PETER C. LEWIS, Magistrate Judge.
Elliot Scott Grizzle ("Plaintiff"), a state prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") alleging violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during his incarceration as a pretrial detainee at San Diego County Jail. (Doc. 1.) Presently before the Court is Defendant County of San Diego's ("County" or "the County") motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 64.)
The Honorable Janis L. Sammartino has referred the matter to the undersigned Judge for Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(c)(1)(d). After a thorough review of the pleadings, supporting documents, and previous orders of the Court in this case, this Court recommends the motion to dismiss be
At the time of filing his complaint, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the San Diego County Jail ("SDCJ"). (Doc. 1 at 10.) Upon his arrival at SDCJ on August 3, 2016, Plaintiff was immediately and inexplicably placed into administrative segregation.
Plaintiff claims he has suffered multiple harms as a result of his placement in administrative segregation. Plaintiff argues that due to SDCJ's daily schedule in the administrative segregation unit, Plaintiff has suffered from severe sleep deprivation, which has led to a slew of other physical and psychological issues. (Id. at 13.) In administrative segregation, televisions are turned on at 7 a.m. and set to a high volume. (Id. at 12.) Televisions remain on until 9:45 p.m. during the week and 10:45 p.m. on the weekends. (Id. at 11) After the televisions are turned off for the night, however, the lights still remain on a bright setting. (Id.) At 11:00 p.m., a count is done, requiring Plaintiff to get out of bed and to the cell door to show the SDCJ floor deputy doing the count an identifying wristband. (Id. at 12.) Following the 11:00 p.m. count, at 12:00 a.m., razors are passed out to inmates and picked up one hour later. (Id.) Plaintiff notes that the distribution and collection of razors is disruptively loud because the razors are passed through the slots in the cell doors. (Id.) Both the sliding of the slots in the cell door and the razor dropping from the slot to the floor on the other side of the door create cacophonic noises which disrupt the night. (Id.) Finally, after razors are collected at about 1:00 a.m., the lights are turned from a bright to a dim setting. (Id.)
In the dim cell lights, those in administrative segregation are allowed their allotted time in the yard, which is an indoor room with no access to the outdoors or sunlight. (Id.) Those in administrative segregation may exercise or otherwise use the yard from 1:00 a.m. to about 3:30 a.m., forcing Plaintiff and other inmates and pretrial detainees in administrative segregation to choose between going to the yard during this time or taking advantage of the dimmed lights and sleeping. (Id.) At 3:30 a.m., after yard, another count is performed, again requiring inmates to get out of bed and to the cell door to show the deputy an identifying wristband. (Id.) This particular count requires potentially sleeping administrative segregation occupants to wake up. (Id.) During this count, the lights are turned to their bright setting once again. (Id.) Inmates are then served breakfast between 4:00 a.m. and 4:30 a.m. (Id.) After breakfast, the lights are dimmed until 7:00 a.m., at which time the televisions are turned back on and set to the same loud volume. (Id.)
This daily schedule results in inmates and pretrial detainees, including Plaintiff, only being given the opportunity to sleep twice with the lights dimmed for two and a half hours each time. (Id.) However, one of those increments is during the yard time, so the inmate must forego the yard time in order to take advantage of the full five hours of dim lighting per night to sleep.
Plaintiff began experiencing sleep deprivation within one week of his arrival. (Id. at 13.) This led to a multitude of other physical conditions, including headaches, muscle aches, inability to focus and think clearly, eye pain, high blood pressure, a lowered immune system, and severe lethargy and fatigue. (Id.) This sleep deprivation also had psychological effects. Shortly after arriving, Plaintiff began experiencing high levels of stress and anxiety due to the lack of sleep. (Id.)
Almost immediately, Plaintiff began filing inmate grievance forms objecting to his placement in administrative segregation. (Id.) Plaintiff filed four total grievances. (Id. at 13, 16.) The grievance form has a place for a floor deputy's signature.
Plaintiff now brings three causes of action based on the above set of facts. First, Plaintiff claims his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated when Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation without any notice, and then was denied an opportunity to be heard regarding this placement, despite his explicit request for notice and such a hearing. (Id. at 17.) Second, Plaintiff claims his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment has been violated by the schedule followed at SDCJ, causing Plaintiff's sleep deprivation. (Id.) Third and finally, Plaintiff claims his Eighth Amendment protection has also been violated both by the yard time being relegated to a sunless indoor room and the only time use of the room is allowed requiring Plaintiff to choose exercise or sleep in the dimmed lights. (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff requests damages and declarative relief. (Id. at 9.)
