JEFFREY S. WHITE, District Judge.
Petitioner Linda Woo, a state prisoner, has filed a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2254 challenging the constitutional validity of her state conviction due to the jury instructions given at the sanity phase of her trial. On October 25, 2013, the Court ordered Respondent to show cause as to why the petition should not be granted. On March 18, 2014, Respondent filed an answer requesting that the Court deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus on the merits. On June 19, 2014, Woo filed a traverse in opposition to Respondent's answer. For the reasons set out below, the petition is DENIED.
At the beginning of the sanity phase trial, the trial court preinstructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3450, which permits a finding of insanity where the defendant is unable to "know or understand" the difference between moral right and wrong. At the close of evidence, the trial court instead instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 4.00, which is the earlier version of the standard instructions that establish a finding of insanity where the defendant is unable to "distinguish" moral right from wrong. Woo argues that these two standards are substantively different because the "distinguish" language of CALJIC No. 4.00 equates to the "knowing" element but lacks the deeper appreciation that the term "understand" of CALCRIM 3450 requires. However, the California Supreme Court has found that CALJIC No. 4.00 "correctly and adequately explains the applicable law." See People v. Jablonski, 37 Cal.4th 774, 831 (2006); People v. Kelly, 1 Cal.4th 495, 535 (1992); People v. Coddington, 23 Cal.4th 529, 608 (1990). Woo seeks to distinguish these cases by establishing that none of the holdings address the specific issue raised regarding the semantic differences between CALJIC No. 4.00 and CALCRIM 3450.
The California Court of Appeal rejected Woo's premise that California's insanity law requires this deeper level of appreciation and furthermore found no significant difference between an inability to "distinguish" right from wrong and an inability to "know and understand" right from wrong. A state court's interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus. Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). To the extent Woo challenges the propriety of CALJIC No. 4.00 under state law, Woo's claim does not warrant habeas relief because this Court is bound by state's interpretation of its own law. Id. Because the state court is the final arbiter of what is required under California law and has concluded here that the jury instructions given correctly conveyed the requirements of the insanity defense, this Court is bound by the state court's interpretation of the adequacy of state law.
Woo was charged with the following: murder of her three-year-old daughter; attempted murder of her four-and-a-half year old son; a special allegation that she committed the offense willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation; and assault on a child less than eight years of age by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury. Following a jury trial, Woo was convicted of murder and attempted murder with the special allegation found to be true. Jurors could not agree on the verdict for the third count and, as a result, the trial court declared a mistrial.
After the sanity phase and following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict finding Woo sane as to both counts of conviction and the related special allegation. On November 24, 2009, the trial court sentenced Woo to state prison to serve concurrent sentences of twenty-five years to life and life in prison, both with the possibility of parole.
On March 23, 2012, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of conviction. (Pet. Ex. A.) On June 13, 2012, the California Supreme Court denied the petition for review. (Pet. Ex. B.) This federal petition was filed on September 10, 2013.
Woo was convicted by a jury of murder and attempted murder with a special allegation that she committed the offense willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation, and assault on a child less than eight years of age by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury. The jury found that Woo was legally sane at the time of commission the crimes.
The facts underlying the charged offense as found by the Court of Appeal of the State of California are set forth as follows:
People v. Woo, No. A127153, 2012 WL 1015254, at *1-8 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2012).
Woo contends it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury at the sanity phase with CALJIC No. 4.00 instead of CALCRIM No. 3450. The findings of the Court of Appeal are summarized below as follows:
Id. at *8-9.
Woo claims violations of the Constitution of the United States and has exhausted all remedies available to her in state court. Accordingly, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over her habeas action for relief under 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d), and this Court finds this petition timely. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999). In addition, this action is in the proper venue because the challenged conviction occurred in San Francisco County, which is located within this jurisdictional district. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); Habeas L.R. 2254-3(a)(1).
The Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that she is in custody in violation of the Constitution of laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The petition in this case was filed after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"); therefore, the provisions of the Act apply. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499-1500 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding "justice and judicial economy are better served by applying the Act to cases filed after the enactment date"). Under AEDPA, a district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law, or if the state court decides a case differently from the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). A state court decision is an "unreasonable application of" Supreme Court authority under the second clause of section 2254(d), if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. Id. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ "simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 411. Rather, the application must be "objectively unreasonable" to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. The writ may be granted under the "unreasonable application of" clause only when the court's "independent review of the legal question does not merely allow [the court] ultimately to conclude that the petitioner has the better of two reasonable arguments, but rather leaves the [the court] with a `firm conviction' that one answer, the one rejected by the [state] court, was correct, and the other, the application of the federal law that the court adopted, was erroneous — in other words that clear error occurred." Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1152-54 (9th Cir. 2000).
