based on reasonable suspicion in light of United States v. Gomez, 2014 WL 1089288, at *14 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 14, 2014). Pls.' Br. at 6-7.
The majority opinion of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. King is binding on this Court. In a series of footnotes, the Ninth Circuit explains that "[o]nly after the meaning and scope of a search clause are determined, under state law, does the federal Fourth Amendment analysis begin." King, 736 F.3d at 815 n. 3. According to the majority, "[u]nder California law, Defendant's agreement to the warrantless search condition as part of his state-court probation was an agreement to be subject
Judge Berzon's dissent speaks adamantly against this interpretation, explaining "King's search condition did not plainly, clearly, and unambiguously provide notice that he was subject to searches without even reasonable suspicion." See King, 736 F.3d at 814 (Berzon, J., dissenting). The dissent thus disavows the "majority's decision [which] ... permit[s] such searches without any quantum of suspicion, as long as the probationer has assented to a warrantless search condition, no matter how ambiguously worded." Id. at 816 (emphasis in original). Thus, when Plaintiffs cite United States v. Gomez for the proposition that "a search condition that includes only the possibility of a warrantless search does not, without more, clearly and unambiguously subject a probationer to a search without reasonable suspicion," this appears to adopt the logic of Judge Berzon's dissenting opinion. See Pls.' Reply at 6 (citing Gomez, 2014 WL 1089288, at *14 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 14, 2014)). Plaintiffs' conclusion that reasonable suspicion was required here based on the ambiguity in Perez's search term is therefore at odds with the majority decision in King. See King, 736 F.3d at 815 n. 3 (noting that "although the dissent plausibly parses King's search clause, California law at the time this search condition was imposed on King interpreted such clauses more broadly, to waive all claims of privacy. We are not at liberty to do otherwise.").
California law on this matter has not changed since the Ninth Circuit decided King — Bravo still applies in interpreting the scope of a probation search term in California. And Bravo stands for the proposition that "a defendant who in order to obtain probation specifically agreed to submit to search `with or without a warrant at any time'" has waived not "only the right to demand a warrant[,]" but also "`whatever claim of privacy he might otherwise have had.'" Bravo, 43 Cal.3d at 610, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336 (quotation omitted). Given Bravo and the Ninth Circuit's requirement in King that California law dictates the scope of the probation condition, this Court is left with the inexorable conclusion that when Edgar Perez agreed to his probation conditions allowing a "warrantless search/seizure" of his residence, he also consented to suspicionless searches of his residence.
Plaintiffs argue they are entitled to summary judgment because "Defendants have a[n] [] unlawful practice of entering homes through the back door (with guns drawn) while officers at the front door are explaining why they are there." Pls.' Br. at 7. In their Opposition, Plaintiffs explain "Officer Tatum violated the requirement that officers knock and announce their presence and wait a reasonable amount of time before entering." Pls.' Opp'n at 10. Thus, Plaintiffs assert Defendants are at least not entitled to summary judgment given the circumstances of the search.
The Court agrees that a reasonable jury could find that evidence demonstrates the search was unreasonable and thus Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment. As Plaintiffs submit, while Officers Rodriguez and Snodgrass approached the
At the same time, the Court cannot grant Plaintiffs summary judgment. Plaintiffs cite no authority supporting that Officer Tatum's actions violated the Fourth Amendment as a matter of law. Rather, they tacitly ask the Court to assume the role of factfinder and determine the reasonableness of Officer Tatum's conduct. But this is not the Court's role, particularly where the facts are still unclear as to precisely how and when he entered the home, what may have been communicated between the officers prior to entry, and what the officers knew about Perez's history with drugs and violence, etc. As the Ninth Circuit reiterated, "it is generally inappropriate to grant summary judgment on the reasonableness of police conduct[.]" Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 621 F.3d 858, 868 (9th Cir.2010) (citing Howell v. Polk, 532 F.3d 1025, 1027 (9th Cir.2008) (per curiam) ("[W]e frequently entrust juries with the task of determining the reasonableness of police conduct.")). Given the available facts, the reasonableness of Officer Tatum's entry is a question for the jury. Id. ("[S]ummary judgment is generally an inappropriate way to decide questions of reasonableness because the jury's unique competence in applying the reasonable man standard is thought ordinarily to preclude summary judgment." (quotation omitted)).
Finally, as to whether Officer Tatum is entitled to qualified immunity for his method of entry, Plaintiffs argue that "[w]hile the Ninth Circuit appears not to have reviewed a case with an analogous separate entry, it is clear from case law analyzing the knock and announce rule that Officer Tatum's entry was flatly inconsistent with the rule's purpose." Pls.' Opp'n at 12. They argue the rule "protects privacy and dignity interests that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance and safeguards citizens and police from unnecessary violence resulting from surprise." Id. As such, they contend Officer Tatum's method of entry was clearly established as unreasonable. Id.
