LUCY H. KOH, District Judge.
Before the Court is Petitioner Luis Campos' ("Petitioner") Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ("Pet.") ECF No. 1. The Court ordered Respondent Kim Holland ("Respondent") to show cause why Campos' Petition should not be granted. ECF No. 10. Respondent filed an Answer addressing the merits of the Petition, ("Answer") ECF No. 16, and Petitioner filed a Traverse, ("Traverse") ECF No. 18. Having reviewed the briefs and the underlying record, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to relief based on the claim presented, and DENIES the petition.
Federal courts reviewing habeas petitions must presume that the state courts' factual determinations are correct unless that presumption is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Accordingly, the facts in this case are drawn from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal. See Answer Ex. 6 ("CCA Op.").
At Petitioner's initial proceedings before the Contra Costa County Superior Court ("trial court"), Petitioner was charged with the following offenses against two victims: four counts of lewd acts upon a child under the age of fourteen (Pen. Code § 288(a); Counts 1, 7-9); three counts of forcible lewd acts upon a child (Pen. Code § 288(b); Counts 2-5); two counts of false imprisonment by violence (Pen. Code § 236/237(a); Counts 6, 11); and one count of assault with intent to commit a felony (Pen. Code § 220(a); Count 10). Answer Ex. 1. The jury found Campos guilty on all counts. Id. On November 4, 2011 the trial court sentenced Petitioner to an aggregate term of 38 years to life. Id. at Ex. 5.
On November 4, 2011 Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. Id. at Ex. 1. On September 30, 2013, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. CCA Op. Finally, on January 15, 2014 the California Supreme Court denied petition for review. Id. at Exs. 7, 8.
On February 2, 2015 Petitioner filed the instant petition for habeas review. Pet. Petitioner claims the trial court violated Petitioner's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by improperly admitting evidence of an alleged prior sexual offense against Carmen S. Id.
This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), a district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court, unless the state court's adjudication of the claim "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 384-86 (2000), while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).
"Under the `contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the U.S. Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an "unreasonable application of" U.S. Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions but "unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. In order to find that a state court's decision was based on "an unreasonable determination of the facts," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a federal court "must be convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record before the state court." Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 778 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[A] state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance." Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 15 (2013). The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ "simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant [state court] decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 411.
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that under AEDPA, a federal habeas court must review state court decisions with a heightened level of deference. See Hardy v. Cross, 132 S.Ct. 490, 491 (2011) (per curiam); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 783-85 (2011); Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S.Ct. 1305 (2011) (per curiam). As the U.S. Supreme Court explained: "[o]n federal habeas review, AEDPA `imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating [state court] rulings' and `demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Id. at 1307 (citation omitted). With respect to federal habeas proceedings, "[f]actual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, § 2254(e)(1), and a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. With these principles in mind regarding the standard and limited scope of review in which this Court may engage in federal habeas proceedings, the Court addresses Petitioner's claims.
Petitioner claims that he was deprived of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when the trial court admitted evidence of an uncharged sexual offense allegedly committed by Petitioner against Carmen S. in 2003. Pet. at 8. Petitioner argues that the testimony of Carmen S. violated Petitioner's right to due process because the uncharged conduct was "so dissimilar" to the incidents surrounding Doe I and Doe II. Id. at 8, 10. Petitioner claims this alleged error created an absence of fundamental fairness that "fatally infected the trial." Id. at 11 (quoting Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 1996)).
The Petition does not specify whether Petitioner is challenging the state court's admission of the uncharged conduct as contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, which are the only bases upon which the Court may grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus under AEDPA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Pet.; Traverse. Accordingly, the Court addresses each potential ground for granting the Petition in turn.
First, as to whether the trial court's admission of the uncharged conduct into evidence was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), "[t]he admission of evidence does not provide a basis for habeas relief unless it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due process." Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). Additionally, the Court may not grant the Petition on the grounds that the alleged evidentiary error constituted a due process violation if the specific error in question is "not forbidden by `clearly established Federal law,' as laid out by the Supreme Court." Id. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has "not yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence [under state law] constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ." Id.; see Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the petitioner could "point to no Supreme Court precedent establishing that admission of propensity evidence, as here, to lend credibility to a sex victim's allegations, and thus indisputably relevant to the crimes charged, is unconstitutional."), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 941 (2009). Petitioner has not cited, and the Court has not found, any cases to the contrary.
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has not held that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence has rendered a trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due process, Petitioner cannot show that the trial court's admission of the Carmen S. testimony was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as stated by existing U.S. Supreme Court precedent, as necessary under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See Mejia, 534 F.3d at 1042, 1046 (holding that the state court's allegedly erroneous admission of evidence of an uncharged offense was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law because the U.S. Supreme Court had not addressed the issue); Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101 (holding that the state court's allegedly erroneous admissions of evidence were not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law because the U.S. Supreme Court had not addressed the issue); see also Monkres v. Campbell, 408 F. App'x 101, 102 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief due to the admission of a prior uncharged sexual assault); Sanches v. Hedgpeth, 381 F. App'x 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that admission of two prior rape convictions during petitioner's rape trial did not violate petitioner's right to due process).
