CYNTHIA BASHANT, District Judge.
Now before the Court is Plaintiff ArchitectureArt, LLC's motion to strike the affirmative defenses in Defendant City of San Diego's Answer to the First Amended Complaint (FAC). The Court finds the motion suitable for resolution on the papers. Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). Having reviewed the pleadings and considered the arguments of counsel in light of the governing case law, the Court
Plaintiff argues the City's Answer is conclusory thereby violating the rule to plead supporting facts. The City concedes that half of its affirmative defenses are unnecessary, but defends the remaining.
Rule 12(f) allows the court to "strike from a pleading an insufficient defense" to avoid spending time and money on "spurious issues." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f); Kohler v. Staples, 291 F.R.D. 464, 467 (S.D. Cal. 2013). Such motions are not favored if they cause unnecessary delay. Id.
The answer must give plaintiff "fair notice" by stating the "nature and grounds for the affirmative defense."
Defendant's second defense is: "The facts alleged in the Complaint, and each purported cause of action alleged therein, fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the City, its agents, or employees, upon which relief can be granted." The Court strikes this paragraph because it is not an affirmative defense to the City's liability; rather, it asserts that there are inadequacies in the complaint. A "Rule 12(b)(6) motion is the proper means of asserting that particular claims are insufficient." Baker v. Jason, No. 11CV2060-BAS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116170, at *9-10 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (citation omitted). The Court has already ruled on Defendant's motion to dismiss. [ECF No. 19]. Accordingly, the Court strikes this paragraph from the Answer
Claims Act, and litigation privilege, as well as the misplaced reservation of rights to seek leave to amend and the demand for a jury trial, should be stricken.
Defendant's remaining thirteen defenses read as follows:
III. "The Plaintiff had knowledge of and voluntarily assumed the risk of all that transpired. Plaintiff's injuries, if any, arose out of such risks."
IV. "Plaintiff has failed to mitigate damages."
V. "Any injury sustained by plaintiff was not caused by carelessness or negligence on the part of the defendant . . ., but was caused solely by and through the carelessness and negligence of plaintiff."
VII. "Plaintiff has failed to exhaust available administrative remedies."
VIII. "Plaintiff's [FAC] is time barred by the applicable statute of limitations."
XI. "Plaintiff has unclean hands."
XII. "Plaintiff lacks standing to sue."
XIII. "Plaintiff presents no case or controversy. There is no injury in fact."
XIV. "Contractor, ArchitectureArt, LLC, not being licensed, lacks capacity to sue."
XVII. "The challenged sections of the City's Municipal Code are facially neutral."
XVIII. "Defendant has at all times treated Plaintiff on equal terms with similarly situated individuals and/or entities that applied for sign permits."
XIX: "Defendant has at all times treated Plaintiff on equal terms with similarly situated individuals and/or entities who have had requests for investigations submitted concerning the legality of their signs."
XX. "Defendant is not liable to Plaintiff on the basis that all actions taken by the City were as a result of the City's valid exercise of police powers as authorized by California Constitution, Article XI, Section 7." [ECF No. 36]
The Court agrees with Plaintiff's observation that these bare bones descriptions do not provide fair notice of the grounds for the listed defenses. Kohler, 291 F.R.D. at 469-73 (striking defenses that failed to mention the legal or factual grounds that make it relevant to the case). The Answer is akin to a table of contents. Qarbon.com Inc. v. eHelp Corp., 315 F.Supp.2d 1046, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2004) ("A reference to a doctrine, like a reference to statutory provisions, is insufficient notice.") (citation omitted); see Kohler, 291 F.R.D. at 467 (simple identification of the defense does not give notice of the supporting facts). Accordingly, the Court
Defendant requests leave to amend the insufficient affirmative defenses. Courts usually grant leave to amend. Kohler, 291 F.R.D. at 467 (citing Wyshak v. City Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979). Because the inadequacies in thirteen of the affirmative defenses might be cured by describing the facts that demonstrate they are relevant to this case, the Court