If the jury accepts as true Plaintiffs' version of the facts, with Officer Tatum failing to knock and announce his presence, sidling through the Barajas' back door with gun drawn, and surprising the Barajas family when they found him standing inside their home, then the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that a reasonable officer in such circumstances would be on notice that his conduct was counter to aims and purpose of the knock and announce rule and could be considered an unreasonable method of entry under the Fourth
In sum, summary judgment is not appropriate on either Plaintiffs' or Defendants' motions concerning Officer Tatum's method of entry.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment because a reasonable jury could find the officers intended to harass Perez and his family when they decided to search the Barajas' home. In California, "probation search is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement as long as the decision to search is not arbitrary or intended to harass." People v. Downing, 33 Cal.App.4th 1641, 1650, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 176 (1995) (emphasis added) (citing Bravo, 43 Cal.3d at 608, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336); see Bravo, 43 Cal.3d at 610, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336 (searches of probationers may not be conducted for "reasons unrelated to the rehabilitative and reformative purposes of probation or other legitimate law enforcement purposes.... [and] a condition of probation does not permit searches undertaken for harassment[.]"); see also King, 736 F.3d at 810 (indicating a probation search could not be "conducted for illegitimate reasons, such as harassment.").
Plaintiffs point out that Perez has had multiple confrontations with Officers Tatum and Rodriguez. Pls.' Opp'n at 13. In November 2010, Officers Tatum and Rodriquez were in an altercation with Perez in front of his home and his family, during which they struck and tazed him. Id.; Pls.' SUF ¶¶ 1-6; L. Barajas Decl. ¶ 2. In the six months prior to the incident in this case, Officer Tatum pulled Perez over while driving at least two times, admitting that the reason may have been solely because Perez was on probation. Pls.' Opp'n at 13 (citing Pls.' SUF ¶¶ 47-48). Officer Tatum was also the one who decided the officers should perform the November 14, 2014 search. Id. (citing Pls.' SUF ¶ 8). Then, on November 14, when talking with Plaintiffs, Officer Rodriguez made a point to identify himself as the same officer involved in the November 2010 incident. Id.; Gonzales Decl., Ex. D (R. Barajas Dep.) 30:20-31:10, Dkt. No. 41-4. He also told Raul Barajas that Perez had broken his arm. Id. As Plaintiffs point out, "[a] rational juror could easily conclude that Officer Rodriguez made this statement in order to elicit a response from Mr. Barajas." Pls.'
This evidence is not conclusive, but a rational jury could conclude based on these officers' history with Plaintiffs and their son, and their interactions with Plaintiffs on the day of the search, that they conducted the search for purposes of harassment rather than related to probation or other legitimate law enforcement purposes. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Oakland, 538 F.Supp.2d 1217, 1227 (N.D.Cal.2008), aff'd, 379 Fed.Appx. 647 (9th Cir.2010) (albeit in a parole search case, finding that "where the parole search was not based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the jury was properly instructed to examine the motives and intent of [the] Officers... to insure that, at the very least, the suspicionless search was not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing."). As such, this is yet another basis for which the Court cannot grant Defendants summary judgment.
As to qualified immunity, Plaintiffs argue "[a] search performed to harass is unconstitutional and no reasonable officer could have believed otherwise in November 2014." Pls.' Opp'n at 12. In doing so, they cite both the Supreme Court's opinion in Samson v. California, as well as the Ninth Circuit's opinion in United States v. King, both of which condemn harassing searches. Id.; see Samson 547 U.S. at 856, 126 S.Ct. 2193 (recognizing California's prohibition on harassing searches as a procedural safeguard under the Fourth Amendment); King, 736 F.3d at 810 (probation may not be "conducted for illegitimate reasons, such as harassment."). The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that if a jury found the Defendant officers intended to harass Plaintiffs or Perez in conducting the search, then a reasonable officer in such a position would understand that such actions violate Plaintiffs' rights to be free from unreasonable searches. Accordingly, the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity on this ground.
In sum, the Court finds Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the ground that their search was reasonable. First, a reasonable jury could conclude it was unreasonable for the officers to enter Plaintiffs' home over their objections without a warrant and without reasonable suspicion. Second, such a jury could also find Officer Tatum's method of entry into the home was unreasonable. Finally, Plaintiffs have also provided evidence raising a triable issue of fact about whether the officers' purpose in conducting the search was to harass. Under these circumstances, the Court cannot grant Defendants summary judgment on the grounds that the search was per se reasonable and constitutional.
