MARIA-ELENA JAMES, Magistrate Judge.
This Order considers whether the United States Citizen and Immigration Service ("USCIS") properly revoked the visa petition for Plaintiff Wenmin Ma ("Plaintiff") following the death of her mother, the petitioner. Pending before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. Pl.'s Mot., Dkt. No. 20; Def.'s Mot., Dkt. No. 21. Having considered the parties' positions, relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, the Court
Plaintiff is the daughter of Shuzen Li. Certified Administrative Record ("AR") 27, Dkt. No. 17-18
Li naturalized on February 26, 2013, and consequently, the I-130 petition was automatically converted to a petition for the unmarried son or daughter of a U.S. citizen. AR 11.
USCIS issued a notice of decision to Li's estate on August 24, 2015, stating that due to Li's death and pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(i)(C), the I-130 petition was automatically revoked as of the date of its approval. AR 2. The notice included instruction on how to request reinstatement of the I-130 petition's approval under 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(i)(C)(2). Id.
Plaintiff filed this case on December 11, 2015. Compl., Dkt. No. 1. Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, she seeks review of USCIS's decision to revoke Li's I-130 petition due to Li's death. Id. at ¶ 1. Plaintiff alleges the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") only authorizes USCIS to revoke an immigrant visa petition where the evidence warrants denial (id. at ¶ 11), and alleges the revocation in this case was unlawful because Plaintiff continued to be Li's daughter even after her mother's death (id. at ¶ 12-13). In her Motion, Plaintiff contends that as she remains the unmarried daughter of Li, USCIS should not have revoked the petition. See Pl.'s Mot. Plaintiff argues that "[t]he single question before this Court is whether the death of Shuzhen Li would have been a good and sufficient cause to deny her petition upon her daughter's behalf under 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1) at the time it was approved. In other words, does the unmarried daughter of a citizen continue to be the unmarried daughter of a citizen after her citizen mother has died?" Pl.'s Mot. at 7.
Defendant phrases the issue somewhat differently: "whether Li's death was a 2017good and sufficient cause' to revoke an approved petition pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1155[.]" Def.'s Reply at 2-3 (emphasis in original). Defendant argues USCIS's revocation adhered to the INA's regulatory scheme, which provides for the automatic revocation of approved immediate relative petitions upon the death of a petitioner. See Def.'s Mot.
The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") provides for judicial review of final agency decisions. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706.
Under the APA, a reviewing court may set aside a final agency action if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The standard of review under § 706(2)(A) is deferential; a court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); see also Sierra Club v. Clark, 756 F.2d 686, 690 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Traditionally, an agency's interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to a high degree of deference if it is not unreasonable."). Judicial review under the APA is "narrow but searching and careful," and courts need not uphold agency actions where "there has been a clear error of judgment." Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The INA imposes a numerical quota on the number of immigrant visas that may be issued and the number of aliens who may otherwise be admitted into the United States for permanent residence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a). However, "[t]he State Department prioritizes visa applications made by 2017the unmarried sons or daughters of citizens of the United States.'" Federiso v. Holder, 605 F.3d 695, 696 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1)). Specifically, the INA provides that lawful permanent residents of the United States, under certain conditions, may petition USCIS for classification of their alien son or daughter as an "immediate relative." 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a)(2)(B), 1154(a)(1)(B)(i). The lawful permanent resident must file a Form I-130 petition seeking formal recognition by USCIS of the relationship. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(B)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a). The filing date of a petition constitutes the "priority date" and establishes the beneficiary's place in the queue for an immigrant visa. 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(b).
The USCIS must approve the petition and notify the State Department if USCIS determines the facts of the petition are true and the listed beneficiary is an authorized immediate relative of the petitioner. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b). But approval of the petition does not guarantee the alien will receive a visa. See Montoya v. Holder, 744 F.3d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 2014) ("[T]he mere filing and approval of a Form I-130 creates no vested right."); Tongatapu Woodcraft Haw., Ltd. v. Feldman, 736 F.2d 1305, 1308 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[A visa petition] does not guarantee that a visa will be issued, nor does it grant the alien any right to remain in the United States."). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1155, "[t]he Secretary of Homeland Security may, at any time, for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause, revoke the approval of any petition approved by him under section 204. Such revocation shall be effective as of the date of approval of any such petition."
