ROBERT M. ILLMAN, Magistrate Judge.
In this motion filed October 13, 2017, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants are in substantial noncompliance with the requirements of Paragraph 27 of the Settlement Agreement with regard to the way in which reviews are conducted of prisoners who have been placed in Restrictive Custody General Population ("RCGP"). (Doc. 847.) Based on that contention, Plaintiffs ask the court to impose a specific, detailed list of requirements on Defendants regarding the review of the status of these prisoners, as well as an additional requirement regarding the yard used by these prisoners. Defendants oppose the motion. (Doc. 945.) The matter was heard before the court on March 16, 2018. (Doc. 980.) After reviewing the arguments made by the parties in their papers and in oral argument, the court will deny Plaintiffs' motion.
Paragraph 27 of the Settlement Agreement provides as follows (emphasis added):
Settlement Agreement (Doc. 424-2) ¶ 27.
Plaintiffs contend that under Paragraph 27, "the ICC's task at the prisoner's 180-day review is to verify whether it is more likely than not that the DRB's initial determination that he faces a substantial threat to his safety in GP continues, or if such a threat ever actually existed."
Plaintiffs present three major arguments. First, Plaintiffs argue that the ICC routinely fails to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that information demonstrates a continued safety threat. In support of that argument Plaintiffs claim that the ICC improperly treats a lack of new information as dispositive evidence of the continuation of a safety threat. They claim that the ICC fails to adequately explain how new information demonstrates a continued safety threat. Plaintiffs further claim that the ICC improperly relies on not guilty findings to verify a safety threat, and that the ICC verification reviews are superficial and brief.
Plaintiffs' second major argument is that the ICC fails to consider evidence demonstrating that prisoners would not face an "inordinate safety threat" in general population. Plaintiffs claim that the ICC does not take into consideration that a prisoner has remained free from harm among prisoners who allegedly pose a threat. They further claim that the ICC does not take prisoners' explanations into account, and misstates evidence of safety threats.
Plaintiffs' third major argument is that the CDCR provides misleading information on how a prisoner may achieve transfer to general population. Plaintiffs claim that misleading information is provided by the DRB. They further claim that the ICC provides misleading information at verification reviews.
Based on the above arguments, Plaintiffs ask the court to find that Defendants are in substantial noncompliance with Paragraph 27 of the Settlement, and order that:
Pl.'s Mtn (Doc. 847)14:20-15:25.
Initially, the court notes that Plaintiffs misstate the terms of the Settlement Agreement when claiming that "the ICC's task at the prisoner's 180-day review is to verify whether it is more likely than not that the DRB's initial determination that he faces a substantial threat to his safety in GP continues, or if such a threat ever actually existed." Pl.'s Mtn. (Doc. 847) 3:2-5. As quoted above, the requirement for the ICC is to "verify whether there continues to be a demonstrated threat to the inmate's personal safety; and if such threat no longer exists the case shall be referred to the Departmental Review Board for review of housing placement as soon as practicable." Settlement Agreement (Doc. 424-2) ¶ 27. There is no language in Paragraph 27 requiring the ICC to determine "if such a threat ever actually existed." Further, there is no reference to the preponderance of the evidence "more likely than not" standard in the language defining the task of the ICC in conducting the 180-day reviews of prisoners' status.
In response to Plaintiffs' claims regarding the manner in which the 180-day reviews are conducted, Defendants provide the Declaration of D. Bradbury, Chief Deputy Warden of Pelican Bay State Prison. (Doc. 945-1.) Chief Deputy Warden Bradbury acknowledges, that "t]he settlement requires the ICC to verify whether there continues to be a demonstrated threat to the inmate's personal safety. Only in cases where `such threat no longer exists' is the ICC authorized to refer the case to the DRB for transfer from the RCGP to the general population." Bradbury Decl. (Doc. 945-1) 2:20-23. Again, Chief Deputy Warden Bradbury states that, "the ICC must evaluate whether the demonstrated threat found by the DRB continues to exist. The ICC's focus is not on reconsidering the basis for the DRB's initial housing decision, but on whether any facts discovered following the DRB's determination show that `such threat no longer exists.'" (Id. at 3:5-8.) Plaintiffs argue that this focus is contrary to the requirement that the ICC verify whether there continues to be a demonstrated threat. Specifically, they argue that verification that safety concerns "no longer exist" means that the original determination will continue to govern unless new evidence arises to show a threat no longer exists. They argue that verifying whether a safety threat "continues," on the other hand, requires that the ICC look critically at the evidence considered by the DRB and, based on any updated information, determine whether a threat still exists.