Second, to the extent Petitioner argues that the state court's admission of evidence of the uncharged conduct was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) because the uncharged conduct and charged conduct were dissimilar, Petitioner's argument lacks merit. The uncharged conduct was highly similar to Petitioner's conduct regarding Doe I and Doe II. The uncharged and charged conduct all involved allegations of sexual misconduct by Petitioner with young women under his supervision or control. See CCA Op. at 2-6. In all three circumstances the victim was a recent immigrant to the United States. Answer, at 11:17-19. Both Carmen S. and Doe II worked for Petitioner at Casa Chicas. CCA Op. at 2, 15. Likewise, Petitioner transported both Carmen S. and Doe I to hotel rooms to have sex with them. CCA Op. at 2, 6. Petitioner's use of drugs in the uncharged conduct does not sufficiently differentiate the uncharged conduct from Petitioner's conduct regarding Doe I and Doe II. See People v. Loy, 52 Cal.4th 46, 63 (2011) (noting that the Legislature had decided evidence of prior sexual offenses was uniquely probative and presumed admissible without focusing on the similarities required by Evidence Code §1101(b)).
Additionally, Petitioner used fear and bribery to pressure Doe I, Doe II, and Carmen S. to remain silent about Petitioner's conduct. As to Doe I, after the incidents in Las Vegas, Petitioner told Doe I not to tell anyone because Doe I's grandmother was very sick and disclosure would make the grandmother worse. CCA Op. at 2. After the molestation of Doe I in the hotel room under the guise of taking a trip to the warehouse, Petitioner warned Doe I not to tell anyone because it would make her grandmother ill and that Petitioner would fire Doe I's uncle Oscar if Doe I reported the conduct. Id. After Doe I reported Petitioner's conduct to the police, Doe I received emails from her uncle Oscar and her sister telling Doe I that Petitioner financially supported the family, and that Doe I's grandmother was not doing well because of the charges against Petitioner. Id. at 3. After Petitioner was arrested, Doe I also received emails and calls from family members urging Doe I to drop the case against Petitioner. Id. at 4.
Doe II was financially dependent upon Petitioner because Doe II worked for Petitioner's company Casa Chicas and also worked as a babysitter for Petitioner's young son. Id. at 5. Doe II learned from Doe II's mother in Nicaragua that money was being sent to Doe II's mother mostly in Doe II's name but sometimes in the name of Petitioner's brother Alex C. Id. at 6. Alex C. told Doe II that the payments were designed to have Doe II cooperate with the Petitioner's investigator. Id.
Carmen S. was financially dependent upon Petitioner because she worked for Petitioner's company Casa Chicas. Id. After Petitioner drugged and raped Carmen S., Petitioner advised Carmen S. not to discuss the events with anyone else and told Carmen S. that Petitioner knew police and Carmen S. could get deported. Id. The next day, Petitioner told Carmen S. that Carmen S. could lose her job if she told anyone. Id. Days later, Petitioner demanded sex from Carmen S. and said Petitioner would bring Carmen S.'s daughter to California from Peru if Carmen S. complied. Id. After Carmen S. reported Petitioner's conduct to the police, Petitioner learned of the report, came to Carmen S.'s apartment, and threatened that things would get worse if Carmen S. pressed these allegations. Id.
Any differences between Doe I, Doe II, and Carmen S. are not sufficiently significant to constitute "clear and convincing evidence" that the court's admission of testimony regarding the uncharged conduct was unreasonable. See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not make an "unreasonable determination of the facts" in concluding that the relevance of the Carmen S. testimony outweighed any potentially prejudicial effect. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Finally, even if admission of the Carmen S. testimony were a due process violation, "habeas relief is only available if the constitutional error had a `substantial and injurious effect or influence' on the jury verdict or trial court decision." Garcia v. Long, 808 F.3d 771, 781 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). In the instant case, there was overwhelming evidence to support the jury verdict, such that any error with regard to the admission of evidence of uncharged conduct did not have a "substantial and injurious effect or influence" on the jury verdict. For example, Doe I's videotaped interview with CARES Northwest ("CARES") firmly supports the jury verdict regarding allegations as to Doe I. In the CARES interview, which was admitted into evidence, Doe I described Petitioner taking Doe I to a hotel and having sex with her, as well as two other instances in which Petitioner molested Doe I. CCA Op. at 3-4. Doe I's interview with the Portland police likewise supports the allegations as to Doe I. Id. Furthermore, many of the alleged incidents regarding Doe I were confirmed by the testimony of Petitioner's wife. Id. at 4. Additionally, Petitioner has not challenged the testimony provided by Doe II, which strongly supports the jury verdict regarding allegations as to Doe II. Id. at 16. Doe II testified that while staying at Petitioner's house, Petitioner entered the room Doe II was sleeping in and attempted to molest her. Id. at 5. In the face of the overwhelming evidence supporting the jury verdict, Petitioner has not explained how the Carmen S. testimony improperly affected the jury. Petitioner merely states that "there [was] no way a reasonable jury could have ignored her prejudicial testimony." Pet. at 10. Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to meet the standard for habeas relief. Roettgen v. Ryan, 639 F.Supp.2d 1053, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (concluding that because the evidence against the petitioner was of such strength, the admission of evidence that petitioner had previously molested a young boy did not have a substantially injurious effect on the jury).
For the reasons mentioned above, Petitioner's right to due process was not violated by the trial court's admission of the Carmen S. testimony.
Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district court that denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a certificate of appealability ("COA") in its ruling. See Rule 1 1(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. Petitioner has not shown "that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Accordingly, a COA is DENIED.
The Clerk shall close the file.