Plaintiff originally named 51 defendants in his complaint, including San Diego County, Sheriff William Gore, and various lieutenants, sergeants, corporals, and deputies who work at SDCJ and Plaintiff personally spoke to. (Id. at 3.) Those defendants besides the County of San Diego previously filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 55.) This motion was granted in part in that all the joining defendants were dismissed except for Sheriff William Gore. (Doc. 73 at 16.) Similarly, the Court dismissed a portion of Plaintiff's third cause of action alleging an Eighth Amendment violation based on sleep deprivation and excessive noise. (Id.)
The County now moves to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint on three grounds: (1) the County is not a proper defendant in this case, (2) Plaintiff's due process rights were not violated when Plaintiff was placed into administrative segregation, and (3) Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights were not violated as a result of SDCJ's yard time policy for inmates housed in administrative segregation. (Doc. 64-1.)
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). The court must accept all allegations of material fact pleaded in the complaint as true. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court must also construe the allegations in favor of the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, rather, it must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal quotations omitted).
"[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the `grounds' of his `entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (alteration in original)). A court need not accept "legal conclusions" as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. "[T]o be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively." Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Despite the deference the court must pay to the plaintiff's allegations, it is not proper for the court to assume that "the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged or that defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983).
As a general rule, a court freely grants leave to amend a complaint which has been dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). However, leave to amend may be denied when "the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency." Schreiber Distrib. Co., 806 F.2d at 1401 (citing Bonanno v. Thomas, 309 F.2d 320, 322 (9th Cir. 1962)). When a court dismisses a pro se litigant's complaint, the court must provide the plaintiff with a statement of the deficiencies in the complaint. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623-624 (9th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiff, in his complaint, alleges the County is liable for Plaintiff's alleged constitutional violations because "the San Diego County Municipality, through it's [sic] Sheriff William Gore, established and ordered" the daily schedule Plaintiff is required to follow. (Doc. 1 at 11.) The County argues Plaintiff cannot hold it liable under such a theory of vicarious liability as Plaintiff does here. (Doc. 64-1 at 4.) Instead, Plaintiff must point to some official policy which has caused his constitutional violation to impose such liability. (Id.)
A municipality or other local government may be liable under Section 1983 if the governmental body "subjects" a person to a deprivation of rights or "causes" a person "to be subjected" to such deprivation. Monell v. N.Y. City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978). While municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable under Section 1983 for their employees' actions, municipalities can be liable for policies, customs, practices, and or procedures that violate constitutionally protected rights. Id. at 691.
As a prerequisite to establishing Section 1983 municipal liability, the plaintiff must satisfy one of three conditions:
Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-1347 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations and internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 932 (1993).
After proving that one of the three circumstances existed, a plaintiff must also show that the circumstance was (1) the cause in fact and (2) the proximate cause of the constitutional deprivation. Arnold v. International Business Machines Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 266-68 (1987) (discussing causation requirement in section 1983 municipal liability cases).
Although Plaintiff need only show one condition is satisfied, Plaintiff contends all three of the conditions are in fact evidenced in this case. Plaintiff first argues while he may not have "articulated a specific policy that was violated," Plaintiff did indicate there was an official policy. (Doc. 70 at 3.) Further, even if the Court finds no such official written policy exists, "a standard operating procedure of a local government entity is sufficient for liability." (Id.) Second, Plaintiff argues because Sheriff Gore is an official with final policymaking authority, and Sheriff Gore "absolutely appeared to be . . . implement[ing] . . . an official government policy," the second condition is also satisfied. (Id. at 3-4.) Finally, Plaintiff states Sheriff Gore "did ratify the actions of jail deputies by delegating the duty of investigating and correcting any violations to [the] administrative sergeant at the jail." (Id. at 4.)
