ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. Nos. 23, 29

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS, District Judge.

Plaintiff brings this action against defendants Tani Cantil-Sakauye in her capacity as the Director of the California Judicial Council and Jean Shiomoto in her capacity as the Director of the California Department of Motor Vehicles, alleging the violation of his civil rights in connection with the suspension of his driver's license. (Dkt. No. 17, "FAC.") Plaintiff appears to bring the following claims against defendant Cantil-Sakauye only: (i) violation of due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and (ii) violation of the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment. With regard to defendant Shiomoto only, plaintiff alleges that her suspension of his driver's license for failure to pay his fines is in clear violation of clearly established federal law.

Now before the Court are defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 12(b)(6) for failure to state claim. Specifically with regard to defendants' Rule 12(b)(1) motion, defendants argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction for the following reasons: (i) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (ii) Younger abstention; and (iii) the Eleventh Amendment. Additionally, defendant Cantil-Sakauye claims that she has absolute immunity, and defendant Shiomoto claims the California litigation privilege bars the instant action.

Having carefully considered the pleadings and the papers submitted, and for the reasons set forth more fully below, the Court GRANTS defendants' motion and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE plaintiff's action. Because the Court finds that dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court does not address below defendants' motions pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

I. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

The parties have filed the following requests for judicial notice:

Defendant Cantil-Sakauye seeks judicial notice of the following documents (Dkt. No. 25, "DRJN"): (i) Ex. A, September 10, 2013 and September 13, 2013 traffic citations; (ii) Ex. B, December 16, 2013 Minute Order by Commissioner Philip Stanger; (iii) Ex. C, January 30, 2014 Minute Order by Judge Lloyd Connelly; (iv) Ex. D, February 20, 2014 Minute Order by Judge Peter S. Helfer; (v) Ex. E, February 21, 2014 Notice of Appeal; (vi) Ex. F, July 8, 2015 Minute Order by Judge Jennifer K. Rockwell; (vii) Ex. G, Notice of Decision by Judge Connelly, issued on February 8, 2017; (viii) Ex. H, Notice of Decision by Judge Connelly, issued on March 14, 2017.1 Plaintiff objects to DRJN based on his claim that these underlying court proceedings were conducted in violation of his constitutional rights. Despite plaintiff's objection, the Court finds that such documents are subject to judicial notice as documents representing proceedings in other courts. See United States ex rel Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1), (2) (documents whose accuracy is not subject to reasonable dispute and can be readily verified). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendants' request for judicial notice.

Plaintiff seeks judicial notice of the following documents (Dkt. Nos. 33, 34, "PRJN"):2 (i) Ex. 1, Excerpt of Reporter's Transcript in plaintiff's traffic court case; (ii) Ex. 2, U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division "Dear Colleague Letter," dated March 14, 2016; (iii) Ex. 3, California Judges Bench Guide 83; (iv) Ex. 4, State of California Manual of State Funds; (v) Ex. 5, California Judicial Council 2012-2013 Total Revenues; (vi) Ex. 6, Conference of State Court Administrators 2011-2012 Policy Paper; (vii) Ex. 7, California Rule of Court 4.335; (viii) Ex. 8, Plaintiff's Ex Parte Application for Modification of Sentence Based on Ability to Pay, dated February 7, 2017; (ix) Ex. 9, February 8, 2017 Order on Plaintiff's Ex Parte Application; (x) Ex. 10, February 8, 2017 letter from defense counsel; (xi) Ex. 11, January 10, 2017 Judicial Council of California Memorandum; (xii); Ex. 12, California Senate Bill 185, dated March 20, 2017; (xiii) Ex. 13, Senate Committee on Transportation and Housing Hearing, dated April 4, 2017; (xiv) Ex. 14, July 8, 2015 Minute Order by Commissioner Brody; (xv) Ex. 15, United States Statement of Interest, Stinnie v. Holcomb, No. 16-CV-00044 (W.D. Va.); (xvi) and Ex. 16, Article, Bill Advances Gov. Brown's Plan to Stop Suspending Licenses for Traffic Debt (Jan. 25, 2017).3 The Court finds that Exhibits 1-9 and 11-15 are proper subjects for judicial notice. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS plaintiff's request for judicial notice of those documents only.

