YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS, District Judge.
Plaintiff Douglas Daniel Clark, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison ("SQSP"), filed this pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that prison officials at SQSP have refused to provide him with a diet that accommodates his religious beliefs in violation of his constitutional rights. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he identifies himself as a Messianic Jew. Dkt. 1 at 3.
On April 15, 2015, the Court found that the aforementioned allegation of Defendant Hyman's denial of Plaintiff's request to participate in the JKDP infringed upon his right to exercise his religious practices and beliefs and appeared to state a cognizable 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Dkt. 10 at 1-2. Thereafter, the Court found the Plaintiff had also stated a cognizable claim against Defendant Former SQSP Warden Kevin Chappell in his supervisory capacity based on this Defendant's failure to act to correct the constitutional violation despite being made aware of Defendant Hyman's denial of Plaintiff's request to participate in JKDP. Dkt. 36 at 3-4.
Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss,
For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants' request for judicial notice and GRANTS their motion to dismiss.
On a motion to dismiss, a court may properly look beyond the complaint to matters of public record, and doing so does not convert a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment. Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986) overruled on other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991); see also MGIC Indemn. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986). Here, Plaintiff has not objected to Defendants' RJN, and the Court finds the documents to be matters of public record properly subject to judicial notice.
The Court may take judicial notice of the Marin County Superior Court's "Order Denying Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus" in In Re Douglas Daniel Clark, Case No. SC183347A (attached as Exhibit A to the RJN, Dkt. 24-2 at 2-6), because "a court may take judicial notice of its own records in other cases, as well as the records of an inferior court in other cases." United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980). The Court also takes judicial notice of SQSP's "Approved Kosher List," which includes Plaintiff's name (attached as Exhibit B to the RJN, Dkt. 24-2 at 8-9), because a court may take judicial notice of the official acts and public records of state agencies not subject to reasonable dispute because they can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Abdullah v. U.S. Sec. Associates, Inc., 731 F.3d 952, 959 n.10 (9th Cir. 2013).
Accordingly, Defendants' unopposed RJN is GRANTED. Dkt. 24-1.
First, Defendants argue that because Plaintiff has been admitted to the JKDP as of April 16, 2015, his claim for injunctive relief must be dismissed as moot. Dkt. 25 at 4. This Court agrees.
A claim is considered moot if it has lost its character as a present, live controversy, and if no effective relief can be granted: Where the question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by developments subsequent to filing of the complaint, no justiciable controversy is presented. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). Where injunctive relief is involved, questions of mootness are determined in light of the present circumstances. Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 528 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, because Plaintiff is presently participating in the JKDP, his claim for injunctive relief is DISMISSED as moot.
Plaintiff may proceed with his claim for declaratory and monetary damages, and the Court will now resolve the pending motion to dismiss as to the remaining claim for such damages, as discussed below.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a defendant to move to dismiss on the ground that there is a "failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." A motion to dismiss should be granted if plaintiff fails to proffer "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (abrogating Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). The court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint," Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and must construe pro se pleadings liberally, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). The court need not accept as true allegations that are legal conclusions, unwarranted deductions of fact or unreasonable inferences. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988, amended, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). As mentioned above, in considering a motion to dismiss, the Court may take judicial notice of matters of public record outside the pleadings. See Mack, 798 F.2d at 1282; MGIC Indemn. Corp., 803 F.2d at 504.
On December 19, 2012, Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Marin County Superior Court, seeking to have the state court overrule Defendant Hyman's February 29, 2012 decision denying him admission into the JKDP. In Re Douglas Daniel Clark, Case No. SC183347A; Dkt. 24-2 at 2. Plaintiff had also described himself as a "Messianic Jew," and requested that the state superior court command the SQSP Warden to allow him to participate in the JKDP and to give him compensation for the days he was not allowed to participate in that program. Id. at 2. The state superior court construed the aforementioned filing as a state habeas petition. Id. at 4.
The state superior court issued an order to show cause regarding the petition, and solicited factual contentions from the parties, including a traverse setting forth Petitioner's contention that the CDCR's denial of his participation in the JKDP "has substantially burdened the exercise of his religion." Id.
Respondent in that state habeas action filed a return to the order to show cause showing that on February 2, 2012, Petitioner wrote a letter to Defendant Hyman asking to attend Jewish services acknowledging Petitioner's "baptism as an `L.D.S. Mormon' and conced[ing] he is `somewhat agnostic but [has] very deep religious roots . . . [with] a special affinity to the Jewish faith." Id. at 4-5. The return also "shows that petitioner attended traditional Jewish services once after the [February 2, 2012] letter was written and then attended protestant services over the eight month period thereafter." Id. at 5. The state superior court noted that "[e]ssentially, respondent contend[ed] that petitioner's professed allegiance to a kosher diet [was] nothing more than an attempt to eat better." Id.
