ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE ALL SCIENTER EVIDENCE NOT TIED TO ALLEGED KNOWING AND WILLFUL CONDUCT RELATED TO THE CHARGED REGULATIONS

THELTON E. HENDERSON, District Judge.

On June 23, 2016, Defendant Pacific Gas and Electric Company ("PG&E") filed a Motion to Exclude All Scienter Evidence Not Tied to Alleged Knowing and Willful Conduct Related to the Charged Regulations. Dkt. No. 688 ("Mot."). The Government timely opposed the motion on an expedited briefing schedule, Dkt. No. 691 ("Opp'n"), and PG&E timely replied in support thereof, Dkt. No. 693 ("Reply"). After carefully considering the parties' written arguments, the Court hereby DENIES the motion.

BACKGROUND

On December 31, 2015, PG&E filed a Motion for Leave to File Additional Motions in Limine. Dkt. No. 225. Because PG&E's requested page limit on these additional motions in limine was patently unreasonable (at up to 475 pages over the Court-ordered limit), the Court denied PG&E's request, and instead ordered the parties to file their 10 most critical motions in limine in a single brief of no more than 50 pages, and file a supplemental brief of no more than 10 pages listing and summarizing any requested additional motions in limine. Dkt. Nos. 229, 232 at 3. Along with its 10 most critical motions in limine, PG&E timely submitted a Brief Regarding Additional Motions in Limine. Dkt. No. 240. Of relevance to the present motion, PG&E sought "leave to file a motion asking that the government be barred from introducing evidence unless it first makes a proffer to establish that the evidence is tied to knowing and willful conduct by an individual employee or employees related to the charged regulations within the relevant time period." Id. at 9. The Court subsequently determined that "none of the motions described in [this supplemental brief]," including the motion just listed, "warrant[ed] pre-trial consideration," and therefore denied PG&E leave to file this additional motion. Dkt. No. 460 ("MIL Order") at 5 n.2.

Though PG&E states that it brings the present motion because its previously denied motion regarding scienter "is now ripe for full consideration," Mot. at 1, the substance of the present motion suggests that PG&E's true aim is to prevent the admission of Government's Exhibit 276. See id. at 1-2 ("The government intends to offer an email during this witness's testimony [Exhibit 276] that reports on what he heard other PG&E employees say back in November 2007."); id. at 4 ("Admitting evidence like government Exhibit 276 is improper."). But the Court has already ruled on the admissibility of Exhibit 276, which it excluded as improper Federal Rule of Evidence ("Rule") 404(b) evidence. See Dkt. No. 698 at 1249-50. Accordingly, to the extent that PG&E's present motion was aimed at excluding Exhibit 276 specifically, that portion of the motion is mooted.

DISCUSSION

Other than PG&E's now mooted effort to exclude Exhibit 276, the present motion boils down to a request that the Court revisit two of its prior rulings.1 Both requests lack merit, and both requests are denied.

I. Evidentiary objections not resolved by the motions in limine are to be resolved in the course of trial.

In previously denying leave to file the motions listed in PG&E's Brief Regarding Additional Motions in Limine, including a version of the present motion, the Court specifically held that "none of the motions . . . warrant[ed] pre-trial consideration." MIL Order at 5 n.2. In other words, the Court determined that admissibility decisions regarding evidence that may fall within one of the listed motions were better left for determination in the course of trial, "so that questions of foundation, relevancy, and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context." In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, Nos. 817, 89 C 8082, 1991 WL 279284, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 26, 1991).

This remains true. As the Court has already held, it would be premature to either grant or deny motions such as PG&E's present and sweeping "motion to exclude all scienter evidence not tied to alleged knowing and willful conduct related to the charged regulations." Rather, the Court will address the admissibility of any evidence that would fall within this motion on a case-by-case basis, as it did with Exhibit 276.

II. The Court is still persuaded by the reasoning in T.I.ME.

PG&E also argues that admitting Exhibit 276, and presumably any other evidence covered by its broadly worded motion, would endorse the Government's "impermissible theory of corporate collective intent." Mot. at 2. But as the Government correctly points out, "the primary purpose of [this argument] is to seek reconsideration of the Court's holding concerning the collective knowledge doctrine in its December 23, 2015 Order," Opp'n at 3, in which Order the Court adopted the reasoning on collective corporate knowledge and intent offered by United States v. T.I.M.E. — D.C., Inc., 381 F.Supp. 730 (W.D. Va. 1974). Dkt. No. 219 ("Order re: Legal Instrs.") at 4-9.

Indeed, PG&E acknowledges in the present motion that it "continues to respectfully disagree with the Court's adoption of [T.I.M.E.]." Mot. at 3 n.2. Respectful or otherwise, PG&E's second-guessing of the Court's prior Order on collective corporate knowledge and intent is inappropriate. The Court continues to find the analysis in T.I.M.E. to be persuasive. Accordingly, the Court refers the reader — and in particular, PG&E — to its prior Order for a full analysis of the case law and conclusion about the applicability of T.I.M.E. to this prosecution. See Order re: Legal Instrs. at 4-9.2

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, PG&E's motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.