WILLIAM H. ORRICK, United States District Judge.
The parties cross-move for summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims that Delta violates California Labor Code section 226 by failing to provide Flight Attendants who work for any amount of time on the ground in California individualized wage statements disclosing the total hours worked at specific hourly rates.
The facts regarding how and when Flight Attendants are paid and what information they are given regarding their wages are not in dispute. Instead, the dispute is whether the protections of the California
Delta pays its flight attendants on a bid packet and rotation system where each month Flight Attendants "bid" on Rotations that are scheduled to depart from the Flight Attendant's base the following month.
Delta's bidding and compensation policies are laid out in Delta's Work Rules. Delta uses four formulas to determine a Flight Attendant's actual pay. The "Flight Pay" formula is based on the actual flight time and/or scheduled flight time of the Segments, whichever is greater. Under the "Duty Period Credit," Delta "credits" flight attendants with "1 hour of flight pay for every 2 hours on duty for any given period." The "Minimum Duty Period Credit" (MDC) multiplies 4:45 hours by the Flight Pay Rate for each Duty Period within a Rotation that has at least one flight Segment. And under the "Trip Credit" formula, Flight Attendants receive credit for 1 hour of flight time for each 3.5 hours they are away from base.
Delta runs calculations for each Flight Attendant's Rotation and pays the Flight Attendant using the formula that results in the highest amount of pay. In no event is a Flight Attendant's pay less per hour worked in the Duty Period (all hours worked), than the California minimum wage rate. Each formula uses a "base" which Delta defines as "Flight Pay Rate." But the Flight Pay Rate is not an agreed to "hourly rate of pay;" it is instead part of the mathematical equation Delta runs to determine actual pay.
Delta provides Flight Attendants information about their hours worked and income paid through its Monthly Time Display System (MOTS), which is available to all Flight Attendants. Declaration of Brian Moreau (Dkt. No. 59-2) ¶ 8. MOTS allows Flight Attendants "real-time" access to their compensation for each Rotation and non-flight activity as they progress through their monthly schedules. Id.
Delta provides wage statements to Flight Attendants at the time of each payment of wages. Moreau Decl., ¶ 10. Those wage statements show each "category" of payments made to Flight Attendants as a separate line-items, but do not show the hours worked or hourly rates paid for
Delta pays Flight Attendants on the 15th and last day of each month (i.e., semi-monthly). Moreau Decl., ¶ 9. As Delta does not know Flight Attendants' final schedules for a bid period until they are complete, it provides them with a base allotment of 45 credits at their Flight Pay Rate per bid period, where Attendants receive 22.5 credits in each paycheck. Id. Following the close of the bid period, Delta calculates the total credits for that bid period, determines what premium pay rates should be applied
During the relevant time period, plaintiff Oman was based out of New York/JFK airport. Plaintiff Eichmann was based out of Los Angeles/LAX and a California resident since February 2014, and before that was based out of Detroit (DTW) or Seattle (SEA). Plaintiff Lehr has been based out of San Francisco/SFO, but has been a resident of Las Vegas, Nevada throughout his employment with Delta. Plaintiff Flores is a resident of California based out of Los Angeles/LAX.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that the named plaintiffs spent between 86 percent and 97.1 percent of their "flight-related working hours" outside of California, and that they continuously worked in multiple jurisdictions on a pay period, weekly, and daily basis.
In my prior Order granting Delta's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' minimum wage claims, I concluded that Delta's payment practice did not violate California's minimum wage requirements because Delta's Work Rules compensated Flight Attendants for all of their hours worked, in a fully disclosed manner based upon the floor guaranteed by the Bid Packet process. I recognized that under Delta's system, workers were not provided a guaranteed minimum rate for each hour on Duty, but that the Flight Pay Rate was used as part of the mathematical equation Delta runs to determine actual pay. December 2015 Order at 5.
The parties now cross-move for summary judgment on plaintiffs' remaining claims under California Labor Code sections 226 and 204.