Absent a formal governmental policy, Plaintiff must show a "longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity." Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1346-47. Under Ninth Circuit law, a custom or practice can be "inferred from widespread practices or `evidence of repeated constitutional violations for which the errant municipal officers were not discharged or reprimanded.'" Hunter v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Nadell v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 268 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2001)). Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy. Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 1984). See also Meehan v. Los Angeles County, 856 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1988) (two incidents not sufficient to establish custom); Davis v. Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230 (9th Cir. 1989) (manner of one arrest insufficient to establish policy).
In arguing there was an official policy, or a longstanding practice or custom, Plaintiff alleges the County "established and ordered" a "day program" schedule the jail was to follow for inmates in administrative segregation. (Doc. 1 at 11.) The County argues because "Plaintiff does not cite to any official County policy that allows for deputies to violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments," Plaintiff has not satisfied this condition. (Doc. 64-1 at 4.)
In order to hold a municipality liable under this condition, Plaintiff must demonstrate "the constitutional tort was the result of a `longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity.'" Privce v. Sery, 413 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 308 F.3d 968, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2002)). To prevail, a plaintiff must show (1) that the plaintiff "possessed a constitutional right of which [he or she] was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and, (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation." Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court finds Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to state a claim of municipal liability under the policy or custom theory. The only pertinent allegation in the complaint demonstrates the conclusory nature of Plaintiff's allegations: "The San Diego County Municipality, through it's [sic] Sheriff William Gore, established and ordered the following daily program." (Doc. 1 at 11.) Instead of developing an argument showing all the elements are met, Plaintiff makes one general statement referencing the County. This single sentence is clearly insufficient to show municipal liability under this the government policy or longstanding practice or custom theory. See Tillery v. Lollis, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106845, *39 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2015) (where the court found a single sentence, conclusory allegation that defendants "acted pursuant to official policies" of a municipality was insufficient to show municipal liability under the policy or custom theory).
The second circumstance under which a municipality may incur section 1983 liability is when the individual who committed the constitutional tort was an official with "final policy-making authority" making the challenged action itself constitute an act of official government policy. Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1346. In Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986), the Supreme Court held that "municipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered. . . . Authority to make municipal policy may be granted directly by a legislative enactment or may be delegated by an official who possesses such authority. . . ." Id. at 481-83. Whether a particular official has final policy making authority is a question of state law. Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1346.
"[N]ot every decision by municipal officers automatically subjects the municipality to [Section] 1983 liability." Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481. The Pembaur Court stressed that "[m]unicipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered." Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481 (emphasis added). "The fact that a particular official — even a policymaking official — has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not, without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion." Id. at 481-482. Therefore, "municipal liability under [Section] 1983 attaches where — and only where — a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question." Id. at 483; see also Collins v. City of San Diego, 841 F.2d 337, 341-342 (9th Cir. 1988). Because the question of final policymaking authority is rooted in state law, the Court looks to California law to determine whether Sheriff Gore had such authority. See McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 786 (1997).
In California, "the sheriff shall take charge of and be the sole and exclusive authority to keep the county jail and the prisoners in it. . . ." Cal. Gov. Code § 26605. In a legislative note to this California statute, the Legislature found "the sheriff, being the chief law enforcement officer of the county . . . ha[s] the sole and exclusive authority for the keeping of the jails and the prisoners therein." 1993 Cal. S.B. 911 § 1(b). Thus, Sheriff Gore did in fact have final policy making authority. This authority clearly included the keeping of prisoners, which can be construed to mean the housing of said prisoners and the decision regarding which unit to house the prisoners in. See Cal. Pen. Code § 4000, Gov. Code §§ 26605, 26610. Therefore, the decisions made by Sheriff Gore constituted official governmental policy decisions. This condition is thus satisfied.
Gillette's ratification test is satisfied if a plaintiff can "prove that an official with final policy-making authority ratified a subordinate's decision or action and the basis for it." Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1346-1347; see also City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). Plaintiff argues this condition is satisfied because Sheriff Gore delegated the duty of investigating and correcting any violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights to the administrative sergeant. (Doc. 70 at 4.) In doing so, according to Plaintiff, Sheriff Gore also ratified the decisions of the administrative sergeant, a subordinate. 1993 Cal. S.B. 911 ("Custodial officers of a county shall be employees of, and under the authority of, the sheriff, . . . ."). Respondent argues that neither Sheriff Gore, nor any other named defendant, committed any actions which violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights, thus there could be no ratification of such acts.