When deciding whether the state court's decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest state court to address the merits of a petitioner's claim in a reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). If the state court only considered state law, the federal court must determine whether state law, as explained by the state court is "contrary to" clearly established governing federal law. Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2001).
As to issues of fact, under 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d)(2), a federal habeas court may grant the writ if it concludes that the state court's adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). "Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). To grant relief, an unreasonable determination of the facts by the state court is found by the federal court if it is left with a "firm conviction" that the determination was wrong and the one petitioner urges was correct. Torres, 223 F.3d at 1108. Thus, a petitioner must present clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1).
All of Woo's arguments relate to her subjective awareness that her acts were morally wrong. Woo argues the jury instructions given at the sanity phase of her trial were inadequate to instruct properly on the insanity defense because CALJIC No. 4.00, as opposed to CALCRIM 3450, does not address the "deeper appreciation" element associated with moral wrongfulness. Additionally, Woo argues that the trial court erred by refusing to give the jury her proffered special instructions to supplement CALJIC No. 4.00.
At the beginning of the sanity phase of trial, the trial court preinstructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3450 which stated, in relevant part: "The defendant was legally insane if: 1. When she committed the crimes she had a mental disease or defect; and 2. Because of that disease or defect she did not know or understand the nature and quality of her act or did not know or understand that her act was morally or legally wrong." Woo, No. A127153, at *8 (emphasis added).
At the close of evidence, Respondent requested that CALCRIM No. 3450 be supplemented with a special instruction. Id. Respondent also contended that CALJIC No. 4.00 might be more accurate and complete than CALCRIM 3450. Id. Woo argued that CALCRIM No. 3450 was sufficient as is, but if the court were inclined to give the Respondent's special instruction then it should also give five other special instructions. Id.
The trial court ultimately decided against giving CALCRIM No. 3450 and gave CALJIC No. 4.00 along with an optional instruction that appears in the standard instruction in brackets and special instruction the court had drafted. Id. at *9. The jury instructions given omitted the "knowing and understanding" language that CALCRIM No. 3450 included.
The jury instructions given were as follows:
Id.
Woo's contends that CALJIC No. 4.00 does not require the same level of analysis or appreciation that CALCRIM No. 3450 demands with regard to morality. (Pet. Mem. at 37.) CALCRIM No. 3450 requires that Woo "did not know or understand the nature and quality of her act or did not know or understand that her act was morally or legally wrong." Woo, No. A127153, at *8 (emphasis added). By comparison, CALJIC No. 4.00 requires that the defendant show an inability to "distinguish what is morally right from what is morally wrong." Id. at *9 (emphasis added). The basis of the argument is whether "distinguishing" moral right from wrong demands the same level of analysis as "knowing and understanding" moral wrongfulness.
Woo alleges that CALJIC No. 4.00 is also inadequate because it refers to a broad, general incapacity to distinguish between moral right and wrong, rather than a specific incapacity to distinguish between moral right and wrong in relation to the crime. (Pet. Mem. at 32-33.) CALJIC No. 4.00 requires that the inability to distinguish right from wrong must exist "at the time of commission of the crime." Woo, No. A127153, at *10. In comparison, CALCRIM No. 3450 provides that the defendant was legally insane if "when she committed the crimes, she had a mental disease or defect . . . ." Id.
Woo further alleges that the trial court's decision to reject her proposed special instructions is erroneous. (Pet. Mem. at 41.) Woo proposed, "If the defendant appreciates that her act is criminal and legally wrong, but does not think it is morally wrong, she may still be criminally insane." (Id.) Woo alleges that the trial court's failure to read her special instruction in conjunction with the error of using CALJIC No. 4.00 instruction compounds to create a substantive error that should be cognizable for this Court to grant the writ for habeas corpus. (Id. at 43.)
