DISCOVERY ORDER

Re: Dkt. No. 47

MARIA-ELENA JAMES, Magistrate Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court is the parties' joint discovery dispute letter in which Defendant Contra Costa County (the "County") seeks to compel Plaintiff Teralyn Renea Evans ("Plaintiff") to respond to certain outstanding discovery requests. Dkt. No. 47. As a preliminary matter, Defendant states the parties did not meet in confer in person because of Plaintiff's remote location in Parlier, California. Jt. Ltr. at 1. However, Plaintiff states she "has no travel restraints that would prevent a meeting near the Defendants' location." Id. at 8. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of the undersigned's Discovery Standing Order, the parties must meet and confer in person for the purpose of resolving all disputes. Accordingly, while the Court shall consider this letter, the parties are advised that no further disputes will be considered unless the parties comply with the Standing Order.1

Having considered the parties' positions, relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, the Court issues the following order.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this case against the County, the City of Richmond, and a number of their employees based on the removal of Plaintiff from her parents' custody and temporary placement in foster care in 2002. Compl., Dkt. No. 1. Although Plaintiff's parents filed a civil suit in 2003, see Compl. in Evans, et al. v. Gilmore, et. al., No. 03-cv-643 MEJ (N.D. Cal., filed on Feb. 14, 2003), Plaintiff brought the present case on her own behalf after turning 18. Plaintiff named twelve defendants and brought six causes of action against all of them: (1) "Violations of Civil Right to Security in Persons and Houses" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) "Violations of Civil Right to Due Process of Law" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) "Violations of Civil Right to Equal Rights under the Law" under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (4) "Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights" under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; (5) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (6) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. See Compl. After the County moved to dismiss, the Court dismissed all of Plaintiff's state law claims against the County as untimely, but allowed her federal claims to proceed. Order, Dkt. No. 33.

On October 26, 2015, the County served Special Interrogatory Requests and Requests for Production on Plaintiff. Jt. Ltr. at 3. Plaintiff failed to produce any documents in response. Id. After the parties conferred by email, Plaintiff stated she "will provide the recorded materials for copy at the Defendant's expense due to the time-consuming and costly nature of making copies of all the recorded materials in Plaintiff's possession." Id. However, after the County set up a meeting location near Plaintiff's remote location and sent a copy service to make the necessary copies, Plaintiff did not produce any documents for copying. Id. As to her interrogatory responses, Plaintiff objected on the basis that responses would cause her "embarrassment and undue burden." Jt. Ltr., Ex. A (Pl.'s Special Interrog. Resps.).

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides that a party may obtain discovery "regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Factors to consider include "the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit." Id. Discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. Id. However, "[t]he parties and the court have a collective responsibility to consider the proportionality of all discovery and consider it in resolving discovery disputes." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes (2015 amendments). Thus, there is "a shared responsibility on all the parties to consider the factors bearing on proportionality before propounding discovery requests, issuing responses and objections, or raising discovery disputes before the courts." Salazar v. McDonald's Corp., 2016 WL 736213, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016); Goes Int'l, AB v. Dodur Ltd., 2016 WL 427369, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2016) (citing advisory committee notes for proposition that parties share a "collective responsibility" to consider proportionality and requiring that "[b]oth parties . . . tailor their efforts to the needs of th[e] case").

Rule 26(c) "confers broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required." Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984). "The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense," including by (1) prohibiting disclosure or discovery; (2) conditioning disclosure or discovery on specified terms; (3) preventing inquiry into certain matters; or (4) limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).

DISCUSSION

Having reviewed the County's discovery requests, the Court finds they are relevant. The County's Special Interrogatories seek information regarding the facts supporting Plaintiff's allegations, her personal recollection of the events that transpired, and contact information for Plaintiff's health care provider who treated her for the injuries alleged in her Complaint. Jt. Ltr., Ex. A. As she is the person who filed this lawsuit, Plaintiff cannot now claim "embarrassment" as a reason not to provide information on the facts surrounding her claims. The County's Requests for Production seek the same information. Id., Ex. B (Pl.'s Resps. to Reqs. for Produc.). Plaintiff does not appear to argue that the requests are not relevant; instead, she argues: "The extended length of this [joint letter] only serves to restate facts that will not be relevant at trial and to cast the Plaintiff's integrity and approach in litigating her claims in an inaccurate and negative manner." Id. at 8. However, the fact that Plaintiff may disagree with the County's position does not mean it is not entitled to obtain relevant discovery, regardless of whether it is admissible at trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes (2015 amendments) ("Discovery of nonprivileged information not admissible in evidence remains available so long as it is otherwise within the scope of discovery."). Plaintiff states she "is satisfied that she can successfully argue her case with discovery as-is and the truthful testimony of all witnesses during trial." Jt. Ltr. at 8. But Plaintiff fails to acknowledge that the County is also entitled to present its case. Plaintiff has failed to respond to the County's relevant discovery requests, and the County is therefore entitled to move for an order compelling the information it seeks.

Further, Plaintiff does not deny she previously admitted she is in possession of the documents at issue. Id. at 4. The County also notes that in her Initial Disclosures, Plaintiff stated she has: (1) original or copied versions of communications between her parents and County personnel during the relevant time period; (2) original or copied versions of home videos from the period of time preceding and following the period covered in her Complaint; and (3) original or copied versions of written, drawn, or otherwise recorded means of communication she make regarding the allegations in her Complaint. Id. Having previously admitted she is in possession of these documents, Plaintiff is now required to produce them.

CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis above, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff to respond to the County's discovery requests by April 29, 2016. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order, the County may move for sanctions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.