JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Karen Bernstein brought this action in the Contra Costa County Superior Court alleging violations of the Song Beverly Warranty Act with respect to a vehicle manufactured and sold by Defendant BMW of North American. Ten days after she filed her complaint, Defendant removed the action to this court based on diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff's motion to remand is now pending before the Court. (Dkt. No. 11.) After considering the moving papers, the Court concludes that oral argument is unnecessary, see Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), and VACATES the May 17, 2018 hearing.
Plaintiff purchased a new 2013 BMW on October 28, 2012 for a total consideration over the term of an installment contract of $49,788.59. (Dkt. No. 1 at 11, ¶ 6.
Plaintiff thus brought suit in the Contra Costa County Superior Court alleging two claims for relief: (1) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under the Song-Beverly Warranty Act, and (2) breach of the express warrant under the Song-Beverly Warranty Act. (Id.) As relief, Plaintiff seeks: (1) replacement or restitution; (2) incidental and consequential damages; (3) a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed two times Plaintiff's actual damages; (4) attorney's fees and costs; (5) the difference in the value as accepted and the value of the vehicle if it had performed as warranties; (6) prejudgment interest; and (7) other relief as the court deems just and appropriate. (Dkt. No. 1 at 17.)
Defendant removed the action to this court alleging diversity jurisdiction and Plaintiff filed the now pending motion to remand to the Contra Costa County Superior Court. (Dkt. Nos. 1 & 11.) Plaintiff insists that diversity jurisdiction fails because Defendant has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy is greater than $75,000.
A district court must remand a removed action "if at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Courts must "strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction." Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). "Th[is] `strong presumption' against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper." Id.
In federal courts, subject matter jurisdiction may arise from either "federal question jurisdiction" or "diversity of citizenship" when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Defendant here removed on the grounds of diversity jurisdiction. To properly allege diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must claim damages in excess of $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In addition, "diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity between the parties—each defendant must be a citizen of a different state from each plaintiff." Diaz v. Davis (In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig.), 549 F.3d 1223, 1234 (9th Cir. 2008); 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Here, there is no dispute that the diversity of citizenship requirement is met. The only question is whether the amount in controversy threshold is met. "Generally, the amount in controversy is determined from the face of the pleadings." Crum v. Circus Circus Enters., 231 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). "Where it is not facially evident from the complaint that more than $75,000 is in controversy, the removing party must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold." Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089,1090 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004). Where there is doubt, the case should be remanded to state court. Matheson, 319 F.3d at 1090 (footnote omitted).
Here, the jurisdictional amount in controversy is facially evident from the complaint. Paragraph 14 of the Complaint alleges:
(Dkt. No. 1 at 12, ¶ 14 (emphasis added).) Thus, in addition to the $25,000 at issue, Plaintiff seeks (among other things) incidental, consequential, exemplary, and actual damages, plus attorneys' fees and costs. Exemplary damages would include the civil penalties Plaintiff seeks which she values at "two times the amount of Plaintiff's actual damages." (Id. at 17.) Two times Plaintiff's $25,000 valuation is $50,000 which totals $75,000 exclusive of attorney's fees. Thus, that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 is evident from the face of the complaint. "[W]hen a complaint filed in state court alleges on its face an amount in controversy sufficient to meet the federal jurisdictional threshold, such requirement is presumptively satisfied unless it appears to a `legal certainty' that the plaintiff cannot actually recover that amount." Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 402-403 (9th Cir. 1996). Because it does not appear "to a `legal certainty' that the plaintiff cannot actually recover that the amount sought here, the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied.
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's motion for remand is DENIED.
The Initial Case Management Conference is scheduled for June 21, 2018 at 1:30 p.m. in Courtroom F, 450 Golden Gate Ave., San Francisco, California. The parties shall file a Joint Case Management Conference Statement by June 14, 2018.
This Order disposes of Docket No. 11.