The California Court of Appeal rejected Woo's argument that CALCRIM No. 3450 should have been read instead of CALCRIM No. 4.00 on the basis that CALCRIM No. 3450 requires a deeper level of appreciation of moral wrongfulness. Woo, No. A127153, at *9-10. Woo contends that the language of CALCRIM No. 3450 requiring "knowing and understanding" establishes a deeper level of appreciation that is necessary in order to assess one's understanding of wrongfulness. Id. at *10. Woo contends that the language of CALJIC No. 4.00 requiring the defendant to "distinguish" merely requires a capacity to know but lacks the "understanding" component that CALCRIM No. 3450 requires. Id. Thus, according to Woo, CALJIC No. 4.00 is inadequate. Id.
Woo primarily relies on People v. Skinner, in which the California Supreme Court held that the M'Naghten test would be read in the disjunctive, so that a defendant could be found legally insane if he satisfied either prong. 39 Cal.3d 765 (1985). The M'Naghten test sets out that "a person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to confirm his conduct to the requirements of the law." Id. at 768 (quoting People v. Drew, 22 Cal.3d 333, 345 (1978)). "The California version of the M'Naghten test ha[s] been liberalized by holding that `knowing' in the sense of being able to verbalize the concepts of right and wrong was insufficient to establish legal sanity." Woo, No. A127153, at *10 (quoting Skinner, 39 Cal. 3d at 779) (emphasis added).
The appellate court here established that subsequent cases have upheld the adequacy of the language of CALJIC No. 4.00 to track section 25(b) of the California Penal Code. Id. (quoting People v. Kelly, 1 Cal.4th 494, 535 (1992)). The appellate court found that "distinguishing" right from wrong and "knowing and understanding" right from wrong are synonymous formulations of the same issue. Id. The California Supreme Court has held, "[t]he relevant inquiry regarding insanity is whether the defendant was incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, that is, of realizing that his crimes were morally wrong." Id. Thus, the appellate court held that Woo's argument lacked substance. Id. The appellate court concluded that CALJIC No. 4.00 was not inadequate and that the trial court did not err in providing this instruction to the jury instead of CALCRIM No. 3450. Id. The appellate court also found no prejudice because there was "no reasonable prospect that Woo could have persuaded the jury with an argument that while she `knew' that killing her children was morally wrong, she did not `understand' that killing them was morally wrong." Id.
The appellate court also rejected Woo's argument that CALJIC No. 4.00 erroneously refers to a general incapacity to distinguish between right and wrong, rather than a specific incapacity to distinguish between right and wrong with respect to the specific crime in question. Id. at *10. The appellate court noted that this argument was rejected by the California Supreme Court in People v. Jablonski, 37 Cal.4th 774, 831 (2006). In Jablonski, the defendant argued that CALJIC No. 4.00 instruction was flawed because it required a general incapacity to distinguish right from wrong, rather than a specific incapacity to distinguish right from wrong in relation to the crime. Id. The California Supreme Court established that Jablonski's argument was a "strained reading" of CALJIC No. 4.00, and that even if the Court accepted the argument, any ambiguity was made clear by the trial court's supplemental instructions. Id. at 831-32. In addition to CALJIC No. 4.00, the trial court in Jablonski instructed, "You may consider evidence of [defendant's] mental condition before, during, and after the time of the commission of the crime as tending to show the defendant's mental condition at the time the crime was committed." Id. at 831 (emphasis added). The Court in Jablonski did not find that CALJIC No. 4.00 needed supplementation or further special instruction in order to be deemed adequate. Here, the appellate court noted that CALJIC No. 4.00 already states that the inability to distinguish right from wrong must exist "at the time of the commission of the crime." Woo, No. A127153, at *9-10. As such, the appellate court found that CALJIC No. 4.00 properly focuses the jury's attention on the defendant's state of mind at the time of the criminal act and that the holding in Jablonski does not suggest otherwise. Id.
The appellate court also found no error in failing to give the proposed defense special instruction that stated, "If the defendant appreciates that her act is criminal and legally wrong, but does not think it is morally wrong, she may still be criminally insane." Id. at *11. The appellate court noted that the purpose of this instruction is that a defendant who understands that his or her conduct is illegal may be found criminal insane depending upon his or her ability to distinguish moral right from wrong. Id. As such, the appellate court found that "this point was covered in the CALJIC 4.00 instruction, which listed the defendant's inability to distinguish legal right from wrong, and inability to distinguish moral right from wrong, as separate grounds for a finding of insanity." Id.
