WILLIAM Q. HAYES, District Judge.
The matter before the Court is the motion to compel arbitration and stay action (ECF No. 6) filed by Defendant GB Capital Holdings, LLC.
On April 15, 2016, Plaintiff Jeffrey G. Heston initiated this action by filing a Complaint pursuant to the Court's admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to recover possession of Plaintiff's vessel. (ECF No. 1). The Complaint alleges that Defendant unlawfully took Plaintiff's vessel from its mooring, continued to exercise control over the vessel, and prevented Plaintiff from taking possession of the vessel. On June 3, 2016, Defendant filed an answer. (ECF No. 4).
On July 1, 2016, Defendant filed the motion to compel arbitration. (ECF No. 6). The docket shows that no response to the motion to compel arbitration has been filed.
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") "was enacted . . . in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements." AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (citing Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008). Section 2 of the FAA provides, "A written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 2 of the FAA "reflect[s] both a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration and the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract." Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "In line with these principles, courts must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts, and enforce them according to their terms." Id. (internal citation omitted).
"The basic role for courts under the FAA is to determine (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue." Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat'l Ass'n, 718 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). "If the response is affirmative on both counts, then the [FAA] requires the court to enforce the arbitration agreement in accordance with its terms." Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). "[T]he party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving that the claims at issue are unsuitable for arbitration." Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91-92 (2000).
Pursuant to section 4 of the FAA, a party may move for a district court order compelling arbitration:
9 U.S.C. § 4.
Defendant asserts that GB Capital Holdings, LLC provides administrative support for San Diego Mooring Co. ("SDMC"), which operates and maintains vessel moorings at various locations within San Diego Bay. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff entered into a contract for private wharfage with SDMC, pursuant to which mooring services were provided for the benefit of Plaintiff's vessel. Defendant asserts that it is an agent for SDMC with respect to matters involving the enforcement of wharfage contract terms. Defendant asserts that the contract includes a valid arbitration clause that governs any dispute between Plaintiff and Defendant arising out of the contract.
The "Maritime Contract for Private Moorage" (the "Contract") attached to the motion to compel arbitration as Exhibit A appears to be signed by Plaintiff and an authorized representative of San Diego Mooring Company. (ECF No. 6-4 at 29-30). The Contract states in relevant part,
Id. at 20. The arbitration agreement goes on to detail the mechanics of arbitration agreed to by the parties. Id. at 20-21.
The arbitration clause in the contract is written broadly to encompass any claims pertaining to the Contract. Defendant contends that the conduct giving rise to this dispute—Defendant's removal of Plaintiff's vessel from its mooring in the marina—was lawful under the terms of the Contract based on Plaintiff's refusal to comply with a contractual requirement that he submit his vessel for an annual inspection by the United States Coast Guard Auxiliary. Defendants contend that the Contract expressly permitted Defendant to remove the vessel from its mooring to another location. The Court concludes that based on the Contract and the representations made by Defendant, a valid arbitration agreement exists and encompasses the dispute at issue. See Kilgore, 718 F.3d at 1058. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to the motion to compel arbitration and therefore has not met his burden to show that the claims are unsuitable for arbitration.
The Court concludes that there is no legal authority for an order to compel non-binding mediation. See Trujillo v. Gomez, Case No. 14cv2483 BTM (BGS), 2015 WL 1757870, at * 9 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2015) (finding that FAA remedies are not available for non-binding mediation and that the California Code of Civil Procedure lacks a provision for motions to compel mediation).
When granting a motion to compel arbitration, a court may dismiss, rather than stay, the court action when all of the claims will be resolved in the arbitration. See Trujillo, 2015 WL 1757870 at *9 (dismissing action because all of Plaintiff's claims in the case were subject to arbitration); Alvarado v. Pacific Motor Trucking Co., 2014 WL 3888184 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2014) (dismissing action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) because the entire dispute was subject to arbitration). The Court dismisses the action because all of Plaintiff's claims are subject to arbitration.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's motion to compel arbitration (ECF No. 6) is granted in part and denied in part. Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. section 4, the parties are directed to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the arbitration agreement in the Maritime Contract for Private Moorage. This action is dismissed.
The docket reflects that Plaintiff has failed to file an opposition as required by Civil Local Rule 7.1.e.2. Defendant obtained a hearing date of August 8, 2016 for the pending motion to compel. See ECF No. 6. Pursuant to the local rules, Plaintiff was to file any response to the motion to compel no later than July 25, 2016, fourteen days prior to the hearing date. The docket reflects that Plaintiff has failed to file a response. The Court construes Plaintiff's failure to oppose the motion to compel as "a consent to the granting of" the motion. S.D. Cal. Civ. Local Rule 7.1(f)(3)(c).