STIPULATION TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE AND [PROPOSED] ORDER

RICHARD SEEBORG, District Judge.

On February 12, 2018, this Court (Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler) entered an Order granting the parties' stipulation to modify the conditions of pretrial release of Defendant Giovanni Antonio Villareal ("Villareal") to allow him to attend a six-week Ship Shape Construction Training program taking place all day on weekdays. That program will still be in session on April 17, 2018, the date currently scheduled for a status conference.

The parties have conferred and agreed that the status conference should be continued to 2:30 p.m. on May 8, 2018. The parties report that United States Pretrial Officer, Mr. Brad Wilson, has no opposition to the proposed stipulation.

The parties further stipulate that there is good cause to exclude the time from April 17, 2018 to May 8, 2018, from computation under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv), so that defense counsel can further investigate this matter, review discovery, and confer with the defendants. The parties further stipulate that failing to exclude that time would unreasonably deny the defendants and their counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation of counsel, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv). The parties further agree that the ends of justice would be served by excluding that time from computation under the Speedy Trial Act and that the need for the exclusion outweighs the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

[PROPOSED] ORDER

Based on the foregoing Stipulation to Continue Status Conference, and for good cause shown, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The status conference currently scheduled for April 17, 2018, at 2:30 p.m., is CONTINUED to May 8, 2018, at 2:30 p.m.

2. The period from April 17, 2018 to May 8, 2018 is excluded from the Speedy Trial Act calculations. In light of the circumstances set forth above, the Court finds that the ends of justice served by excluding the period from Speedy Trial Act calculations outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial by allowing for the defense to prepare effectively, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv).

IT IS SO ORDERED.