Likewise, the Court cannot grant Plaintiffs summary judgment on the ground that the search was per se unreasonable because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to search or on the ground of Officer Tatum's method of entry. Instead, given the facts available, the Court finds the determination of the reasonableness of the officers' conduct is more appropriately considered by a jury. Nonetheless, the Court grants the Defendant officers qualified immunity on the narrow ground that it was not clearly established that the Randolph rule applies in the context of probation searches. Accordingly, the Defendant officers are immune from liability on the issue of whether it was unreasonable for them to enter Plaintiffs' home
Plaintiffs' Monell liability evidence focuses almost exclusively on the City's policy or custom concerning probation searches conducted without suspicion. The Court has not found this theory to be a viable constitutional claim, however, and as such, Plaintiffs cannot maintain a related Monell claim.
The Court has, however, found three constitutional claims that could be viable if proven by Plaintiffs, i.e., (1) a potential violation of the Randolph rule, (2) Officer Tatum's potentially unreasonable method of entry, and (3) the potential harassment of citizens through searching their homes. Thus, the issue is whether a Rohnert Park policy or custom was the moving force behind these potential constitutional violations. See Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900 ("A government entity may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless a policy, practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving force behind a violation of constitutional rights." (emphasis added)).
Defendants generally argue that none of the potential constitutional violations in this case can attach liability to the City because "[i]t is black letter law in the Ninth Circuit that liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents." Defs.' Br. at 14 (citing Hunter, 652 F.3d at 1233). While that is generally the case, Hunter also explains in a footnote that "in some circumstances a policy of inaction, such as a policy of failing to properly train employees, may form the basis for municipal liability." See Hunter, 652 F.3d at 1235 n. 8 (citations omitted; emphasis in original). Hunter cites Connick v. Thompson in recognizing that "[i]n limited circumstances, a local government's decision not to train certain employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens' rights may rise to the level of an official government policy for purposes of § 1983." Id. (quoting Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1359).
The Ninth Circuit has explained that "the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact." Flores v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir.2014) (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197). A plaintiff "must demonstrate a `conscious' or `deliberate' choice on the part of a municipality in order to prevail on a failure to train claim." Id.; see also City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197 ("[M]unicipal liability under § 1983 attaches where — and only where — a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives" by city policymakers." (quotation omitted)). "[T]he focus must be on adequacy of the training program in relation to the tasks the particular officers must perform." City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390-91, 109 S.Ct. 1197 ("That a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the city, for the officer's shortcomings may have resulted from factors other than a faulty training program."). Thus, "[t]he issue in a case like this one ... is whether that training program is adequate; and if it is not, ... whether such inadequate training can justifiably be said to represent `city policy.'" Id. at 390, 109 S.Ct. 1197.
Accordingly, bearing in mind that a Monell claim can be based on a policy of action or inaction, the Court turns to the potential municipal claims in this case. First, as to whether the City has a policy allowing officers to harass citizens through searching their homes, there is no evidence to support this claim. Specifically, there is no evidence suggesting the City had an active policy or practice that officers should harass citizens by searching or that a final decision-making authority in the City ratified such conduct. Furthermore, to the extent such a claim could be premised on a failure to train theory, "[w]here the proper response ... is obvious to all without training or supervision, then the failure to train or supervise is generally not `so likely' to produce a wrong decision as to support an inference of deliberate indifference by city policymakers to the need to train or supervise." Flores, 758 F.3d at 1160 (finding that in light of the regular law enforcement duties of a police officer there was not a patently obvious need for the city to train officers not to rape young women). Given (1) the Defendant officers' general law enforcement duties, (2) the longstanding California law that "a condition of probation does not permit searches undertaken for harassment[,]" Bravo, 43 Cal.3d at 610, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336,
Second, as to Officer Tatum's method of entry, the Court finds Plaintiffs have raised enough specific facts to preclude summary judgment for the City. Plaintiffs point to the testimony of Sergeant Jeff Justice, the City's 30(b)(6) witness designated to testify about its training and practices pertaining to probation searches, who testified he trained Rohnert Park police officers to conduct probation searches in this manner. Pls.' SUF ¶¶ 30, 34. Although it is unclear what he means by "in this manner," Sergeant Justice, testifying on behalf of the City, also stated that, even absent exigent circumstances, if an officer at the back of a home "doesn't know whether or not [the officers in the front] made contact with anyone and he knows that they've attempted or are going to be attempting contact, and he sees a way into the house, then he could go in through that way into the house[,]" with gun drawn and before any words are exchanged.
However, as to the potential violation of the Randolph rule, the Court concludes the parties have not sufficiently addressed Monell liability for this claim. Both parties focused more on whether Randolph actually applied in this case but did not devote much argument or evidence as to whether the City's action or inaction was the moving force behind the potential violation of the Randolph rule. Thus, the Court denies Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against the City as to the Randolph rule, but does so without prejudice in the event Defendants wish to file another motion addressing the City's possible liability on this claim.
Based on the analysis above, the Court hereby
A related scheduling Order is forthcoming.
Comments, Model Civ. Jury Instr. 9th Cir. 9.13 (2007).