The INA gives the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (the "Secretary") authority to promulgate regulations to administer the Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1), (3). The Secretary has consequently promulgated regulations identifying situations where the revocation of an approved petition is automatic. 8 C.F.R. § 205.1. One such situation is the death of the petitioner, if the death occurs before the beneficiary comes to the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(i)(C). Any such revocation is effective as of the date of the approval of the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a). Specifically, the relevant regulation applied by the USCIS in this case provides in pertinent part:
8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a). Defendant asserts that "[a]utomatic revocations pursuant to section 205.1(a) were established under the notice-and-comment procedures of the APA and have been codified under this regulation since January 1, 1977." Def.'s Mot. at 8-9 (citing Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Status, 41 Fed. Reg. 55849 (Dec. 23, 1976) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 205.1); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)).
In 2009, Congress changed the governing law with respect to an alien who is seeking an immigration benefit through a deceased "qualifying relative." 8 U.S.C. § 1154(l).
8 U.S.C. § 1154(1)(1); see also Williams v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 741 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding § 1154(l) alters 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)'s automatic revocation procedures, albeit in a spousal revocation situation). In amending the Act, Congress noted in its Construction statement for § 1154(1) that "[n]othing in the amendment made by paragraph (1) [above] may be construed to limit or waive any ground of removal, basis for denial of petition or application, or other criteria for adjudicating petitions or applications as otherwise provided under the immigration laws of the United States other than ineligibility based solely on the lack of a qualifying family relationship as specifically provided by such amendment." P.L. 111-83, Title V, § 568(d)(2) (2009).
The parties' arguments are as follows. Defendant argues (1) 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(C) (hereafter "§ 205.1(a)(3)(C)") permitted USCIS to automatically revoke a Plaintiff's I-130 petition based on the death of her mother, the petitioner; (2) this long-standing regulation is the Secretary's permissible interpretation of Congress' mandate under 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (hereafter "§ 1155") that the Secretary "may, at any time, for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause, revoke the approval of any petition approved by him under section 204"; and (3) Congress has recently implicitly reiterated the validity of this interpretation in § 1154(l), as it "demonstrates a clear congressional acknowledgment of the longstanding practice of denying petitions upon the death of petitioners and congressional intent to allow for the continued processing of immigrant visas after the petitioner's death only in cases where the beneficiary is in the United States." Def.'s Mot. at 6-12. Plaintiff, for her part, argues Defendant did not satisfy § 1155's "good and sufficient cause" test to revoke Plaintiff's petition because she remained Petitioner Li's daughter even after Li's death and therefore she remained qualified for a visa. See Pl.'s Mot. She further argues § 205.1(a)(3)(C) is an impermissible interpretation of § 1155's "good and sufficient cause" standard and is not entitled to deference, and § 1154(l) does not show Congress's clear understanding or intent to adopt that regulation. See id. & Pl.'s Reply.
The Court must decide whether the death of Plaintiff's mother, the Petitioner, constitutes "good and sufficient cause" to revoke the petition. To answer this question of statutory interpretation, the Court follow the two-step framework laid out in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs. (Brand X), 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005) ("[A]mbiguities in statutes within an agency's jurisdiction to administer are delegations of authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in reasonable fashion."). "Under the first step, we determine 2017whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.'" Humane Soc'y of U.S. v. Locke, 626 F.3d 1040, 1054 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43). "If the intent of Congress is clear, our inquiry ends and we give effect to Congress' unambiguously expressed intent." Perez-Guzman v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, No. 13-70579, 2016 WL 4536572, at *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2016) (citing Locke, 626 F.3d at 1054). "If, on the other hand, Congress has not spoken to a particular issue or the statute is ambiguous, we may consider the responsible agency's interpretation of the statutory scheme." Id. "[I]f the implementing agency's construction is reasonable, Chevron requires a federal court to accept the agency's construction of the statute, even if the agency's reading differs from what the court believes is the best statutory interpretation." Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980.
Under the first step in the Chevron analysis, the Court "begin[s] with the language of the statute, reading it in context and giving undefined terms their ordinary meanings." Perez-Guzman, 2016 WL 4536572, at *5 (citing CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep't of Revenue, 562 U.S. 277, 283-84 (2011); Synagogue v. United States, 482 F.3d 1058, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2007)). The Court's "goal is to understand the statute 2017as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme' and to 2017fit, if possible, all parts into a harmonious whole.'" Gila River Indian Cmty. v. United States, 729 F.3d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)).
Section 1155 does not define "good and sufficient cause," and the INA is otherwise silent about this standard. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has agreed with the Bureau of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") interpretation of § 1155's "good and sufficient cause" as being satisfied if "the evidence of record at the time the decision was issued . . . warranted . . . [a] denial" of the petition. Love Korean Church v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 749, 754 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Matter of Estime, 19 I. & N. Dec. 450, 452 (BIA 1987)); see Herrera v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 571 F.3d 881, 886 (9th Cir. 2009) (adopting same BIA standard). Courts thus review the agency's revocation as if it were an initial denial of the petition at issue.