II. BACKGROUND

The case at bar relates to two traffic citations received by plaintiff, which subsequently led to the suspension of his driver's license and the imposition of civil penalties. Specifically:

Plaintiff received two traffic citations, one on September 10, 2013 and another on September 13, 2013. (DRJN Ex. A.) Plaintiff pled not guilty to both citations and proceeded to trial, which was held on February 20, 2014. (Id. Exs. B, C, D.) Plaintiff was found guilty and ordered to pay a fine for both citations. (Id. Ex. D.) Plaintiff appealed this judgment to the Appellate Division of the California Superior Court. (Id. Ex. E.) Subsequently, plaintiff also filed a petition for certiorari to the California Supreme Court, and then to the United States Supreme Court, both of which were denied. See Docket, Herships v. Sup. Ct. of Calif., No. 13-9198 (2014). After the denial of his appeals, on July 8, 2015, the Superior Court found plaintiff to be in violation of California Penal Code section 1214.1(a) for failing to pay his traffic fines, and imposed civil sanctions and penalties including the suspension of plaintiff's driver's license. (DRJN Ex. F.)

Plaintiff then filed this action on January 30, 2017, alleging that the Superior Court imposed fines and then ordered the suspension of his driver's license in violation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff alleges that the state's budget allocation scheme for the courts creates a structural conflict of interest that deprived him of his right to a fair and impartial trier of fact. Specifically, plaintiff challenges California Government Codes 68085 and 77003, which provide thus: "There is hereby established the Trial Court Trust Fund, the proceeds of which shall be apportioned for the purposes authorized in this section, including apportionment to the trial courts to fund trial court operations, as defined in Section 77003." Cal. Gov. Code § 68086. Section 77003, in turn, defines trial court operations as, among others, "[s]alaries benefits, and public agency retirement contributions for superior court judges and for subordinate judicial officers." On such bases, plaintiff alleges that trial court judges are motivated to find defendants guilty because such fees are used to fund the trial court itself. (FAC ¶ 22.) Plaintiff further alleges that such fines and penalties were imposed without providing plaintiff with an ability to pay hearing.

In connection with the filing of his original complaint, plaintiff also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order asking that the Court order defendants to reinstate plaintiff's driver's license. The Court initially abstained from ruling on plaintiff's motion, requiring the parties to meet and confer and instructing defendants to assist plaintiff in filing a request for modification of his sentence based on his claim that he is unable to pay the fines. (Dkt. No. 9.) On February 7, 2017, plaintiff filed with the Superior Court an Ex Parte Application for Modification of Sentence Based on Ability to Pay. (PRJN Ex. 8.) The Superior Court provided the following order on February 8, 2017 in response to plaintiff's submission:

(PRJN Ex. 9.)

On February 13, 2017, plaintiff filed an amended motion for a temporary restraining order, arguing, among others, that defendants "refused to make a determination on the application" and that defendants had "no intentions of providing an `ability to pay determination.'" Dkt. No. 10 at 8.) On February 15, 2017, the Court denied plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order. On March 14, 2017, the Superior Court provided the following order:

(DRJN Ex. H.)

Based on the above allegations and background, plaintiff requests that the Court order the DMV to reinstate his driver's license, enjoin defendants from suspending licenses prior to an ability to pay hearing and from imposing penalties and fines not related to addressing public safety, and declare that defendants' policies and practices violate his rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States by depriving him of a fair and impartial decision maker in traffic court proceedings. The Court construes plaintiff's complaint as alleging two broad categories of wrongs: first, that the initial guilty verdict in 2014 and subsequent suspension of his license were constitutionally invalid and second, that the state courts have improperly denied his most recent ability-to-pay application. The Court addresses defendants' motions and plaintiff's FAC accordingly.

III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is a challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. "Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction," and it is "presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The party invoking the jurisdiction of the federal court bears the burden of establishing that the court has the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. Id. A challenge pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) may be facial or factual. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). In a facial attack, the jurisdictional challenge is confined to the allegations pled in the complaint. See Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). The challenger asserts that the allegations in the complaint are insufficient "on their face" to invoke federal jurisdiction. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). To resolve this challenge, the court assumes the allegations in the complaint are true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing dismissal. See Wolfe, 392 F.3d at 362. Additionally, when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the Ninth Circuit has held that "pendent state claims also should be dismissed." Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 1984).

IV. DISCUSSION

As previously discussed, plaintiff appears to be seeking both retroactive relief based on the guilty verdict rendered against him in traffic court and the subsequent suspension of his driver's license and prospective relief related to ongoing proceedings concerning his ex parte application for a modification of his sentence based on his ability to pay. Defendants argue that each of those claims is barred by certain judicial and constitutional doctrines that divest this Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the action. The Court addresses each below.

A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Defendants argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes this Court's jurisdiction as to plaintiff's claims regarding the state court's order finding him guilty of the traffic violations and subsequent order suspending his license and imposing civil penalties for failure to pay his fines.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to exercise appellate review over final state court judgments. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923) ("Under the legislation of Congress, no court of the United States other than this court could entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify the judgment for [constitutional] errors . . . ."); see also D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983) ("As we have noted . . . a United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings. Review of such judgments may be had only in this Court."). "If claims raised in the federal court action are `inextricably intertwined' with the state court's decision such that the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules, then the federal complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003). "[T]he United States District Court, as a court of original jurisdiction, has no authority to review the final determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings." Id. (quoting Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1986). The Supreme Court has further explained that the "Rooker-Feldman [doctrine] . . . is a narrow doctrine, confined to `cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.'" Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).