Lastly, the appellate court held that Woo's broader argument, that the instructions as a whole favored the prosecution, was also unpersuasive. Id. at *12. The appellate court found that the trial court furnished instructions that enabled the parties adequately to argue their positions. Id. at *13. The prosecutor minimized Woo's professed motive but the instructions as a whole were sufficient to allow argument that Woo was legally insane because she truly believed that she was protecting her children by killing them. Id.
A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a claim cognizable in federal habeas proceedings. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must show that the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. See id. at 72; Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973); see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). ("[I]t must be established not merely that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous or even "universally condemned," but that it violated some [constitutional right].'"). The instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. In other words, the court must evaluate jury instructions in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial process. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982) (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)); Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1988).
In reviewing an ambiguous instruction, the inquiry is not how reasonable jurors could or would have understood the instruction as a whole; rather, the court must inquire whether there is a "reasonable likelihood" that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 & n.4; Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990); see also Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding an instruction previously found to allow for conviction of sex offense less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt ambiguous with regard to nonsexual offenses where "reasonable minds can differ in their readings"); Ficklin v. Hatcher, 177 F.3d 1147, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 1999) (harmless error when certain that the jury did not rely on constitutionally infirm instruction). In order to demonstrate a violation of due process, the defendant must show both ambiguity and a "reasonable likelihood" that the jury applied the instruction in a way that violates the Constitution, such as relieving the state of its burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt. See Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 190-91 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). A "meager `possibility'" that the jury misapplied the instruction is not enough. Kansas v. Carr, 136 S.Ct. 633, 643 (2016) (quoting Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380).
A determination that there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution establishes only that an error has occurred. See Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998). If an error is found, the court also must determine that the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict before granting relief in habeas proceedings. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993), see also Calderon, 525 U.S. at 146-47.
A state trial court's refusal to give an instruction does not alone raise a ground cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1988). The error must so infect the trial that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. Due process requires that "criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). Therefore, a criminal defendant is entitled to adequate instructions on the defense theory of the case. See Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that it was error to deny defendant's request for instruction on simple kidnapping where such instruction was supported by the evidence).
The omission of an instruction is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law. See Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 475-76 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Henderson, 431 U.S. at 155). Thus, a habeas petitioner whose claim involves a failure to give a particular instruction bears an "especially heavy burden." Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.2d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Henderson, 431 U.S. at 155). The significance of the omission of such an instruction may be evaluated by comparison with the instructions that were given. Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 971 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Henderson, 431 U.S. at 156); see id. at 972 (due process violation found in capital case where petitioner demonstrated that application of the wrong statute at his sentencing infected the proceeding with the jury's potential confusion regarding its discretion to impose a life or death sentence).
A state court's interpretation of state law, including one on direct appeal of the challenged conviction binds a federal court sitting in review of habeas corpus. Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76. In Bradshaw, the Sixth Circuit disregarded the Ohio Supreme Court's authoritative interpretation of Ohio law with regard to the doctrine of transferred intent as applied to aggravated felony murder under Ohio law. Id. at 75. The United States Supreme court noted that the Ohio Supreme Court's explanation of Ohio law was clear and unambiguous. Id. at 76. As such, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Circuit erred when it disregarded the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of state law and ruled that the doctrine of transferred intent was inapplicable to aggravated felony murder. Id. at 75, 80.
With regard to drafting jury instructions, the Supreme Court noted that there is, "no particular formulation [that] has evolved into a baseline for due process, and the insanity rule, like the conceptualization of criminal offenses is substantially left open to state choice." Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 752 (2006). In Clark, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider, first, "whether due process prohibits Arizona's use of an insanity test stated solely in terms of the capacity to tell whether an act charge as a crime was right or wrong," and, second, "whether Arizona violates due process in restricting consideration of defense evidence of mental illness and incapacity to its bearing on a claim of insanity, thus eliminating its significance directly on the issue of the mental element of the crime charged." Id. at 742. The Court held that there was no violation in either instance. Id. The Court noted that "history shows no deference to M'Naghten that could elevate its formula to the level of fundamental principle so as to limit the traditional recognition of a State's capacity to define crimes and defenses." Id. at 749.