As ruled in the Court's Order of April 3, 2018, the Court has found there is enough evidence for specific portions of Plaintiff's claims to survive a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 73.) Given this finding, any violation of Plaintiff's rights was ratified by Sheriff Gore once his administrative sergeant was made aware of the facts and failed to take action to cure the violation. As pled and read in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has sufficiently stated his constitutional rights to both procedural and substantive due process were violated. (See Doc. 73 at 4-5, 11, 12.) This condition is also satisfied.
Because Plaintiff has shown two of the three conditions are satisfied, the County can validly be held liable for any violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. The Court now turns to discuss those alleged violations.
Plaintiff contends his placement in administrative segregation was a violation of his procedural due process rights because he was not afforded notice of the reason for his placement in administrative segregation, a hearing, nor an opportunity to respond to the reasons for his placement. (Id. at 17.) The County, in its motion to dismiss, makes the same argument as the previous motion to dismiss filed by the additional defendants. (Compare Doc. 55-1 at 4-5, with Doc. 64-1 at 5-6.) Both motions argue Plaintiff has no liberty interest in being free from administrative segregation; and accordingly, that Plaintiff has failed to show a specific constitutional guarantee safeguarding interests that have been invaded. (Doc. 55-1 at 4; Doc. 64-1 at 6.) Consequently, according to the County, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for which relief can be granted. (Doc. 64-1 at 6.)
The County also adds at the end of its argument to this extent, one additional sentence: "Plaintiff has not identified a County policy that caused an alleged due process violation based on his classification so the motion to dismiss should be granted." (Doc. 64-1 at 6.) As previously discussed herein, because Plaintiff can show there was action taken by, or ratified by, an official with policy making authority, Sheriff Gore, there need not be an official County policy which caused the violation of Plaintiff's rights. Instead, Plaintiff can assert municipal liability against the County through Sheriff Gore's actions. See Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1346-47. This additional sentence included in Defendant County of San Diego's argument is therefore unpersuasive and does not change the Court's determination.
Because the County argued on the exact same grounds as the previous motion to dismiss (Doc. 55-1), the Court will defer to the Court's order regarding the previous motion to dismiss. (Doc. 73 at 5.) Therein, the Court found:
(Id.) Accordingly, Defendant County of San Diego's motion to dismiss this claim is DENIED.
Plaintiff states he was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged violations. (Doc. 1 at 11.) However, both Plaintiff and Defendant County of San Diego analyze Plaintiff's second and third causes of action under the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at 17-18. Doc 64-1 at 6-10.) Under the applicable Rule 12(b)(6) standards, the Court accepts Plaintiff's claim that he was a pretrial detainee, and thus analyzes his claims as arising under the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment which is applicable to the claims, instead of the Eighth Amendment.
In Plaintiff's second and third causes of action, Plaintiff contends his Eighth Amendment right to protection from cruel and unusual punishment was violated. (Doc. 1 at 17-18). The bases of Plaintiff's claims respectively are the conditions causing Plaintiff's sleep deprivation and SDCJ's scheduling yard time in the early morning hours in a sunless room, thus requiring Plaintiff to choose either yard time or sleep. The County argues that Plaintiff's inability to sleep and timing of his recreation are insufficient to implicate the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 64-1 at 7-9.)
Again, in this section of its motion, the County makes an identical argument for dismissing Plaintiff's complaint as was argued in the previous motion. (Compare Doc. 55-1 at 5-9, with Doc. 64-1 at 6-10.) However, Defendant County of San Diego does add an additional section into the argument regarding the constitutionality of Plaintiff's yard time's location. (Doc. 64-1 at 10.) Despite the seeming novelty of this argument, the argument was in fact presented during the objection phase to the Report and Recommendation issued for the previous motion to dismiss. (Doc. 69 at 3.) There, the then moving defendants made the argument that the location of Plaintiff's recreational yard time was constitutional given the urban environment of SDCJ. (Id.) Because the arguments provided by the County in its motion to dismiss have been previously addressed by the Court, Defendant County of San Diego's motion to dismiss this claim will be decided according to the Court's previous ruling:
R&R, and
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Janis L. Sammartino, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(c)(1)(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined above,
Any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or before