Plaintiff argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine should not apply here because he is challenging the system of funding established by California Government Code sections 68085 and 77003, which creates judicial bias against traffic court defendants. Plaintiff primarily relies on Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2013). In Bell, the Ninth Circuit held thus:

Id. at 897 (internal citations omitted).

Plaintiff does not persuade. In Bell, the Ninth Circuit drew a distinction between an attack on the city's enforcement of the ordinance, which resulted in an adverse judgment against plaintiff, and an attack on the judgment itself. The latter would be barred by Rooker-Feldman, but with regard to the former, no error exists as to the judgment save for the fact that it is applying the enforcement of an ordinance plaintiffs claimed was unconstitutional. Id. at 897. By contrast, here, plaintiff essentially claims that the judgment against him is deficient because the judge who rendered the opinion had a financial incentive to find him guilty and was therefore not impartial. Such remains a de facto appeal of the state court's judgment against plaintiff. See Sepehry-Fard v. Dep't Stores Nat'l Bank, No. 13-CV-3131-WHO, 2013 WL 5537126, at *4 n.6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2013) (applying Rooker-Feldman even where plaintiff alleged that judicial defendants were biased and had financial conflicts); Greene v. Hayward, No. 06-CV-231-OWW, 2006 WL 1376879, *5 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 2006) ("Plaintiff's claim that the judge's bias against him and in favor of Defendants eventuated in a legally erroneous judgment is a de facto appeal like that rejected by the Supreme Court in the opinion which originated the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.").

Thus, plaintiff's claims related to the state court's judgment against him and subsequent suspension of his driver's license are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendants' motions to dismiss the same.

B. Younger Abstention

With respect to plaintiff's claims regarding his recent application for modification of his sentence and reinstatement of his driver's license, defendants argue that the same should be dismissed pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971) (holding that federal courts cannot enjoin pending state criminal proceedings); see also Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975) (extending Younger to civil enforcement actions "akin to" criminal proceedings); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977) (extending Younger to suits challenging the "core of the administration of a State's judicial system").

In civil cases, "Younger abstention is appropriate only when the state proceedings: (1) are ongoing, (2) are quasi-criminal enforcement actions or involve a state's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts, (3) implicate an important state interest, and (4) allow litigants to raise federal challenges." ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Compensation Insurance Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2014). The Ninth Circuit has also identified a fourth requirement: "The requested relief must seek to enjoin—or have the practical effect of enjoining—ongoing state proceedings." Id. (quoting AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007)). "Each element must be satisfied, and the date for determining whether Younger applies is the date the federal action is filed." Id. (internal citations omitted). Where a district court finds Younger abstention appropriate as to a request for declaratory or injunctive relief, the Court may not retain jurisdiction and must dismiss the action. Columbia Basin Apartment Ass'n v. City of Pasco, 268 F.3d 791, 799 (9th Cir. 2001).

Here, defendants argue that each element is satisfied. The Court agrees: First, state proceedings are ongoing and a final determination has not yet been made on plaintiff's application. Contrary to plaintiff's claim that the Superior Court rejected his application without an ability-to-pay hearing, the Superior Court, rather, explained that plaintiff's application was incomplete and invited plaintiff to refile the application with the required additional medical documentation, else inform the court that he is no longer pursuing such line of argument for modification of his sentence. (See supra.) Second, the pending state action on his ex parte application necessarily implicates important state interests. Any decision on his application would necessarily impact the Superior Court's ability to enforce its prior judgment suspending plaintiff's license and assessing fines and civil penalties, and would have an effect on the state's licensing procedures. Third, no reason exists that would bar the Superior Court from addressing plaintiff's due process claims. And finally, plaintiff's requested relief, the reinstatement of his license and enjoining the collection of his penalty assessments and fines would not only violate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as discussed above, but also effectively enjoin the pending state court proceedings on plaintiff's ex parte application for modification of his sentence.

Thus, the Court finds that Younger abstention applies here as to plaintiff's claims related to his pending ex parte application for modification of his sentence. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendants' motions to dismiss such claims.4

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE plaintiff's action. Given that the Court lacks jurisdiction based on the aforementioned doctrines, the Court finds that any amendments would be futile. Thus, the Court further ORDERS the Clerk to close the file.

This Order terminates Docket Numbers 23 and 29.

IT IS SO ORDERED.