Woo alleges that People v. Skinner advances her argument that CALJIC No. 4.00 is an inadequate and inappropriate jury instruction because CALJIC No. 4.00 only requires that a defendant be incapable of distinguishing between moral right and wrong. In Skinner, the court held that a defendant only needs to satisfy one prong of the M'Naghten test instead of requiring a defendant to satisfy both prongs in order to be found legally insane. 39 Cal. 3d at 779. Formerly, the defendant was erroneously held to the higher standard of satisfying both prongs of the M'Naghten test. Id. at 779-80. As such, a defendant had to show that he or she was incapable of distinguishing legal wrongfulness and moral wrongfulness. Id. The Court held that knowing the "nature and quality" of an act is not the same as knowing moral wrongfulness. Id. at 778. A defendant may know that the nature and quality of the act was legally wrong in the sense that killing is a crime, but defendant believed that the act was not only just, but expected of him. Id. While differentiating between the two prongs, the Court emphasized that a defendant must be able to appreciate the moral wrongfulness — not simply know that it is legally wrong. Id. at 780. The trial court held that the defendant had satisfied the moral wrongfulness prong and therefore the defendant should have been found insane under the M'Naghten test. Id. at 784.
Woo's argument is not persuasive because, unlike in Skinner, the trial court here did not conflate both prongs of the M'Naghten test. Rather, the trial court here distinguished each prong by including the disjunctive "or" between each step of the instruction. Woo, No. A127153, at *8-9. Unlike in Skinner, the trial court here did not find that Woo satisfied either prong of the test, and as a result she was not found legally insane.
Similarly, in People v. Kelley, the California Supreme Court held that CALJIC No. 4.00 correctly and adequately explained the applicable law to the jury. 1 Cal. 4th at 535. In Kelly, defendant argued that the court's reference to a "mental disease or mental defect" prevented the jury from considering both as a combination. Id. Defendant also argued that the CALJIC No. 4.00 instruction conflates both prongs of the M'Naghten test due to punctuation. Id. at 536. Lastly, defendant argued that "knowing or understanding" is grammatically confusing. Id. Ultimately, the Court rejected these arguments and found that CALJIC No. 4.00 adequately conveyed the insanity test to the jury. Id.
Woo contends that the defendant in Kelly did not raise the same precise argument, that the "distinguish" language of CALJIC No. 4.00 does not require the same level of appreciation of moral wrongfulness that the language of "knowing and understanding" of CALCRIM No. 3450 demands. This is true: the Court in Kelly did not specifically address the same argument Woo presented here. Regardless, the appellate court here found that Woo's argument is just a slightly altered but not legally significant version of the same issue and as a result is unpersuasive. Woo, No. A127153, at *10. The Kelly Court held that CALJIC No. 4.00 in its entirety was adequate to provide the applicable law for the insanity defense to a jury. Kelly, 1 Cal. 4th at 535. It the Court's duty to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. Because the appellate court held that CALJIC No. 4.00 adequately conveys the elements of the insanity defense, this Court must accept the California Court of Appeal's interpretation of the elements of the insanity defense as presented in CALJIC No. 4.00. See Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76.
Next, just as she did before the appellate court, Woo here contends that People v. Jablonski advances her argument that CALJIC No. 4.00 fails to adequately direct jurors to consider the defendant's moral understanding at the time of the offense in relation to the charged act itself. (Pet. Mem. at 35.) The California Supreme Court in Jablonski held that even if CALJIC No. 4.00 were ambiguous, the additional instruction provided by the trial court focused the jury's attention on the defendant's capacity to distinguish right from wrong at the commission of the crime. Jablonski, 37 Cal. 4th at 831-32. There, defendant argued that the jury instruction was flawed because it failed to inform the jury that a defendant's incapacity to distinguish right from wrong at the commission of the crime must be in relation to that act, and not a general ability to do so. Id. at 831. The Court held that the trial court supplemented CALJIC No. 4.00 with additional instructions that clearly focused the jury's attention; such as, "If during the commission of the crime the defendant was incapable of understanding that his act was unlawful, then he is not criminally liable." Id. Therefore, the Court rejected the defendant's claim altogether without specifically addressing whether CALJIC No. 4.00 alone would be sufficient. Id.
Woo argues that the trial court here erred by failing to supplement CALJIC No. 4.00. Similarly, she contends the jury instructions were inadequate because they do not establish that defendant's inability to distinguish right from wrong is specific to the charged act as opposed to defendant's general capacity. The appellate court held, and this Court agrees, that Jablonski does not support this reading; rather CALJIC No. 4.00 properly focuses the jury's attention on the defendant's state of mind at the time of the criminal act. Woo, No. A127153, at *10.