Summary judgment on a claim or defense is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In order to prevail, a party moving for summary judgment must show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to an essential element of the non-moving party's claim, or to a defense on which the non-moving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the movant has made this showing, the burden then shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to identify "specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. The party opposing summary judgment must then present affirmative evidence from which a jury could return a verdict in that party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
On summary judgment, the Court draws all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-movant. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Id. However, conclusory and speculative testimony does not raise genuine issues of fact and is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Thornhill Publ'g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979).
Section 226 requires employers to "semimonthly or at the time of each payment of wages" provide employees "either as a detachable part of the check, draft, or voucher paying the employee's wages, or separately if wages are paid by personal check or cash, an accurate itemized statement in writing showing (1) gross wages earned, (2) total hours worked by the employee..., (4) all deductions ..., (5) net wages earned, (6) the inclusive dates of the period for which the employee is paid, (7) the name of the employee and only the last four digits of his or her social security number or an employee identification number other than a social security number, (8) the name and address of the legal entity that is the employer ..., and (9) all
Section 204 requires that all wages "are due and payable twice during each calendar month, on days designated in advance by the employer as the regular paydays. Labor performed between the 1st and 15th days, inclusive, of any calendar month shall be paid for between the 16th and the 26th day of the month during which the labor was performed, and labor performed between the 16th and the last day, inclusive, of any calendar month, shall be paid for between the 1st and 10th day of the following month." Cal. Lab. Code § 204.
Delta's main argument is that the four named plaintiffs cannot be covered by Sections 226 and 204 of the California Labor Code — which provide procedural protections for wages earned under California law — when the vast majority of their work occurred in federal airspace governed by federal regulations and any work on the ground in California was de minimis and incidental to their work as Flight Attendants in the air. Plaintiffs contend that whenever a Flight Attendant flies into or out of California, their work in that pay period becomes covered by the Labor Code sections (and therefore California-compliant wage statements and payments are required), regardless of where the Flight Attendant resides or is based out of, and regardless of how much time that Flight Attendant works on the ground in California during that pay period.
Delta does not dispute that it does not provide Flight Attendants an itemized wage statement showing all of the information required under Section 226 for each bi-monthly pay period, particularly the exact hours worked by each Flight Attendant and the rate or rates the Flight Attendant was paid for those hours. Delta argues that it cannot provide that information because, as discussed extensively on the prior motion for summary judgment, Delta uses an atypical method of payment which is not based on a set hourly wage rate for each of the tasks it requires of Flight Attendants.
Delta contends, however, that the essential information required by Section 226 is provided through the monthly MAPS and the accessible-anytime MOTS. The MAPS statements are apparently generated on a monthly basis, not bi-monthly as required under Section 226. Moreover, MAPS does not disclose an hourly wage rate for each hour worked, but instead show the formula of how the final payments for each Rotation were determined. MOTS is not a "statement" provided to the Flight Attendants at the time they are paid, but instead a system that they can access. As with the MAPS, it does not disclose an hourly rate for each category of work performed by plaintiffs.
Delta cannot rely on the MAPS and MOTS to argue that Delta satisfies the requirements of Section 226. However, as discussed below, I reject plaintiffs' theory of liability under Section 226. Because the undisputed facts show that the named plaintiffs only worked a de minimis amount of time on the ground in California, the "situs" of their work is not California. For the reasons that follow, California
Plaintiffs argue that under the California Supreme Court's decision in Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 51 Cal.4th 1191, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 185, 254 P.3d 237 (2011) (Sullivan I), when any work is performed within California, the employee should receive a Section 226-compliant wage statement regardless of where the bulk of her or his work in the relevant pay period is performed. However, neither Sullivan I nor the subsequent decision from the Ninth Circuit in Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 662 F.3d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 2011) (Sullivan II) addressed the question presented here. In the Sullivan cases, the non-resident plaintiffs sought overtime pay for full days and weeks worked "entirely in California." Sullivan I, 51 Cal.4th at 1196, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 185, 254 P.3d 237; id. at 1199-00, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 185, 254 P.3d 237 ("plaintiffs here claim overtime only for entire days and weeks worked in California, in accordance with the statutory definition of overtime." (emphasis in original)).