The court rejects Plaintiffs' argument, and notes that Chief Deputy Warden Bradbury's statement did not misstate the standard set forth in Paragraph 27, but was made to emphasize what the focus of the review is
As set forth above, the scope of the ICC's review is defined by Paragraph 27. This portion of the Settlement Agreement requires the ICC to "verify whether there continues to be a demonstrated threat to the inmate's personal safety; and if such threat no longer exists the case shall be referred to the Departmental Review Board for review of housing placement as soon as practicable." In response to Plaintiffs' claims regarding the ICC's review, treatment and consideration of evidence, Defendants explain their methods as follows:
Def.'s Opp. (Doc. 945) 6:19-7:9.
In response to Plaintiffs' contention that the ICC's reviews are "superficial and brief," Defendants explain that the length of an ICC hearing depends on the amount of information presented to the ICC from one review to the next. Arguing that the length of the ICC hearing does not establish the intensity of Pelican Bay's safety review or a breach of the Settlement Agreement, Defendants provide the following statement from Deputy Warden Bradbury:
Bradbury Decl. (Doc. 945-1) ¶ 7.
In response to Plaintiffs' contention that the ICC gives inappropriate consideration to an inmate's disciplinary record while in the RCGP, particularly if an inmate was charged but ultimately found not guilty of a disciplinary rules violation, Defendants cite the following portion of Deputy Warden Bradbury's Declaration:
Bradbury Decl. (Doc. 945-1) ¶ 8.
In response to Plaintiffs' claim that the ICC does not adequately consider whether an inmate is programming while housed in the RCGP or to an inmate's opinion as to whether he can safely program with the general population, Defendants cite the following portion of Deputy Warden Bradbury's Declaration:
Bradbury Decl. (Doc. 945-1) ¶ 9.
Finally, Defendants cite the following in response to Plaintiffs' claims that certain inmates are confused about how they make transition from the RCGP to alternative housing:
(Bradbury Decl. (Doc. 945-1) ¶ 10.
Under the express terms of Paragraph 27 of the Agreement, the ICC, in doing 180-day reviews, must verify whether there continues to be a demonstrated threat to the inmate's personal safety. After reviewing the parties' arguments and supporting evidence, the court concludes that Plaintiffs have not carried their burden of showing substantial noncompliance of this portion of the Settlement Agreement. (See ¶ 53 of Settlement Agreement.) While particular prisoners may disagree with the ICC's analysis and would prefer that the 180-day reviews be conducted pursuant to a set of criteria of their choosing, this does not amount to a showing of noncompliance with Paragraph 27 the Settlement Agreement.
Further, in entering into the Settlement Agreement, Defendants did not delegate to Plaintiffs the authority to determine exactly how the 180-day RCGP verification reviews would be conducted. Indeed, to have done so would certainly have left open for questioning Defendants' adherence to their Constitutional duty to the prisoners in their care. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of prisoners.). Prison officials have a particular duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. See id. at 833; Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250 (9th Cir. 1982).
For the court to now flatly impose Plaintiffs' extensive list of proposed procedural requirements upon Defendants would exceed the court's authority under the Settlement Agreement. It would also violate clearly established law. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (Prison administrators are entitled to "wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security."); Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) ("We must accord substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a correctional system and for determining the most appropriate means to accomplish them."); Griffin v. Gomez, 741 F.3d 10, 21 (9th Cir. 2014) ("In particular, federal courts should exercise restraint when reviewing management decisions taken by prison administrators to secure the safety of prisoners and state prison personnel.").
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion is hereby DENIED.