But Congress has not otherwise spoken on the precise issue before the Court. As the INA itself does not define the specific grounds for revocation of a visa petition, USCIS is left to interpret Congress's ambiguous "good and sufficient cause" standard. And although § 1154(l) describes instances where USCIS must not revoke such petitions, it does not affirmatively establish when Congress finds revocation acceptable. The Court accordingly proceeds to Chevron's second step, asking whether the agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute is a permissible construction of the statutory scheme. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
At step two of Chevron, courts must "accept the agency's construction of the statute" so long as that reading is reasonable, "even if the agency's reading differs from what the court believes is the best statutory interpretation." Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980; see also Kyung Park v. Holder, 572 F.3d 619, 624 (9th Cir. 2009) (Chevron deference applicable where there is a binding agency precedent on-point in the form of a regulation or published BIA case). Deference "is especially appropriate in the immigration context where officials 2017exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.'" INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)).
Plaintiff argues that deference is inappropriate in this case. She points out the Ninth Circuit (1) found that the son of a deceased U.S. citizen remained her child even after her death, see Federiso v. Holder, 605 F.3d 695 (9th Cir. 2010), and (2) has indicated that the death of a petitioner does not change the relationship between the petitioner and beneficiary merely because of the petitioner's death, see Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2006). See Pl.'s Mot. 1-2. Plaintiff contends this case law shows USCIS's § 205.1(a)(3)(C) regulation is ultra vires and that by enacting § 1154(l), Congress "unequivocally endorsed" the understanding that the daughter of a U.S. citizen continues to be a daughter even after the parent's death. Pl.'s Reply at 2-4. Thus, Plaintiff indicates Defendant's interpretation of § 1155 is impermissible.
The Court finds Plaintiff's arguments unpersuasive. First, Federiso and Freeman both considered whether the government had properly interpreted the statutory definition of "immediate relative"—not whether the death of the petitioner was grounds for revoking a visa petition, as in this case. Neither case even mentions § 1155 or its "good and sufficient cause" standard. Instead, in Federiso, the Ninth Circuit held that under the INA, an alien son of a naturalized U.S. citizen remained eligible for a discretionary waiver of deportability for fraud even though his U.S. citizen mother had died. Federiso, 605 F.3d at 698 (assessing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(i)(H)). And in Freeman—a 2006 case, issued before the amendment to § 1154(l)—the Ninth Circuit held that an alien whose citizen spouse died while her adjustment of status application was pending remained an immediate relative, despite being widowed after less than two years of marriage. Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1043 (assessing 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i)). While these cases persuasively indicate the death of a U.S. citizen should not negatively impact all immigration decisions, they do not hold broadly that the death of a petitioner such as the one in this case should have no impact or consequences on the pending visa petition.
Second, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that § 1154(l) indicates Congress' recognition that children of petitioners remain their children even after death; but the Court does not agree this statute undermines Defendant's decision to revoke the petition in this case. Although Congress' reasoning for amending the INA is unclear, it appears Congress recognized a petitioner's death may be grounds for revocation of visa petitions in certain instances. Indeed, § 1154(l) effectively prohibits revocation based on death of a petitioner when the beneficiary alien resides in the United States at the time;
The only other court that has confronted this issue arrived at the same conclusion. In Desai v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Case No. 14-593 DSF, Dkt. No. 40 (C.D. Cal., filed July 24, 2015), the court found while that "[t]he language of § 1154(l) does not provide explicit statutory authority for denials of petitions on behalf of relatives of citizens who die while the petition is pending[,]. . . . by creating an exception to that rule, it shows a clear Congressional understanding of and intent to adopt the long-standing practice of the immigration agencies." Id. at 2. The court reasoned that "[t]he text of § 1154(l) indicates that Congress intends that certain petitions be denied where the citizen sponsor has died unless the requirements of § 1154(l) are met"; consequently, "[§] 1154(l) would make no sense if Congress did not approve of the general practice of denying petitions where the citizen relative has died — there is no need for an exception to a rule that does not properly exist." Id. In light of the passage of § 1154(l), the court rejected the application of Freeman and Federiso, and ultimately concluded that as the plaintiff never resided in the United States and thus did not qualify for § 1154(l)'s exception to revocation, the Defendant had good and sufficient cause to revoke the visa petition.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds Defendant's interpretation of § 1155's good and sufficient cause standard permissible and entitled to deference under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the Court has no basis to overturn USCIS's revocation of the petition.
Based on the analysis above, the Court hereby