While Woo claims that Jablonski's special instructions supplemented the jury instruction CALJIC No. 4.00 thereby correcting every error, the California Supreme Court did not hold that supplementation was required. The Supreme Court has noted that there is, "no particular formulation [that] has evolved into a baseline for due process, and the insanity rule, like the conceptualization of criminal offenses is substantially left open to state choice." Clark, 548 U.S. at 752. In order to demonstrate a due process violation, a defendant must show both ambiguity and a "reasonable likelihood" that the jury applied the instruction in a way that violates the Constitution, such as relieving the state of its burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt. See Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 190-91 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The instruction may not be evaluated in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. Here, CALJIC No. 4.00 required the jury to find that the inability to distinguish right from wrong existed at the time of commission of the crime. Woo, No. A127153, at *10 (emphasis added). Therefore, this Court finds that Woo requested duplicative supplemental instructions. Because CALJIC No. 4.00 already directs the jury to focus on the defendant's mindset at the time of commission of the crime, the jury instructions as given did not deprive defendant of due process of law. As such, this Court finds reasonable the appellate court's interpretation that CALJIC No. 4.00 adequately focused the jury's attention on the defendant's state of mind at the time of the commission of the crime. In addition, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 3450 at the outset of the trial. Id. at *13. Therefore, the CALJIC No. 400 jury instruction was supplemented by the CALCRIM No. 3450 jury instructions. As a result, the jury was further focused on the defendant's mindset at the time of the commission of the crime.
Woo also alleges that the trial court erred by failing to provide her proffered special instruction that stated, "If the defendant appreciates that her act is criminal and legally wrong, but does not think it is morally wrong, she may still be criminally insane." (Pet. Mem. at 41.) Woo argues that this "pinpoint" instruction was "required to be given upon request." (Id. at 31.) A state trial court's refusal to give an instruction does not alone raise a ground cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Dunckhurst, 859 F.2d at 114. The error must so infect the trial that the defendant was deprived of the fair trial guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. Due process requires that "criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." Clark, 450 F.3d at 904 (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). While the defendant is entitled to a defense, due process does not require the trial court to instruct on the defendant's precise theory of the case where other instructions adequately cover the defense theory. Duckett, 67 F.3d at 743-46; see Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 867 (9th Cir. 2002). The appellate court found this instruction to be redundant because the proffered instruction was already adequately covered in the CALJIC No. 4.00 instruction, "which listed the defendant's inability to distinguish legal right from wrong, and inability to distinguish moral right from wrong, as separate grounds for a finding of insanity." Woo, No. A127153, at *12. This Court agrees and finds that the proposed instruction reiterated the fact that a defendant may be found legally insane if he or she was able to distinguish that the act in question was legally wrong but was incapable of distinguishing that the act was morally wrong. Because the proposed instruction was already included in CALJIC No. 4.00, the appellate court's conclusion was reasonable. The trial court's refusal to include Woo's duplicative proffered instruction does not raise a cognizable due process issue.
Lastly, Woo contends that the trial court's errors and the instructions, individually and cumulatively, raise grounds for a constitutional violation cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. (Pet. Mem. at 38.) Whether a constitutional violation has occurred will depend upon the evidence in the case and the overall instructions given to the jury. See Duckett, 67 F.3d at 745. This Court must examine the record to determine which instructions were given and which were refused and whether the given instructions adequately embodied the defendant's theory. See United States v. Tsinnijinnie, 601 F.2d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 1979). In other words, the examination allows a determination of whether the given instructions were so prejudicial as to infect the entire trial and so to deny due process. See id. The jury here was preinstructed with CALCRIM No. 3450 at the outset of the sanity phase. Woo, No. A127153, at *10. The overall jury instructions read included the clarification and proffered instructions that Woo alleges CALCRIM No. 3450 embodies and CALJIC No. 4.00 lacks. Therefore, Woo's concern that CALJIC No. 4.00 fails to embody the deeper appreciation that the "knowing and understanding" language of CALCRIM 3450 requires in order to distinguish between moral wrongfulness is assuaged. After a complete examination of the record, this Court finds that the given jury instructions were not prejudicial so as to deny due process.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 cases now reequires a district court to rule on whether a petitioner is entitled to a certificate of appealability in the same order in which the petition is denied. Woo has failed to make a substantial showing that her claims amounted to a denial of her constitutional rights or demonstrate that a reasonable jurist wouuld find the denial of her claims debatable or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Consequently, a certificate of appealability is not warranted in this case. A sepparate judgment shall issue, and the Clerk of the Court shall close this file.