Although Plaintiff was given additional time, he did not respond to respondent's return. Id. Instead, the state superior court noted that Plaintiff filed a "`notice of appeal' of what he describe[d] as this court's `hijacking' of his writ." Id. On December 2, 2013, the court denied the petition, and stated as follows:
On February 4, 2014, Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal.
On March 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed a state habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal challenging the denial of his aforementioned petition in Case No. A140898. See In re Douglas Clark on Habeas Corpus, Case No. A141222. On March 20, 2014, the state appellate court denied the petition stating,
On May 5, 2014, Plaintiff sent a petition for a writ of mandate in the California Supreme Court. See Clark v. S.C. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation), Case No. S218679. Because Plaintiff did not sign it, the state supreme court requested his signature before they could acknowledge it as filed on May 19, 2014. Id. On June 30, 2014, the state supreme court transferred the petition to the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District. Id.
Om June 30, 2014, the California Court of Appeal received the transferred petition for a writ of mandate. See Clark v. The Superior Court of Marin County, Case No. A142247. On July 7, 2014, the state appellate court denied the petition for a writ of mandate, stating:
Under the Full Faith and Credit Statute, this court must give effect to California's law on the finality of judgment. In California, a judgment is not final for purposes of res judicata until it is free from direct attack. See Nathanson v. Hecker, 99 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1163 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). Here, the California Supreme Court official website does not indicate that Plaintiff filed a related petition in that court. However, this Court must determine whether the time for Plaintiff to petition the state supreme court has lapsed. The aforementioned state appellate court decisions were final thirty days after filing. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.490(b)(2) (writ of mandate); Cal. R. Ct. 8.387(b)(1) (writ of habeas corpus). Thus, the last state appellate court denial filed on July 7, 2014 was final on August 7, 2014. See id. A party may seek review of a Court of Appeal decision in a habeas corpus proceeding (or in this case a proceeding relating to a petition of writ of mandate) by way of a petition for review in the Supreme Court under California Rule of Court 8.500. A petition for review must be served and filed within 10 days after the Court of Appeal decision is final in that court, which in Plaintiff's last state appellate court proceeding would have been ten days after August 7, 2014, or August 18, 2014.
The federal courts have traditionally adhered to the related doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). Under collateral estoppel, once an issue is actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation. See id.
The Federal Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires that a federal court give to a state court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the state in which the judgment was rendered. See Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). In California, a final judgment in state court "`precludes further proceedings if they are based on the same cause of action.'" Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2004)). "[B]ecause of the nature of a state habeas proceeding, a decision actually rendered should preclude an identical issue from being relitigated in a subsequent section 1983 action if the state habeas court afforded a full and fair opportunity for the issue to be heard and determined under federal standards." Silverton v. Dept. of the Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir. 1981).
The main difference between the state habeas proceedings and the present civil rights action is that damages are available in the civil rights action. However, the unavailability of damages in the state habeas proceedings does not exempt that case from the reach of res judicata. See City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 85 Cal.App.3d 143, 151 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (litigant "cannot avoid impact of rule against splitting causes of action by choosing for his first foray a tribunal of limited jurisdiction").
The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, "`bars all grounds for recovery which could have been asserted, whether they were or not, in a prior suit between the same parties . . . on the same cause of action.'" C.D. Anderson & Co., Inc. v. Lemos, 832 F.2d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing McClain v. Apodaca, 793 F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 1986)). Under the "primary rights theory" adhered to in California, a federal court action will not be barred by res judicata where it seeks relief for harm distinct from the harm alleged in state court. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 952-53 (9th Cir. 2004) (defining "primary right" as right to be free of the particular injury suffered; primary right in state nuisance suit brought by state against billboard owner was right to highways free of advertising, whereas primary right in federal section 1983 suit by owner was right to advertise freely on his property); International Evangelical Church v. Church of the Soldiers, 54 F.3d 587, 590 (9th Cir. 1995) (primary right to seek damages in federal court for fraud and unjust enrichment different from primary right to enforce trust in state court). Under California's "primary rights theory," a "cause of action is (1) a primary right possessed by the plaintiff, (2) a corresponding primary duty devolving upon the defendant, and (3) a harm done by the defendant which consists in a breach of such primary right and duty." Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting City of Martinez v. Texaco Trading & Transp., Inc., 353 F.3d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 2003)). If this cause of action test is satisfied, then the same primary right is at stake, even if in the later suit the plaintiff pleads different theories of recovery, seeks different forms of relief, and/or adds new facts supporting recovery. Id. Also, under California law, not all claims that could have been brought in the state court case are barred in a later action; rather, only those claims that derive from the same primary right are precluded. Id. at 1268 n.2.
In support of their motion, Defendants have submitted a copy of the denial of Plaintiff's habeas petition filed in state superior court. Dkt. 24-2 at 2-6. As outlined above, before Plaintiff filed this section 1983 civil rights action, he filed petitions in the Marin County Superior Court, the California Court of Appeal, and the California Supreme Court. Only the first state superior court petition was litigated extensively; therefore, only that one is described in depth and will be considered in the Court's analysis of res judicata.