Here, plaintiffs ignore the purpose and scope of Section 226. They argue, regardless even of whether the Flight Attendant's or the employer's residence is in California or whether they worked a full pay period in California, that the trigger for liability is simply performing any work in California during a pay period. Given the nature of the claim under Section 226 and the nature of the plaintiffs' jobs as Flight Attendants, it is wrong to ignore whether California can be considered the situs of the Flight Attendants' work sufficient to invoke Section 226's wage statement requirements.
The analysis Judge Alsup recently undertook in a factually analogous case, Ward v. United Airlines, Inc., No. C 15-02309 WHA, 2016 WL 3906077 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2016), is instructive. There, Judge Alsup determined that Section 226 did not apply to wage statements issued to pilots who were California residents but who worked "principally out of state." Id. at *3-5; see also Aguilar v. Zep Inc., No. 13-CV-00563-WHO, 2014 WL 4245988, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2014) ("`the critical factor is where the work at issue is performed' by the plaintiff.").
Plaintiffs argue that the "situs" analysis in Ward ignored the Sullivan precedent and should not be followed. However, plaintiffs read Sullivan far too broadly. To determine whether a particular California Labor Code provision should apply in a situation where work was performed in California and in other jurisdictions, the appropriate analysis must focus on the particular Labor Code provision
This multi-factor approach is consistent with the recent ruling in Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc., No. 15-CV-02277-JST, 227 F.Supp.3d 1049, 2017 WL 57307 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2017), where Judge Tigar concluded that California wage and hour protections, including Section 226, applied to a class of California flight attendants. Judge Tigar reached that conclusion because: (i) the attendants were California residents; (ii) attendants sometimes worked entire days on consecutive flights between California airports; (iii) the defendant was headquartered in California; (iv) the wrongful conduct (issuance and application of compensation policies) emanated from California; and (v) the defendant had other "deep ties" to California, including that almost 90% of its daily flights departed from a California airport and it received millions of dollars in state subsidies to train all of its flight attendants in California. That plaintiffs only spent around 25% of their total work time in California was a factor, but not a determinative one in light of the others. Bernstein January 5, 2017 Order at 6-14.
The facts in Bernstein are starkly different than the undisputed facts here. Here, the question is whether Section 226 should apply based solely on a Flight Attendant's performance of a de minim is amount of work in California during any pay period, not on the Flight Attendants' residence, an employer's California residence or other "deep ties" to California, or the performance of a significant amount of work in a particular pay period in California. Plaintiffs assert that the amount of time worked in California — either during the class period or during a particular pay period — is irrelevant to the applicability of Section 226, but that ignores important California and federal precedent to the contrary. See, e.g., Tidewater Marine W., Inc. v. Bradshaw, 14 Cal.4th 557, 578, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 927 P.2d 296 (1996) ("[I]f an employee resides in California, receives pay in California, and works exclusively, or principally, in California, then that employee is a `wage earner of California' and presumptively enjoys the protection of IWC regulations."); see also Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407, 420, 96 S.Ct. 2140, 48 L.Ed.2d 736 (1976) (concluding that the "predominant job situs is the controlling factor" in determining whether the National Labor Relations Act "right to work" savings clause applies).
Focusing on the purpose of Section 226 (to give employees clarity as to how their wages are calculated, so they can verify that their wages are calculated appropriately under California law)
Plaintiffs also make a totally unfounded legislative history argument that recent
In sum, there is no basis to apply Section 226's procedural protections to the named plaintiffs.
Like Section 226, Section 204 provides California workers a procedural protection; requiring wages earned in California to be paid to them on a specific timeframe.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED and plaintiffs' motion is DENIED. Because no issues remain in this case, judgment will be entered in Delta's favor in full.