ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE APPLICATION TO MODIFY THE SCHEDULING ORDER TO EXTEND DISCOVERY DEADLINES [ECF No. 32]

BARBARA L. MAJOR, Magistrate Judge.

On April 6, 2018, Plaintiff filed an Application to Modify the Scheduling Order to Extend Discovery Deadlines. ECF No. 32. Plaintiff seeks to continue the current pretrial deadlines by sixty days. Id. at 2. In support, Plaintiff states that good cause exists to continue the deadlines because "despite its due diligence, Plaintiff was unable to meet the April 6, 2018 discovery deadline set forth in the Court's scheduling order." Id. at 4. Plaintiff notes that it propounded discovery just ten days after the Court issued its scheduling order and immediately followed up with Defendants when it received responses that it felt were inadequate. Id. at 4-5. After several attempts to meet and confer, the parties were still unable to resolve their issues and Plaintiff filed a motion to compel on January 31, 2018, which the Court granted in part on March 9, 2018. Id. at 5. In further support, Plaintiff states that Defendants failed to produce all documents as ordered by the Court and that Plaintiff was unable to complete the deposition of Defendant Brian Reynders because Mr. Reynders "failed to cooperate by having his mother present in the deposition, having his mother discuss responses to the questions, and refusing to respond to questions." Id. "Plaintiff still needs additional time to complete fact discovery to complete depositions, and obtain the remaining documents compelled by the Court's Order." Id. Plaintiff notes that neither party will be prejudiced by the requested continuance and that there have been no previous requests to modify the scheduling order. Id. at 6.

Defendants filed an opposition to the motion on April 10, 2018.1 ECF No. 33. Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not been diligent in conducting discovery as evidenced by the fact that it noticed its deposition of Defendant Brian Reynders for a few days before the close of fact discovery. Id. at 1. Defendants also contend that Mr. Reynders deposition was cut short because Plaintiff's counsel "left the deposition abruptly and did not return" despite the fact that defense counsel had asked Mr. Reynders' mother to leave the room so that the deposition could continue.2 Id. at 2. Defendants further contend that Plaintiff was not diligent because once Mr. Reynders deposition began, Plaintiff's counsel realized that he would need to notice an additional deposition for another person. Id. at 3. Defendants state that Plaintiff improperly discusses pervious discovery disputes in the instant motion that should have no bearing on this issue. Id. at 2. Finally, Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to properly meet and confer regarding the motion as required by Civil Local Rue 26.13 and "never even tried to arrange a joint call as required in this Court's Chambers Rules."4 Id. at 3. Defendants state that Plaintiff's counsel was aware that defense counsel was on vacation and unable to timely respond to Plaintiff's counsel's email regarding the possible filing of the ex parte application. Id. Defendants note that "[a]ny extension of discovery will greatly prejudice the Defendants, both personally and professionally by delaying this case any further, as the pending litigation has made it extremely difficult for Defendants to operate their small business." Id. at 4.

LEGAL STANDARD

Once a Rule 16 scheduling order is issued, dates set forth therein may be modified only "for good cause and with the judge's consent." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). The Rule 16 good cause standard focuses on the "reasonable diligence" of the moving party. Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1174 n.6 (9th Cir. 2007); Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294-95 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating Rule 16(b) scheduling order may be modified for "good cause" based primarily on diligence of moving party). Essentially, "the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party's reasons for seeking modification." Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). However, a court also may consider the "existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing the modification . . . ." Id.

ANALYSIS

The discovery disputes raised in the instant motion are not currently before this Court and, as such, the Court makes no findings as to which party behaved more poorly during Defendant Reynders' deposition or whether or not Defendants have complied with this Court's March 9, 2018 discovery order [see ECF No. 30]. As such, the Court has no reason to find that Plaintiff has not been diligent in litigating this case. Contrary to Defendants' arguments, the fact that Plaintiff deposed Defendant Reynders four days before the close of discovery alone, does not demonstrate a lack of diligence. In granting the motion in part and not ordering a sixty day continuance as requested, the Court is recognizing the prejudice that Defendants contend they will suffer if discovery is extended.

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED IN PART as follows:

IT IS SO ORDERED.