HOWARD R. LLOYD, Magistrate Judge.
This lawsuit arises out of a one-car accident in which plaintiff David Sley says his new Toyota 4 Runner sustained substantial damage that would have been covered under his automobile insurance policy with defendant USAA Casualty Insurance Company (USAA).
Plaintiff filed his complaint in the Santa Clara County Superior Court, asserting five claims for relief: breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, reformation of contract, and declaratory relief. On the civil cover sheet, he checked the box indicating that this is an "Unlimited" civil matter, meaning that the amount he demands exceeds $25,000. Although the complaint states that Sley seeks general and special damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees, it does not specify the amounts sought.
USAA removed the matter here, asserting diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Sley moves for an order remanding this case to the state court. There is no dispute that the parties are of diverse citizenship. The only issue is whether USAA has met its burden of establishing that the amount in controversy exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold.
All parties have expressly consented that all proceedings in this matter may be heard and finally adjudicated by the undersigned. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. Upon consideration of the moving and responding papers, the court grants plaintiff's motion.
Removal to federal court is proper where the federal court would have original subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The removal statutes are strictly construed against removal and place the burden on the defendant to demonstrate that removal is proper.
Federal district courts have diversity jurisdiction over civil actions in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 (exclusive of interest and costs) and is between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. "The amount in controversy, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, is the total `amount at stake in the underlying litigation.'"
USAA has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
Following removal, Sley offered to stipulate that he will not seek more than $75,000, including punitive damages and attorney's fees. Plaintiff correctly notes that courts within the Ninth Circuit have remanded actions on the condition that a plaintiff stipulates to seeking less than the jurisdictional minimum.
USAA asserts that the complaint's prayer for policy benefits amounts to approximately $50,000 for the value of the damaged vehicle. Sley does not dispute that point.
Ordinarily, attorney's fees are not included in determining the amount in controversy because the successful party does not collect such fees as part of the judgment.
Sley does not dispute that fees incurred up to the time of removal should be included in calculating the amount in controversy. His counsel avers that if he were to charge an hourly fee,
The primary point of contention is whether post-removal fees should be included in calculating the amount in controversy. Plaintiff says no. USAA says yes. And, courts are split on that point.
This court need not decide whether anticipated future attorney's fees may be included in the amount in controversy because it finds that USAA's estimate of such fees is too speculative in any event. Even those courts that consider post-removal attorney's fees have required the removing defendant to make a reasonably specific showing as to why the projected fee award is appropriate. For example, in
In its notice of removal, USAA posited that plaintiff's fees would total about $94,400.00 through trial. (Dkt. 1 at 4-5). Plaintiff argued that defendant's estimates were overblown, pointing out, for example, that it only took 2.4 hours to conduct legal research and prepare the complaint, rather than the 10 hours allotted by defendant. (Dkt. 1, Notice of Removal ¶ 15; Dkt. 10 Frye Decl. ¶ 10). In its opposition to the present motion, defendant scaled its estimate down to about $70,000.00. But, defendant has not provided factual information supporting its calculations. For example, USAA estimates that the parties will spend 36 hours in deposition and 38 hours in a 3-day trial, without explaining how it arrived at those figures. Moreover, defendant's estimate assumes that all time in this matter will be charged at plaintiff's counsel's $350 hourly rate. Plaintiff's attorney, however, avers that as much as possible, work is delegated to junior associates and paralegals whose rates are much lower. (Dkt. 10, Frye Decl. ¶ 10).
In California, a plaintiff may recover punitive damages for insurance bad faith claims, and such damages are included in calculating the jurisdictional amount in controversy.
Here, USAA has submitted three Westlaw reports, summarizing the judgments obtained by the plaintiffs in three insurance bad faith cases involving auto theft claims. Defendant argues that, in each one, the plaintiffs' economic damages were relatively small (e.g., $5,211 in one case; $17,175 in another), yet all plaintiffs ended up with judgments well over $100,000. (Dkt. 12-1, McLay Decl., Exs. A-C). The point, says USAA, is that even relatively small economic damage claims can yield large punitive damages. And, defendant suggests that even at a 1-to-1 ratio based on Sley's breach of contract damages, yields a sum in excess of the minimum jurisdictional requirement.
However, merely stating that a complaint seeks punitive damages, which may ultimately be a large sum of money, does not satisfy USAA's burden.
Here, USAA has not presented the court with any facts that might warrant a large punitive damages award in this case. And, other than to point out that the plaintiffs in the proffered exemplar cases also asserted the bad faith denial of their insurance claims, defendant makes no attempt to identify factual similarities which raise an inference that a jury might award a similar amount of punitive damages here. Indeed, all of the proffered exemplars involved conduct more egregious than that alleged here. For example, in
Based on the foregoing, and in view of the strong presumption against removal jurisdiction, this court concludes that defendant has not established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold. The court therefore lacks diversity jurisdiction to adjudicate this matter, and plaintiff's motion to remand this case to the Santa Clara County Superior Court is granted.
SO ORDERED.