The state superior court denial shows that Plaintiff pursued the same cause of action and that the "same primary right," see Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1268 n.2, was involved in state court as here: a violation of his right to exercise his religious practices and beliefs stemming from the denial of Plaintiff's request to participate in the JKDP. Compare Dkt. 1 at 3 with Dkt. 24-2 at 2. The same violation of his right to exercise his religious practices and beliefs was asserted in both the state action and the instant complaint. Id. The same injury was alleged in both: denial of Plaintiff's request to participate in the JKDP. Id. The actions involve the same injury to Plaintiff and the same wrong by prison officials.
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply "when the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not have a `full and fair opportunity' to litigate the claim or issue. . . . `Redetermination of issues is warranted if there is reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures followed in prior litigation.'" Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 480-81 & n.22 (1982) (citations omitted). Where the federal court is considering the preclusive effect of a state court judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, "state proceedings need do no more than satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in order to qualify for the full faith and credit guaranteed by federal law." Id. at 481.
Here, Plaintiff had an opportunity for full and fair litigation of his claim of a violation of his right to exercise his religious practices and beliefs stemming from the denial of Plaintiff's request to participate in the JKDP. The state superior court denial indicates that Plaintiff's state court petition contained allegations in support of his claims, which the state superior court considered in denying habeas relief. Plaintiff's subsequent petitions to the state appellate and supreme courts contained similar allegations, which the Court must assume were duly considered by the state courts before they denied those petitions on the merits, albeit without reasoned decisions. It is clear that Plaintiff's claim relating to the denial of his participation in the JKDP was fully and fairly litigated in state court.
Lastly with respect to the parties involved, Plaintiff was the same party in the state actions, and Defendants are in privity with the respondents in the state actions. Privity exists when a person is so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right. See Trujillo v. Santa Clara County, 775 F.2d 1359, 1367 (9th Cir. 1985). For example, privity exists between officers of the same government so that a judgment in a suit between a party and a representative of the government is res judicata in relitigation of the same issue between that party and another officer of the government. See Church of New Song v. Establishment of Religion on Taxpayers' Money, 620 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929 (1981) (citation omitted) (prison employees at federal prison in Texas in privity with prison employees at federal prison in Illinois as both suits against employees of Federal Bureau of Prisons). Such is the case here, where the Defendants in the instant action are in privity with the respondent of Plaintiff's state actions because all the suits are against employees of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
Based on the above discussion, the issues raised in Plaintiff's complaint regarding the violation of his rights stemming from the denial of his participation in the JKDP are barred under res judicata and therefore must be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, only bars the relitigation of issues explicitly litigated and necessary to the judgment. See Hiser v. Franklin, 94 F.3d 1287, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996). To foreclose relitigation of an issue under federal law: (1) the issue at stake must be identical to the one alleged in the prior litigation; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated by the party against whom preclusion is asserted; and (3) the determination of the issue in the prior litigation must have been a critical and necessary part of the judgment in the earlier action. Gospel Missions v. City of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 548, 553-54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 948 (2003) (no issue preclusion where plaintiff's standing to challenge ordinance provisions was not actually litigated in prior action).
As discussed above, Plaintiff's cause of action in his state proceedings—relating to the violation of his rights stemming from the denial of his participation in the JKDP—was fully litigated. Furthermore, this claim was actually litigated as the state courts considered briefs and exhibits submitted by Plaintiff in support of his state petitions. Finally, the issue of whether Plaintiff's rights were violated (as a result of the denial of his participation in the JKDP) was at the heart of his state petitions, and was a "critical and necessary part of the judgment." Gospel Missions, 328 F.3d at 553-54. The state superior court denied relief because it was not persuaded that Plaintiff's request to participate in the JKDP was "an integral part of a sincerely held religious belief rather than an opportunistic and perhaps understandable attempt to obtain a more wholesome diet." Dkt. 24-2 at 5. His petitions to the state appellate and supreme courts also contained essentially identical factual allegations, and they were all denied. And, as determined above, these state decisions were final and on the merits. Lastly, Plaintiff was the same party in the state petitions and in the instant action against whom preclusion is being sought.
Based on the above discussion, Plaintiff's claim—relating to the violation of his rights stemming from the denial of his participation in the JKDP—are also barred under collateral estoppel and therefore DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.
The Court finds that Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
For the reasons outlined above, the Court orders as follows:
1. Defendant Chappell's motion to join the Defendant Hyman's pending motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the joinder is accepted. Dkt. 41.
2. Defendants' unopposed request for judicial notice is GRANTED. Dkt. 24-1.
3. Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief is DISMISSED as moot.
4. Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Dkt. 24.
5. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and close the file. Each party shall bear his or her own costs.
6. This Order terminates Docket No. 24.
