LAUREL BEELER, Magistrate Judge.
The plaintiffs sued the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA") in the District of Arizona; the two remaining claims are defamation and false light based on FINRA's allegedly providing false information to the reporter William Meagher. See Hurry v. Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth. Inc., No. CV-14-02490-PHX-ROS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90147, at *9-11 (D. Ariz. Apr. 4, 2016). Mr. Meagher published articles between 2013 and 2015 about whether the plaintiffs' stock-brokerage firm was involved in a fraud; the articles were based on a confidential source (thought by plaintiffs to be FINRA). Id. They subpoenaed Mr. Meagher for a deposition and for documents relating to his communications with his source. (ECF No. 3-1 at 5.
The plaintiffs concede in their opposition that Mr. Meagher's information about his sources is not a proper subject of a subpoena, and they say that they "will not seek information protected by California's shield law." (Opposition — ECF No. 12 at 3.) But they maintain that FINRA's defense is that the statements in Mr. Meagher's articles are statements of opinion, and they are entitled to ask Mr. Meagher if the statements are opinion. (Id.) They want to ask other questions too:
(Id. at 6-7.) They conclude that Mr. Meagher can object to any questions on the ground that it is protected by the reporter's privilege, but he cannot resist a deposition entirely. (Id. at 7.)
After Mr. Meagher filed the motion to quash, a former employee of the plaintiffs identified himself as Mr. Meagher's source. (ECF No. 13-2 at 3.) As Mr. Meagher points out in his reply, this means that the plaintiffs' claims against FINRA in the District of Arizona case survive only if the plaintiffs identify FINRA as a separate source. (Reply — ECF No. 5.)
The relevance of any deposition of Mr. Meagher is to support the plaintiffs' defamation claims against FINRA. Information is relevant if it establishes that FINRA was the source of the information in Mr. Meagher's articles. But as the plaintiffs concede, that information is protected, and they cannot seek it. Other topics — fact-checking, writing every word, policies about fact-checking and verifying sources, and following policies — do not bear on his claims against FINRA. Or rather, if they do, it is because they necessarily call for Mr. Meagher to reveal information about his use of confidential sources to research and write his articles. That is the only information material to the Arizona case, and it is protected for the reasons that Mr. Meagher advances.
In sum, the subpoena appears targeted only at privileged information. The court rejects the plaintiffs' argument that the proper procedure is to require Mr. Meagher's deposition and require serial objections to questions on the ground of privilege. See Lemberg Law LLC v. Hussin, No. 16-mc-80066-JCS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76222, at *17 (ND. Cal. June 13, 2016). In Lemberg Law, the court rejected a similar argument — the attorney-client privilege can be asserted only with respect to specific documents or deposition questions — and held that such an approach would "virtually nullify Rule 45(d)(3)(A)(iii), which requires the Court to quash a subpoena that `requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter,' and would be inconsistent with cases where courts have quashed deposition subpoenas that appear to be targeted at privileged subject matter." Id. (emphasis in original). Moreover, the discovery must be relevant to the claims and proportional to the needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). To the extent that information is not privileged, it is of limited relevance to the Arizona lawsuit. The court quashes the subpoena, with the following caveat.
Mr. Meagher offers a compromise about general editorial practices; he notes that this information can be disclosed without a deposition. (Reply — ECF No. 13 at 13.) He also offered to explore the possibility of responding to written discovery; the plaintiffs rejected that compromise. (Id.) If the plaintiffs want to propound written discovery that is not geared toward privileged information, they may do so within seven days. Mr. Meagher has seven days to object, and the parties have seven days after that to file a joint letter brief that complies with the court's standard practices for discovery disputes (set forth in the attached standing order).
Parties must comply with the procedures in the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, the local rules, the general orders, this standing order, and the Northern District's general standing order for civil cases titled "Contents of Joint Case Management Statement." These rules and a summary of electronic filing requirements (including the procedures for emailing proposed orders to chambers) are available at
Motions are heard each Thursday: civil motions at 9:30 a.m. and criminal motions at 10:30 a.m. Case-management conferences are every Thursday: criminal cases at 10:30 a.m. and civil cases at 11:00 a.m. Parties must notice motions under the local rules and need not reserve a hearing date in advance if the date is available on the court's calendar (click "Calendars" at
Under Civil Local Rule 5-1(b), parties must lodge a paper "Chambers" copy of any filing unless another format makes more sense (such as for spreadsheets, pictures, or exhibits that might be better lodged electronically). Paper copies must be printed on both sides and three-hole punched, and they must be the electronically filed copies with the PACER/ECF-generated header (with the case number, docket number, date, and ECF page number). Parties do not need to submit copies of certificates of service, certificates of interested entities or persons, consents or declinations to the court's jurisdiction, stipulations that do not require a court order (see Civil Local Rule 6-1), and notices of appearance or substitution of counsel. Please read Civil Local Rule 79-5 carefully regarding the requirements for filing documents under seal and providing copies.
1. In cases that are assigned to Judge Beeler for all purposes, the parties must file their written consent or declination of consent to the assignment of a United States Magistrate Judge for all purposes as soon as possible. If a party files a dispositive motion (such as a motion to dismiss or a motion for remand), the moving party must file the consent or declination simultaneously with the motion, and the party opposing the motion must file the consent or declination simultaneously with the opposition.
2. The first joint case-management conference statement in a case must contain all of the information in the Northern District's standing order titled "Contents of Joint Case Management Statement." Subsequent statements for further case-management conferences must not repeat information contained in an earlier statement and instead should report only progress or changes since the last case-management conference and any new recommendations for case management.
The parties may not file separate statements of undisputed facts. See Civil L. R. 56-2. Joint statements of undisputed facts are not required but are helpful. Any joint statement must include — for each undisputed fact — citations to admissible evidence. A joint statement generally must be filed with the opening brief, and the briefs should cite to that statement. A reasonable process for drafting a joint statement is as follows: 1) two weeks before the filing date, the moving party proposes its undisputed facts, and 2) one week later, the responding party replies and the parties meet and confer about any disagreements. For oppositions, a responding party may propose additional undisputed facts to the moving party within seven days after the motion is filed and ask for a response within two business days.